Bibtex export

 

@article{ Pieper2020,
 title = {Strategic Stability beyond New START: Russian Policies and Interests in Nuclear Arms Control},
 author = {Pieper, Moritz},
 journal = {Russian Analytical Digest},
 number = {260},
 pages = {2-5},
 year = {2020},
 issn = {1863-0421},
 doi = {https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000458205},
 urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-87979-5},
 abstract = {Following the end of the INF treaty on August 2, 2019, nuclear arms control is in a state of deep crisis. The erosion of the nuclear arms control regime, however, had already begun before this treaty's termination. In the event that New START, the final remaining U.S.-Russian treaty limiting "strategic" nuclear weapons, also expires in February 2021, (perceived) U.S.-Russian strategic equality will have to be redefined and codified. Aware of the risks and imponderables involved in this process, the Kremlin has called for an extension of New START. Thus, gaining time is deemed a preferable policy to witnessing the demise of yet another arms control treaty, despite Moscow’s concerns about new developments affecting "strategic stability" that would ideally require treaty modifications.},
}