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%T The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: a laboratory investigation %A Veldhuizen, Roel van %P 41 %V SP II 2013-210 %D 2013 %K experimentelle Ökonomie %~ WZB %X Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise. (author's abstract) %C DEU %C Berlin %G en %9 Arbeitspapier %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info