Regionale Zusammenarbeit zwischen Ems und Dollart: die Euroregion EDR

Abstract

The topic of the essay is the cross-border cooperation within the framework of the Ems Dollart Region (EDR). Against the background of the negative development possibilities of many border regions, the essay deals with the possibilities and deficits of cross-border co-operation in the northern German-Dutch border regions. To what extent is EDR capable to contribute to internal development in the form of an intensified cooperation? After a general description of the disadvantages suffered by a location so close the border as well as of the EU INTERREG programme, the Euroregion EDR is described in detail. The origins of the cross-border co-operation in the northern German-Dutch border region stretch back to the fifties. The EDR was established in 1977. Since its first days, the organisational structure of the co-operation has changed in many areas. Above all, in addition to the organisational division in board, committees and administration, the EDR has, since the end of the eighties, had a three-part implementation organisation, the INTERREG, which is responsible for the initiation, coordination, support and management of the projects financed within the framework of the INTERREG programme. While the INTERREG projects are co-financed by the EU, the EDR finances its own budget from member ship fees as well as from subsidies provided by the Dutch Ministry for the Economy, the provinces of Groningen and Drent he as well as the state of Lower Saxony. Due to the considerable subsidies provided by the EU -amounting to ca. 43 million DM between 1994 and 1999- the INTERREG programme is of decisive importance for the project work within the co-operation. The last section of the essay evaluates the actual work of the EDR. One decisive point of criticism in this context is the supreme significance of exogenous financial sources for the actual cross-border project work. This does not only mean dependency from exogenous financing, but also rather a de facto dominance of the decisive organs of the EDR by outside persons and institutions. In addition, the co-operation succeeded in bringing together numerous regional figures within the framework of actual projects, thus improving the circumstances for the mobilisation of endogen ous potential. A more comprehensive success fails as a result of the unwillingness of many regional representatives to enter into cross-border co-operation. A widespread competitive philosophy and the tendency towards jealous regional policies are decisive causes for this.