dc.contributor.author | Bochtler, Paul | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-01-10T12:07:49Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-01-10T12:07:49Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/83787 | |
dc.description.abstract | Do autocracies cooperate internationally? This working paper investigates whether regime-type explains co-sponsorship patterns at the United Nations General Assembly. Co-sponsorship is a relatively costly signal of international cooperation at the UN, which is analyzed based on a novel dataset, including newly validated issue categories and co-sponsorship behavior on 14.995 draft resolutions. Theoretically, the paper unifies three strands of literature: the recent literature on autocratic regional organizations, the growing literature on foreign policy of autocratic regimes and the traditional analysis of the United Nations. The results suggest that regime-type plays a strong role in co-sponsorship behavior: democracies co-sponsor with their peers, whereas autocracies, in line with existing findings, cooperate overall less at the UN. They do, however, prefer to co-sponsor with one another over partners of other regime-types. This seems to be particularly true in issue areas where autocratic regimes could attempt to counter democratic norm-setting, such as human rights. There is mixed results concerning the effect of autocratic regional organizations on autocratic co-sponsorship. Preliminary results suggest at least some positive effect on autocracies and highlight the need for further research. | de |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Internationale Beziehungen | de |
dc.subject.ddc | International relations | en |
dc.subject.other | co-sponsorship behavior; authoritarianism; autocratic regional organizations | de |
dc.title | Authoritarian Member States of the UN: Determinants of Autocratic Co-Sponsorship of Draft Resolututions as a Signal of Foreign Policy Coordination at the United Nations | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet | de |
dc.description.review | reviewed | en |
dc.source.volume | 84 | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | de |
dc.publisher.city | Berlin | de |
dc.source.series | Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin, Arbeitsschwerpunkt Politik | |
dc.subject.classoz | internationale Beziehungen, Entwicklungspolitik | de |
dc.subject.classoz | International Relations, International Politics, Foreign Affairs, Development Policy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | UNO-Generalversammlung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | UN General Assembly | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Mitgliedschaft | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | membership | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | autoritäres System | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | authoritarian system | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Außenpolitik | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | foreign policy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | internationale Zusammenarbeit | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | international cooperation | en |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-83787-6 | |
dc.rights.licence | Creative Commons - Namensnennung 4.0 | de |
dc.rights.licence | Creative Commons - Attribution 4.0 | en |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10057875 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10045697 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10046573 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034694 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10037395 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Arbeitspapier | de |
dc.type.document | working paper | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 70 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10505 | |
internal.identifier.document | 3 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Freie Universität Berlin, Osteuropa-Institut Abt. Politik | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 601 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 327 | |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 16 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 2 | |
internal.identifier.series | 874 | |
dc.subject.classhort | 10500 | de |
internal.pdf.valid | false | |
internal.pdf.wellformed | true | |
internal.pdf.encrypted | false | |