Download full text
(1.842Mb)
Citation Suggestion
Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-94986-1
Exports for your reference manager
Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015
[journal article]
Abstract A dominant argument in the literature is that leaders tend to initiate military disputes in periods plagued by economic distress. This article revisits the diversionary theory and adapts it to the use of economic sanctions in the United States, contending that their use follows a similar diversionar... view more
A dominant argument in the literature is that leaders tend to initiate military disputes in periods plagued by economic distress. This article revisits the diversionary theory and adapts it to the use of economic sanctions in the United States, contending that their use follows a similar diversionary logic. Using a novel dataset on US sanctions from 1989 to 2015, I find that presidents are more likely to use sanctions when unemployment is high and the president's party power in Congress is weak. I show that when doing so presidents opt for sanctions that inflict little harm on the US economy.... view less
Keywords
United States of America; international trade policy; economic sanction; political instrument; domestic policy; political factors; foreign policy; international economics
Classification
International Relations, International Politics, Foreign Affairs, Development Policy
Free Keywords
Sanktionen; Bestimmungsfaktoren; Innerstaatliche Faktoren der Außenpolitik; Ablenkung
Document language
English
Publication Year
2024
Page/Pages
p. 109-131
Journal
Review of International Economics, 32 (2024) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12704
ISSN
1467-9396
Status
Published Version; peer reviewed
Licence
Creative Commons - Attribution 4.0
FundingFunded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) - projects no. GR 5141/1 and GR 5141/1-2