A noção de opinião falsa à luz de uma interpretação do não-ser: um problema entre o Teeteto e o Sofista de Platão

Abstract

Although the 'Theaetetus' puts us in an interpretive setting completely apart from the theory of Forms, we are not allowed to admit their total forgetfulness. Concepts such as 'rationality' opposed to sensible perception, and 'the indispensability of logos' as a discourse that makes true knowledge, are extremely dear to the 'Theaetetus'. Disregarding the relevance and similarity of the meaning of these concepts from maturity to old age would put us in a situation of great difficulty in explaining knowledge. It is important to emphasize here that we have chosen an intermediate perspective, which on the one hand recognizes the absence of an argument based on the classical theory of Ideas, but which includes the Platonic work under the tutelage of a systematic and holistic interpretation, according to which Plato does not abandon the metaphysical presuppositions of the intelligible forms. Far from a rupture with what was said earlier in maturity, the 'Theaetetus' serves as a theoretical complementation on ontology and epistemology, although in the 'Theaetetus', as we have said, there is no direct reference to the notions present in previous dialogues and much of the theme introduce yourself through unusual writing style and vocabulary. Last but not least, a brief analysis will be made of some passages from the final moments of the 'Sophist' in order to understand to what extent the epistemological aspect, proposed by Plato in the 'Theaetetus', can be read in the light of questions related to Being and to Not-being, since the question of 'what is knowledge' also leads us to an ontological discussion.