The Slow Decay of Southern Africa's Dominant-Party Regimes

Abstract

The successful national liberation movements of southern Africa have become dominant-party regimes. However, many now face a series of political and economic crises that have the potential to put the region's stability at risk. Dominant-party regimes in southern Africa base their legitimacy on liberating the nation from colonialism and being an expression of the people's will. However, they preside over an exclusionary social order. The promotion of formal measures of democratisation which focus on periodic elections, formal constitutions, and the existence of opposition parties have had limited success in loosening the political stranglehold of dominant parties. In fact, the adoption of such formal measures has given dominant parties a measure of international legitimacy, to varying degrees, while many of these nominally democratic regimes are restricting the expression of dissent, closing spaces for opposition, and clinging to power by constitutional amendments or popular referenda of questionable democratic credentials. The promotion of economic liberalisation measures - such as creating a "business friendly" environment and courting foreign direct investment (FDI) - especially for the extractive sector and its associated infrastructure, has not provided growth in ways perceived by many to be socially just. Instead, it has tended to concentrate wealth in relatively narrow ruling circles, bolstering the power of ruling parties while contributing to growing social polarisation. Many of the social crises facing dominant-party regimes in southern Africa are based on complex issues of distributional justice and inclusion, which are rooted in their particular social contexts. Foreign partners and donors should focus less on promoting formal measures of democratisation and economic liberalisation, which can be counterproductive, and instead promote more inclusive social and economic programmes, such as universal basic income.