Download full text
(external source)
Citation Suggestion
Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121172
Exports for your reference manager
More effort with less pay: on information avoidance, belief design and performance
[working paper]
Corporate Editor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and perfo... view more
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and perform stunningly well. Agents who are uninformed regarding their piece rate tend to outperform all others, even those who know that their piece rate is high. This also holds for enforced instead of self-selected information avoidance. All our findings can be captured by a model of optimally distorted expectations following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005). (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
expectation; incentive; performance behavior; job; information; wage; wage level
Classification
Human Resources Management
Sociology of Work, Industrial Sociology, Industrial Relations
Document language
English
Publication Year
2015
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
24 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, SP II 2015-304r
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121172
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications