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@article{ Shimamoto2017, title = {Cooperative game theory approach to establishing a landscape agreement}, author = {Shimamoto, Kenichi}, journal = {Journal of Urban and Regional Analysis}, number = {2}, pages = {187-196}, volume = {9}, year = {2017}, issn = {2067-4082}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.37043/JURA.2017.9.2.6}, abstract = {As the need for a participatory approach towards a sustainable landscape development grows, this paper has applied the cooperative game theory to analyse the mechanism of entering a landscape agreement which requires the participation and initiative of local residents and stakeholders. The results confirmed that a landscape agreement only becomes possible with a certain level of supporters and the optimal situation is when all participants agree. Moreover, the possibility of free riders, which would prevent reaching a universal agreement, was also confirmed. The effect of government subsidies for landscape considerate building and the enforcement of penalties for building without were also examined. As a result, we learned that subsidies and the enforcement of penalties influences the number of supporters required for the landscape agreement and in preventing free riders.}, keywords = {Strafe; penalty; Subvention; subsidy; Landschaftsplanung; landscape planning}}