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Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of global pollution problems
[Arbeitspapier]
Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ
Abstract This paper analyses the outcome of non-cooperative national efforts in combatting global pollution problems when governments are elected by their citizens. It is well-known that the latter tend to vote governments that are less ‘green’ than the median voter in order to commit to lower national mitig... mehr
This paper analyses the outcome of non-cooperative national efforts in combatting global pollution problems when governments are elected by their citizens. It is well-known that the latter tend to vote governments that are less ‘green’ than the median voter in order to commit to lower national mitigation efforts, which further increases the inefficiently high amount of global emissions. However, the present paper shows that the option of self-protection against environmental damages, which has been invariably neglected in the relevant literature to date, alleviates or even completely offsets such strategic delegation and the related adverse effects.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Umweltverschmutzung; Umweltschutz; Klimapolitik; internationales Abkommen; Emission; Umweltbelastung; Umweltpolitik; internationale Politik
Klassifikation
Ökologie und Umwelt
spezielle Ressortpolitik
Freie Schlagwörter
strategic delegation; global pollution problems; self-protection; non-cooperative behaviour
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2013
Erscheinungsort
Leipzig
Seitenangabe
7 S.
Schriftenreihe
UFZ Discussion Papers, 18/2013
ISSN
1436-140X
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz
Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht-kommerz., Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen