Causalidade natural e espontaneidade em Aristóteles

Abstract

In Aristotle, the process of constitution of natural beings involves a set of causes, delimited according to the theory of matter and form. Matter is cause as a compositional support by which beings are generated; and form is cause as a factor responsible for the essential characteristics of the natural being, as well as for giving rise to a series of coordinated movements, which will result in substantial composition. In this article, I intend, at first, to argue that between the two types of fundamental causalities, that is, on the one hand, (i) that associated with material nature, and (ii) on the other, formal nature, there would be an explanatory primacy relative to the second, because in a fuller explanation involving these two causal aspects, material causality would be subordinated and subsumed by causality in formal-final terms. In a second moment, I’ll try to establish a contrast between natural causes and spontaneous cause, examining cases in which causal relationships do not occur due to a teleological determination, but by a mere conjunction of concomitant factors. Spontaneous generation is an example of events such as this, for in this case the constitution of the organism would not be presided over by a formal-final causality which administered a set of interdependently related causal series.