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The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless?
Abstract This paper is about the challenges that antitrust authorities face when dealing with bilateral monopolies. The curse of antitrust refers to traps threatening the efficient applicability of antitrust policies in these situations. Standard theories diverge about the attainability of equilibrium under ... view more
This paper is about the challenges that antitrust authorities face when dealing with bilateral monopolies. The curse of antitrust refers to traps threatening the efficient applicability of antitrust policies in these situations. Standard theories diverge about the attainability of equilibrium under bilateral monopolies but share skepticism about its efficiency if it ever exists. We suggest a different approach, based on transaction cost theory. First, since bilateral monopolies often develop in the upper segment of value chains, misalignment between parties may generate negative externalities. Second, if parties reach an agreement, the impact of the governance mechanism implemented must be assessed beyond the usual parameters of prices and quantities. Indeed, the risk of negative externalities in the absence of appropriate governance increases dramatically when "critical transactions" are at stake. With vertical integration prohibited, second-best alternatives in which antitrust authorities leave room for innovative hybrid governance may allow internalizing externalities while avoiding high switching costs.... view less
Classification
Economic Policy
Free Keywords
antitrust policy; bilateral monopoly; hybrid governance; switching costs; critical transactions; bargaining power
Document language
English
Publication Year
2018
Page/Pages
p. 175-196
Journal
Russian Journal of Economics, 4 (2018) 2
ISSN
2618-7213
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0