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Abstract Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates' campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electo... view more
Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates' campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile's deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional electoral system makes most competitive contests relevant only to the intra-coalitional balance of power. This account implies that political finance is as much a function of political systems and the supply of contributions as it is candidates' demand for funds, and motivates several hypotheses about campaign finance in Chile. Among others, the analysis confirms that incumbents and challengers compete on a level playing field, spending similar amounts of campaign finance. The paper also illustrates that incumbents and challengers fare equally well in Chile's "secret" donation system.... view less
Estudios en varios países han demostrado que los incumbentes en las elecciones legislativas recaudan y gastan más dinero cuando se enfrentan a una competencia más dura. No obstante, el análisis estadístico del financiamiento electoral de candidatos chilenos demuestra lo contrario: una relación inver... view more
Estudios en varios países han demostrado que los incumbentes en las elecciones legislativas recaudan y gastan más dinero cuando se enfrentan a una competencia más dura. No obstante, el análisis estadístico del financiamiento electoral de candidatos chilenos demuestra lo contrario: una relación inversa entre los gastos de los incumbentes y la competitividad electoral. Esto ocurre porque los diputados son relativamente limitados en su influencia sobre políticas públicas e incluso en la dispensa de favores canalizados (pork-barrel) y porque el sistema binominal hace que la competencia suceda principalmente al interior de coaliciones. La implicación lógica es que el financiamiento político es tanto una función del sistema político y de la oferta de contribuciones de campaña, como de la demanda de los candidatos por esos fondos, hecho que motiva la presentación de varias hipótesis sobre la financiación de campañas en Chile. Entre otros resultados, el análisis confirma que los incumbentes y sus retadores compiten en "cancha neutra", es decir, gastando cantidades similares en campaña. También muestra que a ambos – a incumbentes y a sus competidores – les va igualmente bien con los aportes reservados.... view less
Keywords
control; party; Latin America; electoral system; election campaign; parliamentary election; Chile; regulation; funding; transparency; competition; political system; donation; candidacy; South America; corruption
Classification
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Method
theory application; descriptive study; empirical; quantitative empirical
Free Keywords
Political science; campaigns and elections; campaign finance; congressional elections; incumbents; campaign finance; secret donations; ciencias políticas; elecciones parliamentarias; elecciones parliamentarias; incumbencia; financiamiento de campañas; aportes reservados; 2005-2010; 2005-2010;
Document language
English
Publication Year
2011
Page/Pages
p. 3-33
Journal
Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3 (2011) 3
ISSN
1868-4890
Status
Published Version; peer reviewed
Licence
Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works