dc.contributor.author | Kodritsch, Sebastian | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-16T08:05:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-16T08:05:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46125 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model of bargaining. When sophisticated bargainers have time preferences that exhibit a form of present bias -satisfied by the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences increasingly common in the economics literature- equilibrium is unique and lacks delay. However, when one bargainer is more patient about a single period's delay from the present than one that occurs in the near future, the game permits a novel form of equilibrium multiplicity and delay. Time preferences with this property have most recently been empirically documented; they can also arise when parties who weight probabilities non-linearly bargain under the shadow of exogenous breakdown risk, as well as in settings of intergenerational bargaining with imperfect altruism. The paper's main contributions are (i) a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes and payoffs for separable time preferences, and (ii) present bias as a readily interpretable sufficient condition for uniqueness at the level of individual preferences. (author's abstract) | en |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Sociology & anthropology | en |
dc.subject.ddc | Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Social sciences, sociology, anthropology | en |
dc.subject.ddc | Soziologie, Anthropologie | de |
dc.title | On time-inconsistency in bargaining | de |
dc.description.review | begutachtet | de |
dc.description.review | reviewed | en |
dc.source.volume | SP II 2014-205 | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | |
dc.publisher.city | Berlin | de |
dc.source.series | Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten | |
dc.subject.classoz | Wirtschaftssoziologie | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Sociology of Economics | en |
dc.subject.classoz | Einkommenspolitik, Lohnpolitik, Tarifpolitik, Vermögenspolitik | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Income Policy, Property Policy, Wage Policy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Zeitökonomie | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | time management | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Gleichgewicht | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Tarifverhandlung | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | collective bargaining | en |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications | en |
ssoar.contributor.institution | WZB | de |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10062832 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10045803 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10037664 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Arbeitspapier | de |
dc.type.document | working paper | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 52 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10205 | |
internal.identifier.classoz | 11004 | |
internal.identifier.document | 3 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 381 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 300 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 301 | |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 3 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 2 | |
internal.identifier.series | 961 | |
dc.subject.classhort | 11000 | de |
dc.subject.classhort | 10200 | de |
dc.identifier.handle | https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101451 | |
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer | CERTAIN | |