Enativismo e conhecimento prático

Abstract

In 'Being and Time' (1927), Heidegger claims the primordial knowledge of Dasein comes from coping with mundane beings. Merleau-Ponty, in turn, argues on 'Phenomenology of Perception' (1945) for knowledge as a bodily activity non translatable in propositional terms. Later, on 'What Computers Can't Do' (1972), Hubert Dreyfus use the work of both to point out the flaws of cognitivism, the dominant paradigm in early days of artificial intelligence. Finally, 'The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience' (1991) by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch brings enactivism as an attempt to take from cognitivism and connectionism the hegemony in cognitive sciences. That being said, the paper describes enactivism while showing its phenomenological heritage.