dc.contributor.author | Konrad, Kai A. | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-05T11:29:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-12-05T11:29:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1992 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/49332 | |
dc.description.abstract | Management control by shareholders is a public good. In the Nash equilibrium only the largest shareholder spends effort on management control. This is an incentive not to be the largest shareholder, and this incentive determines some properties of equilibrium corporate ownership structure. In particular, a perfect market with
endogenous shareholdings and Nash behavior cannot overcome the underprovision problem implied by the public good problem, even if any diversification incentive for risk sharing is absent. | en |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Wirtschaft | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Economics | en |
dc.title | Equilibrium corporate ownership structure with free-riding | de |
dc.source.volume | 92-22 | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | |
dc.publisher.city | München | de |
dc.source.series | Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge | |
dc.subject.classoz | Management | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Management Science | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Unternehmen | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | enterprise | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Gleichgewicht | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Eigentum | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | property | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Struktur | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | structure | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Shareholder Value | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | shareholder value | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Management | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | management | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Kontrolle | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | control | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | öffentliches Gut | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | nonmarket good | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Risiko | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | risk | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Anreizsystem | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | incentive system | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Ökonomie | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | economy | en |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications | en |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10039009 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10045803 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10038800 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034872 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10066349 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10040412 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10042486 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10049197 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10045555 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10035721 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10035305 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Arbeitspapier | de |
dc.type.document | working paper | en |
internal.identifier.classoz | 1090401 | |
internal.identifier.document | 3 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 746 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 330 | |
internal.identifier.licence | 3 | |
dc.description.misc | wzbReportsAndWorkingPapers-10419_112692 | de |
internal.identifier.series | 1033 | |
dc.identifier.handle | https://hdl.handle.net/10419/112692 | |
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer | CERTAIN | |