A liberdade como causalidade da razão pura: entre o formalismo da lei e a sua aplicação à natureza

Abstract

The present paper brings a reading of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (1788), seeking support on two central axes: a) the formulation of the categorical imperative; b) the doctrine of the fact of reason. The choice of this course supports the position that, despite the innumerable formulations given to the imperative of morality throughout the GMS, there would be, in the terms of the second Critique, a clearer and more precise formulation of this principle. Regarding the doctrine of the fact of reason, it will be treated in two ways: on the one hand, from an attempt to reconstruct Kant's original theses, based on the philosopher's textual course; on the other, showing to what extent this doctrine represents a change of position in relation to the impossibilities found in the GMS. The aim will be to show how Kant fails to engage in the task of analytically deducing the concept of freedom from the concept of will, and the appeal to the fact of reason is precisely the distinguishing feature of this change. From this, it will be concluded that not only pure reason can be practical, but only pure reason, not empirically constrained reason, is unconditionally practical. Finally, we will talk about the distinction between will and arbitrariness, emphasizing its meaning for the understanding the concept of autonomy and its relation to Kant's concept of anthropology and human nature.