A incoerência deontológica do modelo igualitário dworkiniano

Abstract

This is an investigation of Michael Sandel’s critique of Ronald Dworkin's thought. Through this analysis it will be possible to evaluate whether or not Dworkin was inconsistent in his egalitarian proposal. In other words, it will be possible to ascertain whether Dworkin, an avowed deontologist, ends up falling into utilitarian arguments to support his own theory. If this statement is true, we will assess the philosophical consequences of this incoherence. To do so, we will use, as a paradigmatic example, the distributive justice argument of Dworkin, more specifically, the question of affirmative action in the United States. In this sense, we will use as conducting threads the works 'Liberalism and the limits of justice' of Michael Sandel and 'A matter of principles' of Ronald Dworkin.