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The emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade: a behavioral model without reputational effects
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract The present article focuses on the conditions that allow governments to increase property
rights protection because they expect enough income from such action. We develop a
behavioral explanation, according to which the answer lies in the growth in the importance,
size and wealth of merchant guilds ... mehr
The present article focuses on the conditions that allow governments to increase property
rights protection because they expect enough income from such action. We develop a
behavioral explanation, according to which the answer lies in the growth in the importance,
size and wealth of merchant guilds in the medieval era in Western Europe as well as a
somewhat surprising effect of volatile price structures. We add to prior research by showing
that even uncoordinated embargo pressures among multiple guilds could get medieval rulers
to offer high levels of property rights protection.... weniger
Klassifikation
Sozialgeschichte, historische Sozialforschung
Volkswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter
Agent-based model; Institutions; Guilds; Property rights; Property rights enforcement
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2008
Seitenangabe
S. 48-62
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68 (2008) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.05.002
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)