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dc.contributor.authorFabbrini, Federicode
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-15T15:25:02Z
dc.date.available2023-11-15T15:25:02Z
dc.date.issued2023de
dc.identifier.issn2183-2463de
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/90524
dc.description.abstractThe war in Ukraine represented a major geopolitical shock for the EU. In the face of an illegal Russian aggression, EU institutions and member states rallied to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine also exposed the limited fiscal capacity of the EU. As a result, EU institutions and member states had to come up with creative ways to financially back Ukraine’s military and civilian efforts. This article examines the two key tools deployed by the EU so far to fund Ukraine in its war against Russia, namely the European Peace Facility and the Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument. The article details the legal features of these tools, evaluates their intergovernmental vs. supranational nature, and reflects on their significance for the consolidation of an EU fiscal capacity. As the article argues, the war in Ukraine quickly prompted the EU to replicate some of the novelties it used to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic, namely the use of common borrowing and spending. Nevertheless, structural fiscal and governance weaknesses still limit the ability of the EU to mobilize resources and leverage power on the international stage.de
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcPolitikwissenschaftde
dc.subject.ddcPolitical scienceen
dc.subject.otherEU budget; European Peace Facility; Macro‐Financial Assistance Instrument; debt; war in Ukrainede
dc.titleFunding the War in Ukraine: The European Peace Facility, the Macro‐Financial Assistance Instrument, and the Slow Rise of an EU Fiscal Capacityde
dc.description.reviewbegutachtet (peer reviewed)de
dc.description.reviewpeer revieweden
dc.identifier.urlhttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7174/3314de
dc.source.journalPolitics and Governance
dc.source.volume11de
dc.publisher.countryPRTde
dc.source.issue4de
dc.subject.classozEuropapolitikde
dc.subject.classozEuropean Politicsen
dc.subject.thesozEUde
dc.subject.thesozEUen
dc.subject.thesozUkrainede
dc.subject.thesozUkraineen
dc.subject.thesozKriegde
dc.subject.thesozwaren
dc.subject.thesozVerschuldungde
dc.subject.thesozindebtednessen
dc.subject.thesozöffentlicher Haushaltde
dc.subject.thesozpublic budgeten
dc.subject.thesozFinanzierungde
dc.subject.thesozfundingen
dc.rights.licenceCreative Commons - Namensnennung 4.0de
dc.rights.licenceCreative Commons - Attribution 4.0en
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossende
internal.identifier.thesoz10041441
internal.identifier.thesoz10064141
internal.identifier.thesoz10035033
internal.identifier.thesoz10037307
internal.identifier.thesoz10043707
internal.identifier.thesoz10039414
dc.type.stockarticlede
dc.type.documentZeitschriftenartikelde
dc.type.documentjournal articleen
dc.source.pageinfo52-61de
internal.identifier.classoz10506
internal.identifier.journal787
internal.identifier.document32
internal.identifier.ddc320
dc.source.issuetopicComparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post-Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Powerde
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7174de
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
internal.identifier.licence16
internal.identifier.pubstatus1
internal.identifier.review1
internal.dda.referencehttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/oai/@@oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/7174
ssoar.urn.registrationfalsede


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