Beyond "Indo-Pacific": Understanding Small Pacific Powers on Their Own Terms

Abstract

In September 2021, the European Union (EU) presented its strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Several states and regional organisations have now embraced the "Indo-Pacific" as a concept to respond to geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics linked to China's rise. The "Indo-Pacific" lens fails, however, to properly capture the interests and perspectives of small powers in the Pacific. The Indo-Pacific is not a coherent world region but a strategic space in which China and the United States, as well as other regional and extra-regional actors, compete for power and influence. Small Pacific powers cannot avoid the strategic dynamics of the broader Indo-Pacific but seek to exert agency and autonomy. And they are concerned about a potential militarisation of the region. Rather than simply viewing small Pacific powers through homogenising concepts such as "Indo-Pacific," or in the case of New Zealand (NZ) also "the Anglosphere," they need to be understood on their own terms instead. Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have championed the "Blue Pacific" narrative to capture their collective identity and common interests. Environmental and human-security issues loom much larger for them than military ones do. New Zealand has embraced the "Indo-Pacific" rubric but calls for an inclusive approach. It also continues to seek an "independent foreign policy" reflecting its own interests and values. The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific names seven priority action areas, ranging from connectivity to security and defence. Not all areas are equally important for the EU's cooperation with PICs and NZ. Green transition and ocean governance should be prioritised in both instances, while human security regarding PICs and trade liberalisation in the case of NZ should also top the agenda.