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[journal article]

dc.contributor.authorHuck, Steffende
dc.contributor.authorLeutgeb, Johannesde
dc.contributor.authorOprea, Ryande
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-12T07:43:56Z
dc.date.available2019-12-12T07:43:56Z
dc.date.issued2017de
dc.identifier.issn2041-1723de
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/65751
dc.description.abstractHuman cooperation has been explained through rationality as well as heuristics-based models. Both model classes share the feature that knowledge of payoff functions is weakly beneficial for the emergence of cooperation. Here, we present experimental evidence to the contrary. We let human subjects interact in a competitive environment and find that, in the long run, access to information about own payoffs leads to less cooperative behaviour. In the short run subjects use naive learning heuristics that get replaced by better adapted heuristics in the long run. With more payoff information subjects are less likely to switch to pro-cooperative heuristics. The results call for the development of two-tier models for the evolution of cooperation.de
dc.languageende
dc.subject.ddcWirtschaftde
dc.subject.ddcEconomicsen
dc.subject.otherEconomics; Experimental evolutionde
dc.titlePayoff information hampers the evolution of cooperationde
dc.description.reviewbegutachtet (peer reviewed)de
dc.description.reviewpeer revieweden
dc.source.journalNature Communications
dc.source.volume8de
dc.publisher.countryGBR
dc.subject.classozAllgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaftende
dc.subject.classozBasic Research, General Concepts and History of Economicsen
dc.rights.licenceCreative Commons - Namensnennung 4.0de
dc.rights.licenceCreative Commons - Attribution 4.0en
ssoar.contributor.institutionWZBde
internal.statusformal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossende
dc.type.stockarticlede
dc.type.documentZeitschriftenartikelde
dc.type.documentjournal articleen
dc.source.pageinfo1-5de
internal.identifier.classoz10901
internal.identifier.journal1655
internal.identifier.document32
internal.identifier.ddc330
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15147de
dc.description.pubstatusVeröffentlichungsversionde
dc.description.pubstatusPublished Versionen
internal.identifier.licence16
internal.identifier.pubstatus1
internal.identifier.review1
internal.dda.referencehttps://www.econstor.eu/oai/request@@oai:econstor.eu:10419/168050
dc.identifier.handlehttps://hdl.handle.net/10419/168050
ssoar.urn.registrationfalsede


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