Download full text
(external source)
Citation Suggestion
Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157372
Exports for your reference manager
Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation
[working paper]
Corporate Editor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Contest designers or managers who want to maximize the overall revenue of a contest (relative performance scheme) are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to e... view more
Contest designers or managers who want to maximize the overall revenue of a contest (relative performance scheme) are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able bidder in favor of greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even if the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders are willing to give up a substantial part of their expected rent and prefer a strategy that ensures a lower but secure pay-off.... view less
Keywords
market; competition; experiment; heterogeneity; auction
Classification
National Economy
Free Keywords
C72; C92; D84; all-pay auction; superstars
Document language
English
Publication Year
2017
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
44 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2017-202
Handle
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157372
Status
Published Version
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications