The Increasing Representativeness of International Organizations' Secretariats: Evidence from the United Nations System, 1997-2015

Abstract

Although international organizations (IOs) and their secretariats play important roles in international politics, we know surprisingly little about their staffing composition and the factors that shape it. What accounts for the national composition of the secretariats of IOs? We theorize that the national composition of international secretariats is shaped by three factors: the desire by powerful states for institutional control, a commonly shared interest in a secretariat's functional effectiveness, and, increasingly, a need for secretariats to be seen as legitimate by being representative of the global population. Building on recent constructivist literature, we argue that IOs face increasing normative pressure to be representative in their staffing patterns. Using panel regression, we assess our argument with a new dataset covering states’ representation in the secretariats of thirty-five United Nations system bodies from 1997 to 2015. The results indicate that while functional effectiveness plays a significant and stable role, international secretariats have become increasingly representative of the global population. Moreover, this has come primarily at the expense of the over-representation of powerful states. This shift from power to representation is particularly strong in large IOs with high political and societal visibility. When it comes to IO secretariats, representativeness (increasingly) matters.