Kleptocracy and foreign loan decision-making process: insights from Malaysia's deals and renegotiations with China

Abstract

One the largest cases of kleptocracy is attributed to the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal involving the former Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak. As a result of the pressure to pay the debt, Najib signed multiple inflated infrastructure loans from China in 2016. This study analyses the manipulation of Public Service Bargains as a critical variable influencing the foreign loan decision-making of the kleptocrat leader. It concludes that Najib's manipulation strategies transformed the established Trustee-type to kleptocratic-type bargains in Malaysia's foreign loan decision-making process. The post-Najib's restoration of Trustee-type bargains under the new Malaysian government, followed by a series of successful renegotiations with China, attest to the significance of the Public Service Bargains system on the foreign loan decision-making process. This analysis also contributes to the wider discussion on the critical side of China's Belt and Road Initiative amidst a global call for good governance.