Bibtex export
@article{ Granier2009, title = {Mergers and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets}, author = {Granier, Laurent and Trinquard, Sébastien}, journal = {Applied Economics}, number = {3}, pages = {297-309}, volume = {42}, year = {2009}, issn = {1466-4283}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840701604495}, urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242012}, abstract = {After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount.}, }