The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Prices: The Case of Turkey, 2002-2012

Abstract

This thesis offers an explanation of a particular empirical puzzle, namely why Turkey under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has recently shifted to strict pharmaceutical price controls. It adopts a political economy perspective and draws on original, mostly qualitative research. It is argued that the Turkish government pursued a policy of strict drug price controls, because it had to balance two political objectives, namely reducing public pharmaceutical expenditure during an economic crisis, and maintaining public satisfaction with health policy, in particular of its own, relatively poor electorate. The government was able to act upon this political will because the policy goal of low drug prices was not substantially countervailed. There was little political concern about drug shortage or unavailability, nor any about domestic production or the interests of businesspeople close to the government that could have diluted the goal of low prices. The implementation of price cuts was further aided by an effective regulatory framework and a powerful political executive. By analysis of this specific historical case, this thesis seeks to contribute to the theoretical exploration of the political economy of pharmaceutical prices, a currently underresearched field.