dc.contributor.author | Vlassopoulos, Michael | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-09T02:56:00Z | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-08-29T23:04:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-08-29T23:04:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/28751 | |
dc.description.abstract | "This paper revisits the hypothesis that nonprofit organizations emerge in markets that are characterized by contractual incompleteness because they ensure consumers against opportunistic behavior. We extend the Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) framework which studies an entrepreneur's optimal choice of organizational form and service quality when quality is non-contractible into a repeated interaction setting. The main result is that when reputations can be sustained, then for-profit status is the preferred organizational form and high quality services are ensured. This finding suggests that existing explanations of nonprofit organizations that focus entirely on contractual imperfections in the producer/consumer relationship may be inadequate." [author's abstract] | en |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Wirtschaft | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Economics | en |
dc.subject.ddc | Psychology | en |
dc.subject.ddc | Psychologie | de |
dc.subject.other | Nonprofit Status; Contractual Incompleteness | |
dc.title | Quality, reputation and the choice of organizational form | en |
dc.description.review | begutachtet (peer reviewed) | de |
dc.description.review | peer reviewed | en |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | de |
dc.source.volume | 71 | de |
dc.publisher.country | NLD | |
dc.source.issue | 2 | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Applied Psychology | en |
dc.subject.classoz | Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics | en |
dc.subject.classoz | angewandte Psychologie | de |
dc.subject.classoz | Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | Reputation | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | reputation | en |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-287514 | de |
dc.date.modified | 2012-04-02T17:23:00Z | de |
dc.rights.licence | PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project) | de |
dc.rights.licence | PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project) | en |
ssoar.gesis.collection | SOLIS;ADIS | de |
ssoar.contributor.institution | http://www.peerproject.eu/ | de |
internal.status | 3 | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10047053 | |
dc.type.stock | article | de |
dc.type.document | journal article | en |
dc.type.document | Zeitschriftenartikel | de |
dc.rights.copyright | f | de |
dc.source.pageinfo | 515-527 | |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10901 | |
internal.identifier.classoz | 10709 | |
internal.identifier.journal | 196 | de |
internal.identifier.document | 32 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 150 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 330 | |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.014 | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Postprint | en |
dc.description.pubstatus | Postprint | de |
internal.identifier.licence | 7 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 2 | |
internal.identifier.review | 1 | |
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer | CERTAIN | |
internal.check.languageharmonizer | CERTAIN_RETAINED | |