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dc.contributor.authorLübkemeier, Eckhardde
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-29T07:30:32Z
dc.date.available2021-03-29T07:30:32Z
dc.date.issued2021de
dc.identifier.issn1863-1053de
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/72161
dc.description.abstractOnly a Europe that provides for its own defence can be a fully sovereign Europe. As is the case for the US, Europe would have to be capable of protecting its core security interests without depending on its transatlantic partner. Structural incentives as well as recent developments militate in favour of establishing such intra-NATO status parity. Structurally, unilateral dependence, even among friends, comes at a price. This timeless incentive is reinforced by recent developments: the demise of the old West, with or without Trump; China's twofold challenge; an emerging Sino-American rivalry; a resurgent Russia; the new world disorder; Macron's offer to his European partners. European self-defence has to meet four key requirements: broader and greater European integration, sufficient military capabilities, effective strategy, and political leadership. Defence autonomy requires an independent nuclear deterrent capability. In the case of the EU, neither primary deterrence, reserved for a single state, nor extended deterrence, such as that provided by the United States, would be adequate. Instead, Europe would have to create a novel type of "integrated deter­rence". Underpinned by a solid community of solidarity and trust, this would be based on French nuclear forces, with the French president main­taining exclusive decision-making authority. Germany and France would have to seize the initiative by "taking their bi­lateral relations to a new level", as stated in the Aachen Treaty of January 22, 2019. They would have to lead by example, bring about the progressive integration of their armed forces and an alignment of their strategic cultures. This would demand a great deal of Germany in terms of defence spending and redefining its "culture of military restraint". To initiate such a process of rethinking and repositioning will require an open-minded debate on the role of the military for a Europe that "takes its fate into its own hands" (Chancellor Angela Merkel). (author's abstract)de
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcPolitikwissenschaftde
dc.subject.ddcPolitical scienceen
dc.subject.otherSouveränität; Streitkräfteplanung; Militärische Stärke, materiell; Militärische Stärke, personell; Selbstverteidigungsrecht von Staaten; Risikoabschätzung; Nukleare Abschreckung; Status und Rolle im internationalen System; Bedrohungsvorstellungen (Sicherheitspolitik); Rivalität von Staaten; Implikation; Epidemie/Pandemie; COVID-19de
dc.titleStanding on our own feet? Opportunities and risks of European self-defencede
dc.description.reviewbegutachtetde
dc.description.reviewrevieweden
dc.source.volume1/2021de
dc.publisher.countryDEU
dc.publisher.cityBerlinde
dc.source.seriesSWP Research Paper
dc.subject.classozFriedens- und Konfliktforschung, Sicherheitspolitikde
dc.subject.classozPeace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policyen
dc.subject.classozEuropapolitikde
dc.subject.classozEuropean Politicsen
dc.subject.thesozEUde
dc.subject.thesozEUen
dc.subject.thesozGSVPde
dc.subject.thesozCSDPen
dc.subject.thesozeuropäische Integrationde
dc.subject.thesozEuropean integrationen
dc.subject.thesozVerteidigungde
dc.subject.thesozdefenseen
dc.subject.thesozMilitärpotentialde
dc.subject.thesozmilitary potentialen
dc.subject.thesozEffizienzde
dc.subject.thesozefficiencyen
dc.subject.thesoztransatlantische Beziehungende
dc.subject.thesoztransatlantic relationsen
dc.subject.thesozWeltordnungde
dc.subject.thesozworld orderen
dc.subject.thesozChinade
dc.subject.thesozChinaen
dc.subject.thesozUSAde
dc.subject.thesozUnited States of Americaen
dc.subject.thesozRusslandde
dc.subject.thesozRussiaen
dc.subject.thesozFrankreichde
dc.subject.thesozFranceen
dc.subject.thesozinternationale Beziehungende
dc.subject.thesozinternational relationsen
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-72161-8
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitungde
dc.rights.licenceDeposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modificationsen
ssoar.contributor.institutionSWPde
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossende
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dc.type.stockmonographde
dc.type.documentArbeitspapierde
dc.type.documentworking paperen
dc.source.pageinfo37de
internal.identifier.classoz10507
internal.identifier.classoz10506
internal.identifier.document3
dc.contributor.corporateeditorStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit
internal.identifier.corporateeditor292
internal.identifier.ddc320
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.18449/2021RP01de
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
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dc.subject.classhort10500de
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