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%T Cooperative game theory approach to establishing a landscape agreement %A Shimamoto, Kenichi %J Journal of Urban and Regional Analysis %N 2 %P 187-196 %V 9 %D 2017 %K landscape agreement; free rider %@ 2067-4082 %X As the need for a participatory approach towards a sustainable landscape development grows, this paper has applied the cooperative game theory to analyse the mechanism of entering a landscape agreement which requires the participation and initiative of local residents and stakeholders. The results confirmed that a landscape agreement only becomes possible with a certain level of supporters and the optimal situation is when all participants agree. Moreover, the possibility of free riders, which would prevent reaching a universal agreement, was also confirmed. The effect of government subsidies for landscape considerate building and the enforcement of penalties for building without were also examined. As a result, we learned that subsidies and the enforcement of penalties influences the number of supporters required for the landscape agreement and in preventing free riders. %C ROU %G en %9 Zeitschriftenartikel %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info