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Career concerns incentives: an experimental test
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the informatio... mehr
Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Reputation
Klassifikation
Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und "Schulen", Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Freie Schlagwörter
C91; D83; L14; Incentives; Career concerns; Signal jamming; Experiments
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2009
Seitenangabe
571–588 S.
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2009) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)