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Hierarchy, opportunism in teams
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerab... mehr
We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Experiment
Klassifikation
Sozialpsychologie
Management
Freie Schlagwörter
leadership; team production; C9; D2; L2
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2008
Seitenangabe
S. 39-50
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69 (2008) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.007
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)