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@article{ Guertzgen2009, title = {Rent-sharing and collective wage contracts - evidence from German establishment-level data}, author = {Guertzgen, Nicole}, journal = {Applied Economics}, number = {22}, pages = {2835-2854}, volume = {42}, year = {2009}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840801964708}, urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242388}, abstract = {Using German establishment-level data, this paper analyses whether wages respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies with collective bargaining coverage. In this context, two conflicting hypotheses are tested. The first one asserts that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm-level and appropriate a larger share of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The second one states that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and suppress the responsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability conditions.\ The empirical analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis. While pooled OLS estimates yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments, dynamic panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.}, }