A signaling model of environmental overcompliance

Denicolò, Vincenzo

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

dc.contributor.author	Denicolò, Vincenzo	de
dc.date.accessioned	2011-09-03T02:52:00Z	de
dc.date.accessioned	2012-08-29T23:08:26Z
dc.date.available	2012-08-29T23:08:26Z
dc.date.issued	2008	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/26405
dc.description.abstract	We present a theory of unilateral regulatory overcompliance as a signaling device. Firms that have a competitive advantage in the use of a cleaner but more costly technology overcomply in order to signal to an imperfectly informed, benevolent government that compliance costs are low, thereby triggering tougher regulation. We identify the conditions under which such an overcompliance signaling equilibrium arises, showing that there may be over-overcompliance in that firms may overcomply even when tougher regulation is not socially desirable. We also discuss the differential implications of the signaling theory as compared to other theories of unilateral regulatory overcompliance.	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Wirtschaft	de
dc.subject.ddc	Economics	en
dc.subject.other	Voluntary actions; Overcompliance; Signaling; Regulation; Raising rivals' costs; D43; D82; L51
dc.title	A signaling model of environmental overcompliance	en
dc.description.review	begutachtet (peer reviewed)	de
dc.description.review	peer reviewed	en
dc.source.journal	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization	de
dc.source.volume	68	de
dc.publisher.country	NLD
dc.source.issue	1	de
dc.subject.classoz	Economic Policy	en
dc.subject.classoz	Political Economy	en
dc.subject.classoz	Wirtschaftspolitik	de
dc.subject.classoz	Volkswirtschaftslehre	de
dc.identifier.urn	urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264055	de
dc.date.modified	2011-09-05T10:43:00Z	de
dc.rights.licence	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)	de
dc.rights.licence	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)	en
ssoar.gesis.collection	SOLIS;ADIS	de
ssoar.contributor.institution	http://www.peerproject.eu/	de
internal.status	3	de
dc.type.stock	article	de
dc.type.document	journal article	en
dc.type.document	Zeitschriftenartikel	de
dc.rights.copyright	f	de
dc.source.pageinfo	293-303
internal.identifier.classoz	1090300
internal.identifier.classoz	1090302
internal.identifier.journal	196	de
internal.identifier.document	32
internal.identifier.ddc	330
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.009	de
dc.description.pubstatus	Postprint	en
dc.description.pubstatus	Postprint	de
internal.identifier.licence	7
internal.identifier.pubstatus	2
internal.identifier.review	1
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN
internal.check.languageharmonizer	CERTAIN_RETAINED

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Das Dokument erscheint in:

Volkswirtschaftslehre (allgemein)
Political Economy (general)
Wirtschaftspolitik
Economic Policy

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