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@article{ Li2022, title = {Research on Government Regulation of Social Credit System - From the Perspective of Business Ethics}, author = {Li, Zhi-qiang}, journal = {Administrative Consulting}, number = {3}, pages = {126-143}, year = {2022}, issn = {1816-8590}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.22394/1726-1139-2022-3-126-143}, abstract = {Institution system is an important part of modern social governance. Government, market and social relations within the system, as well as the corresponding institutional arrangements, can be said to be the top priority. Corporate social responsibility is an outstanding case that embodies the relationship and institutional arrangement of the three in practice. Government regulation of social credit system is a good example to analysis it. The research on government regulation of social credit system itself is put forward from the perspective of government, so in the field of government regulation of social credit system, should enterprises play a role? Especially in the era of big data, a large number of data are provided by private enterprises. Without these data, it is difficult to complete the construction of big data system. If enterprises should play their role, what's the contribution of the government? Academic and industrial circles have been expressing their own opinions on these issues. Therefore, this paper attempts to build a game model among government, enterprise and society to solve the following problems: how to solve the relationship problem among government, enterprise and society? How to build the corresponding system? What's the corresponding government regulation of China's social credit system go from the perspective of business ethics? Through the game model analysis, the author finds that shareholders can reduce the threat of CEO replacement and collude with the management staff members to make the cake (including the interests of stakeholders) smaller. But on the basis of the loss of stakeholders' rights and interests, shareholders' wealth is increasing, which also explains why more and more senior executives are trying to form collusion with stakeholders in the campaign against antitakeover and loose audit system. Shareholders' rights and interests and stakeholders' rights and interests present a seesaw phenomenon. The response of the stakeholders and shareholders to a better corporate governance model is consistent. That is to say, the increase of shareholders’ income is not necessarily based on the loss of stakeholders. The game model also shows that the protection of formal laws and regulations is the main factor to increase the benefits of stakeholders. Through the case of the social credit system, we will conclude that the formal laws and regulations cannot fully ensure the increase of stakeholders' income, but also need to strengthen the transformation of institutional advantages into governance advantages, and strengthen the law enforcement. It will finally promote the further improvement of social credit system.}, keywords = {China; China; Wirtschaftspolitik; economic policy; Regulierung; regulation; Kontrolle; control; sozialistische Marktwirtschaft; market socialism}}