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Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
[journal article]
Abstract This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending... view more
This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at "getting to yes" for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.... view less
Keywords
EU; Canada; United States of America; budgetary policy; fiscal policy; expenditures; redistribution; federalism; political economy
Classification
Public Finance
Free Keywords
fiscal federalism; state‐building
Document language
English
Publication Year
2023
Page/Pages
p. 92-101
Journal
Politics and Governance, 11 (2023) 4
Issue topic
Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post-Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power
ISSN
2183-2463
Status
Published Version; peer reviewed