dc.contributor.author | Kaleji, Vali | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-10-20T09:31:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-10-20T09:31:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | de |
dc.identifier.issn | 1867-9323 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/89914 | |
dc.description.abstract | The Russian war against Ukraine, the extensive Western sanctions against Russia, the blockade of the east-west transit corridors through Russian territory, including the various China-Central Asia-Russia-Europe transit corridors and the Northern Corridor branch of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), that traverse Eurasia have impacted on new dynamics of the three corridors through the South Caucasus: the 'Middle Corridor', the 'International North-South Transport Corridor' (INSTC), and the 'Persian Gulf-Black Sea International Transport and Transit Corridor' (ITC). While neither Iran nor Russia play a role in the 'Middle Corridor' as it bypasses the two countries, Tehran and Moscow (as well as Baku) are very active in the INSTC. Furthermore, Iran aims to play an active role in the ITC in collaboration with Armenia, Georgia, Bulgaria and Greece. In general, Iran seeks to establish a 'transit balance' in the South Caucasus region as part of its 'balanced foreign policy approach' framework; the challenges and constraints it has faced in this process will be examined in this article. | de |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Internationale Beziehungen | de |
dc.subject.ddc | International relations | en |
dc.subject.other | Iran; Caucasus; Ukraine | de |
dc.title | Iran and the Role of Transit Corridors in the South Caucasus in the Context of the War against Ukraine | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet (peer reviewed) | de |
dc.description.review | peer reviewed | en |
dc.source.journal | Caucasus Analytical Digest | |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | de |
dc.source.issue | 132 | de |
dc.subject.classoz | internationale Beziehungen, Entwicklungspolitik | de |
dc.subject.classoz | International Relations, International Politics, Foreign Affairs, Development Policy | en |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-89914-2 | |
dc.rights.licence | Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht kommerz., Keine Bearbeitung 4.0 | de |
dc.rights.licence | Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 | en |
ssoar.contributor.institution | Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen | de |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
dc.type.stock | article | de |
dc.type.document | Zeitschriftenartikel | de |
dc.type.document | journal article | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 14-20 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10505 | |
internal.identifier.journal | 2635 | |
internal.identifier.document | 32 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 327 | |
dc.source.issuetopic | Russia's War against Ukraine: Connectivity and Disruption in the South Caucasus | de |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000613995 | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 20 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 1 | |
dc.subject.classhort | 10500 | de |
internal.pdf.valid | false | |
internal.pdf.wellformed | true | |
internal.pdf.encrypted | false | |