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%T Partnership on the high seas: China and Russia's joint naval manoeuvres %A Paul, Michael %P 8 %V 26/2019 %D 2019 %K Verteidigungs- und sicherheitsbezogene Beziehungen; Südchinesisches Meer; sicherheitspolitische Faktoren; geopolitische Faktoren; maritime Sicherheit; Interessenkonvergenz; Entwicklungsperspektive und -tendenz %@ 1861-1761 %~ SWP %> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-63093-6 %X On the occasion of the 70th founding anniversary of China’s national navy, a big naval parade with more than 30 Chinese ships sailed off the coast of Qingdao. A few days later, on 29 April 2019, the "Joint Sea 2019" Russian-Chinese bilateral naval exercise began. In numbers, China’s navy now has the world’s biggest fleet - also thanks to decades of Russian naval armament. From Beijing's point of view, however, the Chinese armed forces have a serious shortcoming: a lack of operational experience. Here, too, Moscow fills some gaps. Since the first joint manoeuvre in 2005, cooperation has increased at many levels. Sino-Russian sea manoeuvres now also serve as a menacing signal of support for China’s claims in the South China Sea or in the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea. Moscow and Beijing use the joint naval exercises to set geopolitical signals. Despite all historic mistrust, Sino-Russian cooperation seems to rest on a relatively stable foundation of partnership. But maritime cooperation and coordinated partnership must not lead to an alliance. (Autorenreferat) %C DEU %C Berlin %G en %9 Stellungnahme %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info