La ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal

Abstract

This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of "deep disagreements". Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The infallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called "argumentative vertigos", generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices (a kind of "grievance" that, in Miranda's words Fricker, constitutes an act of "epistemic injustice"). Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as "epistemicide" (adapted from the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos). In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated against himself. I call this phenomenon "autoepistemicide", and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research.