Endnote export
%T Strategic coalition voting: evidence from Austria %A Meffert, Michael F. %A Gschwend, Thomas %J Electoral Studies %N 3 %P 339-349 %V 29 %D 2010 %K Strategic voting; Coalitions; Electoral expectations; Rational choice; Proportional representation %= 2011-08-01T11:01:00Z %~ USB Köln %> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257796 %U http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/gschwend/pdf/publications/MeffertGschwend2010_JELS_EvidenceAustria-1.pdf %X "Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses." (author's abstract) %C NLD %G en %9 journal article %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info