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%T Mergers and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets %A Granier, Laurent %A Trinquard, Sébastien %J Applied Economics %N 3 %P 297-309 %V 42 %D 2009 %@ 1466-4283 %= 2012-08-09T12:32:00Z %~ http://www.peerproject.eu/ %> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242012 %X After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount. %G en %9 journal article %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info