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https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250
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Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending... mehr
This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at "getting to yes" for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
EU; Kanada; USA; Haushaltspolitik; Finanzpolitik; Ausgaben; Umverteilung; Föderalismus; politische Ökonomie
Klassifikation
Öffentliche Finanzen und Finanzwissenschaft
Freie Schlagwörter
fiscal federalism; state‐building
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2023
Seitenangabe
S. 92-101
Zeitschriftentitel
Politics and Governance, 11 (2023) 4
Heftthema
Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post-Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power
ISSN
2183-2463
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)