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Lying to appear honest
[working paper]
Corporate Editor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the image... view more
This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the image repercussions of upward lying in high-stakes contexts. This constitutes first evidence of systematic downward lying in an unobserved lying game. The observed behavior is consistent with the spirit, but not the letter, of the prominent models of lying behavior. It therefore presents a challenge for these models.... view less
Classification
Sociology of Economics
Free Keywords
honesty; image; lying; private information; reputation; truth-telling
Document language
English
Publication Year
2019
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
21 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, SP II 2019-307
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204826
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications