

Patrimonialization on the Ruins of Empire: Islamic Heritage and the Modern State in Post-Ottoman Europe

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Maximilian Hartmuth,
Ayşe Dilsiz Hartmuth (eds.)

PATRIMONIALIZATION ON THE RUINS OF EMPIRE

Islamic Heritage and the Modern State
in Post-Ottoman Europe

[transcript] Cultural Heritage Studies

Maximilian Hartmuth, Ayşe Dilsiz Hartmuth (eds.)
Patrimonialization on the Ruins of Empire

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Maximilian Hartmuth, Ayşe Dilsiz Hartmuth (eds.)

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Introduction

Maximilian Hartmuth & Ayşe Dilsiz Hartmuth (University of Vienna)

After the failed Siege of Vienna of 1683, the Ottoman Empire gradually withdrew from Europe. Even so, monumental reminders of its former presence survived throughout the continent. How these remains were approached differed greatly according to the period and place.¹

This volume examines the locus of material remains from the Ottoman period (or the lack thereof) in relation to the identity constructions of the modern nations that came to inherit them and of the Muslim communities on their territories. In the scholarly discourses on the histories of displacement and the region's architectural reminders of an Ottoman past, these two processes are frequently lumped together as a regional historical phenomenon dubbed 'de-Ottomanization'.² In so doing, the substantial differences in approaches that the various successor states adopted towards the empire's architectural legacies (including Turkey) are downplayed. Even within the same countries, different policies appear to have been pursued in different periods (and regions), in keeping with differing circumstances.

This volume presents case studies from various areas in formerly Ottoman Europe. They inquire from diverse vantage points how visible remains of the empire's presence (and, with that, of Islam's presence) have been coped with discursively and materially. Importantly, readers will find that it is almost impossible to disentangle these two levels of action. To foster a common perspective, the volume draws upon a concept that describes the discursive process that elevates objects to become a community's or territory's heritage as 'patrimonialization'.

1 On this heritage, its problems and interpretations, see also Hartmuth & Dilsiz (2010), Hartmuth (2010), and Sindbaek & Hartmuth (2011).

2 For a discussion, see Ginio & Kaser (2013).

Patrimonialization, heritagization, heritization?

Like its (equally awkward) terminological twins ‘heritagization’ and ‘heritization’, ‘patrimonialization’ regards heritage not as preexisting and undisputable fact but as the outcome of a moderated process. Depending on the overall agenda, certain objects and values are prioritized over others in the course of its implementation.³ Subsequently, a community’s resources are mobilized so as to preserve and promote this essential assortment of buildings, objects, and practices.

The available scholarly literature has, to our knowledge, thus far not engaged in conscientious efforts to differentiate these terms; they are largely used interchangeably in the scholarly literature. That said, it appears that ‘patrimonialization’ is more likely to be used in French or Francophile studies,⁴ with *patrimoine* corresponding to the English ‘heritage’. Both terms derive from Latin: *Patrimonium* denotes a passing of assets or obligations (*monium*) from father (*pater*, as also in *patrie*, fatherland) to son;⁵ ‘heritage’ derives from the Latin term for heir (*heres*, gen. *heredis*) and entered standard English as a French loanword (*héritage*). As the French suffix *-age* indicates, it signifies the outcome of a process (*héritier*, to inherit). Thus, epistemologically, in both

3 Thoui (2002, p. 1036) maintains that the term ‘heritagization’ emerged in the late 20th century to mark a shift in heritage discourse – a shift “from what heritage *is* to what heritage *does*” (our emphasis). Carter et al. (2020, p. 2) emphasize the usefulness of the term as an analytical instrument to untangle the intricate dynamics that have changed societies’ relationship with the past – an “ongoing negotiation between memory, identity and space.” Yet, they also note that the practices of heritage production have usually worked in favor of the authorities and their quest to establish legitimacy through their approach to history. For Harrison (2013, p. 69), ‘heritagization’ in effect marks a transition from useful to representational. He defines it as “the process by which objects and places are transformed from functional ‘things’ into objects of display and exhibition.” Frigolé (2010, p. 14) similarly sees decontextualization and recontextualization as part and parcel of the process of ‘patrimonialization’. While these definitions speak of loss (of original purpose, context) and manipulation, not all appraisals of term and concept are as critical of this manipulative enterprise. Loulanski & Loulanski (2014), for instance, have presented the ‘heritization’ of rose cultivation in Bulgaria as a means of promoting sustainable tourism.

4 The term, has been defined by Gillot et al. (2013, p. 3) as describing “historically situated projects and procedures that transform places, people, practices and artifacts into a heritage to be protected, exhibited and highlighted.”

5 For the rapport of these terms, see also Salais (1993).

'heritage' and 'patrimony' a present condition is being related to events in the past.

Outside the humanities, both terms are used in much broader ways than simply designating old buildings and objects. In American English, 'heritage' is also used to denote kinship in genealogical terms. In its British usage, 'heritage' may be more often used in contexts of touristic marketability than elsewhere.⁶ It is, perhaps, because of these unwanted associations, as well as to circumvent using a term awkwardly by doubling the suffixes of *-age* and *-ize*, that we have chosen to use patrimonialization rather than heritagization (or heritization) in this volume. Beyond that, our choice has no meaning or implications.

Inheritances treasured, disregarded, or discarded

Despite the skepticism with regard to terminology, we believe that the analogy with inheriting is still useful to understand the processes at play. For sure, there is a stark difference between the legal inheritance by an *individual* (or several) of a deceased ancestor's assets and a *community's* claiming of such assets, lacking a strictly legal entitlement. Nevertheless, the decisions taken during the course of inheriting, triggered by the fact that something (a human being, a polity, another community's presence) has expired, can well be linked. This is illustrated by another analogy laying bare the different approaches to inherited assets. They may be assigned (at least) three different categories:

The first category pertains to assets prized by the inheritor to an extent that they become part of his or her identity. This may be because these objects are esteemed for their association with the deceased ancestors or simply because of their market value.

Another category consists of those goods identified as of little use to the inheritor. They are sold or discarded, being bereft of emotional value to the inheritor.

There is also a middling category between the two. It concerns objects that are perhaps recognized as being of some value, to somebody, at some point,

6 This is maybe due to the fact that, more than elsewhere, heritage preservation is expected to decrease government subsidies. Britain's key preservationist institution 'English Heritage', for instance, which guards over 400 sites and monuments, is organized as a self-financing charity. Its unwanted reliance on state funding, of course, impacts pricing policies and the use of properties.

but their utility to the inheritor in the present situation is unclear. The inheritor may not want to exhibit them as part of his or her household for lack of identification with their origins, their lacking use value, or their unpersuasive aesthetic qualities. Even so, they are also not actively discarded. Instead, they remain boxed up or left to their own. A univocal decision regarding their destiny is delayed. Their existence may not be entirely forgotten, but there is resolution to not accord prominence to them in the present. These different approaches – treasuring, disregarding, and discarding – are echoed in the choices made by communities when they negotiate their relationship with the past.

Secondary inheritances and the politics and economies of interest

It is important to stress the difference between the middling category and the other two. To disregard parts of an inheritance does not mean that this choice cannot be reconsidered at a later point. For instance, Crimea's Muslim heritage appears to have only become part and parcel of a Ukrainian 'heritage package' following Russia's encroachment upon Ukrainian territory, as addressed in the contribution by Demchuk. Curiously, an act of administrative disinheriting fostered a belated (now largely symbolic) inheriting.

Hartmuth's contribution explains how an inheritance that would have been discarded in the Habsburg political context around 1700 – whether through destruction or adaptive reuse, because of its status as a burdensome leftover of the Ottoman archenemy – was treated very differently around 1900. A patrimonialization was promoted (if with limited consequence) because of its political usefulness in communicating with a minoritized community.⁷

On Cyprus, as Sabri demonstrates, the British administrators prioritized what could be considered a shared heritage: the pre-Ottoman cathedrals-turned-mosques, which were both Muslim and Western. 'Real' Ottoman-period monuments were initially relegated to the middling category. In Crimea, as discussed in Guboglo's paper, the focus of preservationist efforts under Russian rule was similarly first focused on Greek and Genoese remains, relegating "Turkish and Tatar" buildings to secondary significance.

7 In early Soviet Crimea (discussed by Kançal-Ferrari), by contrast, village mosques were easily transformed beyond recognition into cinemas by destroying only their minarets and reorganizing their interiors.

In the Serbian case, discussed by Radovanović, the Islamic 'pious foundations', or *evkaf*, came to be considered an anachronism associated with a past (to be) overcome, while in Bosnia and Cyprus they became a key lever in solidifying control over a population skeptical of foreign rule. Yet, also in Turkey, *evkaf* were first omitted from the secular republic's national heritage narrations on account of their religious connotation. Dilsiz Hartmuth demonstrates that, around 1940, there were attempts at a kind of conceptual secularization, which were to turn a religious (non-)heritage into a national/cultural one.

In sum, we see considerable movement between these categories. Disregarded heritage may be reassessed, and eventually *revalued*; it may also be *devalued*. Of course, an inheritance long met with disinterest tends not to benefit from the resources mobilized to preserve 'primary inheritances'. As time takes its toll, such goods may be 'un-preserved' in material terms, resulting in an eventual disposal that, at that point, seems to lack alternatives. In such cases, we see not an active destruction but simply a non-intervention to an ongoing deterioration. The significance of given objects to the inheriting community or communities could not be argued in a manner ensuring that substantial resources are directed toward their preservation.

Bandwidths of post-Ottoman patrimonialization

The present volume gathers a selection of papers presented at two single-day workshops organized at the University of Vienna in June and November 2022. Their aim was to collect case studies from various regions in formerly Ottoman Europe and Turkey to address the question of how visible remains of the empire's presence (and of Islam's presence) have been coped with discursively and materially. They operated on the premise that both levels of action are really inseparable from each other. Thus, the workshops' problematic focused on how buildings, environments, and objects were appropriated for different purposes and by different actors using the medium of language. Through a comparison

of methods and outcomes, the relevant fault lines would be identified.⁸ The organizers, who are also this volume's editors, asked:

How central was the factor of continued use by a Muslim community for the preservation of Ottoman architectural works? Did the approaches differ structurally in territories appropriated by emerging nations or those occupied or annexed by external powers, such as Austria-Hungary or Russia? Did an emerging nation's commitment to either language or religion as the primary marker of its ethnic distinction impact the approach to buildings and populations associated with Ottoman rule? Were there antagonisms in these discourses – and, if so, why did certain actors/voices prevail over others? How did the changing role of Turkey since 1989 influence perceptions of Ottoman inheritances in Balkan countries? At which points did the policies of the traditional protector of Muslim communities in Southeast Europe change and why?

The first bloc of papers focuses on Ottoman leftovers in territories taken over by the Habsburgs. Maximilian HARTMUTH looks at how the rich Islamic inheritance of Bosnia, which switched hands from the Ottomans to the Habsburgs in 1878, was integrated into a trans-confessional imperial heritage narrative around 1900. This fascinating, if forgotten, project posed conceptual challenges to its promoters.

Gergő KOVÁCS focuses on the mausoleum of an Ottoman sheikh that has been preserved in Budapest, today Hungary's capital. He demonstrates how the symbolic significance accorded to this object greatly outweighed its architectural significance, showing how it also became a medium in bilateral relations.

Ajla BAJRAMOVIĆ turns to an Ottoman mosque in the Bosnian mining town of Tuzla that was completely rebuilt by the Habsburg authorities. Curiously, this brought about a monumentalization of this object. In her paper's second part, she analyses the findings from an empirical survey conducted among local residents about the perceptions of this building.

8 The fact that this volume features not all papers presented at the two workshops has resulted in a largely unintentional focus on entities that "did not seamlessly transition from the Ottoman domains to a nation state," as one of the manuscript's anonymous reviewers aptly put it. This, indeed, can be said of Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Crimea, and Serbia. In light of previous scholarship's focus on 'classic' post-Ottoman Balkan nations like Bulgaria, Greece, or Albania, we deem this to be an advantage of this volume rather than a deficit. For a guide to previous scholarship on the Ottoman architectural heritage in other Southeast European countries, much of which authored by Machiel Kiel, see the introduction to Hartmuth & Dilsiz (2010).

The second bloc of papers focuses on Crimea, which switched hands from the Ottomans to the Romanovs in 1783. Anna GUBOGLO inquires about the perceived role of Crimea's heritage in the later Russian empire and among the non-Russian communities therein. Importantly, she emphasizes the accomplishments of non-state patrimonialization efforts.

Stefaniia DEMCHUK reflects about the place of Crimea's heritage in art historical narrations of Ukraine's heritage. Notably, she points to narrative shifts during the course of the past years and decades. Nicole KANÇAL-FERRARI, finally, focuses on interventions to Ottoman-era and Muslim buildings in post-Ottoman Crimea, with a focus on recent decades.

The third bloc of papers focuses on the question of 'pious foundations' (*evkaf*, *awqaf*) and their endowed properties in different post-Ottoman territories. Reyhan SABRÎ looks at the case of the British administration of Cyprus and mechanisms installed to manage the Muslim community's assets. Jelena RADOVANOVIĆ examines a similar issue in Serbia, showing how *evkaf* became demoted from weighty social institutions to a minority's religious property. Ayşe DİLSİZ HARTMUTH inquires about the secular Turkish republic's approaches to this religiously-connotated heritage, identifying rather curious attempts at an appropriation through nationalization and secularization of this central Islamic institution.

Ercan AKYOL continues this discussion by looking at Turkey's Ottoman-period literary heritage and how republican actors sought to unburden it of its ideological weight. By way of conclusion, Jeremy WALTON, who participated as an invited commentator at both workshops, reviews all contributions from his cultural anthropological perspective.

We hope that these contributions will help add nuance to the scholarly discourse on de-Ottomanization – a term that rather inaccurately implies a linear process – and on patrimonialization projects on European soil.

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No news as good news?

Occupied Bosnia's Ottoman heritage in the Habsburg imperial imaginary ca. 1900

Maximilian Hartmuth (University of Vienna)

Abstract: *This paper discusses how occupied Bosnia's Ottoman-era architectural inheritance was approached by the Habsburg imperial centre. It inquires about how Vienna and its proxies imagined that the occupied territory's Islamic heritage might be integrated into, and harmonized with, the empire's cultural self-image. Looking at attempts to include monumental works of Ottoman architecture in Bosnia into an empire-wide canon of notable buildings across the confessional divides, the study asks: Was an art history of the Habsburg lands that included cathedrals and mosques alike considered possible and desirable?*

In 1878, after more than four centuries of subordination to Istanbul, Bosnia changed hands. The distinctly Ottoman imprint on Bosnia proved a burdensome legacy for the new Habsburg authorities. The occupation turned around half a million Muslims into Habsburg subjects. Most of them were sceptical of the prospect of rule by a Christian monarch, to say the least.¹

Under the pretext of advancing conciliation and modernization, the regime's bureaucracy quickly penetrated into many aspects of its new subjects' lives. This did not stop at the Muslim community's infrastructure of worship and confessional education, most of which was facilitated by way of endowments (Arabic *awqaf*, Ottoman Turkish *evkaf*, Bosnian *vakufi*). To supervise and regulate a system of operations through which endowed assets generated incomes then used for the upkeep of public services and the buildings in which they were hosted, the territorial administration (*Landesregierung*) installed in

1 For the broader political context, see e.g. Okey (2007).

1883 a so-called *Vakuf-Commission*. Although nominally headed by a prominent Muslim,² the commission may be better characterized as an agency of the regime. Its authority to decide whether to demolish, restore, renovate, or rebuild a dilapidated Ottoman-period building cannot be underestimated.³

The curiously Orientalizing style informing most of these interventions was the focus of an ERC project, in the context of which this paper was researched.⁴ Instead of continuing a provincial Ottoman aesthetic, that new style drew upon a generalized Islamic heritage. It aimed not to conserve but to embellish objects that were perceived as lacking ambitions to individualism or monumentality.⁵ Occasionally, it was also simply cheaper to construct a new building than to repair a derelict old one.⁶ In other cases, Habsburg-period interventions left little or no mark.

Evidently, there were deliberations that preceded the decisions of how to go about a given project, taking into consideration its prominence just as much as an intervention's financial feasibility. These deliberations may not always have been documented in writing; perhaps they were top-down decisions communicated orally.

There is no doubt that the Habsburg authorities' interest in safeguarding Bosnia's Ottoman-Islamic heritage owed more to considerations of *realpolitik* rather than to an earnest esteem for the alien faith's cultural infrastructure. The *Vakuf-Commission* was a useful instrument to parade the new regime's benevolence towards its Muslim subjects. Architecture became both instrument and medium for this message. Ironically, there were few other periods in Bosnia's history in which so many notable mosques and *medreses* were built or rebuilt in such a short time.

2 Note the parallel with the corresponding institution in British Cyprus, discussed in the contribution by Sabri to this volume.

3 The history of this Habsburg-period institution is understudied. Fundamentals are explained e.g. in Omerčić (2017). An older standard work is Begović (1963). A useful regional perspective is taken by Popovic (1994), with Yugoslavia treated on pp. 206–12.

4 "Islamic Architecture and Orientalizing Style in Habsburg Bosnia, 1878–1918," Grant agreement No. 758099, 2018–2023, PI: Maximilian Hartmuth. For information on the project's goals and outputs, see ercbos.univie.ac.at.

5 On this mindset, see Hartmuth (2010). On style, see Hartmuth (2018).

6 In the case of the *Elçi İbrahim Paşa Medresesi*, which was demolished so that railways could arrive in Travnik, a reconstruction of the building was reported to cost 60.000 guilders (*Vatan* 469 [1893], p. 2), whereas the grandiose rebuilding eventually undertaken amounted to 70.000 guilders (*Bosnische Post* 55 [1895], p. 3).

The Habsburg empire's Muslim inheritance

This paper inquires about how the architectural heritage of the pre-Habsburg Ottoman period was seen and approached at the imperial centre. More specifically, it examines how the imperial centre imagined that Bosnia's Ottoman heritage might be integrated into, and harmonized with, the empire's cultural self-image. Given the centuries-long enmity of both empires, this was certainly no easy task. Any positioning had to be well-reasoned. While we have seen in our investigations of this period's *new* architecture that the authorities were willing to cultivate an aesthetic which would balance the country's Islamic tradition with the ambition of assimilating Bosnia into a modern European milieu (Fig. 1), it remains to ask how the *old* architecture fit into this picture. Were there attempts to include Bosnia's monumental works of Ottoman architecture into an empire-wide canon of notable historical buildings across the confessional divides? Differently stated, could there be an art history of the Habsburg lands that included cathedrals and mosques alike?

Before this paper concludes with a hesitant *yes*, it first needs to identify a source on which such a claim can be credibly made, and then proceed to analyse it in accordance with that hypothesis. Such a source is the imperial panorama titled *Die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild*. It was issued between 1886 and 1902 in 24 volumes, which covered all territories under Habsburg rule. The publication project was instigated by crown prince Rudolph and received the emperor Francis Joseph's blessing. An editorial committee, headed by Rudolph, was installed in the *Hofburg* imperial complex in Vienna. All volumes were published by the royal printing house, the *k.u.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei*. For these and other reasons, *Die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild* must be considered an official account of the empire's domains. In view of the unwieldy full title, it soon became known as the *Kronprinzenwerk*.⁷

Its largely decentralized mode of production, with most authors and illustrators recruited in the very provinces covered, must not distract us from the fact that all information compiled and disseminated was ultimately endorsed at the imperial centre. For that reason, I will take the liberty to regard the contents of the volume on Bosnia, published in 1901 as the penultimate volume, not as necessarily reflecting the attributed authors' opinions, but as a closely edited representation of, essentially, an official cultural policy.

7 For an overview of the project, a standard reference is Wagner (1989).



Fig. 1: Sarajevo, mixed-use building known as Đulagin dvor, 1896–97, Arch. Hans Niemeczek, photograph by Anida Krečo, 2023.

One might go one step further and suggest that the challenge of representing Bosnia to a national and international audience may have been a catalyst for devising a narrative that catered to the sensitivities of various stakeholders. These included not only the three (ethno-)confessional groups in Bosnia that were competing for influence, but also actors and communities in the empire's core lands, newly divided into two halves, with the Hungarian half eager to underpin its position through historical claims in the Balkans. It is most likely due to the requirement of balancing various interests carefully that the Bosnian volume's publication was delayed by a full five years.⁸

Bosnia's administrative status as an occupied territory consigned neither to the empire's Austrian nor to the Hungarian half resulted in a curiously irregular mode of production as well. The volume's contents were supervised not by the editorial committees in Vienna and Budapest but by the general superintendent of the occupied territories, Benjámín von Kállay (1839–1903), a Balkan connoisseur whose principal office was actually that of the Austrian and Hungarian joint finance minister.⁹ It was he and his collaborators who had to ensure that the final product was tolerable to anyone claiming a stake in Bosnia's past, present, and future.

How this affected the choice of illustrators and the distribution of areas and subjects among teams is discussed in detail in another publication by the author,¹⁰ but it should be mentioned here that the Bosnian volume was exceptional because it did not mobilize authors or artists native to the territory portrayed. This makes it more 'colonial' in scope than any other volume in the series, in which such participatory mobilization seems to have been a vital component of the overall cohesion-building enterprise.

The preference for expatriates over local contributors to author the chapters in the Bosnian volume was probably implemented because local contributors were regarded as too partisan to entrust them with the occupied territory's representation abroad. The fact that no native artists were hired as illustrators, on the other hand, probably rather reflected the fact that the Western mode of representation used in the *Kronprinzenwerk* was still largely in the domain of expatriates. As the series was to share a common aesthetic and artistic quality,¹¹

8 On the volume's difficult realization, see also Hartmuth (forthcoming).

9 For a standard study of the Kállay period and system, see Kraljačić (1987).

10 Hartmuth (forthcoming).

11 On aesthetic concerns, see Wagner (1989, esp. p. 63), and Kohl (1997).

representing (according to the series' preface) an empire unified in its diversity,¹² the bulk of the artists were recruited in Vienna and Budapest.

The chapter surveying Bosnia's art-historically relevant assets was authored by Johann Kellner, a long-serving public official dispatched to Sarajevo from his native Brno to work in the occupation government's construction department. That chapter will be analysed here in detail regarding content, organization, and illustration, and the origins of its framework design in policy concerns will be speculated upon.¹³

Scope: Whose art history?

Kellner's chapter was titled *Baukunst*, or the "art of building," meaning architecture, and thus explicitly excluding other art forms. This already marks a notable distinction from other volumes in the series, with comparison laying bare a basic difference between the volumes covering the Austrian and the Hungarian territories: the volumes on the Austrian crown lands usually contain chapters dealing with all three fine arts – architecture, painting, and sculpture – while most Hungarian volumes are comprised of regional surveys limited to architecture. Repeatedly, the patchiness of the Hungarian survey chapters with regard to the arts and periods covered (or not) was excused with the reason that the persistent Ottoman menace had not been conducive to cultural development in these areas.¹⁴

In that sense, the Bosnian volume is more Hungarian than Austrian. It starts off with the same apologia, excusing with reference to the province's traditional frontier status the lack of remarkable (Christian) art as well as the absence of noteworthy works in the genres of painting and sculpture more generally. The focus is instead on the one fine art in which, in Kellner's view,

12 See the illustrative preface to the inaugural volume (*Kronprinzenwerk* 1886).

13 That chapter, it should be noted, has only 22 pages, including 12 images, so the analysis is somewhat microscopic and rests as much on comparison as on content as such.

14 In the third Hungarian volume of the *Kronprinzenwerk* (1893) we read e.g. on p. 96: "Die 145 jährige Türkenherrschaft hat Budapest um die Entwicklung der durch König Matthias eingebürgerten Renaissance-Architektur gebracht." In this volume's chapter on painting and sculpture we read on p. 413: "Die vielhundertjährigen Stürme, welche das Leben Ungarns beunruhigten, sind dem Aufblühen der bildenden Künste so hinderlich gewesen, daß hierin fast nur die neueste Zeit augenfällige Erfolge auszuweisen hat."

Ottoman culture produced the most notable results: architecture.¹⁵ Of course, these omissions would also reflect contemporaries' inability to treat Orthodox icon painting or Islamic calligraphy in a similarly dutiful way. Artfully crafted ceramics, carpets, and metal objects are relegated to a chapter titled *Haus- und Kunstgewerbe*. Curiously, even the Middle Ages are omitted entirely from the *Baukunst* chapter. Its scattered material remains are discussed in the archaeological chapter, which is otherwise focused on tombstones.

All things considered, the unfamiliar cultural tradition of Bosnia posed structural problems for the narrative framing of this heritage by outsiders. It could not be presented in a way that would make it easily comparable to other Habsburg lands – except for its architectural heritage. Thus, from the editors' perspective, a history of 'Bosnian' architecture that excluded ruined and adapted buildings basically began with the Ottomans.

Periodization: Politics or culture?

Kellner's architectural survey is divided into only two periods translating as "the period of Ottoman administration" and "the period of Habsburg administration."¹⁶ The emphasis on the term 'administration' is worth questioning here; a political framework's use to narrate artistic production was not the context of choice in any other *Kronprinzenwerk* volume. Instead, a sequence of styles, as in standard art history, was the preferred mode of narration.

Was the Bosnian chapter's foregrounding of politics over aesthetics due to a scheme to diminish the ubiquitous Ottoman legacy to that of a mere episode in a longer sequence? In the text, the two periods are indeed – if in passing – contrasted with regard to how, and for which art forms, they were conducive (or not). Did this reflect the regime's desired perception as a body administering something that existed independent of it, to suggest that local creative forces could be mobilized differently in accordance with who (and how well one) managed them?

Of course, here as elsewhere it is almost impossible to say which of the formulations were due to Kellner and which to his editors and superiors. Of significant interest in this regard is the fact that Kellner published only one

15 Kellner (1901), p. 414. ("Vorwiegend ist es die Baukunst, die durch das neue Culturelement einen erfrischenden Impuls erhält.")

16 *Ibid.*, p. 413, 429.

year later a text he more unpretentiously called “Contributions to an architectural history of Bosnia.”¹⁷ It now included the Roman and medieval periods and excluded the Habsburg period, which he may not have thought of as sufficiently ancient to include. The section on Ottoman architecture is almost entirely identical in both texts. Yet, publishing outside the framework of the *Kronprinzenwerk*, he chose to label it “the Mohammedan period” rather than “the period of Ottoman administration.” As a private person, a cultural rather than political framework may have made more sense to Kellner. However, for the reasons discussed above, the *Kronprinzenwerk* was simply edited to conform to a different logic.

Modes of narration: Typology, survey, illustration

Kellner's survey in the *Kronprinzenwerk* was neither in title nor in content a truly historical one. It dealt with an artistic genre – architecture – and not with the history of architecture. In that way, past and present could be combined and compared. There was an evident imbalance, however: the well-informed survey of Bosnia's Ottoman architecture covers three quarters of the text, the Habsburg period the remaining quarter. Oddly, both sections follow different narrative structures, and neither proceeds chronologically.

Ottoman architecture is presented in accordance with a typological classification, starting with mosques, schools, and dervish convents – all of which are tacitly assigned to a common category of religious architecture. Among the secular buildings, bathhouses and commercial structures are highlighted as occasionally of artistic relevance. Towards the end, townscapes, bridges, and transport infrastructures are discussed. Among the townscapes, those of Sarajevo, Mostar, Travnik, and Počitelj are singled out as “unambiguously Mohammedan creations.”¹⁸ One can sense an appreciation here, probably echoed in the fact that so many picturesque townscapes are depicted throughout the volume, though mostly in other chapters (Fig. 2).

17 Kellner (1902).

18 Kellner (1901), p. 424 (“spezifisch mohammedanische Schöpfungen”).




Fig. 2: Town views of Počitelj, Travnik, Stolac, and Jajce in the *Kronprinzenwerk's* volume on Bosnia, in original drawings (before 1901) by Rudolf Otto von Ottenfeld (left top/bottom) and Gyula Hány (right top/bottom), Austrian National Library POR Pk 1131, 1551; Pk 1131, 952, Pk 1131, 1550; Pk 1131, 948.

Buildings from the Habsburg period, by contrast, are then presented in accordance with their stylistic affiliation – with the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, etc. Special attention is devoted to buildings in the Orientalizing style, which account for a quarter of the illustrations in the *Baukunst* chapter. The accompanying text emphasizes the government's resolve towards a “preservation and revival of the Arab style.”¹⁹ As if to further that claim, it is mentioned that the government had sent an architect to Cairo to document specified monuments there in detail. These drawings were then used to decorate Sarajevo's

19 Ibid, p. 432. (“besondere Aufmerksamkeit wendet die Regierung der Erhaltung und Wiederbelebung des arabischen Stils zu”).

City Hall (Fig. 3). It is worth emphasizing that the origins of the ‘Oriental’ or ‘Mohammedan’ style to be revived were thus sought in the Arab lands rather than the Ottomans’. That dynasty’s architectural heritage is only briefly mentioned as derivative of a Byzantine tradition.²⁰




Fig. 3: Sarajevo, former City Hall, 1892–95 (various architects), in drawing of 1898 by Bartolomeo Knopfmacher for use in the Kronprinzenwerk, Austrian National Library POR Pk 1131, 1146

The chapter’s illustrations mostly but not entirely reflect the text’s focus. In a way, they can be said to constitute a parallel text. Seven of the twelve images concern buildings associated with the Muslim community (among which are five Ottoman and two Habsburg buildings; Fig. 4, green frames). Only two images – the new Catholic cathedral and the later theatre – feature buildings in standard Central European Historicist forms (Fig. 4, blue frames). Eight

20 Ibid, p. 433 (“gründliche Studien des seither verstorbenen Regierungsarchitekten Alexander Wittek, besonders an der Sultan Hasan-Moschee in Cairo und an der aus dem XV. Jahrhunderte stammenden Grabmoschee des Sultan Kait-Bai nächst Cairo [haben] die Basis gebildet”) and p. 414 (“der centrale Kuppelbau nach byzantinischem Muster und zwar vorwiegend als monumentaler Steinbau [wird] sehr häufig angewendet”).

of the twelve images are either Ottoman or in an Orientalizing style (Fig. 4, red frames), making the chapter's aesthetic impression heavily Oriental. The two heritage objects associated with the Orthodox community may simply have been chosen so as to also have that heritage represented (Fig. 4, purple frames).²¹

21 The two illustrations with Orthodox motifs would have fit just as well in the regional-topographical survey. They correspond to a minor section in the text, in which Christian works from the Ottoman period are marginally addressed, using terms such as "poor" and "sad" to describe them. Cf. Kellner (1901), p. 413. ("[die kümmerlichen Schöpfungen der christlichen Baukunst dieser Epoche]") and p. 414 ("Illustration des traurigen Zustandes der religiösen christlichen Baukunst"). They may have been included so as to not be reproached for underselling Bosnia's Orthodox majority.




Fig. 4: The 22 pages of the Kronprinzenwerk's Bosnian volume's "Baukunst" chapter: green marks buildings associated with the Muslim community, blue marks buildings in standard Central European Historicist forms, red frames mark buildings either Ottoman or in an Orientalizing style, and purple marks heritage objects associated with the Orthodox community.

Highlights: A canon prefigured

Finally, it can also be remarked that the chapter is not a cultural history in the sense that it highlights accomplishments and seeks to link them chronologically or geographically. Kellner presents his typology, and for some building types he has little more to say than that we must not look for major accomplishments in which.²² More than an appreciation, this is a taxonomy.

Kellner was clearly most interested in the mosques. The relative abundance of monumental examples of this functional type certainly facilitated their comparative appraisal. Presented and related are mosques not only in Sarajevo but throughout the country. Thus, he prefigured here what was to become the canon of noteworthy buildings.²³

The paramount monument is the mosque of Gazi Hüsrev Bey (Bosnian *Gazi Husrev-beg*) in Sarajevo, known as the Begova Mosque, completed in AH 938 (CE 1530/1). It claims one of only two full-page illustrations in the chapter, engraved from an accurate drawing by Rudolf Bernt, a trained architect (Fig. 5). A vantage point facing eastward was chosen – perhaps from the upper storey of a bazaar shop – so as to include all distinctive elements in one single picture: the large central dome and one of the two lateral domes, indicating architectural ambition; the minaret and the portico. The ablution fountain to the left is also allowed some prominence. This was actually a Habsburg-period reconstruction (Fig. 6),²⁴ as was the Orientalizing decoration on the portico's rear wall (Fig. 7), but that fact is not stated in the text. The Habsburg-period additions seem to have been thought of as blending in with the historical structure or even as embellishing it, as was claimed for its redecorated interior, which was not chosen for illustration.²⁵

22 E.g. *ibid.*, p. 422 (“Profanbauten haben die Mohammedaner in den seltensten Fällen monumentalen Charakter gegeben”).

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 414–8.

24 See Hartmuth (forthcoming).

25 Kellner (1901, p. 416) only stresses that the interior was redecorated in multicolor during the Habsburg period, and that it added to its grandeur (“prachtvolle Wirkung des Innenraumes wird gehoben durch reiche [vor einigen Jahren ausgeführte] Polychromirung”). This section is notably missing in the 1902 survey by Kellner, which may indicate that the editors of the *Kronprinzenwerk* had required him to include it. Some contemporaries had apparently thought that this decoration was an eyesore: Truhelka (1912), p. 162: “islikana je džamija iznova a te sadanje slikarije doimlju se



Fig. 5: Sarajevo, Begova Mosque, 1530/1, in drawing (from before 1901) by Rudolf Bernt for use in the Kronprinzenwerk, Austrian National Library POR Pk 1131, 286.

posmatrača kao na žalost neuspjeli pokus, da se orijentalnim arhitektonskim formama najbolje dobe priljubi ornamentika modernog arhitekta, koji je više vadio impulse iz svoje fantazije, nego li iz onog upravo neiscrpivog vrela prebujne orijentalne umjetnosti"). This possible controversy may have led to the fact that no depiction from the mosque's interior was included.



Fig. 6: Sarajevo, Begova Mosque, canopied ablution fountain with wooden canopy (replaced with a replica in recent years) over faux-Ottoman stone basin (1893), Arch. Hans Niemeczek, photographed by Auguste Léon in 1912, Musée Albert Kahn, photo ID A1718.



Fig. 7: Sarajevo, Begova Mosque, portico wall with decorations of 1885 (later over-painted), Arch. Hans Niemeczek, photographed by Auguste Léon in 1912, Musée Albert Kahn, photo ID A1715.




Fig. 8: Foča, Aladža džamija, in drawing of 1897 by Hugo Charlement for use in the Kronprinzenwerk, Austrian National Library POR 1131, 710.

The Begova Mosque was certainly the most-reported Ottoman building in Bosnia. It was featured in travel guides; a model of it was exhibited in Vienna and elsewhere.²⁶ The other full-page image is devoted to the famous interior of the so-called Coloured Mosque of Foča (Fig. 8) which dated to the mid-16th century. The artist, Hugo Charlemont, added two praying men to the composition, imbuing this image with an ethnographic, perhaps Orientalist, quality. Again, the vantage point was cleverly chosen so that key elements of the mosque interior could be incorporated: prayer niche, pulpit, squinches, and – most importantly – what remained of the much-praised historical decoration. For the Austro-Hungarians, this uniquely preserved interior, erroneously believed to draw upon original Arabic and Persian motifs,²⁷ figured as a sort of museum of Oriental art. It, too, was standardly recommended in travel guides and featured in publications.²⁸

A third Ottoman monument standardly featured was the *medrese* of Gazi Hüsrev Bey (*Gazi Husrev-begova medresa*) inaugurated in AH 943 (CE 1537). It is described in a lengthy paragraph and depicted in a bipartite illustration with a facade view and a courtyard view. In all three cases, these buildings and their interiors were described in detail in older publications that Kellner could base his elaborations on.²⁹

Conclusion: Prevalence and persistence of the Oriental

What did contemporaries mean when they spoke of ‘preservation’ with regard to Bosnia’s architectural inheritance? My impression is that style, perceived as an expression of a community’s collective culture, was foregrounded over material historicity. In this discourse, there was little differentiation between an ‘Oriental style’ of old and new. The Oriental stylistic tradition that Kellner presented was not only *not* interrupted by the end of Ottoman rule; it was even rejuvenated thereafter. Style was divorced from the Ottoman political context

26 One public official later authored a seminal monographic study of it, in which he likened its importance to that of the Acropolis for Athens. Truhelka (1912), p. 91: “Ko će si na primjer pomisliti Atenu bez Akropole, Pariz bez Louvrea, Zagreb bez Svetoga Kralja, a *si parva licet comparare magnis*, Sarajeva bez Begove džamije?”

27 Kellner (1901), p. 418 (“arabische Formen mit persischen Anklängen”).

28 See e.g. the extensive appreciation in the popular panorama by Renner (1896), pp. 144–8.

29 Notably Stix (1887).

and construed as a living tradition of the Bosnians. This teleology was supported by the fact that eight out of the twelve images in that chapter concern either Ottoman or Orientalizing buildings (Fig. 4, red frames). The latter were, in a way, proposed as a progression of the former.

In addition, the interest in preservation was focused less on individual buildings, which only occasionally enthused the expatriates, than on the townscapes, ensembles, and picturesque settings that enchanted many a visitor from across the Sava. However, the removal of dilapidated objects soon amounted to a loss of character that the new buildings could not compensate. While it was undisputed that ramshackle structures should make way for improvements, buildings identified as noteworthy were preserved, restored, and advertized. From the viewpoint of the restorers, the buildings' Oriental qualities were even emphasized – just as new buildings in an Orientalizing style were seen as a contribution to the preservation of a cultural tradition, even when they replaced actual historical structures.³⁰

This strongly distinguishes Sarajevo from other Balkan capitals around 1900. Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade aimed for a transformation in which the remains of the Ottoman period would successively disappear from view. The emerging nations of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia staked the claim of belonging to modern Europe through the architecture of their capitals.³¹ In Sarajevo, by contrast, what is often perceived as a concerted Europeanization appears more like a logical consequence of adjusted frameworks – notably building codes – than of premeditated grand designs.³² The persistence of reminders of the Ottoman past was not put into question – much like the presence of Muslims that continued to use them. In effect, these buildings were a useful constituent in an iconography translating into the townscape the political narrative of conciliatory modernization. It is no coincidence that, purportedly, the world's first mosque to be electrified was Sarajevo's Begova, in 1898.

Even so, in empire-wide appraisals these buildings remained outsiders. While the purpose of the *Kronprinzenwerk* volume on Bosnia may have been to lay the foundations for the assimilation of those buildings and their perceived successors into an empire-wide cultural narrative, one cannot help but get the impression that many, if not most, readers may still have conceived of them

30 Kellner (1901), p. 343 and Hartmuth (2010).

31 On this regional context, see Hartmuth (2007).

32 On building codes, see Jäger-Klein et al. (2021). On the construction business, see Sparks (2014).

as something else: as trophies concluding a centuries-long struggle with the Ottoman archenemy.

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Note: Articles in the newspapers *Bosnische Post* and *Vatan* are referenced in the footnotes.

Ottoman until proven otherwise

Mutations of the Behram-beg mosque in Tuzla, 1540–2021

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Abstract: *How do we understand authenticity when discussing a building that went through several different construction phases? Is only its initial and intended state considered 'original'? Can local memory influence its perceived authenticity? Using the Behram-beg mosque in Tuzla as a case study, this paper seeks answers to these questions by examining transformations the mosque experienced since its construction in 1888, followed by interventions around 1895, in the 1960s and since 2018. It also addresses the newly uncovered wall decoration from the late 19th century, as well as the change in the object's cultural significance brought about by the ongoing restoration/reconstruction project.*

The story of the Behram-beg mosque will be told in two parts. After a brief discussion of the persistence or rediscovery of Ottoman architecture in Bosnia, the first sections will discuss the mosque's history since the 16th century, with a focus on the present building's construction around 1888 and a major intervention of ca. 1895. The second part of the paper takes place in the present. It will revolve around the implementation of the mosque's reconstruction project of 2018 and the results of an empirical study, conducted by the author in 2022, with the goal of using the object as a case study for a better understanding of transformation versus authenticity. It questioned whether a building can ever *be*, or rather *stay* unchanged.

What we will find is that there is no simple or straightforward answer to these inquiries. As discussed in the paper's final part, there appears to be a significant difference between the objective and subjective ways of looking at the Behram-beg mosque. The objective point of view is, at least in their own perception, usually coming from fields of architecture and art history, in which the building's authenticity is determined solely by hard facts stated by experts who

are able to properly identify, date, and categorize the object in question. The subjective point of view is usually taken by the local population and formed on the basis of (oftentimes suggestive and/or outright fabricated) collective memory and oral history.

The long shadow of Ottoman Bosnia

For more than four centuries, specifically from 1463 to 1878, Bosnia was ruled by the Ottoman Empire.¹ This greatly impacted the area's cultural and religious development – with Islam becoming the region's dominant religion. The conversion to Islam of the Bosnian population did not occur instantaneously, but rather at a moderate pace and variable rate, brought about by the economic and political stability the Ottoman Empire established upon its arrival, as well as the urbanization of the land.² By the 17th century, many settlements, such as Sarajevo, the capital city, and other larger towns such as Banja Luka, Travnik, and Tuzla, had evolved into typically Ottoman provincial urban centers with mosques, *medresas*, *mektebs*, *hamams*, and trading markets.³

Since the end of the Ottoman period, the building typology of Bosnian mosques went through different phases – only to, interestingly enough, make a full circle and return to Ottoman archetypes. During the 16th and 17th centuries, wooden mosques with a steep hipped roof and a minaret rising from it represented a typical traditional type of a neighborhood or *mahala* mosque.⁴ The steady urbanization of Bosnia also saw more representative mosques in selected city centers. Their building typology was more recognizably Ottoman, and they were larger and built of solid material, with a prominent portico and a pencil shaped minaret. They could either have a hipped or tented roof or a central dome, rarely supported by semi-domes. In Tuzla, the Jalska and Čaršijska mosques are examples of such a mixed traditional/monumental type (Fig. 1&2), built of solid materials but lacking a dome.⁵

1 Malcolm (1996), p. 11; pp. 43–4.

2 Kadrić (2017), p. 277.

3 Malcolm (1996), p. 68.

4 Jahić (2019), p. 6. A great example of such a neighbourhood mosque in Tuzla is the Džindijska mosque (a.k.a Husein Čauš mosque) from the 16th century.

5 Hadžimehanović (1982), pp. 114–26.



Fig. 1–2: Tuzla, Jalska and Čaršijska mosques. Sources: Photograph by Ajla Bajramović (2018) and Karić (2008), p. 24.

Under Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia (1878–1918) there was an attempt to change the urban and religious landscape of the country. When it came to mosques, the most familiar Ottoman mosque type was questioned in favor of mosques in a new Orientalizing style.⁶ The main case study of this paper, the Behram-beg mosque, is a prime example of that new style, and will be discussed at length in the following pages. After the period of Habsburg rule ended and the Kingdom (1918–41) and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945–92) were formed and dissolved, there was yet another shift in the visual appearance of Bosnian mosques.⁷ Next to a handful of modernist mosques, a neo-Ottoman aesthetic has triumphed since the 1960s, most likely due to its

6 Like Hartmuth's, this paper forms part a project that received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement No. 758099 – project "Islamic Architecture and Orientalizing Style in Habsburg Bosnia, 1878–1918", 2018–2023, PI: Maximilian Hartmuth. Information on the project's goals and achievements, as well as output papers and presentations, can be viewed on the project's official website: <https://ercbos.univie.ac.at>.

7 Malcolm (1996), pp. 161–3.

recognizable and simply achieved monumentality. Today, in almost every corner of Bosnia one can stumble upon a simple, usually white, rectangular building with two rows of windows, a pencil minaret, a dome or a hipped roof, and few decorative elements whether in- or outside of the mosque.

Between the Ottoman era and today are several influential historical periods, and yet, according to a 2013 census, the majority of the Bosnian population (52 percent) identified with the Muslim faith.⁸ This points to the fact that the amalgamation of 400 years of Ottoman rule and Bosnian identity could not be so easily overwritten by the events of the past century. This bond is still visible to this day, as it is expressed through carefully cultivated cultural, political, and touristic relationships between Bosnia and Turkey.⁹ It is, perhaps, also for this reason that no specifically *Bosnian* mosque type or style developed in recent times. A simplified version of Ottoman forms remains the preferred norm throughout the country, in which many mosque projects were also Turkish-funded. So, instead of a de-Ottomanization, it could be said that Bosnia is currently experiencing a re-Ottomanization, perhaps even a form of Turkification. This particular phenomenon is a central topic to this paper, as it aims to use the Behram-beg mosque to inspect the contemporary construction of a, in this case at least, inaccurate idea of Ottoman heritage in people's collective memory.

The architectural history of the Behram-beg mosque

The Ottoman period building(s), 1540–1871

Not much information on the state of the mosque prior to the Habsburg period is available. Next to 'Behram-begova', the mosque was also known amongst the people as the *Atik* (old) or *Šarena* (colorful) mosque. It is referred to as *old* since the first written sources, dating it back to around 1540, which insinuate that it was Tuzla's first mosque.¹⁰ Yet, it is not known who built it or how it looked like

8 U.S. Department of State, 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available online: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-international-religious-freedom/bosnia-and-herzegovina/> (Last accessed September 2020).

9 Karić, Rašidagić & Aydın (2021), p. 104.

10 Hadžimehanović (1982), p. 119.

at that time. At some point during the 17th century a certain Behram-beg is said to have settled in town. He purchased the land on which the old mosque stood, rebuilt it, added a *medresa* nearby, and founded a *waqf* (Bosnian *vakuf*) to support them. These new objects survived for almost 200 years, up until the Tuzla city fire of 1871 when both the mosque and *medresa* burned to the ground.¹¹ It was not until 1888 that both were rebuilt, now under Habsburg supervision. The questions that arise are why that process took so long, and why the two objects were rebuilt by the new administration in the first place.

The Habsburg-period rebuilding of ca. 1888

Wishing to establish effective state regulation and adequate supervision over waqf-owned lands, the Habsburg government founded the Waqf Commission (*Vakuf-Commission*) in 1883.¹² This meant that all *waqfs* in Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed under the control of government-appointed opinion-leaders of the Muslim community. Most likely, the Behram-beg mosque and *medresa*, as they belonged to the Behram-beg's *waqf*, were rebuilt under the supervision of the mentioned commission, explaining why governmental architects and engineers were involved with these objects in the first place. According to an article published in an Austrian engineers' journal in 1888, reporting on a study trip in May of the same year, the new mosque was attributed to an Austro-Hungarian engineer named Franz von Mihanović (sometimes also spelt Mihanovich). It was then described as a "newly built" creation styled on "Arabic models."¹³ Important to mention is that the Behram-beg mosque was the first mosque in Bosnia rebuilt in the newly fashionable Orientalizing architectural style. This means that it not only transformed its own visual appearance in comparison to the previous two models, but it also influenced a whole generation of Orien-

11 Kreševljaković (1991), p. 98.

12 Donia (1981), p. 23.

13 Körtz (1888), p. 321. The article describes the Behram-beg mosque as follows: „Hierauf wurde die schön gelegene neue Dzamja (Moschee) in Augenschein genommen, welche, nach arabischen Vorbildern vom Kreis – Ingenieur Herrn v. Mihanovich projectirt, durch ihre zierliche Architektur und geschmackvolle Farbenzusammenstellung einen angenehmen Eindruck macht. Das bescheidene Budget für diesen Bau – die Kosten sind mit fl. 10.000 veranschlagt – wird durch einen Beitrag der Landesregierung und freiwillige Spenden gedeckt.“

talizing buildings in Bosnia. But why pursue such a significant project in the small industrial town of Tuzla?¹⁴

With the arrival of Austro-Hungarian rule, a shift in Bosnia's urban landscape of the country occurred. Next to promoting industrialization and improved infrastructure and transportation systems, the new administration started building in a particular, Orientalizing style of architecture, mostly directed toward the Muslim population of Bosnia, with the goal of both accepting and exoticizing the country's 'Oriental' tradition. Its stylistic vocabulary reveals diverse Islamic influences.¹⁵ There are certain Orientalizing architectural elements used so often that they became known as markers of the style, such as the banded façade, inspired by Mamluk *ablaq* masonry, and horseshoe shaped and multifoil arches and windows, inspired by the Islamic architecture of al-Andalus and the Alhambra in particular.¹⁶ By employing the Orientalizing style on various religious, administrative, and residential objects throughout Bosnia, the administration's goal was most likely to broadcast tolerance toward Muslim traditions and preserve Bosnia's evocative alterity.¹⁷

That may have been the primary reason the Waqf Commission allocated the money and the means to rebuild the Behram-beg mosque after the city fire, but it still does not explain its monumental appearance. According to photographic evidence dated to shortly after 1888, this was a large square building with a dome, a portico, and a minaret attached to the western corner (Fig. 3). The mosque's façade was wrapped in horizontal bands, most likely originally painted in the colors of ochre and crimson. Its intricate wooden portico was composed of Alhambresque arcades with multifoil arches and an S-shaped shed roof.

14 Hadžibegović (2004), p. 187. Located in northeastern Bosnia, Tuzla is both the capital of a canton as well as the region's largest town. During the Ottoman period, it was a smaller settlement mostly dealing with salt mining as well as crafts and trade. Under Austro-Hungarian rule, Tuzla became a regional industrial center, which is a role it fulfills to this day.

15 For a more substantial overview of the implementation of the Orientalizing style in Habsburg Bosnia, see Hartmuth (2018).

16 For a more substantial overview of the European Orientalizing architecture, see Koppelkam (2015).

17 Bajramović (2021), pp. 101–9.



Fig. 3: Tuzla, Behram-beg mosque, historic photograph, dated prior to 1895. Source: Family archive of Srećko Škrobić, used with permission.

An architectural element that was up until that moment nonexistent in Bosnian building vocabulary, and interestingly enough never repeated since, is the Orientalizing minaret in a square base. Its platform was topped with a bulbous cupola surmounting several wooden multifoil arches carried by thin cast iron rods. The dome of the Behram-beg mosque was a standalone hol-

low dome featuring a thin tambour decorated with a stucco band and several small window openings. The dome's wooden frame was most likely covered with sheet metal. Its shape resembled more the Orientalizing domes of the Elephant House in Budapest's zoo or the Potsdam-Sanssouci steam engine house than it resembled typical domes in Istanbul.




Fig. 4–5: Comparison between the drawing by Franz Schmoranz depicting a detail of the mausoleum window from the Qalawun complex (from Ebers 1879, p. 290) and photograph (by the author, 2021) of the biforate windows of the Behram-beg mosque in Tuzla.

Upon closer inspection of the Behram-beg mosque's outer appearance, one may wonder where Mihanović got the inspiration for such an object. One possible theory is that he must have been acquainted with or had purposefully sought out the available literature on the topic of Islamic architecture (of Cairo and al-Andalus, that is), and succeeded in getting his hands on publications by the architects and engineers Julius Franz Pasha, Max Herz Pasha, and/or

Franz Schmoranz.¹⁸ From the example of Schmoranz's illustration showing a detail of the mausoleum window in Cairo's Qalawun complex and subsequently published in Georg Ebers' *Aegypten in Bild und Wort* (1879), we may infer that it served as a direct inspiration for the windows of the Behram-beg mosque (Fig. 4–5). Their similarity suggests this was a medium through which knowledge of Islamic architecture reached Austro-Hungarian architects and engineers operating in Vienna, Budapest, or Bosnia.

A major intervention ca. 1895

At some point before 1893, when a photograph shows a domeless mosque, the dome of the Behram-beg mosque must have been damaged and then dismantled. The reason for this is most likely the unwelcoming climate of northeastern Bosnia, with frequent rainfall and snow compromising the light dome construction. Since the mosque's interior appears to have remained unscathed, it is safe to assume that the dome did not collapse but was rather purposefully taken off. According to the construction documentation from 1895, the dome was ultimately replaced with a hipped roof (Fig. 6). The same year several other changes to the outer appearance of the mosque transpired. Instead of the portico's thin columns supporting the multifoil arches and a shed roof, a larger, much sturdier, construction was implemented. The new portico maintained a vaguely similar form, but was carried on massive square pillars supporting horseshoe arches and a smaller half-tented roof with three slopes rising to a peak. Nothing on the adaptation plan indicated that the portico was going to be altered, nor is this change explained in any of the written sources. However, there is a possibility that the original porch suffered damage along with the dome, or during its dismantling. On the other hand, it is also probable that it was upgraded to a sturdier material in order to prevent it from suffering the same fate as the dome. The banded façade first remained unchanged, as photographs from after the intervention show. By the 1930s, however, the entire facade was covered in white or beige paint (Fig. 7). The reason for the overpainting of the colored stripes could not be ascertained.

18 Ibid., pp. 9–19.




Fig. 6: Plan documentation of the 1895 adaptation project showing the solution for a new hipped roof. Adapted from Krzović (1987), p. 50.



Fig. 7: A postcard image of the Behram-beg mosque in the 1950s, without the banded façade and with a new portico. See Bajramović (2021), p. 189.

Excursus on decorative layers recently uncovered

Since the major intervention in 1895, the Behram-beg mosque remained mostly unchanged. Due to a lack of maintenance and general interest in the upkeep of religious objects during the Yugoslav period, it was left without any major repair or restoration work since the 1960s, when the mosque was equipped with electricity and the interior wall decoration was covered with wallpaper.¹⁹ The lack of care caused it to start deteriorating, to the point of its roof and portico collapsing as well as the façade chipping off, exposing the rubble masonry underneath. It was not until 2018 when the mosque was finally approved for a major restoration project. During the project's initial phases, the interior of the building was inspected and the layers of wall paint

¹⁹ Vesković (2016), pp. 1–2.

in some parts of the mosque were stripped one by one. If the dome was indeed taken down purposefully, this suggests that the interior wall decoration from 1888 would still be preserved – and it was. However, what was unexpected was identification of another layer of wall decoration, most likely belonging to the adaptation phase of 1895.²⁰

Having an overview of these three layers is interesting for two reasons. One, their historical existence had not been established thus far. Two, their existence raises the additional question of which of them should be restored. Both impact the heritage object's perception.

The third, last applied layer, which dates back roughly to the 1960s, consists of a basic wallpaper with a repetitive pattern of light blue squares with dark blue and violet floral ornaments, placed throughout the ground and biforate zones of the mosque. On the biforate window axis, there is a horizontally placed sequence of painted blue circles inscribed with calligraphy. There are nine of them in total, two on the *mihrab* wall, four on the southwestern, and three on the northwestern wall, placed directly underneath each upper window from the central prayer area.

The second layer of wall decoration most likely dates to the adaptation phase of 1895. According to the conservator's report, retrieving this layer was problematic because the wallpaper was applied over it without a coat of protective adhesive, making it difficult to separate the two.²¹ However, they did manage to isolate a single decorative band from the ground level. It shows an intricate arabesque-like ornamentation in blue, yellow, and red, with a black background. Judging by the uncovered band itself, it is difficult to accurately say what kind of decoration it was and what it actually represented.

In an attempt to corroborate the thesis that this layer indeed belonged to the adaptation of 1895, I compared the isolated band to a postcard from Tuzla dated to 1899. It is titled "Innerer Theil einer Moschee" (inner part of a mosque), and, comparing the shapes of the windows and the wooden *minbar*, it can be established that it indeed depicted the Behram-beg mosque. On the postcard, only a segment of the ground and biforate zone is visible. The wall decorations of the ground floor consisted of large square panels placed between the windows and filled with intricate ornamentation. As far as I could discern, interchanging narrow and wide vertical bands of repetitive ornamental/decorative

20 I would like to thank Mr. Elmedin ef. Avdibašić and the *Medžlis Islamske zajednice Tuzla* for making these documents available to me.

21 Vesković (2016), p. 29.

and vegetal motifs were painted, visually matching the band of wall decoration isolated in 2018. Considering that the band was only the second of three layers of wall paint and that a very similar vegetal pattern can be seen on a postcard from 1899, when the Behram-beg mosque had already lost its dome, portico, and banded façade, the singular band from the ground floor can tentatively be dated to 1895 (Fig. 8).




Fig. 8: Photo manipulation comparing isolated band of the second layer of wall decoration and the interior depicted on the 1899 postcard. See Bajramović 2021, p. 53, 160, 195.

Lastly, the first layer of the wall decoration was fairly easy to uncover for the conservators, as it was painted on wet plaster.²² Due to the fact that this

22 Ibid.

particular painting technique was used, it is most likely that this layer dates back to 1888, when the mosque was initially rebuilt. The colors used were predominantly orange, red, and blue. On the ground level area, underneath the singular band of the second layer, there seems to be a similar vertically shaped arabesque-like ornamentation, painted in blue and orange. The shapes are outlined with a fine black line and show stylized *fleur-de-lis* motifs (Fig. 10). However, in contrast to the second layer, these shapes look rather one dimensional and naïve in their execution.



Fig. 10: Isolated decorative band from the ground zone, showing a fleur-de-lis motif belonging to the first layer of wall decoration, 2016. Source: Vesković (2016), Fig. 30.

From these findings it can be concluded that there are no major differences in the mosque's wall decorations between the two layers from the Habsburg period. The most obvious distinction is the difference between the color schemes. The first layer favored warmer colors, whereas the second layer seemed to be decorated in cooler tones of black, blue, and red. Other than this, most of the decoration applied during the adaptation phase in 1895 simply followed the already existing layout from 1888 and altered the motifs minimally (the lily motifs changed into a more intricate floral ornamentation). By looking at the lo-

cations of painted elements, as well as the original decoration's general theme, it can be said that during the adaptation phase the already existing decorative setting was only refreshed.

With these layers uncovered, the question arose of how to preserve and present them to the public. The official wording used in the 2018 project to describe the process the mosque is going to go through is *rekonstrukcija* (reconstruction).²³ Its goal is to attempt to restore the building's original appearance, which was either demolished or severely altered. But what is 'original'?

The future of the Behram-beg mosque's past

Since the reconstruction project began, a Facebook page called "Atik Behram-begova – Šarena džamija" posts semi-regular updates on the project's progress.²⁴ In some of the published images showing the mosque's interior it is noticeable that some parts of the interior wall decorations are covered with protective planks, whereas some are left exposed. It is unclear why this is so, and whether the uncovered parts will be completely repainted. Should it be decided to preserve the first layer of wall decoration, from 1888, does that mean that the second layer, from 1895, would be completely eradicated? In addition to the interior renovations, the outer façade has been stripped down to the masonry, the large portico and the minaret were completely removed, and a wooden faux dome has been installed – all with the goal to revert the Behram beg mosque back to its Orientalizing state. This is a look no living person would have witnessed, since the mosque was only shaped like that for a few years between ca. 1888 and ca. 1895.

To make matters even more confusing, this reconstruction project is actually funded through a donation from the *Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü* (Turkish Directorate General of Foundations) to the *Vakufska direkcija islamske zajednice*

23 News article updating the process of the mosque's reconstruction, published by the web portal of the Media Center of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina: <https://www.preporod.info/bs/article/29137/poseban-arhitektonski-izraz-rekonstrukcija-sarene-dzamiije-u-tuzli-se-privodi-kraju> (Last accessed November 2022).

24 The Facebook group "Atik Behram-begova – Šarena džamija" is accessed through <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100076164667038> (Last accessed February 2023).

Bosne i Hercegovine (Waqf directorate of the Bosnian Islamic society).²⁵ Thus, a Turkish governmental institution that manages *waqfs* dating back to the Ottoman Empire donated money to a project the goal of which is to reconstruct an Austro-Hungarian mosque inspired not by Ottoman architecture but rather by the architecture of Islamic Spain and Cairo.

To be sure, the object itself was built on the land owned by the Behram-beg *waqf*, but the shape into which the mosque is being returned must be credited to Austro-Hungarian efforts. This fact is carefully omitted, from most secondary and internet sources, as well as from the large panel placed in front of the building site informing bypassers of the Turkish Directorate's involvement in the project (Fig. 9). Should this be read as a claim for ownership over its Orientalizing look or as a rebranding of the mosque as Ottoman? Several generations of locals consider the mosque's original shape to be the one with a tented roof, massive portico, and pale façade. Its originally more heavily Orientalizing version is not widely known outside academic circles. Due to the lack of general awareness of the architectural history of not only this object but most buildings erected in Bosnia for use by Muslims during the Austro-Hungarian period, a further disassociation between the Behram-beg mosque and the Christian-connoted Habsburg empire is fostered. And why would anyone question it? The mosque's name clearly identifies it as belonging to the Ottoman heritage, which seemingly explains the Turkish involvement in its reconstruction. Upon the project's completion, a person with a trained eye might be able to recognize the Orientalizing elements as likely non-Ottoman. But what about ordinary citizens? What, if anything, does the Orientalizing version of Behram-beg's mosque mean to them?

In the spring of 2022, I conducted a survey to investigate the degree of local historical awareness of the Behram-beg mosque's architecture. 100 people participated,²⁶ of which 50 were teenagers (between fourteen and eighteen years of age) attending the High School of Applied Arts and Architecture in Tuzla,

25 This information is made public on the official website of the Institute for the Protection and Use of the Cultural Natural and Historical Heritage of Tuzla (*Zavod za zaštitu i korištenje kulturno historijskog i prirodnog nasljeđa Tuzlanskog kantona*): <http://bastina.ba/index.php/bobovac/40-zavod/vijesti/655-u-toku-su-radovi-na-rekonstrukciji-behram-begove-dzamiye-u-tuzli> (Last accessed January 2019).

26 I would like to thank Amina Šečić and Amra Delalić for their help in conducting the survey.

and the remaining 50 were employees of the Municipality of Tuzla, with an age range from 28 to 60.



Fig. 9: Current state of the Behram-beg mosque with the Turkish flag in front. Source: Photographed by Ajla Bajramović in January 2023.

The survey consisted of four questions, with three optional answers provided for the first three and an open answer for the fourth. The first question asked participants to locate the object in Tuzla's urban area, with three choices. The second one asked when it could have been built, whether in the Ottoman, Habsburg, or Yugoslav periods. The third question asked the participants why they think the mosque came to be referred to as the 'colourful' one: because of its colourful interior, because of a once colourful façade, or for other reasons.

The fourth question then asked the participants to compare two images, one showing the pre-reconstruction state (thus without dome and striped façade) and one showing the reconstruction project (with reconstructed dome and repainted façade). They were then invited to choose which of the two versions better befits Tuzla's urban identity and briefly explain why.

71 percent responded that they think the mosque dates back to the Ottoman period; 64 percent stated that the reconstructed Orientalizing version would fit better with the urban identity of the town. Almost all of those (36 percent) who argued for leaving the mosque in the shape it was in for most of the 20th century wanted this for the sake of “preserving its authenticity,” or something to that effect, whereas some of the arguments for its new, Orientalizing look were that it is “simply prettier,” “looks more important,” “looks unique,” or “has a better construction.”

Interestingly, a handful of people wrote that they would find the Orientalizing version of the mosque very fitting, as it would stylistically fit well with the entrance portal to the Behram-beg *medresa*, thus recognizing the stylistic similarity of the two buildings.

The Behram-beg *medresa* had, as the name suggests, also belonged to the *waqf* of Behram-beg.²⁷ In 1892 it was decided that a building that must have perished early was to be rebuilt at a cost of 16,000 forints, which would be collected from taxes and donations.²⁸ The “new *medresa*” was officially opened on 29 December 1893.²⁹ This was a polygonal single-story building with a colossal entrance portal, inspired by the Mamluk architecture of Cairo. In 1907 the *medresa* expanded: a floor was added and surmounted by roofs replacing an earlier crenellation. It remained in this altered state until 1974, when it was demolished due to land subsidence, having previously served as a school of medicine.³⁰ Curiously, the monumental portal was rebuilt in a smaller version in its 1893 appearance after the demolition, as a reminder of the *medresa*'s existence. One of the biggest fallacies of this portal is its red and yellow banded facade, with the lintel and parts of the trilobed niche painted blue (Fig. 11–12). None of the original period photographs depicting the madrasa (Bosnian *medresa*), from both 1893 and 1907, show any indication of its being banded.

27 For an in-depth analysis of the Behram-beg *medresa*, see Bajramović (2021), pp. 55–62.

28 *Bošnjak*, 2 (1892), p. 3.

29 *Bošnjak*, 1 (1894), p. 3.

30 This information is available as part of the official finding declaring the Behram-beg *medresa* a national monument by the Commission to Preserve National Monuments of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Text available online: http://old.kons.gov.ba/main.php?id_struct=6&lang=1&action=view&id=3295 (Last accessed December 2020).




Fig. 11–12: Current entrance portal to the Behram-beg madrasa and image from undated postcard. See Bajramović 2021, p. 207, 210.

The participants in the questionnaire who responded that the Orientalizing Behram-beg mosque would tie mosque and *medresa* together and make a sort of ensemble, are most likely not aware that the *medresa*'s portal was never banded and that this feature was added in the 1970s, most likely with the idea of giving the *medresa* a more 'authentic' Oriental look, in comparison to its original monochrome façade. By doing so it would be much easier to link the entrance portal to its religious function, especially because the rest of the building is missing and the only reference to its function can be given through its visual appearance. So, in the case of the *medresa*, the exaggerated Orientalizing style was used to communicate function rather than representing the historical period during which it was initially erected. On the other hand, the Behram-beg mosque is being reconstructed in a style which has little to do with clarifying the buildings' function, as everyone is aware it is a mosque, and has rather more to do with creating an impressive ensemble of buildings in the same peculiar style, with the potential to become a touristic sight of Tuzla.

Nevertheless, in both of them the Orientalizing style was used under false pretense, in a manner that has nothing to do with establishing authenticity. The *medresa* was indeed originally built in the Orientalizing style, with its monumental portal, but by adding the banded façade, the Orientalizing style was amplified and the portal lost its authentic look. The mosque, albeit under the Turkish flag, is being restored back to its Orientalizing version. The works have so far shown little regard to conserving the interior decoration, if the lack of isolation from exterior elements is an indicator. Using the Orientalizing style as a common denominator to (re)create narratives which have little in com-

mon with the actual building history of these objects tells us that, in Tuzla at least, this style is not viewed as an architectural phenomenon of the 19th century brought about by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, but rather as a decorative costume that a building can wear to seem more exotic, and therefore more attractive (Fig. 13–16).



Fig. 13–16: Collage showing the different versions of the Behram-beg mosque. Sources: see above (Fig. 3, 7, 9); last image courtesy of Elmedin ef. Avdibašić.

Conclusion

Since the local population's knowledge of these two buildings' architectural history is already very limited, people can be easily persuaded into associating the banded façade, *muqarnas*, and multifoil arches with something 'pretty', 'unique', or 'important'. Yet, this was not considered authentic to Bosnian architectural heritage. None of the people who stated as their preference in the survey the Orientalizing version of the mosque actually considered that particular look as the original one. Has the idea of something like this ever existing in Tuzla become unfathomable? Is it easier to see it as Ottoman, flaunting a familiar look, having a familiar name, being 'reconstructed' by a familiar country? If we take away the conventional idea of originality and look at the peculiar situation we have here, the original shape of the mosque is something unfamiliar to the people. It will be foreign to people who have prayed there for years, for tour guides who now must incorporate it to their city walk differently, as well as for locals who pass by every day. They may think of it as new, but not relatable. If we look at it objectively, after a century, the Behram-beg mosque is reverting to its authentic exoticizing look. If we look at

it subjectively and through the eyes of current developments and Tuzla's residents, the reconstructed, re-Orientalized Behram-beg mosque will become a symbol of novelty instead of authenticity.

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Monument preservation as an aspect of 20th century Turkish-Hungarian relations

A case study on Gül Baba's Shrine

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Abstract: Major historical events of the 18th and 19th centuries significantly changed judgments of Ottoman-Turkish and Hungarian relations resulting from negative memories of the sultanate's occupation of Hungary in the 16th and 17th centuries. Intensifying Hungarian and Ottoman-Turkish rapprochement at the turn of the 19th-20th century coincided with the emergence of institutionalized monument preservation. This affected both buildings in Turkey related to Hungarian history and monuments of Ottoman origin on Hungarian territory.¹ Therefore, steps taken to mutually protect the respective architectural heritages can be considered a separate case study category in the history of monument preservation.

Interest in the Ottoman architectural heritage in Hungary at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries was fuelled by several factors. It was influenced by a series of cultural diplomacy gestures resulting from the general Hungarian-Ottoman political rapprochement, Turanian ideology in Hungarian intellectual life, and general interest in the art and architecture of Asia and Islamic lands in Europe. This process parallelly emerged with the institutionalisation of monument protection and the first significant steps taken to protect common architectural heritage. One of this process's key monuments is the Shrine (Türbe) of Gül Baba in Buda, which is the subject of monument conservation's earliest catalogues. Thus, the building and its conservation are closely linked to the history of monument protection in Hungary. Furthermore, the building's subsequent research and restoration are symbolic of the developing Hungarian and Ottoman-Turkish diplomatic relations.

1 For an overview of objects related to Hungarian history in Turkey, see <https://www.turkmagyarizi.com>.

This paper investigates the steps and process of restoring the Shrine of Gül Baba as a key monument in the 20th and 21st centuries. Additionally, an attempt is made to outline the main periods and phases for one of the crucial Ottoman monuments in Hungary during the 20th century, with a view to the present day and analysing a significant example of the patrimonialization process. As a result, this monument's preservation can be considered an important aspect of the period's Turkish-Hungarian bilateral relations.

Introduction: Functional definition and the main aspects of the research

During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottomans took possession of the Hungarian Kingdom's central territory, and it became the Ottoman Empire's northern border region for approximately one and a half centuries. This period significantly impacted the area's history. Firstly, because this region was the field of continuous battles, and both the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire used the formerly prosperous land as a buffer zone, with both the population and the townscape – the network of former settlements and built infrastructure – subject to large-scale destruction. However, alongside this destruction, the Ottoman population erected a unique group of buildings with special functions and architectural styles. These Ottoman constructions can be grouped into two main subcategories – those that were converted into a new function from formerly existing buildings (e.g. churches converted into mosques) and newly erected sacral and profane constructions to meet the functional needs of the new population.

Amongst the extant Ottoman buildings in Hungary, military architectural remains have particular importance as the frameworks of the settlements. The stone and brick fortifications intermittently reconstructed are known as *kale*, and *palankas* are the wooden-soil palisades.²

Within the urban texture, the most iconic buildings tended to be mosques. They were usually embedded into larger complexes (*külliyes*),³ which often included baths. Among this category, we may distinguish between baths using thermal water sources (named *ılıca* or *kaplıca*) and baths using heated water (*hamams*).⁴ While examples of these types have survived, the *medreses*, *mek-*

2 Hegyi (2007).

3 Sudár (2014).

4 Papp (2018).

tebs, and *hans* have generally vanished, as have the dervish lodges, or *tekkes*, although there are local examples and some are under archaeological investigation. Little is known about the residential building stock. One reason is that the new Ottoman population generally used the extant buildings. However, the 'Turkish house' in Szigetvár is a known example of Ottoman civil building stock. Groups of public fountains are rare, but their importance in Ottoman times is undoubtable; hence, the importance of the fountain's reconstruction in Pécs.

The most significant problem of the research and, therefore, reconstruction of these Ottoman buildings in Hungary is the limited number that still exist since these buildings generally vanished or changed their functions after the Ottoman period. For example, if we examine the religious buildings, according to written sources, the number of mosques and masjids operating in Hungary during the Ottoman period can be put between 250 and 300.⁵ A significant number of these buildings were not newly erected structures but were built using or modifying existing buildings.⁶ Because these structures were the most iconic examples that carried the layers of the Ottoman period's cultural memory, they were generally destroyed or modified after the conquest.⁷ Therefore, buildings formerly used for mosques, including churches, are a promising basis for identifying Ottoman buildings that are still hidden.⁸

A unique category of Ottoman architecture, which has examples in good condition in Hungary, are memorial buildings. Defining Ottoman memorial architecture is complex since most new buildings erected in Ottoman Hungary were dedicated to a specific person. Generally, this person is the founder, possibly a nobleman registered in the *vakıfnâme*, or the emperor. From this perspective, almost all Ottoman buildings have a memorial purpose.

This paper will focus only on the buildings that have funerary functions and hence a memorial connotation; in this way, not only is the memory held by the structure, but the person's grave is also located in the building.

There are different types of Ottoman funerary memorials. A tombstone (*mezartaşı*) marks a burial site that is not bordered as a space. A shrine (*türbe*) frames a burial site architecturally. The latter type is an important type in the

5 Sudár (2009), p. 630.

6 Sudár (2018).

7 Baku & Kovács (2018), pp. 425–48.

8 Gerelyes (2011), pp. 85–8.

Ottoman architectural heritage of Hungary. Of the at least 17⁹-22¹⁰ shrines built during the 16th and 17th centuries, two can still be visited today: the Shrine of Gül Baba in Buda and the Shrine of İdris Baba in Pécs. Another is under excavation (the memorial Shrine of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent near Szigetvár, in the area of Turbék-Szólóhegy).¹¹ The total number of shrines is an open question, and many are still to be identified and archaeologically excavated. Those that can be currently visited also hold many questions as they have all undergone substantial alterations since the Ottoman period. For this reason, the study of Ottoman shrines and their positioning in relation to the empire (periphery or semi-periphery) is an important area of research in Ottoman architectural history.

Examining the history of a specific shrine in Hungary is a significant issue not only for the general analysis of Ottoman architectural history but also for cultural history. The Shrine of Gül Baba played a vital role in Ottoman-Turkish and Hungarian diplomacy, and because of this, is a unique example and indicator of the two nations' relationship. As one of the Ottoman era's best-preserved buildings, the shrine is located in the northwest of Budapest's Second District – at the edge of different urban textures: the crowded centre and a hilly, green area with mansions. Being one of the most northerly pilgrimage sites in the former Ottoman cultural world, and still attracting many visitors today, it is not surprising that it has been the subject of several studies by Hungarian and Ottoman/Turkish specialists at different periods, each of whom have shaped it to their own needs. These transformations were often symbolic gestures involving substantial and functionally relevant changes (e.g. new windows, change of the covering material of the dome). Thus, by tracing the history of the *türbe*, examining the reasons for the interventions, and also examining the actors and aspects of the current heritage conservation work, we can sketch a picture of the fate of a building erected on the border of two culturally different worlds, of its life before and after monument status, and of its contemporary heritage presentation.

The imprints of the Ottoman era are recorded in the local community's memory and continue to have an impact even after the generations that lived through the events have passed away. Ottoman rule's end also ended a coexistence that subsequent generations often sought to cover up, reform for new

9 Ayverdi (2000), p. 84.

10 Sudár (2013), p. 39; pp. 70–91.

11 Pap & Fodor (2017); Pap (2020).

functions, or demolish. The process of erasing the layers and thus transforming the past into cultural memory continued until the late 19th century; it was only possible to stop and even reverse it in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Due to this area's political and diplomatic environment, a particular need arose to restore this building's Ottoman aspects and add site-sensitive annexes, which today allow the buildings to be identified according to the different cultural layers.¹²

The interest in the Ottoman architectural heritage in Hungary during this period arose from several sources and is a complex issue in itself. To highlight the main aspects, we must first mention the political and diplomatic issues, specifically in Hungary. Besides these factors, this age was the beginning of institutionalised monument preservation in Hungary. The restoration works carried out on the Shrine of Gül Baba in different periods were the result of the actual diplomatic relations between the two countries and had a key symbolic role in them. In this sense, the shrine is not just a historical monument but a unique and prominent indicator of the relationship between the two countries.

Indeed, recording the shrine's history exceeds this paper's limit. Consequently, it aims to highlight and define some key factors that played a role in the monument preservation works carried out, and their effect on the subsequent diplomacy, scientific research, education and culture.

Initially, the building's architectural features will be analysed. Through this, the critical factors of the different monument preservation works will be examined, drawing an approximate picture of the complex patrimonialization that resulted in a contemporary cultural centre complex that developed from a sacred memorial monument of an Ottoman Bektashi dervish in Hungary's capital city. Following this, the factors that played an important role in the structural and environmental changes during the 19th and 20th centuries and the last complex heritage preservation works are examined.

The area now functions as a cultural centre and gardens with an authentically restored monument as its focus.

Gül Baba and the shrine

A dervish from the Bektashi order representing the *tasavvuf* (mysticism) of Islam arrived with the Ottoman armies fighting in the 1541 Buda campaign.

12 Baku & Kovács (2018).

He was called Gül Baba, or Father of Roses.¹³ Gül Baba died soon after the Ottoman conquest of Buda; some legends place his death at the time of the first Friday prayers in the Church of Virgin Mary, freshly converted to the Mosque of Sultan Süleyman. This act linked Buda with the domain of Islam. His funeral was attended by the most influential representatives of the empire, the padishah, Sultan Süleyman, and by the head of the empire's judiciary, the *Rumeli kazaskeri*, Ebussuud Efendi. Following the dervish's death, the third governor-general of Buda, Yahyapaşazade Mehmet built a shrine over his grave at some point between 1543 and 1548. The followers of the Bektashi dervish gathered around him and founded a lodge, or *tekke*, in its environment. Thus, it was built on the hills of northern Buda, a major pilgrimage site for the Muslim world and a valuable object of Sufism and *tasavvuf*. Although the building is now a protected monument, it remains a place of great affection and significance in the hearts of visitors and is remembered with fondness throughout Turkey and other parts of the world.

Gül Baba's shrine fits perfectly into the general category of Ottoman *türbe* buildings of the 16th and 17th centuries. In Ottoman times, the central octagonal plan had a brick-structured hemispherical dome covered with lead and a crescent finial. Its single entrance door opens towards Mecca, the Qibla's direction. Its structure is composed of a wall of limestone masonry; the interior surface is covered with a pink Ottoman base plaster containing brick dust and an unpainted white plaster. Gül Baba's grave is located below the hexagonal brick-tiled (so-called *şeshane*) floor, also perpendicular to the direction of Mecca, above which a symbolic wooden coffin (*sanduka*) stands in the interior.

Regarding the shrine's interior dimensions and wall structure, a regular multiple of the historical Ottoman unit, the so-called *arşın* can be observed.¹⁴ The wall of the Shrine is one *arşın* thick, the contour of the exterior façade corresponds to a 10 x 10 *arşın*s grid, while the interior conforms to a modular grid system of 8 x 8 *arşın*s, and the height of the building is ten *arşın*s. This demonstrates that its interior and exterior are symmetrical on two sides, and a regular, modular grid system can be accurately applied to the shrine's plan. More-

13 Ágoston & Sudár (2002); Yılmaz (2003); Sudár (2022); Tosun Saral (2022).

14 The *arşın* is the characteristic measuring unit in classical Ottoman architecture. 1 *arşın* – also denominated as *dhirā'* – was 0.758 meters, equal to 24 *parmak*, 12 x 24 *khatt*, or 288 x 2 *nokta*. As can be seen on some Ottoman building plans, the interiors and constructions of the buildings were recorded as the integral multiples of the *arşın* unit. See: Ünsal (1963), p. 194; Necipoğlu-Kafadar (1986), p. 231.

over, the nominal size of the door is two *arşıns*. Consequently, it can be assumed quantitatively that the *türbe*'s dimensions were determined according to these units during its construction and, by this, has a regular shape.¹⁵

In addition to its regular architectural shape, the building is characterised by a single window facing the Danube. This is unique in the general architectural features of the Ottoman shrines, a building type characterized by many windows and a bright interior. Also, there was undoubtedly a front roof (porch) over the building's entrance in the Ottoman period, but it later disappeared and is now marked by two console stones. The exact shape of that roof is unknown.

The demolition of the Ottoman front roof is not the only change that occurred to the building during recent centuries. Following the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), which officially ended the Ottoman period in Hungary, the area became the property of the Jesuits, who converted the *türbe* into a chapel dedicated to Saint Joseph. During the Jesuits' ownership, the Ottoman lead-covering was replaced by shingles, raised, and a small lantern was added, the only function of which, having no interior opening, was to modify the building's mass. Oval-shaped windows were opened in its walls. Despite the modification of the Ottoman layout, the wall and dome structure were not damaged, and the grave of the dervish was not harmed.¹⁶

The Jesuit order was abrogated in 1773, and the city took over the *türbe* and sold its land to János Thoma, a citizen of Buda, in 1830.¹⁷ In 1857, it was sold to the architect János Wagner, who built two separate villas, part of which included the *türbe*. The wing of the villa facing the Danube was built jointly to the foundations of the *türbe*, which still had the features from the Jesuit period.¹⁸ This was the situation around 1900: an Ottoman shrine with features of a Baroque Jesuit chapel in the garden of a Historicist mansion.

From the 1900s on, however, a period of gradual reconstruction began with the site's registration as a historical monument, the ultimate aim being to restore it to its original Ottoman historical state. Hungarian and Turkish experts were involved in this process, with many significant periods linked to developing Ottoman-Hungarian or Turkish-Hungarian diplomatic relations. The following points analyse the most significant aspects of this process in parallel with the sequence of reconstructions that resulted in a shrine that is both

15 Kovács & Rabb (2020).

16 Sudár (2022), p. 76.

17 Farbaki (2022), p. 100.

18 Ágoston (2022), pp. 104–5.

an authentically restored monument based on a systematic, multidisciplinary and international research project, and the focal point of a garden framed within the complex of a cultural centre. These descriptions will highlight the trends that emphasize the unique role of this monument in the developing relations between the two countries and also reflect the ideas of the time. The starting point is fittingly the ‘rediscovery’ of the *türbe*.

Sacral centre in a changing environment

Following the conquest of Buda in 1541, the hill above the “gunpowder mill neighbourhood” (*baruthane mahallesi*), rich in thermal springs and located outside Buda’s walled precinct, became a sacred centre as a result of Gül Baba’s burial there. Although its surroundings, ownership and condition have changed many times, the sacrality has not, attracting crowds of pilgrims and visitors. On the one hand, the life of Gül Baba is shrouded in many legends and mysteries, and several dervishes from Anatolia and the Balkans bore this initiatory name; however, as will be explained in more detail later, the person of Gül Baba, who took part in Sultan Süleyman’s campaign in Buda, is linked to the occupation of Buda also in a spiritual way, because, according to legend, he died during the first Friday prayer, and was thus honoured as the region’s Ottoman protector (*gözcü*). Consequently, Bektashi dervishes settled close to his mausoleum and built a *tekke* to cherish his memory. According to the contemporary sources, this *tekke* was one of the most crowded, with almost 60 dervishes and several land properties that supported the complex as a foundation (*vakıf*).¹⁹ The lodge, which was recorded in several engravings during Ottoman times and had already been damaged by the fighting and destruction that took place during the expulsion of the Ottomans, completely disappeared. However, the area’s name, above the “gunpowder mill neighbourhood,” was the Hill of Gül Baba (*Gül Baba tepesi*), which preserved the heritage of the dervish.

After the building became a Jesuit property in 1689, Christians were buried in the area. Although the building underwent several alterations referred to earlier, including the disappearance of the porch, the raising of the dome, the addition of wooden shingles and a lantern on the top of the dome, the addition of oval windows on the walls and the replacement of Ottoman sacral objects

19 Ágoston (2022), pp. 94–5.

in the interior with Christian objects, the sacrality of the place remained unchanged; Christians were also buried in the area, known as Calvary Hill (*Calvarienberg*) or the Hill of Oil Trees (*Oelberg*).²⁰

In 1773 the building first became the property of the city of Buda and then private property. In the second half of the 1880s, János Wagner built a historicizing private mansion around the shrine. However, Wagner received permission for the construction on the condition that pilgrims and visitors would still be allowed to enter the shrine. The design of the Historicist building certainly allowed it, since it enveloped the shrine and the nearby garden. One wall of the *türbe* was included in the mansion's porch.

During this period, the figure of Gül Baba among the Hungarians was more associated with an Ottoman sage who cultivated roses in the area. Thus, the gardens in the area were also associated with the *türbe*. The area began to be called the Rose Hill (*Rózsadomb*), which connected with the Ottoman-era idea of Gül Baba's hill. In addition, in 1915, the adjacent *Niedermayer Gasse*, a rising lane dotted with enclosed parapets, was named *Gül Baba utca*. Thus, the figure of the dervish was repeatedly evoked in the naming of the neighbourhood, and the *türbe* became an evocative garden folly, associated with romantic, Oriental aspects.

Wagner's lands contained a smaller mansion in the southern part of the area, where the family generally stayed. Therefore, the shrine was centrally sited in the interior garden of a mansion, but still retained the sacral function as a pilgrimage site and location for prayer. It was visited regularly by members of the Muslim community that arrived in Buda after the occupation of Bosnia, with religious leaders like Abdüllatif Efendi and Hüszein Hilmi Durics saying prayers and even, according to news footage, celebrating the sacrificial feast. The idea of turning the site into an Islamic sacred centre and building a mosque next to it has been raised several times by Ottomans and Hungarians. At the suggestion of Ottoman diplomats and with the support of the Hungarian state, Mimar Kemaleddin Bey, a renowned architect of the late Ottoman and early Republican era,²¹ drew up a mosque plan for the site in 1911. A similar plan was drawn up in 1934 by Jenő Kismarty-Lechner, and similar ideas were mooted at an international workshop in 1987. Although most of these proposals failed to materialize because of their grandiosity, the building and its surroundings underwent several changes at the end of the

20 Farbaky (2022), p. 100.

21 Yılmaz (2022).

20th century, which did not detract from the building's originality. One of the driving forces behind these changes was the visitors to the building.

The shrine as a focus for visitors (emperors, historians, pilgrims, travellers, and delegations)

Among the many famous visitors who saw the building were monarchs, historians, travellers, military engineers and, during the 20th century, ambassadors, politicians and business people. Despite its small size, the *türbe* became an important pilgrimage site almost immediately after the death of the dervish, which remained so during the Ottoman period and then gained new strength in the 19th and 20th centuries. One of the first builders of Gül Baba's legends was the well-known Ottoman historian Evliya Çelebi. His records explain how the Ottomans sought to add symbolic elements to the foundation of the dervish legend because Gül Baba's death occurred during the first Friday sermon in 1541, which was recited in the newly converted Church of Virgin Mary, subsequently renamed after Sultan Süleyman.²² With this act, Buda became part of the Ottoman Empire in administrative terms and part of Islamic territory spiritually; it shows Gül Baba's symbolic importance to the Ottomans. As already mentioned, Evliya also recorded that his funeral was attended by Sultan Süleyman and the *Rumeli kazaskeri* Ebussuud Efendi, which reflects the Ottoman intention to make the mausoleum an important Ottoman pilgrimage site in the newly conquered territory. In addition to the descriptions of Ottoman historians, like Naima or İbrahim Peçevi, or foreign visitors, like Georgius Wernherus (1551), Ebu Bekir ibn Behram el-Dimişki (1660), Peter Lambecius (1666), or Eduard Brown (1669),²³ in the Ottoman period, the shrine is mentioned in the records of foundations, and during the conquest from the Ottomans in 1686. In the following years, various drawings, surveys and military siege maps of Buda gave an account of the state of the mausoleum, including, for example, engravings by Wilhelm Dilich (1600) and Alexander Mair (1602), the drawing by Heinrich Ottendorf (1663), the siege drawing by Heinrich Ottendorf (1663), the siege maps of Karl Joseph Juvigny (1686) and H. Bredekow (1686), the engraving of

22 Sudár (2022), p. 77.

23 Saral (2022), pp. 79–82.

Justus van der Nypoort (1689), and the engravings by Luigi Fernando Marsigli (c.1686), Marcel de la Vigne (1686) and Domenico Fontana (1686).²⁴




Fig. 1: The visit of the Ottoman delegation of Sheikh Süleyman in 1877. *Vasárnapi Ujság* XXIV/19 (1877), p. 293.

After the importance given by the Ottoman emperor Sultan Süleyman to Gül Baba's Shrine as a pilgrimage site, and following the term it served as a Jesuit chapel, an Ottoman sultan also played a key role in initiating the process of its rediscovery, and monument preservation works in the 19th century. Between June 21 and August 7, 1867, Sultan Abdülaziz set off on an official tour of Europe, visiting France, England, Belgium, Prussia, Austria, and Hungary. During his stay in Buda, he visited the tomb of Gül Baba and received, as an official gift, a silver urn bearing the Hungarian and Buda city coats of arms containing soil taken from the tomb.²⁵ This visit was well received in the Ottoman Empire and was supported by people in his delegation, for example, the *şehremini* (mayor) of Istanbul, Ömer Faiz Efendi, or official correspondents like Basiretçi Ali.²⁶ The visit was followed by several further visits that resulted in descriptions and drawings published in the newspapers of the time (Fig. 1–2).

24 Ágoston (2022), pp. 93–9.

25 *Magyarország és a Nagyvilág*, 31 (3 August 1867), p. 371.

26 Saral (2022), p. 22.

These visits also created an impetus for the professional studies on the Hungarian side. For the emperor, Franz Xaver Linzbauer, the doctor of the Imperial Baths, published a treatise on Buda's Turkish architectural monuments. Subsequently, Lajos Némethy published a small monograph on the Turkish places of worship in Buda; Árpád Károlyi and Imre Wellmann continued his work.²⁷




Fig. 2: Ottoman journalists visit the Shrine of Gül Baba in 1910. Vasárnapi Ujság LVII/51 (1910), p. 1065.

27 Némethy (1878).

The shrine and arts

It is important to remember that the figure of Gül Baba at one time differed for the Ottoman Turks and the Hungarians. Although the actual figure of the former Bektashi dervish was forgotten after the end of Ottoman rule, and his building was turned into a Jesuit chapel, his name and influence still survived among the Hungarian people and was associated with many fabulous tales. Hence the legend of the old rose gardener who lived on the hills of Buda in Ottoman times was born, inspiring many 19th-20th century art movements. These legends were recorded by Béla Tóth,²⁸ in the operetta Jenő Huszka, the movie directed by Kálmán Nádasdy (1940) and the movie titled Student Gábor (Gábor diák) directed by László Kalmár (1955).²⁹ These works portray an idyllic world and have helped to make Gül Baba's name known to many generations, and also his tomb, even if there is little historical basis for what they contain.

A further romantic, artistic element in the relationship between the two countries was the painting of the imagined death of Gül Baba by Ferenc Eisenhut in 1868. The painting also contains little historical authenticity: the Dervish's dress is not in keeping with Bektashi tradition, and the Buda skyline in the background evokes a city dotted with domes and minarets, even though Buda had only just been conquered when the Dervish died. However, the painting was sent to Ankara as a diplomatic gift following the proclamation of the Republic at the beginning of the 20th century; it can still be found on the wall of the Hungarian Embassy in Ankara.³⁰

Clearly, Hungarians were also aware of Gül Baba, even if their conception often contained few historically accurate elements. Thus, thanks to the popularity of the Hungarian legends and the simultaneous high-level visits by the Ottomans, the general political and diplomatic atmosphere and the efforts of institutionalised monument protection, the *türbe* also received attention.

The shrine as museum

The visit of the Ottoman emperor coincided with the first years of institutionalised monument protection in Hungary, and as such, in addition to its sta-

28 Tóth (1907).

29 Sudár (2022).

30 Ibid., p.180.

tus as an Ottoman pilgrimage site, it was also registered as a historic building on various lists. In 1855, a list of the monuments of Buda was prepared by the Lieutenantcy of Buda and edited by Antal Auguszti; Péter Gerecze's inventory of historical monuments in 1906 also included Ottoman buildings.³¹

All this led to the 20th-century developments, during which, in addition to diplomatic visits and the interventions of Ottoman diplomats, the building increasingly attracted the interest of the Hungarian government and Hungarian experts. The reasons may have been diplomatic or monument protection, or a combination of both. The search for Hungarian political contacts, the Turanist ideas that were increasingly gaining strength the Muslim Bosnian population arriving in Buda with the occupation of Bosnia, and the Ottoman-Hungarian political and military fellowship of the pre-WWI period all led to symbolic gestures between the two states. This included naming the present-day Museum Boulevard after the Ottoman Emperor Mehmet V, the foundation of the Hungarian Scientific Institute in Constantinople as one of the first significant achievements of Hungarian cultural diplomacy,³² and two important stages in the history of the *türbe*. First, in 1914, the shrine was officially registered as a museum. In 1916, Enver Pasha witnessed the shrine in this condition during his visit. Second, in 1916, Islam was officially declared an accepted religion in the Kingdom of Hungary.

As a result, until the 1960s, the building increasingly lost the layers deposited on it during the Jesuit era and regained its original Ottoman shape through the professional work of Hungary's prominent scholars of monument protection.

The shrine as an educational area

Before turning to the process of the monument preservation works, a small but significant interlude is a relevant feature of the era. In 1918, a book was published by Ernő Foerk titled *Török emlékek Magyarországon (Turkish monuments in Hungary)*.³³ The book was a unique documentation of Ottoman monuments for several reasons.

31 Gerecze (1906), p. 616.

32 For a history of the institute, see Fodor (2021).

33 Foerk (1918).

Firstly, it contained the survey drawings of twenty Ottoman buildings and details from various Hungarian cities (Bács, Budapest, Eger, Pécs, Szigetvár, Érd, Temesvár), and by this, it was the most comprehensive recording of the known Ottoman remains of the era. Furthermore, the drawings were made by 2nd and 3rd-year architecture students studying at the Hungarian Royal Public Higher Architectural Industrial School of Budapest (*Budapest Magyar Királyi Állami Felső Építőipari Iskola*), who were part of a long-term education programme.³⁴ In 1912, Professor Foerk announced the so-called 'Vacation Surveys' for its students, with various aims on different dates.³⁵ Between 17–29th June 1917, supported by the Hungarian state and the MOB (National Committee of Monuments), Foerk supervised a study tour to survey Ottoman buildings. With the students, Ottó Szőnyi also participated in the journey as an architect of the MOB; Professor Ignác Kúnos, an Ottoman language scholar, was also involved in the works because some Ottoman inscriptions on the tombstones in Temesvár were translated into Hungarian, showing the interdisciplinarity of his programme. The surveys' publication included an introductory text summarising the known data on the Ottoman buildings; however, in addition to its scientifically precise description, ideologically, it contains interpretation. As one of the aims of his activity, Foerk describes "supplying justice to our closest relative of genus".³⁶ Consequently, the Turanian interpretation is highlighted. Besides the survey programme in Hungary, Foerk participated in study tours in the Balkans. The tours were organised officially by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences's Pál Teleki, a member of the Turanian Society's vice-presidency.

Among the various 'pan' movements (pan-Germanic, pan-American, pan-Slavic) at the turn of the 19th-20th century, Hungarians also began to research their hypothetical origins. It was manifested in researching the common cultural and architectural heritage links with Middle-Eastern and Inner-Asian Turkic nations, which was toned with political and ideological aspects resulting from Turanism. In Hungary, the institutionalised appearance of Turanian ideology was officiated under the 'Hungarian Turanian Society'.

The partnership of the 'Tahsil-i Sanayi Cemiyeti' (Industrial Education Association) in Istanbul also supported young engineers through application-based, short-term scholarships in Hungary, declared by the circular on the

34 Kovács & Fehér (2019).

35 In 1912 and 1914, the summer surveys were organised in Transylvania, and in 1913 in Northern Hungary.

36 Foerk (1918), p. 1.

Duties of the Oriental Culture Centre and the education of Turkish youths placed in Hungarian Schools, launched on the 25th of August 1916. As a result, a number of students studied in various fields in Hungary, and seven received an architectural education.

One of them was Semih Rüstem [Temel] (1898–1946), who had an important career in Turkish-Hungarian architectural relations. After his return to Istanbul, he worked on several significant projects, was an instructor at schools, translated Hungarian architectural books, was later appointed to the Ankara Development Directorate (*Ankara İmar Müdürlüğü*) and worked in the construction of the new republic's capital, Ankara. In these works, he used the knowledge from his Hungarian education.³⁷ In the 1917 survey programme, he prepared the survey of the Shrine of Gül Baba; thus, this work is a key element of the Hungarian-Turkish architectural academic knowledge transfer (Fig. 3). The result of the Ottoman buildings' survey programme received the attention of the diplomatic representatives of the Ottoman Empire when counsellor general Ahmet Hikmet, and Abdüllatif Efendi visited the Academy in March 1918 to see the results of the survey. Rüstem's survey of the Shrine was probably known to the diplomat, who was a key figure in its preservation on the Ottoman side. Consequently, in the survey drawing, the profession of architecture, monument preservation, diplomacy and education have an interesting connection under the umbrella of Turanian ideology.

The shrine's site inspired students in later times since university students designed several projects around it. Following a long period throughout the 1980s and 1990s, initiatives to restore the Shrine and exploit its surroundings were revived occasionally, some of which were born out of diplomatic visits. In 1987, the Aga Khan Foundation supported an international workshop that focused on the design of the *türbe's* environment. This workshop was organised by Károly Polónyi, a professor at Budapest Technical University, with participants from Hungary, Turkey and European countries.³⁸ Among the ideas presented at the workshop, the group supervised by Selahattin Önür (Ankara) proposed a project that preserved the Wagner villa and restored the hillside by demolishing the villa's retaining walls, with a Museum of Ottoman Art established in the building covering the firewalls of *Mecset utca* (exhibition, conference centre and offices). The team, led by Alison and Peter Smithson (London) and Károly Polónyi (Budapest), explored the many different aspects of the

37 Gümüş (2015) and (2022).

38 Polónyi (1987).

metropolis surrounded by the ambience of the area's complex atmospheres; they would preserve the 'rus in urbe' genius of the area with the preservation of the mansion's remains.




Fig. 3: The survey drawing of the shrine made by Semih Rüstem under the supervision of Ernő Foerk in 1917. Source: Foerk, 1918. p. 3.

The shrine as the focus for monument preservation works

Before the mausoleum was officially declared a museum, survey and restoration plans were drawn up for it in 1885 by the Hungarian engineer Lajos Grill. These were preserved in the Ottoman Archives and purchased by the Ottoman Consulate General.³⁹ Then, in the 1910s, several initiatives by the Ottoman Consul General Ahmet Hikmet achieved results within the building. At that time, the eminent master architect of the Late Ottoman and Early Turkish Republic,

39 Yılmaz (2021).

Kemaleddin Bey, was also commissioned to prepare plans for the restoration of the building and to design a mosque, which would have occupied a place next to the shrine and would have been based on the architect's mosque in Bebek/Istanbul. Although the ambitious initiative was washed away by the World War, with the help of the Consul General, a number of 'liturgical' objects – a lectern (*rahle*), a table (*sehpa*), a censer (*buhurdan*), and a candlestick (*şamdan*) – manufactured in the workshops of the Süleymaniye complex in Istanbul were donated to the tomb by the Ministry of Foundations (*Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezareti*). These objects can be seen in today's exhibition in the hallway near the *türbe*.⁴⁰

The official registration of the Shrine as a museum created a new opening for the monument preservation works, led by the eminent master of the age, István Möller. Through comprehensive work between 1915 and 1916, the dervishi's grave was also excavated and researched by anthropologist Lajos Bartócz. This led to the area's opening for visitors in a more authentic form. However, the surroundings of the Shrine, where the former Wágner Mansion was occupied by apartments, were still not in good condition. In 1942, the area became the capital city's property, and in WWII, the surroundings of the *türbe* were damaged. Through the project led by Géza Lux in 1942/43, the mansion was partially deconstructed, and through this action, the shrine was freed from the mansion's frame. In 1960–62 the Municipal Inspectorate of Historical Monuments ordered and then implemented new restoration works according to the plans of Egon Pfannl, during which the existing flooring was laid, the door was renewed with a metal and glass construction, the window was covered with a wrought iron grid, the lantern was dismantled, and the dome covering was replaced with metal cladding. This restoration was intended as one of the main steps for the shrine's restoration to its original Ottoman appearance, officially preserved, and in this way, became the basis of the contemporary restoration. Later, by 1969, the above ground structure of Wágner's mansion had been demolished, and only the shrine was visible on the site.

From the Turkish side, in 1976, Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi, a leading scholar of Ottoman architecture, visited the site and prepared a survey drawing with his colleague, İ. Aydın Yüksel, during his comprehensive research work in Hungary and the Balkan countries, which led to a series of publications.⁴¹

40 Yılmaz (2022).

41 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

The next phase, which consisted of restoring the shrine and designing its surroundings, can be linked to a presidential visit of Süleyman Demirel to Hungary. The design works were led by Tamás K. Pintér. Besides restoring the monument, the *türbe*'s surrounding area was also landscaped. The most iconic element is a colonnade framing the area, designed to imitate Ottoman features, which shows the contours of the former villa and refers to an Ottoman mosque's courtyard. However, this architectural gesture created a spatial world around the shrine that did not exist in Ottoman times; although it is not an authentic Ottoman addition, it resulted in a pleasant environment. The problem with the restoration is its rapid deterioration, which will soon require comprehensive renewal. Despite this, the restoration and presentation is to be commended. It has sought to create a unified, clear picture, visually separating the 19th century and the Ottoman-era elements, and restoring them as authentically as possible together with a popular public garden in Budapest's Second District.

A combination of previous factors: The complex heritage preservation works of the shrine and its environment – and the Gül Baba Heritage Foundation

After the complex's restoration in 1996, the shrine and its surroundings deteriorated rapidly, and a new architectural intervention was necessary. One of the main cornerstones of the process was the agreement signed in February 2015 by the Deputy Prime Ministers of Hungary and the Republic of Turkey. Following long preparation and a gradual widening of the scope of participants, the main objectives of the heritage conservation works to be carried out by experts from both countries in the framework of cooperation between the two countries were established. The comprehensive investment, which used archaeology, heritage conservation, contemporary architecture and landscape architecture tools, included both the 16th-century building and its immediate and broader surroundings in three main zones: the heritage works of the Gül Baba Shrine, the inner garden area bordered by the mansion of János Wagner, and some of the surrounding public spaces – the most important of which are the garden terraces that were historically part of Wagner's mansion, and the picturesque Gül Baba Street (fig. 4).⁴²

42 Kovács (2022).



Fig. 4: The view of the shrine and the surroundings following the complex restoration project from 2015–18. Photograph by György Nagy, Gül Baba Heritage Foundation.

On behalf of Hungary, the representative of the Hungarian state was the Hungarian National Asset Management Ltd. Because the project was a priority investment, the project coordination on behalf of Hungary was provided by the Centre of Priority Government Investments Nonprofit Ltd. On behalf of the Republic of Turkey, the representative institution was TİKA (*Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı* – Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Presidency); that organisation belonged to the Prime Minister’s Office of the Republic of Turkey for most of the project period, and starting from September 2018, to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey, which opened an office in Budapest and still works for bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Both institutions delegated experts for the project, and from that point of view, it was a unique cooperation without precedent in Hungary and was also unique worldwide. The following table provides an overview of the interventions in the three project zones (Table 1).

	Area	Function	Methodology	Zones
Existing constructions	Shrine of Gül Baba	Monument as a sacral, pilgrimage site, museum to present the building in an authentic way	Restoration only used materials verified by historical data – authentic presentation	1
	Basement level of Wagner's mansion	Eastern part	Exhibition	The Wagner villa restoration of the remaining brick walls, contemporary building structure and mechanical elements, protecting the former 19 th -century space and providing a new function
		Northern part	Café, workshop rooms, permanent exhibition room	
		Southern part	Multifunctional exhibition and workshop room, office desk	
	Garden in the surroundings of the Shrine	Park and graveyard (memorial garden)	The space system of the 1996 restoration, some elements of the the newly designed park and the archaeological excavation and research marking the location of tombs	
New constructions	Entrance building attached to the northern part of Wágner's Mansion	Reception, barrier-free walkway, service functions (toilets, café)	A new building that is in harmony with the historical complex and meets modern requirements	
Landscape	Gül Baba Street, Mosque Street, Turban street, and supporting walls, public spaces and green areas surrounding Wágner's mansion	A garden complex, public spaces for general use, streets, car parks, and bus stops equipped with the necessary utilities	Arranging the monument's environment, providing a new public park, development of the district	3

Table 1: Functional arrangement of the restoration and complex development project fulfilled between 2015–2018.

The main focus was restoring the shrine (Zone 1; Fig. 5). The basis for the restoration was the actual condition of the building, which by then was in a quasi-Ottoman state due to various restorations carried out during the 20th century, and the extensive restoration work carried out by Lajos Grill, which was protected. This was complemented by thorough research, which included the study of archival written and visual sources and a field survey of the building. The number of Ottoman-period windows in the *türbe* was the most open question; however, the wall survey carried out during the restoration confirmed the authenticity of only the window facing the Danube, which is still visible today. Above the entrance, two console stones of the former front door have been restored. The exterior wall of the building has been professionally restored in stone using materials appropriate to the site's climatic conditions and preserves the wartime bullet marks on the wall. To ensure authenticity, the metal restoration works correctly positioned the crescent top finial perpendicular to the direction of the Qibla. The faithful restoration of the historic interior was preceded by a thorough wall survey, which included the restoration of the interior wall moulding, the wall covering, the frame of the window and the door. The interior floor of the *türbe* was replaced by a hexagonal brick floor (*şeşhane tuğla*), typical of Ottoman architecture. Following the faithful assessment of the interior, the wooden *sanduka* was restored, covered with a newly embroidered, inscribed shroud and a new Bektashi headgear; two bronze candlesticks were placed on either side, and authentic calligraphic panels were positioned on the wall. The excellent cooperation of the Hungarian general designer, the experts and designers from Turkey, the historian and archaeological experts, as well as wall plaster, wood and metal conservators and the contractor, resulted in an authentic and historically accurate result.⁴³

43 The multi-level cooperation of Turkey and Hungary included several specialists on both sides. The general design of the complex was carried out by Mányi Architect Studio, with the involvement of a number of renowned architects and the landscape architect Anikó Andor on behalf of Land-A Studio. The various restoration and art history expert tasks and supervision were carried out by Szabolcs Csányi metal conservator; Vidor Kófalvi and Levente Kófalvi stone conservators; Zsolt Kóbor and Péter Zágoni wood restorator; Gizella Makoldi, plaster restorator; Judit Lászy, art historian and Ferenc Bor, art historian. The archaeological research in the area of the *türbe* was carried out by the Budapest History Museum under the direction of Adrienn Papp. TİKA, on behalf of Turkey, delegated a number of academic researchers and specialists, experts of the Directorate of Pious Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*), as well



Fig. 5: The view of shrine as it is today. Photograph by Nikolett Farkas, Gül Baba Heritage Foundation.

The second priority area (Zone 2) was the internal garden in the immediate surroundings of the Shrine, framed by János Wágner's 19th-century Historicist mansion. Besides the overall landscape architectural design, archaeological research,⁴⁴ protection of the existing vegetation, and the creation of an authentic garden with small contemporary interventions were important aspects.

Although most of the ruined structures above the ground level of János Wagner's mansion were demolished during the 20th century, the most recent

as architects (Asır Proje and Ekol) who have been involved in the tasks of monument experts, designers and technical inspectors.

44 Papp (2022).

restoration has been carried out with an open-plan portico to invoke the mass of the building. The portico was rebuilt with a natural limestone column body and a glazed Zsolnay pyrogranite header. The basement mass of the villa has been restored – at the same time, an accessible entrance section has been added, which includes the functions necessary for the operation of the building and a tea room. In addition to cleaning the historic walls and partially replacing the brickwork in the villa's basement, the previously blocked-off row of the basement facing the Danube has been excavated and restored, and the southern section of the basement has been rebuilt. The historical spaces thus created, belonging to the former villa, contain permanent and temporary exhibitions. The permanent exhibition aims to provide insight into the history of Ottoman Buda, the person of Gül Baba, the world of the Dervishes and the history of the *türbe*. It outlines the nuanced and changing history of Hungarian-Ottoman and Hungarian-Turkish relations, the key ideas of the Turkish image in the minds of Hungarians, and the facts and legends associated with the figure of Gül Baba in each period based on Hungarian and Turkish experts' concepts, together with artefacts from Budapest and Turkey.

Zone 3 of the project is the landscaped area. These territories are places provided for the public, and in this sense, the project generated an urban district development at an intersection between the mansion District of Rózsadomb and the crowded centre near Margit avenue, which is frequently used by pedestrians. This part of the project consists of the three-level gardens on the terraces to the southern side of the former villa, the retaining walls bordering the complex from the east, the promenade running between them, and the former *Niedermayer Gasse*, the street renamed after Gül Baba in 1915.

Following the ceremonial opening of the complex on October 9, 2018, in the presence of the President of the Republic of Turkey and the Prime Minister of Hungary, the task was not finished. At the end of 2017, the Hungarian state established a Foundation based on a government decree to manage and operate the building. The Gül Baba Heritage Foundation's mission is to maintain the shrine and the garden complex, manage the monument and its surroundings, and operate a cultural centre and exhibition space in the complex with exhibitions, workshops and a café. In addition to permanent and temporary exhibitions, the cultural activities include organising concerts, book shows, fine arts workshops and conferences to create a cultural centre that is an important part of the capital's and the country's touristic and cultural life. On a broader level, this decree declared a strategy for preserving Ottoman-Turkish cultural heritage in Hungary, supporting projects related to the Ottoman heritage in

Hungary and the Hungarian heritage in Turkey.⁴⁵ Besides the cultural aspect, the Foundation supports educational workshops for students on monuments in Hungary and Turkey.⁴⁶

Today, the building is frequently visited; according to the statistics, around 10,000 visitors per month – a high number for Budapest. It is visited by individuals and groups from Hungary, Turkey, and many other countries. In addition to individual visitors, the institution welcomes groups and offers specialist-guided tours for all ages. In addition to civilian visitors, diplomatic delegations should also be mentioned. The shrine is an essential part of the programme during presidential and ministerial visits to Hungary from Turkey, so the interest throughout history, as described earlier, has not changed, and the building continues to serve cultural and diplomatic relations between Hungary and Turkey.

Conclusion

This paper has traced the history of an Ottoman shrine in Hungary from the time it was built for a Bektashi dervish in the 16th century, to its conversion to a Jesuit chapel after the Ottoman period, and its steady return to its original Ottoman state through the diplomatic, cultural and monumental processes of the 20th century. Thus, by tracing the history of the building, we have been able to define several factors and aspects of patrimonialization.

The shrine of Gül Baba in Buda is a monument in Hungary that is worth analysing from several points of view. Firstly, this historic building is a kind of litmus paper reflecting the relationship between two countries. At the time of its construction, it was a pilgrimage site built for the purpose of the Ottomans' spiritual settlement. After the Ottoman period, in the changed cultural milieu

45 1995/2017 (XII. 19). Government Decree on measures for the preservation and utilization of the outstanding value of the Gül Baba Shrine and its surroundings.

46 In 2021, a Hungarian-Turkish university workshop for the survey of the Neo-Gothic chapel located in Feriköy Protestant Cemetery in cooperation with the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Yıldız Technical University, the Gül Baba Heritage Foundation, the Liszt Institute – Hungarian Cultural Centre in Istanbul and Lica Geosystems Hungary; in 2022, a university workshop for the survey of the Turkish well in Zsámbék, Hungary, and the complex development of the historical centre of Zsámbék in cooperation with the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, the Gül Baba Heritage Foundation and the Municipality of Zsámbék.

it was converted into a Christian chapel. At the end of the 19th century, a wave of Orientalist fashion enveloped it with a historicist villa. From the end of the 19th century, as a symbolic centre for Hungarian-Turkish diplomatic relations and reconciliation, it was restored to its authentic Ottoman state through different monument preservation works. Today, it is a monument which has undergone a thoroughly researched heritage preservation project and complex development of its environment by official Hungarian-Turkish cooperation, and is at the heart of a cultural centre presenting the cultural heritage of the two countries.

However, the building can also be analysed as a complex historical environment, which has undergone continuous transformation and then a series of conservation works. As well as the 16th-century Ottoman monument standing at its centre, it is surrounded by a grave garden, a 19th-century mansion created in the Historicist style, and a contemporary garden complex. Its restoration between 2015 and 2018 also resulted in the development of a distinctive part of Budapest.

We have seen that although the physical form of the building and its surroundings have undergone numerous changes, and many new ideas and narratives have been associated with the building, its sacrality has continued. The aim of the study was to define some key factors that had impact on the previously described processes. There were also religious, political and, during the 20th century, historic preservation reasons for change, with educational aspects and often high-profile visits that added impetus to the process.

The building's history is a tangible illustration of Hungarian-Turkish bilateral relations. While its sacral significance has not changed, today it is a complex of a monument, cultural centre and public park combining all the previous factors and serves Hungarian-Turkish diplomatic and cultural relations.

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Scales of patrimonialization in late imperial Crimea

Between Bakhchisaray and Saint Petersburg

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Abstract: *Crimean Tatar heritage, a subject featuring a multitude of actors with complementing as well as diverging interests, underwent a centuries-long process of discursive formation prompted by a dialogue between the metropole and the periphery. This essay demonstrates that it was a series of very different factors – including conservation, study, literary depiction, and formation of touristic infrastructure – that allow us to speak of the patrimonialization of a Crimean Tatar architectural heritage specifically between the 1880s and 1920s. Starting with the beginning of the 20th century an increase in the activity of non-state and local actors becomes visible. The various components or layers of this process are schematized in order to show the development of the image of Crimean Tatar culture and identity, and its relation to the architectural heritage.*

Introduction

Patrimonialization as a dynamic historical process inherent to 19th- and 20th-century societies has been a subject of theoretical debate by scholars of heritage and museum studies in recent decades. In a different form, the idea of “heritage in the making” was integrated into the historiography of colonialism in the contexts of Western European nation states,¹ in the context of British colonial rule in the Near East,² museum practices of display in the Ottoman Em-

1 Swenson (2013). She uses the term “heritage-making.”

2 Sanders (2008).

pire,³ of Russian colonization of Turkestan,⁴ and other contexts. In the present work, patrimonialization is best defined as a process that involves a conscious selection of heritage objects in order to bolster a narrative of the past that is significant for the construction of a community's identity. Its broad spectrum includes acts of discussing, preserving and representing objects. The idea of heritage being *made* (or constructed) allows the writing of a meta-history of national heritage, identity building and national myths. Heritage does not allow for simple historical narratives because it always implies a link with identity, as the heritage of a perceived collective.⁵

The approach used in this work connects the processes in Crimea to the broader spectrum of Muslim heritage in Russia. A valid question to be considered is how particular was this internal dynamic of the Russian Empire and how embedded was it in the European colonial endeavor. The scholarship of global Muslim heritage, and the recently published volume titled *Islam and heritage in Europe* in particular, highlights the idea that the European imagination of Islamic heritage and its position with regard to Europe was shifting throughout time. Sometimes it rejected Islam on civilizational or cultural grounds, and sometimes it accepted it as part of the European heritage mosaic.⁶ Crucially, the European perspective on Muslim heritage is founded on Europe's perception of itself. In the same way, the understanding of Muslim heritage in the Russian Empire is fundamentally a discourse of what is Russian heritage and which cultural phenomena should be validated by the dominating political and historical narratives.

Along with establishing the subjects of the history of heritage in Russian colonies, it is necessary to establish its object: does heritage refer to a physical or mental space? If to a physical space, then where do its limits end in the circumstances where not only sites but neighborhoods, cities and landscapes can undergo the process of transformation into heritage? Considering heritage as mental space, in its turn, would require assuming that its representations are designed according to theoretical premises, with only a loose connection to its materiality. But in order to emphasize the social nature of space, in *The production of space*, Henri Lefebvre argued that

3 Shaw (2003).

4 Gorshenina (2014).

5 Shatanawi, Macdonald & Puzon (2021), p. 6.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 10–1.

between the sixteenth century (the Renaissance – and the Renaissance city) and the nineteenth century, [there did] exist a code at once architectural, urbanistic and political, constituting a language common to country people and townspeople, to the authorities and to artists – a code which allowed space not only to be ‘read’ but also to be constructed.⁷

These observations on the nature of space can also prove useful for heritage historians. They indicate that the apparent observation, description and museumification of space by specialists, artists or common citizens may as well be contributing to the creation of space and its redefinition, and that the two processes are likely to be occurring simultaneously.

Legislation: The view from the metropole

One characteristic of the process of patrimonialization is selectiveness and classification. Interest in the past of the empire’s Muslim peoples, first in the form of collecting antiquities and curiosities, was evident already in the first half of the 17th century, during Peter the Great’s reign. Yet only with the later development of Oriental studies did Muslim monuments from different corners of the empire achieve wide attention in scholarly societies, press, and legal decrees. The *Kunstkamera*, as the first Russian museum, institutionalized the collection of ‘curious’ things starting in 1714. Up until that date, the center of Russian Islam was located in the former Kazan Khanate, and one of the oldest incentives for description of epigraphic material and restoration of buildings came from the Great Bolgar after the emperor’s visit in 1722. According to archaeologist and historiographer Alexander A. Formozov, the Petrine time marked the transfer of responsibilities in management of antiquities from the church to the imperial institutions – the museum and the palace.⁸ After this date, the next activity connected to the study of historical monuments occurred in 1771, when, during Catherine the Great’s reign, a decree concerning the inclusion of “ancient kurgans, ruins, caves, islands and other

7 Lefebvre (1991), p. 7.

8 Formozov (1990), p. 20.

landmarks” into topographic plans and economic registers was issued (decree of 9 April 1771).⁹

The beginnings of the formulation of the idea of ‘monuments’ and ‘heritage’, rather than mere ‘objects of antiquity’, lay in the first half of the 19th century. At that time, a category of people dedicated to the study of historical sites gradually emerged. The Ministry of Internal Affairs began to send regular circulars to governors starting in the 1820s, which demanded the identification of all necessary data on monuments (such as location, ground plans, and their state), and which played an important role in collecting information about ancient monuments. As a result of these materials being sent to the statistical department of the Ministry, a work titled *A brief review of old Russian buildings and other monuments of the country* was published in 1840. In the next decades, the Ministry further issued circulars aimed at the accumulation of information about sites related to “national history and life of peoples.”¹⁰

The Rumyantsev Museum, opened by the decree of Emperor Nicholas I of March 22, 1828, and the Moscow Society for the History and Antiquities of Russia, created on June 6, 1804, were among the first organizations that acted as places for the gatherings of societies devoted to the study of history and antiquities. Soon such societies were also created in Odessa, Kiev, Pskov, Kazan and other cities.¹¹ The Odessa society was focused on the study of Crimea, while the Kazan society was active in the Kazan governorate. These local institutions acted as intermediaries between the sites and the Academy of Sciences and the later Imperial Archaeological Commission, both in Saint Petersburg. During the development of the museum network and initial archaeological institutions in the first half of the 19th century, the antiquities of Siberia and the Northern Black Sea region represented a major interest of the researchers.¹²

An 1826 emperor’s decree titled “On the delivery of information about the remains of ancient buildings in cities and the prohibition on destroying them” established that local authorities would enforce the prohibition of the destruction of ancient monuments. This expanded the notion that ‘ancient buildings’ possessed value beyond the capital to the provinces, and created the prerequisites for the formation of professional or semi-professional groups that would

9 Starostina (2007), p. 16; *Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire I* (1830–1851, p. 263).

10 Starostina (2007), p. 17.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

12 Shamanaev & Zyrianova (2018), p. 39.

engage with their description and study. The decree prescribed the compilation of lists of ancient buildings in all imperial provinces.¹³ These lists were also to contain detailed information about construction and reconstruction activities, materials used, original purposes and contemporary use, as well as any intervening destructions, and thus resemble the conservation-restoration documentation assembled for objects today.

Yet, due to the inconsistency of the empire-wide decrees, the initiatives to study and conserve monuments were often carried out by private parties, and therefore were not uniform. Crimea played a significant role as a precedent for the procedure then followed in other regions of the empire. Within the Russian Empire, it represented a pioneering case in terms of monument acknowledgement, research and protection. As a land open to Russian and foreign travelers after its first annexation in 1783, it was attractive as an experience of the 'Orient' on the verge of being transformed by Russian expansion.¹⁴ This resulted in numerous personal endeavors to create descriptions and accounts of Crimean landscape, people, and architecture. Sometimes links between these private actors and the administration of the land were established.

Such was the case of Vasilii Kapnist, who, during his travels in Crimea in 1820, was witness to numerous cases of destruction and looting of historical sites. He saw "remains of ancient buildings and fortresses, which are used for state and private needs," and "considered that if necessary measures of precaution will not be taken, we will be deprived of any means for uncovering domestic¹⁵ antiquities."¹⁶ Based on this, he addressed the Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education, Prince Alexander Nikolayevich Golitsyn, asking for urgent measures to be taken to save the objects and sites. Kapnist's idea was that the government was more suited than local authorities or private individuals to carry out measures to preserve Crimean antiquities and allocate the funds necessary for this purpose. The initiative was supported by the governor as well as by the president of the Academy of Sciences, Count Sergei Semenovich Uvarov.¹⁷ In this way in 1821, three decades after the annexation of Crimea, academician Egor Egorovich Koehler (also known as Heinrich Karl Ernest Koehler) and architect Evgenii Frantsevich Pascal were sent to the Crimea to inspect the

13 Starostina (2007), p. 19.

14 Jobst (2001), p. 125.

15 In the original, the term *otechestvennykh* is used, thus closer in meaning to 'national'.

16 Tiesenhausen (1872), p. 363.

17 Shamanaev & Zyrianova (2018), p. 40.

state of historical monuments, determine measures for their preservation and draw up a cost estimate.¹⁸ Upon the completion of the report on their journey, the decree of July 4, 1822 titled “On the means of preserving the monuments of Taurida” was conceived.

That decree officially classified architectural masterpieces as monuments for the first time in the Russian Empire, and in accordance with the decree’s stipulations, the monuments were divided into two classes. The first included “those that can be restored with little cost for a long time,” while the second group “belongs to those that are ruins and cannot be helped; but, being protected from destruction, they can stand for ages.”¹⁹ According to the committee of ministers, a “ranking” of monuments could be made:

Of the monuments that have not been destroyed in the Crimea so far, the remains of Turkish and Tatar buildings, which are closest to our time, do not deserve to be saved as much as Greek and Genoese buildings.²⁰

Nonetheless, it classified as monuments of architecture the mosques in Yevpatoria and Feodosia, and the fortresses in Balaklava (Cembalo), Sudak and Mangup (Mangup Qale),²¹ while Koehler’s reports produced much more detailed lists of “Turkish and Tatar” monuments. The restoration of the Khan Saray in Bakhchisaray, as the only example of Crimean Tatar palace architecture, was managed directly by the governor, which underlined its difference from other sites. Koehler, judging from a perspective unrestrained by financial concerns, advocated the importance of all historic sites:

In my opinion, all ancient monuments in Crimea must be described. Which other work would bring more use to this great Empire? The French, and especially the English, have shown bigger eagerness to make visible the antiquities of their fatherland. But their riches are quite unimportant in comparison to the precious monuments in Crimea, and their monuments are not as many and do not belong to such distant times, as those that are found in the Taurida peninsula.²²

18 Tiesenhausen (1872), p. 364.

19 Shamanaev & Zyrianova (2018), pp. 40–1.

20 *Ibid.*, literal translation by author.

21 Starostina (2007), p. 19.

22 Tiesenhausen (1872), p. 386, translated by author.

This decree of 1822 for the first time in Russian legislation allocated state funds for specific measures to preserve ancient monuments. It is equally important due to the fact that it names the main state institutions that in the 19th and early 20th centuries were active in the protection of cultural heritage: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education, the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Arts.²³

The validation of heritage sites by the state occurred through measures taken for their protection, as the regulations are reflective of the expectations and values of the contributing side.²⁴ The rather disadvantaged position of Crimean Tatar monuments in comparison to Greek ones in particular is important for establishing that in the first half of the 19th century their formal recognition as heritage by the Russian government could not have been achieved. In that time frame, when the displacement of Muslims from the peninsula was deemed preferable, the image of Crimea as the cradle of Russian Christianity and as the remains of ancient Tauris was the discourse that would engage the nobility.²⁵

This means that the status of the buildings was achieved by the scholarly systematization of information about them and intense research activity rather than by immediate protection decrees. With the 1839 foundation of the Odessa Society for History and Antiquities, the empire's first archaeological society, intense scholarly activity in the region contributed greatly to awareness of the sites. It was prolific in writing petitions to the emperor, managing the activity of the Museum of Antiquities in Feodosia (Kefe), and publishing notes, drawings and lithographs from sites and objects.

After the Crimean War of 1853–56 and the subsequent emigration waves of the Crimean Tatar population toward the Ottoman Empire, accounts by Russian ethnographers are among the few sources to illuminate the situation of the Crimean Tatar built environment. Most notably, Vasilii Khristoforovich Kondaraki (1834–86) compiled the monumental *Ethnography of Taurida* in 1883. It is highly reliable thanks to his excellent linguistic competence in the Crimean Tatar language. He came from a Crimean Greek family in Simferopol and was a member of the Odessa Society for History and Antiquities, the Russian Geographic Society and the Odessa Society for Agriculture in Sout-

23 Shamanaev & Zyrianova (2018), p. 41.

24 Gorshenina (2014), p. 246.

25 Jobst (2020), p. 26; Schönle (2001).

hern Russia.²⁶ His *Ethnography of Taurida* is but one example of the interest and professionalization of the study of Crimean Tatar culture, and the separation of its monuments into a category distinct from the previously broad ‘Muslim architecture’. Between 1903 and 1908 the so-called Russian Museum of Alexander III in Saint Petersburg also organized ethnographic expeditions that collected material from over 800 Crimean Tatar villages. The textiles, household items and even models of houses emerging from this expedition were eventually displayed in an exhibition in the museum.²⁷ The objects’ museumification conceptually freed them from their physical environment and reimagined them as objects belonging to Crimean Tatar culture. This also supports the statement that – although it is widely considered that the first transfer of Crimean Tatar culture into a museum context occurred in 1917 with the transformation of the Khan Saray in Bakhchisaray into a museum – even before the Revolution, research activity into matters of Crimean Tatar history increased through the efforts of local organizations as well as those outside of Crimea. The ethnographic interest was a sign of the transition to a new environment, or landscape, where the old was being replaced and started to represent a curiosity, but also stood as a symbol for the imagined community. This is an important event because it constitutes one of the earliest cases of systematic display and research by a state institution on the Crimean Tatars as a “people” (*narod*).

One argument that can be made based on analysis of the Russian Empire’s classification and conservation policies is that the governing institutions attempted formal unity while integrating the Muslim, in this case Crimean Tatar, heritage. This point of view was promoted by academic Orientalists, for example Vasilii Bartold, who considered that by developing and consolidating the culturally distinct identities of non-Russians, local identities and an awareness of local cultures and histories would create the basis for achieving civic unity.²⁸ Bartold argued that the question of mosques as “objects of antiquity” (*predmety stariny*) emerged only after the conquest of Turkestan, since on the Volga and in the Black Sea region, conquered in earlier centuries, “the conquerors faced relatively young cultures without outstanding constructions.”²⁹

26 Aradzhioni (2005), p. 250.

27 Nepomnyashchii (2016), p. 31.

28 Tolz (2010).

29 Ananiev (2016), p. 285.



Fig. 1: Cover of *Zhivopisnaia Rossiia V* (Semenov 1898).

He mentioned as significant monuments the Great Bolgar Complex, Suyumbike in Kazan and Khan Saray in Crimea – sites that already benefited from isolated decrees of study and conservation. In this case, Russia's top-down patrimonialization of Crimean Tatar architecture was supported by the ideology of *grazhdanstvennost*, or civic unity. One of the covers of the multivolume edition *Zhivopisnaia Rossiia: Otechestvo nashe v ego zemelnom, istoricheskom, plemennom, ekonomicheskom i bytovom znachenii* ("Picturesque Russia: Our fatherland and its land, history, tribes, economy and everyday life") transposed this idea into the visual sphere by representing Muslims in the foreground, as part of the Russian Empire's universe, with distinctly Slavic-Orthodox objects

in the background, but also as being located on the fringes, with a visibly alien outlook (Fig. 1).

Depiction of buildings in literature

A second characteristic of patrimonialization is value-associated representation. If selectiveness shows that patrimonialization is defined by existing perspectives on history and involves socio-political acts of consolidation, a side that requires particular attention around 1900 is the public discourse of patrimony. In the Russian imperial context, patrimonialization has been studied predominantly for the case of Turkestan, and largely from a Russian perspective.³⁰ In Crimea, however, we have evidence to establish a community-driven association between monuments and an identity, based on sources such as travel-writing, the press and literature.

As put by Carel Bertram in her *Imagining the Turkish house*, literature (particularly fiction) positions an object on a memory chain of values and implants it into the public imagination.³¹ Via literature, objects enter the collective memory as ideas and undergo a process leading to conceptual monumentalization, which means they begin to take similar meaning in the collective thought, a process similar to patrimonialization. In earlier depictions of Crimea, landscape rather than architecture figured prominently in Russian post-annexation travel-writing. As was shown by Beatrice Teissier in her review of European and Russian travel writing related to Catherine the Great's epic journey from Saint Petersburg to the Black Sea,³² writers such as the academicians Vasilii Feodorovich Zuev and Peter Simon Pallas, and the traveler Pavel Ivanovich Sumarokov, may have had very different viewpoints, but they were all describing Crimean Tatars and their culture through the description of its ancient and modern ruins, its landscape, or through ethnographic and Orientalist commentary.³³

Socio-political events like wars and emigrations were not addressed directly. Vassili Feodorovich Zuev and Pavel Ivanovich Sumarokov, for example, do not mention emigration, and instead point to the ruined state of Crimean

30 Notably works by Svetlana Gorshenina.

31 Bertram (2008), pp. 5–9.

32 Teissier (2017).

33 *Ibid.*, p. 235.

towns.³⁴ Indeed, ruins and wastelands were a recurrent motif in Crimea travel writing – not only with respect to ancient Greek sites, but also concerning more modern settlements such as Sudak, Kefe and Balaklava. The prioritization of classical sites went hand in hand with the official discourse of the Greek Plan, Catherine the Great’s project of restoring the Byzantine Empire. It was contributed to by developing the discipline of archaeology and the organization of local scholarly commissions for antiquities with a focus on uncovering ancient Greek sites, thus implicitly confirming Russia’s legitimacy in the region as its successor. In the context of Crimean Tatar sites, however, ruins had the implication of destruction and decay. The discourse of the visual representations on the plates of Peter Pallas similarly emphasizes first the religious landscape of the Tatar towns, and second their ruined condition.

Reviewing the references to the Crimean Tatar built environment reveals a preference toward the use of the ‘ruin’ metaphor in Russian and European Orientalist writing. Embedded in the history of the decay and reuse of the Tatar post-emigration material heritage, these accounts provide a better understanding of the underlying cultural implications of the emigration for the perception of the architectural surroundings of Crimea.

The war of 1853 created the conditions for a broader acquaintance with Crimea’s inheritance among Europeans, after a large influx of people to the peninsula’s battlefields.³⁵ British officers, doctors and soldiers inspired by philhellenic views expressed enthusiasm about the Greek classical artefacts found in Crimea, and depicted the peninsula in terms of its classical topography and imagination. Especially in the areas of Sevastopol and Kerch, preoccupation with the past turned into hasty excavations and looting. Officers like William Munro and Robert Westmacott, and doctors such as Duncan McPherson, had their excavation results published in British newspapers; they also photographed and collected pottery, statues, vases and various antiquities, while producing rough descriptions of the digs. Many of the discovered antiquities were brought to the British Museum.³⁶

Newer depictions, delivered by Crimean Tatar intellectuals since the 1880s through publications such as the newspaper *Tercüman* (“The Interpreter”), the literature journals *Yeşil Ada* (“Green Island”) and *Vetan Hadimi* (“Homeland’s

34 Ibid., p. 238.

35 Richardson (2013), p. 38.

36 Ibid.

Servant”), and other publications from the early 19th-century onwards, vigorously integrated the concept of *vetan*, or homeland, into the literary discourse. Historical representations and folk culture motifs played an important role in the construction of the homeland’s image. Another prominent component of the literary and poetic discourse was the narrative of enlightenment, introduced through the topics of education, traditionalism vs. modernization, and female emancipation.³⁷ As will be shown, drawing on the enlightenment vision presented by Ismail Gasprinskii (İsmail Gaspıralı), all of these values and initiatives were translatable into the sphere of historic preservation.

Gasprinskii, writing in different genres from journalistic articles and essays to novels, maintained the topic of enlightenment as his main preoccupation. The ideal of enlightenment through education was presented in polemical positions between promoters of ignorant traditionalism and of progressivism (between *ulema* and the Jadids, the archetypical mullah and the teacher, more general the East and the West). In his 1895 article “The Eastern Question” (*Şark Meselesi*) he proclaimed that: “the Eastern question is in fact the question of education.”³⁸ For Russia’s Muslims, rapprochement with Russian culture and recognition of its civilizing potential was, according to Gasprinskii, the way to fight ignorance and illiteracy. In his rhetoric, “the Muslim Turko-Tatars”³⁹ of the Russian Empire, as a group unified through language and a traditional way of living, should never be considered in isolation, but against the backdrop of Russian socio-political life and in (unflattering) comparison to the Muslims of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire. His publication activity and range of interests covered an area much wider than Crimea.

One of his first publications appeared in the Tiflis newspaper *Ziya-i Kafkasiye* (“Caucasian Light”) under the title “A letter sent from Bakhchisaray” (*Bağçasaraydan gönderilen mektub*). It described the press as an instrument that should be in the possession of all people, to guarantee the right for the discussion of relevant issues.⁴⁰ In Crimea Gasprinskii had a long history of collaboration with Ilya Ilyich Kazas, a prominent figure of the (Turkic-Jewish) Karaim community’s enlightening. Ismail Bey published articles in the newspaper *Tavrida*, edited by Kazas, and Kazas was the censor of *Tercüman*.

37 Memetova (2018), p. 95.

38 Seydahmet (1934), p. 166.

39 Gasprinskii (1881).

40 Khakimov (2017), p. 11.

In contrast to earlier writers and poets from Crimea, in the 1880s Gasprinskii brought forward the idea of a Russian Muslim identity for a community united not only by culture and language but also by its common goal of progress. The new school teaching method *usul-i jadid* (literally “the new method”) was intended as a path for the realization of these ideals. Presenting Russian rule as highly beneficial, he argued for a higher degree of involvement by fellow Muslims in the reforms being implemented, rather than having the whole executive and administrative class constituted of Russians.

His famous essay “Russkoe Musulmanstvo” of 1881 provides insight in regard to Gasprinskii’s stance towards the problem of Muslim architecture. Here he developed the concept of Islamic monuments as witnesses to the faded glory of its constructors. Ruinated monuments were conceived of along the same lines as epigraphy and manuscripts, as objects demonstrating connectedness to Persian and Arab cultural traditions:

only half-ruinated, dilapidated monuments of antiquity with their inscriptions, some greasy, dusty books witness that once Tatars had the ability to write and speak beautifully, could ponder upon things needing reflecting, understood the beauty of Hafiz, humaneness of Sheikh-Saadi and the bold thinking of Ibn Sina and other Arabic and Persian writers and philosophers.⁴¹

In another 1881 essay, titled “The World of Islam,” Gasprinskii used the example of Andalusian architecture from the period of the Abbasid Caliphate to illustrate how monuments can bear testimony to a golden age of Islamic civilization, when the richness of the world’s artistic and philosophical traditions were syncretized.⁴² Another essay, “Muslims and the Land of Comfort” (*Dār er-Rahat Müslümanları*), represents the journey of a 19th century mullah through Europe and his reflections on the relationship between the European and Islamic civilizations; the Alhambra Palace in Granada plays the role of a guide through which he gets introduced to “the land of comfort” – an exemplary progressive Muslim civilization.⁴³

The nostalgic, reminiscent tone used in connection to representations of historical monuments is characteristic of these essays of Gasprinskii, and is

41 Khakimov & Salikov (2017), p. 87.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

43 Tuna (2015), p. 152.

one of the elements forming his discourse of progress. It is ironic that with the name of the Jadids (from the Arabic term *jadīd* – “new”) the literary paradigm of glorifying the past began.

After Gasprinskii, the new generation of socially and culturally active Crimean Tatars came to perceive their identity in a narrower manner than ‘Russian Turks,’ based on a territorial identification. The turmoil of the First Russian Revolution (1905) allowed for wider political representation and self-organization of Muslims; Crimean Muslims held regular meetings and drafted petitions to the government, sent delegations to all-Muslim Congresses, and formed a political party and a politically active group known as the “Young Tatars.”⁴⁴ Fin-de-siècle Crimean Tatar literature has been researched in the context of the 1905 revolutionary movement and nation-building process,⁴⁵ yet a novel direction in its analysis would be achieved by analyzing the expressions of identity and perception of built heritage in literature. In the timeframe between the Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire (1908) and the 1917 February Revolution in Russia, new political forces known as the Young Tatars began to form, taking a course toward more independence from the Russian Empire. Tatars from the Ottoman diaspora, notably Cafer Seydahmet and Numan Çelebi Cihan, who became politicized during their time in the Istanbul of the Young Turk Revolution, founded an association called “Homeland Society” (*Vatan Cemiyeti*) in 1908 as a platform for developing a distinct Crimean Tatar national identity.⁴⁶ The press and education were the vital factors that allowed the distinctions between the northern steppe Nogays, mountain Tats and southern Yaliboyu to be overcome. Both in the press and in poetry and prose, a dissemination of a “sense of *Kırım Tatarlık* [sic] (Crimean Tatarness), based on secularist principles”⁴⁷ by the nationalist intelligentsia can be observed.

In 1899 Osman Nuri Asan-Oglu Akçokraklı published a story titled “The Mausoleum of Nenkecan Hanum” (*Nenkecan Hanum Türbesi*) in Saint Petersburg.⁴⁸ It featured two young men who in the 1890s hear the life story of Tokhtamysh Khan’s daughter Janika and decide to visit her mausoleum. The framing of the main storyline may have addressed the reality of the author’s

44 Kırımlı (1990), pp. 78–99.

45 For example, in Ülgen (2014).

46 Jobst (2020), p. 241.

47 Williams (2015), p. 56.

48 Kurnaz & Çeltik (1993).

time, when young Crimean Tatars were rediscovering their folklore and forming new connections to it, by engaging in touristic activities. Here Akçokraklı referred to Bakhchisaray in the following manner:

The Khan Palace, located in the central part of this town [Bakhchisaray], whose heart it enslaves, is worthy of being called “the center of the centers,” just as the town, famous for its air and water, and their special purity and beauty, occupied the center of the Khanate. But now this palace in which life was seething in former times is empty, abandoned, open to idle onlookers, and probably no repair will be able to restore its roof, ornaments, and decorations. In the broad Khan's garden every day there are now crowds of people walking and thirsting for entertainment.⁴⁹

Akçokraklı translated Crimean Tatar folk literature into Russian and Russian literature into Crimean Tatar. He conducted surveys and in 1917 founded the “Museum of Turk-Tatar Culture” in Bakhchisaray together with the archaeologist Usein Bodadinskii. His experience in the Russian, Crimean and Ottoman framework is exemplary of switching between cultural codes, or, more often, bringing cultural codes into other contexts. In Crimea, Akçokraklı studied in an *usul-i jadid* school and in a Russian school, eventually graduating from the prestigious Zincirli Medrese in Bakhchisaray. He used his knowledge of Arabic and Tatar to work in a publishing house and in the Public Library in Saint Petersburg, together with the Orientalist Vasilii Dmitrievich Smirnov, and with his recommendation undertook two study trips to Istanbul.⁵⁰ It was during his last stay in 1899 that he actively took part in the political currents overwhelming the Ottoman capital. Taking a close look at his biography, it is easy to notice that his professional formation and the formulation of his circle of interests were shaped in Saint-Petersburg and in Istanbul. In 1906 he came back to Crimea to work in the newspaper *Tercüman* for several years. This work clearly influenced him into publishing his own newspaper in Orenburg – *Vakt* (“Time”).⁵¹

Asan Çergeyev's poem “The Fountain of Tears” (*Közyaş Han Çeşmesi*), published in *Vetan Hadimi* in 1908, was directly inspired by Alexander Pushkin's 1820s poem “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray”. In this poem, the Khan Saray represents the sad decay from glory to desertion. The crying fountain that main-

49 Originally published in Aqçoqraqlı (1899), p. 1; translated by author.

50 Nepomnyashchii (2021), p. 156.

51 Ibid., p. 157.

tains the hope that life can return to its previous condition personifies that eclipse:

İşidüp çoq namın, çeşme,
Keldim yoqlay, alın nice?
Cümle yuqlay, dök derdini
Kimse duymaz, qara gice [...] ⁵²
(Közyaş Han Çeşmesi, 1908)

I heard much about your fame, fountain,
I came to visit you, what is your state?
Everyone is sleeping, pour your troubles,
No one will hear, the night is dark.
(The Khan's Fountain of Tears, 1908) ⁵³

The literary tradition put the buildings on the mental map of Tatar people as historical monuments, investing them with a fundamental value for Tatariness. Mehmet Niyazi, born in Dobruja in 1878 and moved to Crimea in 1898, was a poet making national pathos a characteristic trait of his writing. His “March to the Medrese of Menli Geray” (*Menli Geray Medresesine Marş*), written most probably between 1912 and 1931, tied an educational institution and its building, the *medrese*, to the idea of Muslim awakening.

This illustrates that the literary production starting from the 1890s is focused on nurturing the concept of *Tatarlıq* – ‘Tatariness’. Moreover, it has an evocative tone, mobilizing historical narratives of rise and decadence, and representing local historical buildings. In line with the contemporary social needs, these narratives were put in relation to enlightenment and a sense of awakening.

Along with literary endeavors and probably based on this ongoing dissemination of knowledge about Crimean architectural monuments, travels to historic sites gained prominence toward the end of the 19th century. In 1890 the Crimean-Caucasian alpine club was created in Odessa. This was a touristic organization that local intellectuals modelled after Western European alpine

52 Kurnaz & Çeltik (1993); Kerim (2019).

53 Translation by author.

clubs. It was the first organization of this type in the country and organized three types of excursions: scientific, educational, and touristic. Its regulations defined its touristic activity as “protection of historical monuments, rare types of plants and animals and all kinds of landmarks.”⁵⁴

Already during the first years of the club's existence, branches in Yalta and Sevastopol were created, focusing on excursions to medieval monuments. The peak of its activity was reached in 1903, when 39 excursions with over 700 people were organized. The major destinations were the ancient site of Chersonesus and the fortress of Inkerman, but trips to Bakhchisaray palace and the fortresses of Çufut Qale and Mangup Qale were also organized. The overall amount of people who participated in the excursions of the club's Yalta branch was 120,000.⁵⁵

Moreover, it had high visibility in the region, having its advertisements published weekly in local newspapers, creating travel guides, brochures, and even opening a museum in Odessa. The travel guides of the turn of the century – as opposed to the descriptions of land, customs, and simply travels produced in earlier decades – were not only a privilege of the higher classes, but were oriented at a vast number of tourists. The issuing of over 300 travel guides before the October Revolution marked the necessity to translate the scientific observations of earlier travel accounts into accessible and compact descriptions of tourist attractions. This type of literature shows the change of focus over the second half of the 19th century from unsystematic collection and transmission of information about the peninsula to active popularization of historical, natural, and cultural sites in a standardized form, with the aim of turning Crimea into a competitive touristic destination.⁵⁶

Conclusion

The elevation of sites to the status of monuments in the 19th and early 20th century in Crimea was expressed through legal formulations, protection practice, validation through official Orientalology and history organizations, as well as by literature and popularization through touristic infrastructure. It was characterized by the overwhelming involvement of representatives of the imperial

54 Rudenko (2015), p. 2.

55 Ostapchuk (2016), p. 160.

56 Molochko (2010), p. 137.

power, due to the lack of a coherent civil society that would nurture the formation of local Crimean intellectuals, as well as the complete destruction of the earlier social system existing in the Crimean Khanate. It did not, however, turn patrimonialization into a ubiquitously top-down phenomenon. It was often on the private initiatives of imperial subjects, and not decisions of state functionaries, that measures for an organization of knowledge on 'monuments of antiquity' would be created. Due to the specifics of Crimea's annexation and its symbolic meaning to the crown, it created precedence for practices that would later extend to other corners of the empire. With the renaissance of Crimean Tatar literary life after the 1890s, the imagined pantheon of national monuments as formulated by representatives of Crimean Tatar culture is a product of subaltern resistance that departed from the Russian course of representation and followed new ideas of its identity and aspirations. The discussion of patrimonialization cannot be kept at the level of the architectural sites, since the values they are invested with, through processes of discursive transformation, essentially concern the understanding of people's identity and the means for its display.

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Amazing stories?

Crimean heritage and the reinvention of Ukrainian art history

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Abstract: *This essay reconsiders the place of Crimea's Islamic heritage in Ukraine's mainstream art histories. Unlike art and architecture originating among Orthodox Christian communities, the Crimean heritage, produced by a people ethnically, culturally and religiously different, presented a challenge in terms of patrimonialization for Ukraine's titular nationality. From the early 20th century, the Ukrainian art historical narrative was exclusive and ethno-centred; thus, it was sluggish in embracing the other paradigm of a multicultural state. This essay undertakes not only to expose the factors that impeded or even forbade the patrimonialization of early modern Crimean art but also to present possible methodological solutions that can facilitate reinventing the canon of Ukrainian art history.*

Early modern Ottoman Crimean art and architecture have been in the focus of studies for several decades, with a recent shift towards a transregional perspective.¹ In recognition of this trend, this essay will not explore particular artworks or monuments, but instead examine the ways that the Crimean heritage was incorporated into Ukrainian art history and identify the challenges that are still open. Thus, chronologically I shall focus on the times of the Crimean Khanate (1441–1783). Analysis of the patrimonialization process of the monuments that emerged from the extremely diverse and intertwined Crimean culture will facilitate the exposure of flaws in Ukrainian art history's existing narrative and

1 Kançal-Ferrari (2017, 2018 and 2022).

reveal its methodological underpinnings stemming from Soviet times. The essay's first part discusses that narrative and its origins, whereas the essay's second part focuses on the post-2014 politics of memory as it is reflected in exhibitions. The closing paragraphs will offer a viable alternative that can reshape the old patterns of scholarship and memory culture.

Before 2014: Crimea, its heritage and Ukrainian art history

Ties between mainland Ukraine and Crimea developed over several centuries. This coexistence was marked by economic and cultural exchanges as well as by political and military conflicts. This impacted Crimea's patrimonialization within Ukraine after its inclusion in Ukrainian territory in 1954.

Once a part of Greco-Roman antiquity, Crimea and its steppe hinterland became a centuries-long site of conflict between the Eastern Slavs and steppe peoples like the Khazars and Cumans. On the coast, Greeks and Italians (Genoese) continued to be present. In 1475, a client state of the Mongol 'Golden Horde', which overran most of Ukraine in 1237, came under Ottoman suzerainty. This entity, known as the Crimean Khanate after 1441, remained that empire's vassal until its annexation by Russia in 1783.²

In the following period, new towns were founded and populations were moved around.³ This process peaked in the 1944 wholesale deportation of Crimean Tatars to Inner Asia on account of their purported collaboration with the Nazis. Settlers from more 'loyal' ethnic backgrounds (Russians and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainians) repopulated Crimea, resulting in a completely changed ethnic composition.⁴

After multiple political and military conflicts, the Crimean Peninsula officially became a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. It was in the same year that the Soviet Union celebrated the 300th anniversary of the "Union of Russia and Ukraine" – also known as the Pereyaslav Council.⁵ No wonder that none of the (rather scarce) historical accounts of Ukrainian art

2 Zhirohov & Nicolle (2019), p. 6–8; Brook (1999), p. 253; Curta (2019), pp. 177–8; Cvetkovski & Hofmeister (2014), p. 370.

3 O'Neill (2017), pp. 317–8; Cvetkovski & Hofmeister (2014), p. 37.

4 Aydın (2019), p. 10.

5 Kasianenko (2005), p. 212.

mentioned Crimea prior to this date, despite the traditionally strong economic and cultural ties between the peninsula and its Ukrainian hinterland.

This paradox's explanation lies both in the traditions of Russian cultural policy and in the dogma of the triune Slavic nation, which was designed as one of the Russian empire's tools of hegemony-building.⁶ According to this dogma, three 'fraternal' modern nations originated from the people of the medieval Rus: Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians.⁷ Throughout history, they were divided because of the evil plots designed by other states such as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But they had always striven to reunite, because only being united within one state was a natural state for them. These three nations constituted the so-called 'Russian world', in which 'Great Russia' should dominate the 'Little Russians' and 'White Russians'. This 'world' had to be Orthodox and Russian-speaking.⁸ Other religions and cultures were considered foreign and imposed on the territories that should have been part of the 'Russian world', as, for example, in Ukraine.⁹ Soviet authorities promoted the same dogma, but common language and shared culture, especially literature played the role of glue instead of religion.

Therefore, the Crimean khanate's medieval and early modern heritage could not constitute a natural part of the Ukrainian national canon during neither the Russian empire or the Soviet Union. Ukrainian art historians tended to produce art historical accounts based solely on the history of ethnic Ukrainians, and at the expense of all other groups that inhabited its territory in the past.¹⁰ For example, Volodymyr Modzalevskyi asserted, in his 1918 book titled *Key features of Ukrainian art*, that,

every people has its own art intertwined with the essence of its national countenance, and it is in the artworks that are nothing like art of the neighbouring people in which we can see the genuine examples of Ukrainian people's artistry.¹¹

6 Krawchenko (1987), p. 31.

7 Metreveli (2020), p. 102.

8 Ibid., p. 102–3.

9 Biletskyi (1969), p. 232.

10 "Кожний нарід має своє мистецтво, тісно зв'язане з самою суттю його національного обличчя і якраз у речах, не схожих на мистецтво нікого із сусідніх народах, ми можемо побачити справжні зразки української народної творчості". Modzalevskyi (1918), p.4.

11 Ibid., p. 5 (translation by author).

This approach legitimized the focus on ‘people’s art’ as the true ‘Ukrainian art’, which corresponded with the Soviet idea of the people as the driving force behind both economic and cultural development. Modzalevskiy even renounced examination of Ukraine’s Baroque and Classicist architecture, considering them products of foreign influences and lacking the typical features of a Ukrainian architectural style.¹²

Ukrainian scholars that fled from the Soviet regime were not restricted to exploring Ukrainian art history solely through Marxist dogma. Dmytro Antonovych refuted Modzalevskiy’s statements in his *Short introduction to Ukrainian art history* of 1923, in which he emphasized the intertwining between national styles. He argued that every national style was part of a universal style, an integral part that cannot be taken from its context.¹³

Moreover, unlike Modzalevskiy, Antonovych acknowledged the difficulty one had to deal with when defining Ukrainian art. He pointed out that this question was relevant only in Ukraine because “For every other European cultured nation, this question would seem unthinkable.”¹⁴ All art created in France or by Frenchmen abroad is considered French, and so it is with German art, he stated.¹⁵ However, in Ukraine, one wanted to be careful: “Although Ukrainian people live mostly on the territory of Ukraine, there are something like colonies interspersed amongst them that are not fully assimilated yet.”¹⁶ He explored Jewish and Polish art in the territory of Ukraine to come to the conclusion that, despite differences in culture and religion, their artwork could still be treated as Ukrainian.¹⁷ With respect to the identities of Ukrainian-born painters, Antonovych suggested being flexible and discriminating between masters who were influenced more by the countries where they stayed or who kept true to their Ukrainian identity.¹⁸

12 Ibid., p. 16.

13 Antonovych (1923), p. 3–4.

14 “У всякого іншого культурного європейського народу таке питання здавало-бися неймовірним”; Antonovych (1923), p. 6.

15 Ibid., p. 6.

16 “...хоч український народ живе компактною масою на території України, але між українською людністю здавна вкраплено невеличкі відносно колонії, які не вповні асимілювалися з Українцями, але тим часом вносять свій відносно невеликий, вклад в мистецьку творчість України”; Antonovych (1923), p. 7.

17 Antonovych (1923), p. 7-8.

18 Ibid., p. 9-10.

Despite this rather outstanding statement for this period and time, the survey did not explore the Crimean heritage. Antonovych limited himself to examining Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish architecture, as did his predecessor, Hryhorii Pavluts'kyi, whom he referred to in the introduction.¹⁹

No matter how progressive Antonovych was, he published his books in emigration and had no impact on Soviet scholarship, which adhered to the arguments expressed by Modzalev's'kyi. But not only methodology rooted in nationalism impeded a multicultural approach to art history; also the Soviet educational reform resulted in all departments of history and theory of art being either dismissed or transferred from the universities to the academies of art. That reform, together with the systemic persecution and execution of intelligentsia, broke the back of a Ukrainian art history that was showing signs of recovery in the 1950s, at the very time when Crimea became an administrative part of Ukraine and, thus, a new narrative was on the agenda.

But even then, the inertia of the triune dogma was still not so easy to overcome. In the 1950s and 1960s, many Ukrainian art historians tended to focus almost exclusively on Ukrainian art of the Rus and Baroque times. For example, in a monograph on Ukrainian portrait painting of the 17th and 18th centuries by Platon Bilets'kyi, one of the most famous Ukrainian art historians, it is stated that: "There is no need to include in the history of Ukrainian art everything that was once created in Ukraine or by its natives far from the homeland."²⁰ Ethnicity and Orthodoxy were regarded as the key characteristics of the 'Ukraineness' of art both in the Soviet times and in the first decades of Ukraine's independence.

Attempts to change the existing paradigm became evident only in 1967, when *The history of Ukrainian art* (1966-70), a multi-volume encyclopaedia supervised by Mykola Bazhan, was published. The survey was conceived a decade earlier by Ukrainian architect Volodymyr Zabolotnyi. He commissioned scholars from three academic institutions – the Institute for History and Theory of Architecture, the Institute for Artistic Industries and the Institute for Monumental Art and Sculpture – with the development of a conceptual framework for the future encyclopaedia.²¹ In 1956, shortly after Joseph Stalin's death, the editorial board published a booklet entitled "The program for the study of

19 Ibid., p. 7.

20 Bilets'kyi (1969), p. 7 (translation by author).

21 Umantsev (2007), p. 98.

Ukrainian art”, where the necessity of a multi-volume survey was promoted.²² The “program” had to pave the way for the larger publication that, however, emerged much later.

After the death of Zabolotnyi in 1966, a single-volume monograph titled *Studies in the history of Ukrainian art* was published.²³ Its concept dwelled on earlier publications with their ethno-centric narratives that meant once again exclusion of the art of other ethnic groups or religious minorities on the territory of Ukraine. Thus, the project planned by Zabolotnyi was still to be undertaken.

Eventually, Mykola Bazhan, a Soviet-Ukrainian poet, cultural historian and writer stepped forward and turned the initial idea into a six-volume encyclopaedia that covered Ukrainian art from prehistoric times to the 20th century. He insisted on the inclusion of Muslim and Jewish art, much in imitation of Hryhorii Pavlutskyi, who was as inclusive in his account of Ukrainian architecture in 1911.²⁴ Bazhan intended this survey to be written according to the territorial principle in opposition to the earlier ethno-centric accounts. It, too, had to emphasise “first democratic and then Socialist elements in Ukrainian art.”²⁵

The period that is of interest to us here is addressed in the second volume of Bazhan’s encyclopedia.²⁶ Tatars are branded as a constant threat to Ukrainians, as invaders whose art and architecture were wiped out from the ethnocentric part of the book. The author started his account by stating that “Crimean architecture developed separately from Ukrainian architecture,”²⁷ although later on, he dismisses his own claim by pinpointing mutual influences.²⁸

In general, Crimean Tatar art and architecture are discussed rather briefly (the account amounts to five pages) and sketchily. It states that the Tatars’ culture was under Ottoman influence. At the same time, Nelgovskiy, the author of the section on Crimean art, mentions Italian architects at the khan’s service, who were said to participate in the building of Or Qapi Fortress.²⁹ He also

22 Hirik (2021), p. 229.

23 Zabolotnyi (1966).

24 Hirik (2021), p. 232.

25 “демократичних, а потім і соціалістичних елементів українського мистецтва”; Bazhan (1966), p. 8.

26 Bazhan (1967), pp. 99-104.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 101, 104.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 102.

states that Ukrainian artists reluctantly contributed to the Tatars' arts and architecture being kept as their prisoners, but he failed to specify the sheer scale of this contribution. Nelgovskiy only briefly mentions Ukrainian elements being used in the ornamentation of Tatars' edifices.³⁰ He concludes by stating that,

when Ukrainian masters were getting acquainted with artwork originating from countries conquered by Ottoman Turkey, they picked up different features and used them in their own artistic practice. But this issue has not been explored at all, so it is hard to talk about exact connections.³¹

Thus, one can surely deduce that Crimean art and architecture in the time of the Khanate were not considered a part of Ukraine's culture. Of course, the remains of palaces, residential houses, mosques or fortresses were considered during Soviet times and later as a cultural heritage that needed to be studied and protected, but it only idled on the periphery of the larger narrative and was doomed to be left out of any attribution.

Independence did not change much in the canon of Ukrainian art history. Ukrainian art historians adhered to the concept of the ethnic nation as a framework for art studies. Ukraine's natural cultural diversity was narrated in the same fashion as it had been done in the late 1960s in 'the history of Ukrainian art'.

The existing canon was supported by emerging new surveys of the history of art and the applied arts (which were seen as separate domains), and biographical sketches of the most prominent Ukrainian artists.³² Despite being free from the pressure of Soviet Russian authorities, interpretations of art as a product of national spirit persisted and dictated the structure of all new surveys. Focus was placed on art created by ethnic Ukrainians, while the artistic development of other ethnic groups that lived on the territory of Ukraine was discussed separately.

Here I shall limit myself to the most comprehensive and authoritative account published before the occupation of Crimea: *The history of Ukrainian art* (in

30 Ibid., 101.

31 "Разом з тим, знайомлячись з витворами мистецтва країн, які захопила османська Туреччина, українські майстри переймали окремі риси цього мистецтва, перенесли їх у свою творчість. Але це питання ще зовсім не досліджене і говорити про конкретні прояви зв'язків досить важко". Bazhan (1967), p. 104.

32 Avramenko (2006), Naiden (2011); Kashuba-Volvach (2012).

six volumes, 2006–11). Produced under the auspices of the Rylsky Institute of Art Studies, Folklore and Ethnology, it claimed to explore how Ukrainian material corresponds with European periodization, both chronologically and in terms of content. But the use of the term ‘Rus-Ukraine’ when referring to the period from the 13th until the first half of the 16th century exposes the underpinning idea of building a continuous narrative of Ukrainian art as an uncontested entity rooted only in Slavic artistic culture.

Crimean late medieval and early modern art and architecture were studied in volumes 2 and 3 respectively. These accounts are longer and contain more details.³³ Generally, the Crimean Khanate was criticized for promoting wars and the slave trade.³⁴ Its late medieval art was rightfully considered a mixture of Western, Eastern Byzantine and Muslim artistic traditions.³⁵ “Western”, that is, Western European Romanesque and Gothic styles blend with the Byzantine tradition, and as to the architecture of the Crimean Khanate, it undergoes “Orientalization” under the influence of Muslim countries of the Near East. However, the “Orientalization,” in the authors’ opinion, was not limited to the Khanate.³⁶

They stated that despite religious and ethnic differences, Crimean artistic culture could be considered a unity based on its stylistic features. Supposedly,

The same decorative floral patterns, namely shoots, helical and entangled stalks or various braids can be found in ornamentation in a Tatar mosque and medrese, in an Armenian or Greek church or palace, in a Jewish synagogue and even on Genoese plates with inscriptions from Kaffa or Soldaia.³⁷

This conclusion is of strong importance as the authors actually outlined a strategy that could defy the existing canon and bring together the histories of art in

33 Skrypnyk (2011), pp. 743–60.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 743.

35 Skrypnyk (2010), p. 86.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

37 “Одне й те саме декоративне оздоблення у вигляді рослинних пагонів, спірале-подібних і заплетених стеблин з потовщеннями чи різних плетінок трапляється в татарській мечеті та медресе, у вірменському чи грецькому храмі або палаці, у єврейській синагозі й навіть на генуезьких плитах з написами у Кафі та Солдайї”. Skrypnyk (2010), p. 86.

Ukraine. However, until now this comment has not led to any tectonic changes in art historiography, the possibility of which I shall discuss in the conclusion.

Crimean architecture of early modern times was regarded as a local variant of Turkish Ottoman architecture, which in itself is a mixture of Byzantine, Seljuk and Western European traditions, with Mimar Sinan (d. 1588) as the brightest representative. One chapter is focused on Kezlev (present-day Yevpatoria), its urban planning and, of course, the Friday Mosque (1552-64) designed by Mimar Sinan.

The author also briefly explored the Italian presence at the khan's court. He cited the example of Aloisio the New (possibly the Venetian sculptor Alvise Lamberti da Montagnana), who had been captured by Menli I Giray on his way to Moscow and worked on Bakchisaray palace, leaving behind a beautifully carved portal Demir-Kapu.³⁸ With respect to the Italian influence, the so-called Turkish Renaissance and so-called Turkish Baroque are mentioned as the dominant styles,³⁹ but the former is not explained any further, and the latter's description is limited to one sentence, where it was called "pronouncedly decorative" and highly ornamented in the "Khatai" style.⁴⁰

A separate chapter studied Crimean Tatar applied arts, which were considered completely under the Ottoman influence through books, manuscripts, textiles, jewellery and pottery imported from Turkey.⁴¹ Once again, the entangled nature of Crimean art becomes evident when Achukurina states that "Khatai" as a style transcended religious boundaries, being popular among both Muslims and Christians.⁴²

Although the survey of 2011 does contain fairly detailed entries about Crimean Muslim late medieval and early modern art and architecture, the volumes themselves rely structurally on their Soviet predecessors. It is evident when it comes to the buildings' structure, and, although the survey covers

38 Skrypnyk (2011), p. 744.

39 The notion of a 'Turkish Baroque' is not explained fully in the Ukrainian encyclopaedia. An 'Ottoman Baroque' is outlined in the eponymous book of 2019 by Ünver Rüstem. He explores how Istanbul's architecture was transformed with the use of European models that had to reinforce the image of the Ottoman empire as a global force and convey to its capital a cosmopolitan look.

40 "Останній з них характеризується підкресленим декоративізмом архітектурних форм і застосуванням орнаментальних композицій, в основі яких лежав реалістичний рослинний і квітковий декор у стилі «хатаї»". Skrypnyk (2011), p. 744.

41 Skrypnyk (2011), p. 952.

42 Ibid., p. 953.

all the important aspects of Crimean art and architecture in the times of the Crimean Khanate, it mostly fails to integrate the Crimean part into Ukrainian art history. Crimea stands on its own totally disconnected from the main narrative, which gives the reader an idea of the region's being only mechanically added due to political and economic reasons. On rare occasions, relations to what is considered a pure 'Ukrainian' culture are presented but they are not really explored. However, these accounts are far more advanced, and sometimes pave the way for a different perspective on the Crimean artistic tradition.

Therefore, the surveys published before 2014, if they mention it at all, tend to create an image of Crimea as an exotic Other of Ukrainian culture that has to be understood and appreciated, but not thought of as something that can be easily assimilated into a national narrative. And that is the biggest flaw that scholars of Ukrainian art history have to deal with right now.

Knowing thy Other? Post-2014 exhibitions

In late February 2014, when the so-called Revolution of Dignity in Kyiv entered its most dramatic stage, Russian military troops invaded Crimea and installed the pro-Russian puppet government there. An orchestrated referendum followed. It resulted in the declaration of Crimea's 'independence' on 16 March 2014, followed by the peninsula's incorporation into Russia two days later. The annexation of Crimea led to drastic changes in Ukrainian cultural politics. Crimean Tatars and their culture finally came into focus.

In 2015 the Crimean House (*Kryms'kyi dim*, *Qırım Evi*) was established in Kyiv as an educational and cultural centre that offered workshops, public talks, exhibitions, and publications in the Crimean Tatar language, as well as translations from it to Ukrainian. The Crimean House also partners in concerts and art exhibitions with museums (like the Art Arsenal) and musical groups, and advocates human rights by organising political actions in support of the political prisoners in Crimea and public talks with their relatives in Ukraine. Its representatives also join the bigger missions to advocate the rights of Crimean Tatars in the European parliament, the United Nations Security Council and the Council of Europe.

Two years later, in 2017, the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation (UCF) was created to, as it says in the statement, "introduce new mechanisms for result-oriented and competition-based state funding for initiatives in the field of culture

and creative industries.⁴³ During the next three years, the UCF invested 13,5 million hryvnas (ca. 355,325 Euros) into fifteen projects related to Crimea. In 2021 Yuliia Fediv, the UCF's acting director, announced a special Crimean programme as a part of the next call for projects, developed by the UCF together with the Ukrainian Institute and the Crimean house.⁴⁴ That call for projects on the 'Culture of Crimea' has now been published on the UCF's official website.⁴⁵ Its stated priorities include a comprehensive retrospective understanding of Crimean culture through art, forming a vision of Crimea's future cultural landscape by emphasising the continuity of cultural ties between Crimea and mainland Ukraine, and the preservation, development and representation of the cultural diversity of Crimea, in particular the Crimean Tatar culture. The submitted projects were supposed to reach a wide audience in mainland Ukraine and Crimea, and foster new partnerships between organizations and institutes involved in the preservation and promotion of Crimean culture and human rights.

Ukrainian cultural policy is reflected in a wide range of projects aimed at bringing Crimean culture closer to Ukrainians. It was a necessary step towards both the integration of Crimean art into the Ukrainian art-historical canon and, more generally, the recognition of Crimean Tatar identity as a part of Ukrainian identity. Here I shall examine two recent exhibitions that addressed Crimean culture and contributed to the change in the narrative of Ukrainian art history.

'Amazing Stories of Crimea' (2019), in the Art Arsenal (*Mystetskyi Arsenal*) in Kyiv, offered insight into the complicated ethnic and cultural history of the peninsula. It was open from February 26 through May 5, the starting date being the 'Day of Resistance to the Occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol'. It commemorated the 2014 demonstration when thousands of Crimean Tatars assembled outside the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, i.e. the day before Russian Federation sol-

43 "About us," *Ukrainian Cultural Foundation*, accessed 28 February 2023, <https://ucf.in.ua/en/p/about>.

44 Krymskyi, Ivan, "Krym v kulturnykh proiektakh Ukrainy," *Voice of Crimea*, 2 September 2021, <https://voicecrimea.com.ua/main/articles/krim-v-kulturnix-proyektax-ukra%D1%97ni.html>, accessed 28 February 2023.

45 "LOT 3. Culture of Crimea," *Ukrainian Cultural Foundation*, accessed 28 February 2023, https://ucf.in.ua/en/m_lots/61a62fo801635d328f689cd2.

diers took armed control of the parliament in preparation for the annexation of Crimea.



Fig. 1: General view of the exhibition “Amazing Stories of Crimea.” Photo: Oleksandr Popenko / Mystetskyi Arsenal, 2019.

The curators pointed to the problem in the Ukrainian imagination that they wanted to tackle:

The glimmering sea, the rustling cypress trees, the waves crashing beneath the steep cliffs, the faint smell of lavender, the endless steppe with wormwood and burial mounds, and the light ochre-coloured earth. This is the beautiful, but sometimes harsh, Crimea we see in pictures, drawings and photographs. And it seems like in the Ukrainian public consciousness, Crimea is more a space, a landscape, than the home of countless cultures – some well-studied, others mysterious.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ “Amazing stories of Crimea,” *Mystetskyi Arsenal*, <https://artarsenal.in.ua/en/vystavka/amazing-stories-of-crimea>, accessed 28 February 2023.

Basically, even in 2019, Crimea was perceived as an exotic Other of Ukraine. The variety of presented artefacts connected with stories was an attempt to bridge the gap between two cultures and, ultimately, integrate Crimea into a new, inclusive Ukrainian artistic narrative. The ethnic and religious otherness was supposed to be overcome by personal stories related to the presented objects, which eased the way for visitors to connect on an emotional level.

The exhibition also aimed to trace the paths of Crimean artefacts into mainland collections. An exhibition about Crimea without Crimean materials presented a challenge for the curators, who not only had to address existing stereotypes but also had to deal with the difficulties of obtaining objects for the exhibition. Thus, they requested objects of Crimean origin or related to the topic from museums in mainland Ukraine.



Fig. 2: Jewellery and cauldron, 4th century BC, bronze casting from burial mound near Mala Lepetykha village, Velykolypetskyi district, Kherson region, excavated in 1992 by Hennadiy Yevdokymov of the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Photo: Oleksandr Popenko / Mystetskyi Arsenal, 2019.

Fifteen museums and anonymous private collectors contributed to the exhibition. The title “Amazing stories” hints at the focus of the project, which

treats the objects only as a pretext to tell stories of glory, wars, and personal tragedies. The real subject of the “Amazing stories” was the cultural memory of Crimean ethnic groups more generally, and Crimean Tatars in particular endangered by the annexation of the peninsula.

As Svetlana Biedarieva summed up in her review of the exhibition:

It also reveals the uneasy history among Crimean ethnic groups. It is divided into areas, each presenting the culture of a particular group that lived in Crimea for centuries, such as Turks, Italians, Goths, Sarmatians, Scythians, Greeks, Khazars, Cimmerians, and Tauri, among others, presenting Crimea as a place of intensive cultural exchange before the 20th century.⁴⁷

The exhibition was accompanied by a series of lectures titled “(Un)known Crimea”, presented by Oleksandr Halenko, Evelina Kravchenko, Tetiana Shevchenko, Svitlana Tzurkan, Gulnara Bekirova and Yuliia Skubytska.⁴⁸ They are still available for watching at the webpage of the Art Arsenal.⁴⁹

In 2021 a multi-genre project ‘Crimean way/Yol Qırım’ curated by Rustem Skybin and Vlodko Kaufman tackled the history and culture of Crimean Tatars. The exhibition was intended for a wide audience and for families in particular and, therefore, fluctuated between presenting a historical narrative of Crimean statehood, culture, religion and traditions, and entertaining features like listening to lullabies, immersing into the virtual reality experience of Bakhchysarai and its environs, or Crimean Tatars’ board games for family and companies to play. The artistic component was represented by a newly formed collection of applied arts, which consisted of 200 items with pottery, textiles and jewellery amongst them.

47 Biedarieva, Svitlana. “Crimea’s amazing history told through art,” *Hyperallergic*, 3 May 2019, <https://hyperallergic.com/498027/amazing-stories-of-crimea-art-arsenal/>, accessed 28 February 2023.

48 “Amazing stories of Crimea. Tsykl lektsii ‘(Ne)vidomyi Krym” [The series of lectures “(Un)known Crimea”], *Mystetskyi Arsenal*, accessed 28 February 2023, <https://artarsenal.in.ua/education/proekt/ne-vidomyj-krym-tsykl-lektsij/>.

49 “Amazing stories of Crimea. Tsykl lektsii ‘(Ne)vidomyi Krym” [The series of lectures “(Un)known Crimea”], *Mystetskyi Arsenal*, accessed 28 February 2023, URL: <https://artarsenal.in.ua/education/proekt/ne-vidomyj-krym-tsykl-lektsij/>.



Fig. 3: Fragments of an Ottoman military tent, late 17th century, Lviv Historical Museum. Photo: Oleksandr Popenko / Mystetskyi Arsenal, 2019.

First, the curators stated that the Crimean Tatars were among the indigenous peoples of Ukraine, and that their cultural heritage as well as spiritual and material heritage were integral parts of the all-Ukrainian heritage. Second, admitting it as an integral part would open the ‘way’ to the non-mythical Ukrainian (in particular, the Crimean Tatar) history, and enable the personal perception of Crimean culture by the viewers as their own, close, and native culture. Vlodko Kaufman, one of the curators, aptly noted that:

Addressing Crimea, Crimean culture and people means to show the topic as a raw wound. Despite the tragic history of the Crimean Tatars, the Ukrainian state remained blind and never addressed the problem for 30 years. This belatedness haunts us now. And although the annexation triggered bringing this problem of loss into the public space, we still have to feel it and perceive it on the mental level.⁵⁰

50 “Piznai svoikh: ukrainsi maiut znaty pro kulturu krymskykh tatar,” 3 October 2021, <https://life.pravda.com.ua/culture/2021/10/3/246101/>, accessed 28 February 2023.

The belatedness and superficiality of Ukrainian art historians responsible for writing the grand narrative still constitute one of the major issues. Of course, there are art historians who explore Crimean culture in depth, but they are mostly known amongst their colleagues from abroad who study the same topic and not in the mainland Ukrainian art historical community with its centres in Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv.



Fig. 4: General view of the exhibition “Amazing Stories of Crimea.” Photo: Oleksandr Popenko / Mystetskyi Arsenal, 2019.

The imposition of the Russian narrative in Crimea is one more issue that we have to deal with. As Sevgil Musaeva, the editor-in-chief of ‘Ukrainian Pravda’, one of the key Ukrainian media outlets, pointed out:

Russian historiography did everything possible to erase the Crimean Tatars’ narrative in Crimea. Ukrainians have to know that our people have a lot in common as (for example) our experience of opposing the empire, which aimed at erasing our languages, cultures, traditions and the peoples themselves. Unfortunately, we started to discover each other only after the an-

nexation of Crimea. But I'm sure this knowledge will strengthen us, and the culture of the Crimean Tatars will enrich Ukrainian culture.⁵¹

The exhibition was later transferred and became a part of the Crimean House's exhibit, and a part of the collection of applied arts was donated to the Museum of Folk Architecture and Everyday Culture 'Pyrohiv' in Kyiv, where a 'Crimean manor' was opened.⁵²

Reinventing the canon of Ukrainian art history after 24 February 2022

Despite the efforts of artists, curators and public institutions, the foundations of Ukrainian art history remained largely unquestioned until the Russian invasion in February 2022. Art historians, who were responsible for narrating Ukrainian art history in lectures and texts, kept clinging to a nation-centred narrative that stemmed from the Soviet times, postulating that Ukrainian art should be limited to (preferably) Orthodox art created by artists who were ethnically Ukrainian. Being exclusive, the existing canon stands in the way of making Crimean art and architecture, especially of the early modern period, part of Ukrainian identity. It is considered not on the material and immaterial levels of Ukrainian cultural heritage, but rather on the level of state cultural policy. The large-scale war made the issues of cultural heritage even more pressing.

If one tries to deconstruct the canon it will become evident that a national canon means both selection of the most important artists and their key works, and an uninterrupted course of a nation's art history, which avoids dealing with ruptures and conflicts. In his critique of Panofskian iconology, Didi-Huberman claimed that Panofsky tried

to eradicate the impurity, to resolve it, subsume it into an ordered schema that re-establishes the yearning of art history for aesthetic golden ages (the Renaissance was one) and reintroduces the enforcement by art history of coherent periods and 'systems of reference'.⁵³

51 Ibid. (translation by author).

52 Halukh (2021).

53 Didi-Huberman (2003), p. 281.

His observation is very true for a national canon too, for the surveys attempt to avoid “the impurity of time” and, I have to add, statehood, because in the Ukrainian case the people had to live under different regimes for the major part of their history.

Therefore, the first step towards a different canon should be acknowledging the plurality of art histories on Ukrainian territory, that is to say, starting with exploring ‘histories of art’, which would add another dimension to the patrimonialization of cultural heritage in general and that of early modern Crimea in particular.

It does not necessarily mean that the existing narrative’s structure will be fully sacrificed for conflicting temporalities of artistic traditions. Historicism that grants coherency to the survey can still be preserved. In regard to the “History of Ukrainian art” of 2011, I mentioned the artistic unity in Crimea despite religious or ethnic differences. That moves the emphasis from particularities to general lines of development, which could be perceived as a good starting point for a discussion of periods. I do not imply that identities should be moulded artificially into generalizations. I would rather point to entanglements of traditions in Crimea and mainland Ukraine that are often overlooked and remain understudied.

However, at this stage of development, do we need a canon at all? In his essay on the formation of the canon, Hubert Locher cites Jan Assmann, who saw a canon as a necessary means for preserving identity in times of crisis, “the principle of a collective constitution and stabilization of identity, which is at the same time the foundation of individual identity.”⁵⁴ Locher concludes: “The individual finds her- or himself addressed and represented in the canon. Its function is to give orientation that can only be achieved if the reference system is relatively stable.”⁵⁵ In terms of a national canon, it means creating the type of reference system criticised by Didi-Huberman. Normativity in times of war and crisis can be considered a refuge and a secure connection, or “a nexus between the identity of the ego and collective identity,” as Locher put it.⁵⁶

Therefore, the importance of the national canon of art history cannot be denied for a society in danger, especially in the case of present-day Ukraine. Certainly, it should be viewed from a critical distance and sometimes deconstructed, but nevertheless, the canon can serve a very specific purpose.

54 Assmann, as cited in Locher (2011), p. 33.

55 Locher (2011), p. 33.

56 Ibid.

Recent exhibitions conceived for a wide audience tried to appeal to viewers through artworks as well as through everyday tangible and intangible heritage; they tried to tell the stories of Crimean Tatars to Ukrainians, for whom Tatars until 2014 were often rather distant if not invisible. These and other exhibitions, as well as films and books produced in independent Ukraine, mostly put emphasis on the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in May 1944. They rarely dealt with a more distant history, which is understandable, as many artefacts, not to mention the architectural heritage, are no longer accessible while Crimea is still occupied.

Thus, until Crimea is liberated, the patrimonialization of its Islamic heritage can happen through surveys of the history of Ukrainian art, which are still an important part of every curriculum of every university or academy where art history is taught and are still read by a wide audience. But the vantage point should be shifted. This essay offers a possible solution based on concepts such as “connected histories” or “histoire croisée,” which gained popularity in the early 1990s.

The term ‘connected histories’ was introduced by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, an Indian historian, who called for breaking the moulds of traditional ‘historical objects’ like nation or statehood and turning to cross-cultural and multidisciplinary studies of transfer (and not only cultural) between the regions and countries.⁵⁷ The notion of “histoire croisée” was elaborated in works of French historians Bénédicte Zimmermann and Michael Werner.⁵⁸ It, too, dates back to the 1990s, having been triggered by both globalization and the cultural turn.⁵⁹ Unlike comparativists, they question the categories that are usually used to explore histories of social or ethnic entities like nation or national culture, which are ahistorical and teleological. What Zimmermann and Werner propose in their programmatic essay is to find points of reference in the material and then move on to construct an argument.

In our case, developing connected histories or even “histoire croisée” will mean in-depth studies of artistic networks and exchanges in early modern Ukraine, both in Crimea and the mainland, without any preconditioned ideas about how politics, ethnicity or religion might have shaped the artistic culture of every group. The existence of artistic networks and exchanges beyond

57 Subrahmanyam (1997).

58 Werner & Zimmermann (2003); Zimmermann, Didry & Wagner (1999); Zimmermann (2010).

59 Werner & Zimmermann (2003), p. 7.

boundaries of any kind was hinted at but not really explored in the surveys, which is unfortunate, as it could defy the narrative of constant enmity between the Tatars as Ottoman allies and Cossack Ukraine. Artistic unity in late medieval Crimea was obviously conditioned by artistic collaborations and connections between the artists and their clientele.

A survey with a title like “Entangled art histories in Ukraine” that would point to the inclusivity of the account, could be a solution as, without doubt, the lens through which we see early modern Crimean heritage has to be changed. The ethnocentric canon with its strict limitations and defensiveness towards the Other or the different, ethnically and/or religiously distorted the view of art historical development. It cut ties that were natural for the already globalised early modern world.

Therefore, the patrimonialization of the Crimean heritage is still a work in progress where Ukrainian cultural memory is concerned. The reinvention of Ukrainian art history should deconstruct the patterns adopted in Soviet times and find other, more productive ways to tell a story of Ukraine as a multicultural state with complex and connected histories.

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Between destruction, protection, and transformative re-creation

Muslim (Crimean Tatar and Ottoman) architectural heritage in Crimea

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Abstract: *This article discusses the politics of patrimonialization in the historical and cultural context of Crimea's Muslim material heritage. It asks how the peninsula's rich Islamic past—from the Seljuk, Golden Horde, Ottoman, Crimean Khanate, and later imperial Russian and Soviet eras—is integrated into national heritage politics, and explores the rationales and mechanisms behind cases where it is ignored or even erased. Starting with an historical overview, the article continues with an account of the changing stances toward Crimea's Islamic material remains after the peninsula's incorporation into the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union. The main focus, however, is on the more recent past, specifically developments in Crimea before and after the Russian invasion and subsequent occupation in 2014. Through the examples of sites such as the famous Khan's Palace, the article looks at how heritage strategies have unfolded over recent decades, and at the ideological and political climate that shaped them. The last part of the article investigates the creation of new narratives, the re-creation and reinvention of a specific Islamic past, through the decision to embrace an Ottoman visual idiom at the expense of other locally rooted forms.*

[Crimea] is the location of ancient Kherones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and

Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour.¹

These lines, delivered by Vladimir Putin in 2014 in a speech marking Crimea's 'reunification' with Russia, symbolically appropriate the peninsula through a religious founding myth and narratives of military victory and sacrifice. Through the baptism of an iconic prince,² Crimea is tied to the Christian Orthodox faith and Slavic ethnicity, with the Turco-Islamic and other dimensions of its past deliberately excluded. The Crimean Tatars, an indigenous Muslim people of Crimea who were persecuted and ultimately deported en masse in 1944,³ are mentioned by Putin only as having been "treated unfairly, just as a number of other peoples in the USSR."

This downplaying and disregard of Crimea's Turco-Islamic past is the present article's starting point. Focusing on architectural edifices and their cultural context, this study investigates how the rich layers of the peninsula's Islamic past – from the Seljuk, Golden Horde, Ottoman, Crimean Khanate, and Russian and Soviet periods – are integrated into national heritage politics today, and explores the rationales and mechanisms behind instances where this heritage has been ignored or even erased.⁴ This study draws heavily on fieldwork carried out in the region by a team of scholars led by Hakan Kırımlı and this author prior to the Russian occupation in 2014, and many of the photographs and details included here are products of that fieldwork.⁵ Although

1 "Address by President of the Russian Federation," *Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia*, March 18, 2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>.

2 Vladimir the Great (Volodymyr I Sviatoslavych, r. 980–1015), prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, was ruler of Kievan Rus, a federation of East Slavic and Finnic peoples that existed from the late 9th to the mid-13th century. According to tradition, he was baptized in 988 in Chersones. For Chersones, see Jobst (2013).

3 See Izmirli (2020), pp. 327–38.

4 The many layers of the region's past are reflected in its toponyms. Most places have been renamed multiple times and are today known by different names in different languages. Where possible, I have opted to give the place name in Crimean Tatar the first time I use it, followed by its Turkish (Ottoman) name, and finally the toponym given after the Russian annexation in 1783 (for main centers) or after the 1944 deportations (for villages). If there is a difference between the current Russian and Ukrainian toponyms, I have given both. In later instances, I use only the Crimean Tatar name, except for Aqmescit/Simferopol, for which I provide both names.

5 This fieldwork was supported financially by the Turkish government. For the results, published as an inventory of Crimea's Turco-Islamic material heritage, see Kırımlı &

this article began as part of a workshop on the Ottoman legacy's fate in a "post-Ottoman territory," the Turco-Islamic remains in Crimea extend well beyond the Ottoman past. Nevertheless, the peninsula's cultural and political connection to the Ottoman world and later to Turkey continues to shape Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, and Russian attitudes in different but substantial ways.

The article begins with an historical overview of the Muslim presence in Crimea under the Golden Horde (13th–15th century) and the Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire (15th–late 18th century). This is followed by a section on the transformations of, and changing stances toward, the peninsula's Turco-Islamic material remains under imperial Russian and Soviet rule. Afterwards, developments since Ukrainian independence in 1991 and Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014 are discussed.

In the second half of the article, particular examples of the protection, destruction, and appropriation of Crimea's Turco-Islamic material heritage from the early Soviet era onward will be addressed alongside the heritage approaches they entail and the ideological and political climate in which they have unfolded. Throughout most of this period, diverse levels of disruption and destruction of the region's Islamic material heritage and culture are apparent.⁶ More recently, a new dynamic has also arisen: the transformative re-creation and re-invention of a specific Islamic past through the implementation of an idealized Ottoman visual idiom at the expense of other locally rooted forms, a troubling trend with significant implications for the few surviving examples of the region's Turco-Islamic past.

Islamic culture in Crimea to 1783

The first Muslim presence in Crimea arrived with Seljuk conquests in the early 13th century. A century later, under the Golden Horde, most of the local Turkic population converted to Islam.⁷ This new religion was nourished by ties with Anatolia and the Mongol-dominated realms in northwestern Asia, including the lands around the Volga Basin and the Caspian Sea. Crimea's

Kançal-Ferrari (2021). The other team members and co-authors were Gökçe Günel, İbrahim Abdulla, Nariman Abdülvaap, Safiye Eminova, and Gülşen Dişli.

6 Muslim heritage in other neighboring regions, such as the Meskheti region in Georgia, experienced a similar fate: Kançal-Ferrari (2022a).

7 Peacock (2006).

oldest Islamic architectural remains date to this period, including religious structures like the mosques and madrasa in historical Qırım (also known as Solkhat, today Eski Qırım in Crimean Tatar and Saryi Krym in Russian/Ukrainian), the mosques in Sudaq (Sudak in Russian/Ukrainian) and Şeyhköy (today Davidovo), the mausolea in Qırq Yer (later Çufut Qale, “the fortress of the Jews”) and Eski yurt (literally “old settlement,” renamed Podgorodnee in 1948), and the nearby Azizler (“saints”) burial ground. These remains are among the most important legacies of the Golden Horde, and their cultural and archaeological significance is not limited to the peninsula.⁸ In the 15th century, Islam became more firmly established in the region with the formation of the Crimean Khanate, a successor state to the Golden Horde and later vassal of the Ottomans. In 1475, the Ottomans conquered Crimea’s southern shore and the important Genoese trading outpost of Caffa (Ottoman Kefe, renamed Feodosiya in 1802), thereafter transforming its cultural landscape and marking their presence visually through extensive construction activities.⁹

Caffa was a *şehzade sancağı*, a district where young Ottoman princes gained their first ruling experience. It was home to many mosques and even mausolea (*türbes*) of Ottoman princes, among them the mosque and adjacent bathhouse of Sultan Süleyman (1494–1566), erected when he was still a prince, and at least two other mosques with lead-covered domes. The cosmopolitan town was called ‘little Istanbul’ because of its rich urban structure. Its fountains, marketplaces, and white stone streets were praised by the famed Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi, who states that Caffa was home to about 50 mosques and neighborhood *maşıds*, several madrasas, dervish lodges, palaces, and more than 50 churches.¹⁰

In parallel with the Ottoman presence in southern Crimea, art and architectural production in the Crimean Khanate developed in a continued dialogue with Ottoman artistic and literary culture from the late 15th century on, especially under the patronage of the ruling Geray (Ottoman: Giray) dynasty. This close dialogue, which lasted for some three centuries, can be traced in the architecture of the region’s mosques, madrasas, and mausolea, and particularly

8 Kançal-Ferrari (2018); Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 88–93; 426–31; 488–95; 606–43; 765–77.

9 Kançal-Ferrari (2022).

10 Evliya Çelebi (2011, II/7, p. 259); Öztürk (2006); Bocharov (2016).

in and around the khanate's capital of Bağçasaray (named for the khan's "Garden Palace" there).¹¹

The political and artistic center of the khanate was the Khan's Palace, constructed in Bağçasaray in the early 16th century at a time of particularly close relations with the Ottoman Empire. Partly burned down along with much of the city during the Russian invasion in 1736, the palace was restored in the mid-18th century with material and craftsmanship furnished by the Ottomans. This palace constitutes the northernmost representative and one of the period's rare extant examples of Ottoman secular architecture. Its adjacent mosque, mausolea, and cemetery with rich epigraphic material exemplify Ottoman material and literary culture (Fig. 1).¹² The palace, as discussed in greater detail below, is unfortunately currently the subject of controversy because of its ongoing 'restoration'.

Another prominent representative and visual marker of the shared artistic culture between the Ottomans and the Geray dynasty is the Khan's Mosque in the harbor town of Kezlev (Turkish: Gözleve, Russian: Yevpatoriya, Ukrainian: Yevpatoriia). Constructed for the Crimean khan Devlet Geray I (r. 1551–77), the mosque was designed by the famous Ottoman architect Mimar Sinan in the classical Ottoman idiom and built on the model of the great sultanic mosques, with a central dome, two large minarets, and a private prayer area for the khan (*mahfil*).¹³

Transformations under Russian/Soviet hegemony, 1783–1991

Crimea's incorporation into the Russian Empire in 1783 and the Treaty of Jassy (1792) marking the end of the Russo-Turkish War (1787–92) put an end to both the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman presence on the northern shore of the Black Sea. Several waves of emigration to the Ottoman Empire followed, yet a large Muslim population nevertheless remained.¹⁴ Under the policy of

11 Turkish: Bahçesaray, Russian: Bakhchisarai, Ukrainian: Bakhchysarai.

12 Kançal-Ferrari (2005, 2017).

13 Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 726–43; Necipoğlu (2011), pp. 265–7; Kançal-Ferrari (2022b), pp. 161–3.

14 Karpát (1985, 2002, 2010); Kırımlı (2008); Fisher (2008).

religious tolerance introduced by Catherine the Great (1729–96),¹⁵ Crimean Tatar communities were free to practice their faith and continue their cultural life, which sometimes even flourished. During the 19th century, many pitch-roofed mosques were constructed or reconstructed atop earlier prayer houses in urban centers like Aqmescit/Simferopol,¹⁶ Kezlev, and Bağçasaray and in their surrounding villages.¹⁷ Yet alongside this continuation of Muslim culture, there was much systematic destruction of the khanate's legacy, as in the case of Caffa, where virtually no trace remains of the city's 300 years as a flourishing Ottoman town. Nearly everything was destroyed in the first phase of the Russian occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea (1771–83);¹⁸ much of what remained, including the mosque and bathhouse of Sultan Süleyman, was taken down in the 1830s on the pretext of urban restructuring.¹⁹ The memory of the Ottoman presence and of Muslim culture was thus annihilated almost entirely. The sole visible reminder of Ottoman architecture in Caffa is the so-called Müftü Mosque, a single-domed prayer house from the early 17th century. It was converted into an Armenian church under Russian rule and then transformed back into a mosque in the 1990s. The systematic eradication of Ottoman-period remains was, and continues to be, facilitated by Russian (and Ukrainian) affirmation and reappropriation of the Genoese past in Caffa and Southern Crimea more generally.²⁰

Russia's approach to its southern territories after the 1783 annexation entailed a complex and transformative restructuring of the region's past in line

15 For the late 18th- and 19th-century transformations of conquered Muslim territories in Crimea, see Schönle (2001) and O'Neill (2006) and (2017); for the whole Russian Empire, see Tuna (2015).

16 Although the town's name was officially changed to Simferopol after the annexation, the name Aqmescit continued to be used by the Crimean Tatar population.

17 Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021).

18 Clarke (1848), pp. 258–62, vividly describes the destruction caused by the Russian army.

19 Tunkina (2011), pp. 50–6; Katyushin (1998), pp. 121–53.

20 This Genoese past has recently been a source of conflict and competing research between Ukraine and Russia. See "Regarding the sanctions list of Russian scientific and museum institutions that participate in archaeological research on the territory of the Crimean peninsula and operate directly in the Crimea," *National Conservation Area of St. Sophia of Kyiv*, last accessed May 1, 2023, <https://st-sophia.org.ua/en/news/regarding-the-sanctions-list-of-russian-scientific-and-museum-institutions-that-participate-in-archaeological-research-on-the-territory-of-the-crimean-peninsula-and-operate-directly-in-the-crimea/>.

with a new Russian imperial interpretation that left little room for its Turco-Islamic cultural remains and their Crimean Tatar inheritors. Although efforts were made to integrate the Crimean Tatar nobility into the imperial state structure, they were largely viewed as an Oriental ‘other’. Catherine ordered the towns of Bağçasaray and Qarasuvbazar (Turkish: Karasubazar, Russian: Belogorsk, Ukrainian: Bilohirsk) to be preserved as examples of Crimea’s Oriental face. As Crimea turned into an increasingly popular destination for the Russian imperial family, the state elite, and its local collaborators, new monumental mosques were constructed not in the region’s historically rooted idiom, but instead in a new eclectic Orientalist style that reified its imagined exoticism.²¹

In contrast, Crimean Tatar consciousness and self-identification continued to hark back to the glorious Turco-Islamic past of the Golden Horde and Crimean Khanate, and to Muslim values and a Sunni Islam nourished by the cultural and political climate of the late Ottoman Empire. The early 20th century even witnessed a Muslim revival and the rise of a pan-Islamist movement under İsmail Gaspralı/Gasprinsky (1851–1914).²² After the abolition of the Russian monarchy, this Muslim revival spawned an attempt at independence with the declaration of the short-lived Crimean People’s Republic (Crimean Tatar: Qırım Halq Cumhuriyeti) in 1917. Four years later, in 1921, Crimea was incorporated into Russia as an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

In this period, ‘Crimean Studies’ – not confined to Turco-Islamic heritage – flourished. Already in 1918, under German occupation, Taurida University (the Ancient Greek name for Crimea, now V. I. Vernadsky Taurida National University) was founded and carried out many archaeological expeditions to historical sites. Archaeological, historical, and ethnographic research was also undertaken by the “Crimean Regional Committee for Museum Affairs and the Protection of Antiquities, Art, Nature and Folk Life (KrymOKHRIS),”²³ established in 1920. Crimean Tatar scholars strove to document their heritage through linguistic, archaeological, and art and architectural research, and together with Russian scholars, they undertook archaeological expeditions to document the

21 For the construction activities of imperial Russia in Crimea, see Kalinin & Zemlyanichenko (1991, 2016). For the region’s political, administrative, and demographic transformation in the period, see O’Neill (2017) and Kırımlı (1996), pp. 1–31. For Qarasuvbazar, where most of the Turco-Islamic edifices were destroyed in the 1920s, see Abdullayev (2013). See also the contributions of Ana Guboglo and Stefaniia Demchuk in this volume.

22 Kırımlı (1996).

23 Nepomnyashchiy (2022).

peninsula's early Muslim heritage from the 13th to the 15th century. This documentation remains the main corpus of our knowledge on this period.²⁴ Museums like the Khan's Palace in Bağçasaray and the short-lived Oriental Museum in Yalta (1921–29) were established to document Crimean Tatar heritage and display Muslim cultural artifacts. The Khan's Palace, transformed into a museum in November 1917 by Noman Çelebichan,²⁵ is still the most important museum in the Crimean Peninsula, currently named the Bakhchisaray Historical, Cultural, and Archaeological Museum-Reserve.²⁶ The Oriental Museum in Yalta, however, was closed only few years after its opening, and much of its collection of valuable manuscripts was lost.²⁷

This quest to document Crimea's early Turco-Islamic presence was also an attempt to legitimize the Crimean Tatars as indigenous inhabitants of the peninsula, partly in response to efforts on the part of the Orthodox Church, the imperial Russia state, and the later Soviet state to turn Crimea into a realm of Russian culture and to marginalize or even erase the peninsula's Turco-Islamic, Crimean Tatar component. Against this backdrop, the Crimean Tatars maintained a strong feeling of identity as a historically rooted Muslim community.

The favorable climate of the early Soviet regime, which allowed the Crimean Tatar (Turco-Muslim) identity to re-emerge, was reversed within the framework of harsher policies under Stalin. The nascent Crimean Tatar and Muslim revival posed a threat to the increasingly stringent Soviet ideology, and as a consequence, the Crimean Tatar revival and its elite proponents were suppressed. The scholars and intellectuals who participated in this revival, especially those involved in research on Crimea's early Turco-Islamic culture, were arrested, among them Osman Nuri Aqçoqraqlı, an intellectual, and Hüseyin Bodaninskiy, the first director of the Bağçasaray Palace Museum. Accused of anti-Soviet and Pan-Turkist activities, both were eventually executed in 1938. Many others were labelled Nazi collaborators and killed after the Soviets retook the peninsula from German troops in 1944. The same year, the Crimean

24 Kızılov & Prokhorov (2011, pp. 440–7); Bocharov & Sitdikov (2016/1); Aqçoqraqlı (2006); Nepomnyashchiy & Zaitsev (2018); Nepomnyashchiy (2019).

25 Noman Çelebichan was a jurist, poet, and president of the independent Crimean People's Republic 1917–18; he was executed in 1918.

26 Osmanova (2007).

27 Musayeva (2014).

Tatar population was collectively deported to Central Asia, leaving their material effects, their houses, and religious and institutional buildings behind, abandoned and unprotected.²⁸

The 1944 deportations marked the beginning of a new wave of alterations to the Crimean Tatars' historical buildings and architectural structures. Some of these buildings predated the Russian conquest and had managed to survive the destructions and transformations of the late 18th and the 19th centuries. Others had been constructed during the century of Russian rule that followed the annexation. But with the mass deportation of their builders, users, and owners, all these buildings faced new threats. While the now-empty homes of the Crimean Tatars were occupied by Russian families, their houses of prayer – closed to religious use well before the deportations – were often transformed and repurposed. Some were converted into storage places and barns. Others, like the Seyithalil Çelebi Mosque (1860), were converted into apartment buildings.²⁹ Many were turned into museums and cultural centers, with the southeastern side (facing Mecca) transformed into a stage and film projectors installed on the northwestern side. In some village mosques, these projectors were still in place during our fieldwork in 2012.

The Khan's Mosque in Kezlev was converted into a museum as early as 1929. It underwent a long restoration between 1962 and 1985, during which its minarets (demolished by the end of the 18th century) were re-erected. After that, the mosque was turned into a museum of religious history and atheism. It returned to use as a mosque only in the 1990s, on the initiative of the returning Crimean Tatars. The Khan's Mosque in Bağçasaray, meanwhile, was turned into a storage depot for the palace museum after 1944. Its minarets, which had also been torn down, were reconstructed in the 1960s. It, too, returned to use as a mosque with the return of the Crimean Tatars.

In the 1970s and 1980s, archaeological research resumed on the early phase of the peninsula's Islamic past. While this research was carefully published and is of great scholarly importance, it was also a mixed blessing, as building fragments, artifacts, and tombstones – physical testaments to Islam's early presence in Crimea – were removed to local museums (notably the Feodosiya Antiquities Museum, founded in 1811) or to museums outside the peninsula (notably the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg, which carried out much of

28 Izmirli (2020), pp. 327–30; Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 27–30.

29 Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 60–1.

the research).³⁰ The relocation of objects of Tatar material culture to the Hermitage Museum undoubtedly helped to preserve them, but that action also must be seen as a continuation of the tsarist period's colonial legacy and as part of the other Soviet-era transformations that aimed at both a real and a symbolic 'cleansing' of the territory.

Heritage politics since 1991

A new era began in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian independence, and Crimea's declaration as an autonomous republic. The Crimean Tatars, deported in 1944, were finally allowed to return, and many did.³¹ Returnees soon set to work to protect and preserve the last vestiges of their ancestors' material culture. Their former homes had long since been occupied by non-Crimean Tatar families, and it was often not possible to reclaim them. Other physical reminders of their heritage, especially cemeteries, had been desecrated or destroyed under the Soviet regime, with tombstones smashed or used as construction material.³² Unfortunately, not a single endowment deed of any of the many endowments in the Crimean Khanate is known to have survived, meaning that returning Crimean Tatars lacked any documentary record of their community's oldest religious and public buildings.³³ The same was often the case with private property, as property deeds from before the deportation had often been lost or destroyed as well. What remained were the still-standing religious edifices, mainly mosques, mausolea, a few madrasas, and the Khan's Palace in Bağçasaray.

During the approximately 20-year period before the Russian invasion and occupation in spring 2014, a balance of a sort existed between national (Ukrainian) heritage politics and Crimean Tatar efforts related to their Muslim heritage. The Crimean Tatars were an important counterweight to the pre-

30 Kramarovskii (2012).

31 Izmirli (2020), pp. 331–5; Tutku Aydın (2021), pp. 69–126.

32 The last large-scale destruction took place in the Khan's Palace cemetery, where "in October 1991 ... the local Communist Party chairman led a group of thugs with sledgehammers to break the tombstones, in a primitive form of 'protest' against the return of Crimean Tatars." Personal note by András Riedlmayer, January 23, 2015.

33 For the fate of religious foundations after the annexation in 1783, see Kırımlı (1996), pp. 15–7.

dominance of ethnic Russians in Crimea.³⁴ This mutually beneficial balance, coupled with the shared memory of Soviet-era oppression and a desire to construct a common future in the face of Russian encroachment, increased cooperation between Crimean Tatar scholars and Ukrainian academics and institutions. Following its independence, Ukraine undertook many steps to document and protect Crimean Tatar and Turco-Islamic heritage and incorporate it into an inclusive national narrative. Research on and restorations of the Crimean Khanate period's historical sites were initiated. Nominated by Ukraine, the Khan's Palace entered the Tentative List of UNESCO in 2003. The documentation, protection, and restoration of local Muslim heritage was also aided by support from Turkey through institutions like the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency and the Directorate for Turks Abroad and Related Communities.³⁵ In 2006 and 2007, important restorations were carried out in Salaçıq (renamed Staroselye in 1945), the site of the first palace of the Crimean Khanate in the suburbs of Bağçasaray, including the mausoleum of Hacı (Mengli) Geray (1501/2) and the Zincirli Madrasa (1500/1), perhaps the two most important symbolic examples of the region's early Islamic heritage.³⁶ On the same site, the New Zincirli Madrasa (1909), also known as the Gaspıralı School, was transformed into a private museum in 2011 with a collection of documents related to the history of the Crimean Khanate and the Crimean Tatars (Fig. 2).³⁷ In the heart of Bağçasaray, the Orta Cami (Central Mosque, also known as the Friday Mosque, rebuilt in 1861), which had been repurposed

34 For the Russian majority's opposition to the Crimean Tatars' return, see Izmirli (2020), pp. 331–5. According to the census of 1785, Crimean Tatars represented 84.1 percent of Crimea's population, compared with 2.2 percent for ethnic Russians. After the Crimean War, in the census of 1864, these numbers had changed to 50.3 and 28.5 percent, respectively (O'Neill 2017, p. 30). The only census from Ukrainian Crimea, carried out in 2001, identifies the population as 58.3 percent Russian, 12 percent Crimean Tatar, and 24.3 percent Ukrainian ("All-Ukrainian Population Census' 2001 Data," State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/20070918184853/http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/>, accessed April 16, 2023). The first Russian census after the occupation in 2014 gives these numbers as 67.9 percent Russian, 12.6 percent Crimean Tatar, and 15.7 percent Ukrainian; Surinov & Dianov (2015), p. 108.

35 Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021).

36 For an excellent publication on the site and the results of the restoration, see Gavriluk & Ibragimova (2010).

37 Originally called La Richeesse, the historical museum was renamed in 2015 as the Crimean Historical Museum-Reserve (Krymskiy istoricheskii muzey-zapovedni).

as a cinema in the Soviet period and refaced with a façade that disguised its religious past, was restored and reopened for prayer in 2013 (Fig. 3).³⁸



Fig. 1. Bağçasaray, Khan's Palace. Photograph by Osman Ohtar, 2012; Fig. 2. Historical and archaeological complex in Salaçıq. Photograph by Yevgeniy Kalinin, 2013, WikiMapia. Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0).

Cultural cooperation between Ukraine and the Crimean Tatars has grown steadily since the peninsula's invasion and subsequent occupation in 2014, after which many Crimean Tatars also left for mainland Ukraine. This commu-

38 Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 376–83.

nity's integration into Ukrainian cultural politics progressed against the backdrop of the escalating conflict with Russia in advance of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the Crimean Tatars' historical contribution to the formation of Ukraine has been renegotiated on several levels.³⁹ After long efforts, the Crimean Tatars were recognized in July 2021, together with Crimea's two Turkic-speaking Jewish communities (the Karaites and Krymchaks), as an "indigenous people of Ukraine" – a designation that grants legal protection to their language, history, and culture.⁴⁰

This recognition is all the more important because of the stark erosion of their cultural rights in occupied Crimea. The peninsula's steadily increasing Russian population views Crimea as historically belonging to (Orthodox) Russia, and the Crimean Tatars as later invaders with no historical claim to the territory. Such sentiments, nourished by ideologically driven discourses both before and after the occupation, are partly echoed in Putin's speech in front of the Duma, quoted at the start of this chapter.⁴¹ Yet Putin has also referred to the peninsula as the homeland of the Crimean Tatars, and Russia has made some concrete efforts to embrace and ostensibly even protect its Muslim (Crimean Tatar) heritage – though the sincerity of these efforts remains to be seen, as I will discuss below. In August 2014, only months after the occupation, the Crimean parliament added all monuments of cultural heritage in the peninsula to the Russian Federation's official list of cultural heritage sites; this was formalized in a decree signed by the prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, in fall 2015. Following this inclusion, fieldwork and excavation activities started to be carried out in Crimea, and restoration work commenced on the Khan's Palace.⁴² In many cases, however, these efforts have been criticized, not only

39 Rohdewald (2015).

40 See Law of Ukraine, No. 1616-IX, about the indigenous peoples of Ukraine: *Holos Ukrainy*, July 1, 2021, <http://www.golos.com.ua/article/348879>, accessed April 16, 2023. Crimean Tatars were already accepted as an indigenous people of Crimea in the "European Parliament Resolution of February 4, 2016, on the Human Rights Situation in Crimea (2016/2556[RSP]);" *European Parliament*, accessed April 16, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2016-0043_EN.html?redirect.

41 Saraf (2014).

42 Sharkov, "Russia adds Crimean cultural sites to its official monuments list," *Newsweek*, October 21, 2015, <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-adds-crimean-cultural-sites-its-official-monuments-list-385595>. For the national cultural-heritage register of Russia, see the Russian Ministry of Culture website at <https://opendata.mkrf.ru/opendata/7705851331-egrkn/>, last modified March 29, 2023.

by Ukraine, the official 'owner' of these sites according to international law, but also by the wider international community, which has condemned the construction activities being carried out on the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Chersones, one of the peninsula's most significant archaeological sites, as well as the removal of cultural artifacts from Crimean museums to Russian institutions and the invasive nature of the alterations being carried out to the Khan's Palace under the guise of restoration work.⁴³

Notwithstanding these developments, scholarly work on Crimea has increased substantially in recent years, even under Russian occupation. The inventory of Turco-Muslim heritage in Crimea that Hakan Kırımli and I compiled before the occupation has been followed by other similar inventories since.⁴⁴ New journals have been established, and many new studies have been published on Crimean archival material, architecture, and artifacts, often in collaboration with or with the support of institutions in Kazan, in the Republic of Tatarstan, with which the Crimean Tatars share the heritage of the Golden Horde and early khanate periods as well as the experience of being a Turco-Muslim community under Russian rule.⁴⁵ Especially in recent times, Kazan has taken up the flag of Golden Horde and Turco-Islamic heritage studies in Russia, and renowned scholars of the field outside Russia, in the West and in Turkey, have contributed to these publications. Yet this new interest in Crimea's Turco-Muslim past since the Russian occupation has a manipulative dimension, disturbingly presenting the indigenous Crimean Tatars and their history and culture as a mere subgroup of the greater (Kazan) Tatar culture.

The incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation, although criticized internationally, has not engendered serious consequences for Russia or

43 For examples of criticism from Ukraine, see "Evacuation' of Crimean museums to the territory of the Russian Federation will be a war crime," *Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine*, October 15, 2022, <https://mkip.gov.ua/news/7904.html>; "How Russia is destroying the unique historical and cultural heritage of Crimea," *Press Service of the Ukrainian Security & Cooperation Center*, August 26, 2021, <https://uscc.org.ua/en/how-russia-is-destroying-the-unique-historical-and-cultural-heritage-of-crimea/>. For an example of criticism from UNESCO, see the relevant sections from the program of the 212th meeting of the UNESCO Executive Board on the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine), 212 EX/5.I.E, September 10, 2021, <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000378910>.

44 Kırımli & Kaçal-Ferrari (2021; first edition 2016); Khakimov & Seytumerov (2016, 2018).

45 Nepomnyashchiy & Zaitsev (2018); Nepomnyashchiy (2019).

a boycott of scholarly collaboration on cultural issues, at least not until the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the first months of the peninsula's occupation in 2014, Turkey and Russia even coordinated on plans to restore several historical Crimean mosques and to build new ones. Although this collaboration was terminated in 2015 after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet in Syria,⁴⁶ Russia has nevertheless pressed forward with several of these projects in the years since, using local and Russian companies instead of Turkish partners, though some cooperation between the two countries seems to have recommenced since 2020. Today, eight years after Crimea was occupied by Russia, some of these projects have been realized, but they have involved an approach to heritage protection and restoration that has had some unfortunate results for the Islamic monuments in question – an approach that, as will be shown below, is becoming troublingly common in the region.

Case studies

Historical monuments in conquered territories are part of complex mechanisms of negotiation. The fate of a given monument, its demolition, protection, and/or reinterpretation, is often determined by ideological and political objectives and territorial claims. The decision of what to do with a monument is thus a translation of ideology into cultural policy, a process that has taken a number of forms in attitudes toward and transformations of Crimea's Turco-Islamic remains since the late 18th century, as the examples below will illustrate.

46 "Rus yönetimi: Kırım'da Türk yatırım projeleri donduruldu," *Kırım Haber Ajansı*, November 26, 2015, <https://www.qha.com.tr/gundem/rus-yonetimi-kirim-da-turk-yatirim-projeleri-donduruldu-140930>.



Fig. 3. Bağçasaray, Orta Cami or Friday Mosque. Photograph from 2013, Kırımlı & Kaňçal-Ferrari (2021), p. 381; Fig. 4. Kurkulet Village Mosque. Photograph by Kaňçal-Ferrari, 2012; Fig. 5. Otarcıq Village Mosque, circa 1930, adjusted. Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Otarchik_1930.jpg; Fig. 6. Otarcıq Village Mosque. Photograph by Kaňçal-Ferrari, 2012.

Transformation and use for practical needs: The Kurkulet and Otarcıq mosques

Sometimes, changes made to a building are a consequence of its practical use. The Kurkulet village mosque (renamed Lavrovoe in 1945), built in 1875 on the site of a mosque from the late 17th or 18th century, is one of the many buildings repurposed after Crimea's Tatar population was deported in 1944. The mosque was transformed into a grocery store. As with other mosques, the minaret was torn down to erase any religious associations, and the building was divided into two stories through the addition of a second floor (Fig. 4). The mosque in the village of Otarcıq (renamed Novoulyanovka in 1945) underwent a similar transformation, repurposed as a grocery store, its minaret torn down (late, in the 1970s), and its interior divided into the store and a storage area. After

the Muslim population returned in the post-Soviet era, Muslim residents campaigned to restore the Otarçıq mosque and succeeded in reclaiming the smaller storage area in 1992, when a *mihrab* niche was painted on the wall. The store itself was only reclaimed in 1995, and as of 2012 had not yet been integrated into the prayer space. Today, the building is hardly recognizable as a mosque because the two rows of windows arranged on all four sides of the façade are still walled up (Fig. 5–6).

Constructed in the second half of the 19th century by a vibrant local Muslim community, the Kurkulet and the Otarçıq mosques are good examples of the visual alteration and utilitarian transformation experienced by Crimean Tatar religious buildings after they were deprived of their congregations during the Soviet era. Their minarets demolished, windows partly walled up (with some transformed into doors), and interior spaces divided into two floors, these buildings in their present state are no longer visibly recognizable as mosques. Even when the buildings are used as prayer houses, they often have not been returned to their original appearance because of a lack of the means to carry out a restoration.⁴⁷

Deliberate destruction: Şeyhköy Mosque, Kalgay Palace, and Azizler burial ground

Where some sites were repurposed, others were deliberately destroyed by Soviet and later local authorities, especially sites of spiritual significance such as cemeteries, mosques, and mausoleums. The domed 14th-century mosque in Şeyhköy is a case in point. One of the oldest examples of Islamic heritage in Crimea, and one of the rare remnants from the Golden Horde period, the mosque was bombed twice and ultimately destroyed in the 1950s because of its symbolic status as a testament to the early Muslim presence in the peninsula.⁴⁸

Deliberate destruction was carried out on a grand scale under Russian and Soviet rule for several reasons. Sometimes a site's strategic importance was the motivator; sometimes it was the site's status as a reminder of the defeated Ottomans or the Crimean Khanate, as in the case of the khanate-era Kalgay Palace in Aqmescit/Simferopol on the Salgır River. This palace was destroyed in the

47 Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 147–7; 580–3. For Otarçıq, see also Kançal-Ferrari (2013).

48 Kırımlı & Kançal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 88–93.

19th century during the post-conquest restructuring of what is now Simferopol. However, its afterlife continued in the Crimean Tatars' collective memory as a symbolic site of the defeated khanate.⁴⁹ In 2015, there was an initiative to excavate the site before the planned construction of an ice rink, but that effort ultimately failed.⁵⁰

Another prominent example is the Azizler ("Saints") burial ground from the Golden Horde and early khanate periods in Bağçasaray's outskirts. A longstanding conflict over the site, which was being used for a weekly market ("the market on bones") since Soviet times, came to a head in 2006, when the Crimean Tatars, who had been seeking to reclaim the site since the 1990s, demanded that the market stop using this ancient burial ground. Despite Ukraine's official recognition of the burial ground as a heritage site of great spiritual significance for the Muslim population, their demands met with massive opposition from the local Russian community.⁵¹

These few examples illustrate the tensions, constant since the 18th century, regarding local Muslim historical heritage and the culture of its representatives, the Crimean Tatars. In times of strong political dominance – whether imperial, Soviet, or post-Soviet Russian – or turbulence, these sites were often suppressed or destroyed, or, alternatively, revindicated, as in the aftermath of the 1783 annexation, in the early Soviet period, and after 1991, when the Crimean Tatars returned. Prior to the Russian occupation in 2014, Ukraine was well aware of the constant potential for conflict around these sites and developed diverse strategies of toleration and de-escalation in places shared by both the peninsula's Crimean Tatars and its Russian majority, seeking to maintain the fragile equilibrium between the two communities.⁵²

49 O'Neill (2006), p. 168.

50 Volkan Torun, "Kırım'da bulunan Türk sarayının yerine buz pateni pisti yapılıyor," *Arkeofili*, March 30, 2015, <https://arkeofili.com/kirimda-bulunan-turk-sarayinin-yerine-buz-pateni-pisti-yapiliyor>. See also Demchuk's and Guboglo's contributions to this volume.

51 İzmirli (2020), p. 333; "Kırım Tatar Türklerine saldırı," *İnternet Haber*, July 12, 2006, <http://www.internethaber.com/kirim-tatar-turklerine-saldiri-31695h.htm>, last modified on January 19, 2021. For the Islamic material heritage on this site, see Kırımlı & Kaççal (2021), pp. 426–51.

52 Afanasyeva (2015).

Dissonant heritage and revindication: The Khan's Palace and Salaçıq

Perhaps Crimea's most important site of Crimean Tatar and Muslim cultural identity is the Khan's Palace in Bağçasaray (Fig. 1). Now a museum, the palace is a site of tremendous significance, described by its former director, Elmira Ablyalimova-Chiygoz, herself a Crimean Tatar, as a "symbol of statehood for us."⁵³ The palace offers a rich example of the ideological transformation of Crimean space since 1783; and, like much of the peninsula's Turco-Islamic heritage, its continued existence is very much in question, in this case because of concerns about its ongoing restoration. Restoration efforts at the palace started when the region was still under Ukrainian control. Parts of the Khan's Mosque, the Sarı Güzel bathhouse, the ground-level rooms, the council hall (*divanhane*) and adjacent chambers, the inner courtyard, and the so-called Iron Door were restored. The upper level of the two-story building holds the famous Golden (or Fruit) Room, the khan's private audience chamber. Dating to the mid-18th century, this level of the palace was constructed in the Ottoman fashion of that era with material and craftsmen sent by the Ottoman sultan Mahmud I (r. 1730–54). It was in urgent need of repair during our visit in 2012. Planned restoration efforts were not realized before the Russian occupation in 2014, when most of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar palace employees left or were dismissed. When restoration work finally began in late 2017, it was internationally condemned as a destructive reconstruction violating heritage-protection guidelines. Work on the building, which is on Ukraine's heritage list and has been a candidate for UNESCO recognition as a World Heritage Site since 2003, started without the consent of Ukraine. Work has started on the palace mosque and continues on the privy chambers of the upper floor. The upper floor rooms seem to have been completely dismantled; a metal roof has been constructed over the whole complex to shield it from the elements. Ukraine has protested these interventions and expressed concern that they might disqualify the monument from the UNESCO World Heritage list.⁵⁴

53 Marichka Palamarchuk, "Russia continues erasing cultural heritage, legacy in Crimea," *Kyiv Post*, December 8, 2022, <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/5535>.

54 Halya Coynash, "Why are we letting Russia destroy a 16th century palace in Crimea?," *Atlantic Council*, January 11, 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-are-we-letting-russia-destroy-a-16th-century-palace-in-crimea/>. See the program of the 212th meeting of the UNESCO Executive Board on the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine), 212 EX/5.I.E, September 10, 2021, <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000378910>.

These interventions in the Khan's Palace continue practices begun in the late 18th century, when the palace was reinterpreted in line with Russia's new imperial claim.⁵⁵ Rooms were transformed for use by the tsarist family and renamed accordingly, such as the "dining room of Catherine the Great."⁵⁶ The palace was also incorporated into the Russian literary tradition, transformed from a symbol of past Crimean greatness into a poetic trope and topic of legends, of a mythological, distant, past. Crucial here was the Russian writer Alexander Pushkin, who, after his exile in Crimea, authored the famous poem "The Fountain of Bakhchisaray" in 1821–23.⁵⁷ Inspired by the palace's so-called Fountain of Tears, the poem transformed the palace into an imaginary land of khans and harems. Today, visitors experience the palace through this 'Russian gaze': they are rushed straight to the Fountain of Tears, and to Pushkin's bust, arranged as the heart of the edifice's new interpretation as part of a Russian cultural canon instead of a Crimean Tatar canon. Yet as problematic as this imperial Russian reading of the palace's history is, it also likely saved the site during the Soviet era. A fragile timber building dating mainly to the 18th century, the palace was a symbol of Crimean Tatar greatness and the site of the 1917 declaration of the Crimean People's Republic. A museum since that year, it was only thanks to the personal initiative of the palace director and successor of Bodaninskiy, Maria Kustova, that the edifice was not destroyed in the sweeping efforts to erase Crimea's Muslim heritage after World War II. Utilizing Pushkin's famous poem, she managed to convince the Soviet authorities that the palace was a Russian cultural memory site and therefore worthy of preserving.

Other sites were not so fortunate. A case in point is the village of Salaçıq, the original seat of the Crimean Khanate and home to the first palace, madrasa, and mausoleum of the first two khans and the Ottoman-style tombs of İsmail Gaspıralı and other important figures of the Crimean Tatar nationalist movement (Fig. 2).⁵⁸ In Soviet times, this entire complex was used as an asylum for

55 See also the contribution by Guboglo to this volume.

56 Dickinson (2002).

57 Pushkin (1977), pp. 131–50. For the English translation, see Lewis (1849).

58 The bodies of a number of these later figures were interred at the site only recently, as requested in the wills of the deceased. These include the intellectual Edige Mustafa Kırımlı (d. 1980, in Germany, buried in Crimea in 2007) and the politician and writer Ahmet Özenbaşlı (d. 1958, in Leninabad, Tajik SSR, and buried in Crimea in 1993). For the latter figure, see "Kırım Tatarı Dr. Ahmet Özenbaşlı'nın vefat yılı

the mentally ill and profaned in the worst manner, with the mausoleum's entrance *eyvan* used as a toilet. Together with the Khan's Palace in Bağçasaray, it was among the first monuments to be visited by a group of international scholars in 1991 after Ukraine's independence.⁵⁹ After many initiatives by returning Crimean Tatars, the asylum was relocated, the complex was cleaned, and the monuments protected and later restored. However, in recent years, a nearby Orthodox monastery, the Assumption (Uspenskiy/Uspenskiyi) Monastery of the Caves, reopened in 1993, has been steadily expanding, prompting fears of a return to 19th-century efforts to (re-)Christianize Crimea at the expense of local Muslim sites.⁶⁰

Reclaiming the historical past: Re-Ottomanization and the creation of a new tradition

Another dimension of the complex heritage politics affecting Crimean Tatar monuments involves efforts since the 1990s to reestablish a connection between the Ottoman Empire and Crimea's Islamic architectural culture after years of neglect during the Soviet era.

Crimea's link to the Ottoman Empire and the sultan, understood as the leader of the Muslim faith until the empire's end, continued after the Crimean Khanate's incorporation into the Russian Empire in 1783. Partly as a result of this enduring link between the Ottoman Empire and Muslim culture in Crimea, the nostalgic cliché of 'classical' Ottoman decoration was used for the partial reclamation in the 1990s of mosques repurposed during the Soviet period; sometimes this was done on the initiative of individuals or returned local communities, and sometimes with money from Turkish businessmen and craftsmen and material from Turkey.

dönümü," *Kırım Haber Ajansı*, December 4, 2022, <https://www.qha.com.tr/kirim/kirim-tatari-dr-ahmet-ozenbasli-nin-vefat-yil-donumu-463660>.

59 Personal note by Andrés Riedlmayer, January 23, 2015.

60 The monastery's age is disputed. Local monks trace it back to the eighth century, but the current structure dates to the 15th century, thus roughly to the same period as the early Crimean Khanate. See Afanasyeva (2015), Kozelsky (2008), and Jobst (2019) for the expansion of the Orthodox Church and conflicts with Muslim sites, including in the region mentioned here. For the transformation of Crimean territory into Russian space, philhellenism, and the exclusion of the Crimean Tatars, see O'Neill (2006, 2017).



Fig. 7: Akyar/Sevastopol, Akyar Mosque, minaret. Photograph of 1910, from Kırımlı & Kañçal-Ferrari (2021), p. 97; Fig. 8: Akyar/Sevastopol, Akyar Mosque, exterior. Photograph by Kañçal-Ferrari, 2012; Fig. 9: Akyar/Sevastopol, Akyar Mosque, interior. Photograph by Kañçal-Ferrari, 2012; Fig. 10: Aqmescit/Simferopol, Seytsettar Mosque (exterior before reconstruction). Photograph by Kañçal-Ferrari, 2012; Fig. 11: Aqmescit/Simferopol, Seytsettar Mosque (interior before reconstruction). Photograph by Kañçal-Ferrari, 2012.

Among those reclaimed edifices is the Friday Mosque in Akyar (today: Sevastopol). Opened in 1914 with the first prayer led by İsmail Gaspıralı, this mosque was converted into archival storage during Soviet times and the interior was divided into two floors. Its minaret was torn down upon Stalin's visit to the city in 1948, erasing the primary visual marker of its identity as a mosque.⁶¹ In 2000, a craftsman from Istanbul was invited to reconstruct the minaret, but instead of the original's neo-Mamluk style, the new minaret is a slender, pencil-like minaret in the classical Ottoman style (Fig. 7, 8). Although not in keeping with the building's design, this new minaret does at least restore

61 Kırımlı & Kañçal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 96–107.

its Muslim identity. The edifice remains two-floored, and since 2000, the walls of the entrance floor, including the *mihrab* and the *minbar*, have been entirely revetted with industrial neo-Ottoman tiles imitating 16th-century tiles. Like the minaret, these tiles reflect a visual reclaiming and reestablishment of a common glorious past in a neo-Ottoman style (Fig. 9).

Since 2014, Ottoman references in architecture have also spread through institutional collaboration between Turkey and Russian-occupied Crimea. A number of new collaborations have emerged since the occupation, as in the case of the Seytsettar Mosque in Aqmescit/Simferopol. This mosque – a rectangular, 19th-century gable-roofed building – was completely intact when we visited in 2012. It was a typical representative of its period, a type of mosque that was at that time widespread in Anatolia, the Balkans, and across the northern Black Sea (Fig. 10–11). However, in 2016, it was replaced by a neo-Ottoman building with a single central dome and a three-domed portico in imitation of the classical Ottoman style.⁶² In this example of neo-Ottomanism, the revindication of a glorious past comes at the expense of the locally rooted material culture, disassociating the site from its historical and cultural context in the wider Black Sea region and the Balkans.⁶³

Another example that illustrates subtle appropriation and the grafting of a neo-Ottoman idiom onto the region's Muslim material culture is the Simferopol Cathedral Mosque in the suburbs of Aqmescit/Simferopol (Fig. 12).

62 The reconstruction was carried out with the support of the local religious authorities and the Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs (TDV). See the page “Kırım Seyit Settar Camii ve Medresesi” on the TDV's website at <https://tdv.org/tr-TR/proje/kirim-seyit-settar-camii-ve-medresesi/>, accessed April 16, 2023. Starting with the Ankara Kocatepe Mosque in 1986, but mainly after 2010, the TDV has constructed many mosques in Turkey and abroad, mostly in a neo-Ottoman style harking back to the designs of Mimar Sinan. For other TDV projects, see <https://tdv.org/tr-TR/camiler/>; for a downloadable booklet in English prepared by the TDV in 2016, see “Our mosques,” [https://tdvmedia.blob.core.windows.net/tdv/MedyaOdas%C4%B1/Camiler/TDV%20-%20Camilerimiz%20Genel%20Katalog%20\(2016\)%20-%20ENG.pdf](https://tdvmedia.blob.core.windows.net/tdv/MedyaOdas%C4%B1/Camiler/TDV%20-%20Camilerimiz%20Genel%20Katalog%20(2016)%20-%20ENG.pdf), accessed April 16, 2023.

63 Though a longer discussion of the region's mosque architecture at the fin de siècle is beyond the scope of this article, examples of contemporary edifices with similar plans and building types do exist elsewhere in the region. See note 82 below, and also my submission to the 17th International Congress of Turkish Art (Warsaw, September 2023): “Mosque architecture in the broader Black Sea region at the turn of the twentieth century: Oscillation between transnational orientalism and the vernacular from the Caucasus to the Balkans.”

Originally planned to open in 2019 and nearly finished at the time of writing, this monumental mosque and its construction have a long history: in 1996, the Crimean Tatar community requested the construction of a mosque, the *Aqmescit Cuma Camisi* (Friday Mosque), on the current site. The request was accepted in 2004, rejected in 2008, and again accepted in 2011.⁶⁴ Construction was scheduled to begin in April 2014, with the groundbreaking planned for a summit of the presidents of Ukraine and Turkey. This summit was called off because of the Russian occupation, after which the project resumed under the new authorities. This was a highly symbolic act, as the Crimean Tatars, protesting the years of stalling by local authorities, had, since 2008, started to gather limestone blocks and other building materials on the site in a visual protest against the delay. This provided a welcome opportunity for the political authorities in occupied Crimea to score a propaganda victory by resuming the project. In fall 2014, Crimean Muslims appealed successfully to Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for support.⁶⁵ The project was relaunched one year later, and Erbek İnşaat, a Turkish company operating in Ukraine and Crimea, was contracted for the construction. The groundbreaking ceremony was held on September 25, 2015, the second day of Eid al-Adha, with Turkey expected to finance the project. Much publicity surrounded the project's announcement and Turkey's role in it, with headlines declaring "Turkey to build Crimea's largest mosque." According to this project, and in line with the first initiative of the Crimean Tatars in 1996, the mosque would be called 'Friday Mosque' and would be large enough to hold 4,000-5,000 people.⁶⁶ It was planned in the classical Ottoman idiom as a domed edifice with a colonnaded courtyard and an ablution fountain in the center.

However, after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter plane in Syria, the Turkish company was replaced by the local architectural firm of the brothers Yunus and Emil Idrisov, who proceeded without significant alterations to the design. The new project was touted in 2019, now with the name of Cathedral Mosque (*sobornaya mechet*), as the "largest mosque in Crimea and Eastern Europe," and as being financed by Russia, but mostly through donations

64 "Crimean Tatars receive official support for building mosque," *The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization*, February 22, 2011, <https://unpo.org/article/12297>.

65 "Biz de cami istiyoruz," *Bedir Haber*, November 20, 2014, <https://bedirhaber.com/biz-de-cami-istiyoruz/>.

66 "Turkey to build Crimea's largest mosque," *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 29, 2015, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-build-crimeas-largest-mosque--89129>.

(i.e., rather than through support from Turkey, as before).⁶⁷ This Russian appropriation of the mosque was accompanied by the Crimean muftiate's incorporation into the centralized Russian religious hierarchy.⁶⁸ The mosque was stripped financially, and partly culturally, of its relationship with Turkey, the holder, heir, and representative of Ottoman heritage. The design of the nearly completed edifice (2024) is still based on the classical Ottoman type, with its four dominant minarets with three balconies each,⁶⁹ a central dome supported by four half-domes, and an arcaded portico. Through this design – not a deliberate choice by Russia after 2014, but the realization of the already-existing project – the Ottoman past, rejected and erased since 1783 in the peninsula, has become a symbolic vessel for a 'local' face of Islam.

In 2016, a tentative departure from the mosque's neo-Ottoman design was initiated when a Kazan-based design studio was contracted to strip away some

67 Kulcanay, Lilya. "Erbek İnşaat, Kırım Büyük Cuma Camii projesinden uzaklaştırıldı," *İmarpanosu*, November 26, 2015, <https://imarpanosu.com/erbek-insaat-kirim-buyuk-cuma-camii-projesinden-uzaklastirildi/>; "Cathedral Mosque," *Crimean Travel Portal*, <https://en.travelcrimea.com/history-and-culture/20190321/73482.html>, accessed April 16, 2023.

68 The centralized organization of religious institutions in Russia has placed the Crimean muftiate in a constant dilemma related to its political situation since 2014, when it found itself part of this centralized structure. See Vitaly Solonchak, "Muftis of the Moscow Patriarchate: Support for the war against Ukraine in Russian Muslim circles," *Voice of Crimea*, March 3, 2022, <https://culture.voicecrimea.com.ua/en/muftis-of-the-moscow-patriarchate-support-for-the-war-against-ukraine-in-russian-muslim-circles/>. A similar process of integrating the Muslim clergy into a centralized system was carried out by Russia after Crimea's 18th-century annexation. See Kırımlı (1996), pp. 14–7.

69 This number surpasses the Süleymaniye Mosque (1550–57) with its four minarets and ten balconies, and is topped only by the Sultan Ahmet Mosque (1609–20), which has six minarets with three balconies each. This new trend of building large neo-Ottoman mosques started with the TDV's construction of the Ankara Kocatepe Mosque (1986) with four minarets, followed by the Adana Sabancı Central Mosque (1988) with six. In recent decades, the construction of mosques with a similarly high number of minarets and balconies has also increased abroad, including the Central Mosque in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the Hala Sultan Mosque outside of Lefkoşa/Nicosia, Northern Cyprus, both completed in 2017, and the Namazgah Mosque in Tirana, Albania, started in 2015. For mosque construction and a discussion of Ottoman architecture in the Turkish republic, see Bozdoğan (2007).

of the Turkish (Ottoman) features and instead give it a Crimean Tatar face.⁷⁰ This shows that in Crimea, the visibility of contemporary connections to the Turkish (Ottoman) cultural sphere seems to have caused some discomfort and to have been countered by the promotion of Crimean Tatar localness.⁷¹ However, architectural and artistic production under the Crimean Khanate and in successive periods was never strictly local – it was part of a transregional, even transcultural, high culture. It seems that in 2020, the decision to promote localness in the mosque's design was partly revised in favor of a new approach highlighting the diversity of Crimea's architectural heritage. The decoration was now to be executed by experienced Turkish craftspeople and calligraphers. The edifice's interior was to be done in marble, and a carpet for the interior of this mosque was to be produced in Turkey. The colors used for the decoration would also be imported from Turkey, perhaps similar to those in the Moscow Cathedral Mosque (Fig. 13). But this time, the decoration would not be exclusively Turkish (Ottoman), and would include motifs from the Crimean Khanate visible in the Khan's Palace, which was, as mentioned above, also part of the Ottoman cultural sphere. In addition, the architects declared that they had carried out extensive research regarding ornamentation in Russian and Turkish archives, ultimately deciding on a yellow tulip – a symbolic motif connected to the iconic Crimean Tatar figure Noman Çelebicihan – as the decoration's central element. In an additional layer of symbolism, the complex is also to include a “fountain of tears,” thus incorporating an allusion to Russian cultural heritage alongside its Ottoman and Crimean Tatar elements.⁷²

70 “Kazan designers will help to defeat Ottomanism in the main mosque in Simferopol,” *Realnoe Vremya*, April 7, 2016, <https://realnoevremya.com/articles/330>. In the words of Dmitry Musin, head of the design studio contracted to carry out the modifications to the design, “We are alarmed by the direct citation of the architecture of Turkey (Ottoman period) in this project ... [T]he culture and ethnicity of the Crimean Tatars are not reflected in the architecture.”

71 The 2018 move by Ukraine's Ministry of Culture to include the Crimean Tatar ornamentation system of “Ornek” in its national list of elements of intangible cultural heritage can be read in this light. UNESCO added Ornek to its Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2021: “Ornek, a Crimean Tatar ornament and knowledge about it,” UNESCO, <https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/ornek-a-crim-ean-tatar-ornament-and-knowledge-about-it-01601>, accessed April 16, 2023.

72 “Turkish specialists to paint the main mosque of Crimea,” *Russkiy Mir*, July 31, 2020, <https://ruskiymir.ru/en/news/275609/>; “The precise date of the Cathedral Mosque opening in the Crimea is announced,” *Islamic Information Portal*, June 10,

The distant connection to the Ottoman cultural sphere of the past is not today perceived as harmful or dangerous, and therefore the integration of its elements does not seem to be viewed as problematic; on the contrary, the inclusion of such elements is promoted as a way of embracing Crimean Tatar heritage. This attitude is also perceptible in the case of the Khan's Mosque in Kezlev. This mosque, an expression of mid-16th-century Ottoman architectural culture, was, in an act of patrimonialization, included in the coin series of "Architectural Monuments of Russia" in 2016. It is one of the edifices represented as a motif on a commemorative silver coin, labeled "Friday Mosque, Yevpatoria" ("mechet Dzhuma Dzhami Yevpatorii").⁷³

Neo-Ottomanism in the broader region

Use of the classical Ottoman mosque type for 21st-century mosques is not limited to the examples offered above; it is also common in other sites in the broader region. One instance is the Sultan Süleyman Mosque in Mariupol, Ukraine (Fig. 14). Rebuilt in 2007 on the site of a mosque erected in 1906 and destroyed in 1936, this mosque illustrates a pattern typical in the region's recent mosque construction: It was erected as a revindication of a site where the Bolsheviks had destroyed a mosque. The reconstruction's patron was a Turkish steel entrepreneur from Trabzon, and high-level Turkish state functionaries attended the opening. The marble that covers the whole exterior façade of the two-story building and the ablution fountain was brought from Turkey.⁷⁴ It makes multilayered allusions to the period of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66), the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, and the heyday of

2022, <https://islam.ru/en/content/news/precise-date-cathedral-mosque-opening-cremea-announced>.

73 "Commemorative coins of Russia," *Bank of Russia*, 2016, p. 12, http://www.cbr.ru/Content/Document/File/123639/coins_cbr_2016_pr.pdf.

74 "Sultan Suleiman Mosque," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultan_Suleiman_Mosque, accessed April 16, 2023. This edifice was recently (April 2022) in the news because of rumors that it had been hit by Russian artillery, destroying the mosque and killing the people sheltering within it. Fortunately, these rumors proved unfounded: the mosque was damaged by shelling but not hit directly, and it remains mostly intact. Interestingly, early news coverage described the edifice as a historical 16th-century mosque, perhaps because of its name and its visual reference to that period.

Ottoman architectural culture through its name, its main dome, and its façade revetted in precious marble, once the privilege of Ottoman imperial buildings. That Sultan Süleyman's wife, the famous Roxelana (Hürrem Sultan, d. 1558), to whom the mosque is also dedicated, was from what is now western Ukraine turned this building into a monument of a common cultural past.⁷⁵

Similar examples of this neo-Ottomanist architectural trend can be seen in other recently constructed mosques as well. The Akhmad Kadyrov Mosque in Grozny, also called “the Heart of Chechnya,”⁷⁶ is an example with similar traits of monumental visibility, references to ‘official’ Muslim presence in the area, and multiple overlapping layers of meaning. Initiated by the first president of the Russian Federal Republic of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, it was completed by his son and current Chechen president, Ramzan A. Kadyrov, in 2008. The edifice’s neo-Ottoman design “after the model of the Sultan Ahmet Mosque” is the result of collaboration between Turkey’s Konya municipality and Kadyrov’s government. Supervised by Chechen civil engineers trained in Turkey, craftsmen and artists from Turkey worked on the site and executed its interior decoration in the Ottoman style. Marble from the island of Marmara was used in the interior and on the *minbar*, *mihrab*, and pulpit (*kürsü*) to create a mosque with the “aesthetic of traditional Islamic architecture of the Ottoman golden age.” But the most dramatic part of the interior decoration is its 36 chandeliers, designed as small models of the three holy sites of Islam – the Kaaba in Mecca, the dome over the Tomb of the Prophet in Medina, and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem – thus creating visual and imaginary connections to these sites. The application of these lavish details is most probably based on the reported decoration of classical Ottoman mosques in Istanbul.⁷⁷

It is ironic that these new 21st-century mosques, especially the new “Friday/Cathedral Mosque,” the reconstructed Seytsettar Mosque in Aqmescit/Simferopol, and the Kadyrov Mosque in Grozny, are modeled on the architecture of the Ottoman golden age.⁷⁸ The result is a strange situation where

75 Sertaç Bulur, “Ukrayna’da ‘muhteşem’ cami,” *Anadolu Ajansı*, August 13, 2014, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/ukraynada-muhtesem-cami/132025>.

76 “Akhmad Kadyrov Mosque,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akhmad_Kadyrov_Mosque, accessed April 16, 2023.

77 Kançal-Ferrari (2021), pp. 508–14.

78 An early example of this trend is the Grand Mosque of Makhachkala (Yusuf Bey Mosque), constructed in 1998 in Makhachkala (Russian Federal Republic of Dagestan) on the model of the Sultan Ahmet Mosque in Istanbul through the support of a wealthy Turkish donor family. The mosque was enlarged in 2004–7 and has a ca-

efforts to articulate the cultural heritage of local Muslim communities are carried out through reference to a former imperial (for Crimea) or an entirely distinct (for Chechnya) cultural and ideological context, the classical Ottoman past. While Crimea saw the visual presence of its historically rooted Muslim culture, mainly that of the Crimean Khanate and Ottoman periods, virtually erased during the imperial Russian and later Soviet periods, efforts in the 21st century to revindicate the local Muslim culture have instead resulted in the reinvention and recreation of an idealized Ottoman past. The choice to model new buildings in the region on Ottoman architecture at its peak rather than on locally rooted alternative forms has once again transformed the local architectural heritage.

Yet Turkey's promotion of neo-Ottomanism in the region's architecture in recent decades,⁷⁹ which some have dubbed "Ottoman nostalgia,"⁸⁰ has not gone unchallenged. In the Balkans especially, it has been criticized as a new visual reimplementaion of Turkish dominance.⁸¹ But it has also been defended as an effort to counter the deliberate destruction of historically rooted (Ottoman-era) Muslim architecture over the past century in Crimea and the Balkans. The Ottoman idiom, despite its problematic dimensions, can thus also be understood as a visual commemoration and reclamation of a silenced past.

The choice of neo-classical Ottoman architecture – or, more generally, embracing a Turkish-based, state-supported version of Islam through architecture – in territories outside Turkey gains a further dimension when viewed in the context of newly expanding Muslim communities and mosque construction in the broader post-communist, post-Soviet region. It can be understood

capacity of 17,000 people. "Grand Mosque of Makhachkala," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Mosque_of_Makhachkala, accessed May 7, 2023.

79 Tokay et al. (2013); Avcioglu (2013) and (2021).

80 Ahmet Ersoy describes this nostalgia as a "promotion of Sunni-Ottoman symbolism in the political and aesthetic sphere" with an "emphasis on Sunni Muslim identity" and on Turkey's "postimperial leadership in the former Ottoman lands and the larger Muslim world." For an analysis of this phenomenon as a reaction against the modernism and secularism of the early Turkish Republic, see Ersoy (2015), pp. 247–48; see also Bozdoğan (2007).

81 In 2018, a planned mosque in the center of Bucharest was suspended because of local opposition and a lack of funds. Ana Maria Luca, "Romanian Muslims cancel grand mosque project," *Balkan Insight*, July 18, 2018, <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/18/romania-muslim-cult-tables-turkish-grand-mosque-project-07-17-2018/>.

as a deliberate choice of the Sunni tradition against newly introduced forms of Islam (i.e., diverse forms of Salafism and Wahhabism), and also as in line with Russia's preferred version of a 'manageable', more institutional form of Islam.



Fig. 12: Aqmescit/Simferopol, Aqmescit Cuma Camisi (Friday/Cathedral Mosque), main façade with entrance to the courtyard. Photograph courtesy of Zafer Karatay, 2023; Fig. 13. Moscow, Moscow Cathedral Mosque, interior. Photograph by Alexander Savin – Wikimedia Commons, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=46444127>; Fig. 14. Mariupol, Sultan Süleyman Mosque, 2009. Photograph by Malik Bilal, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6586492>; Fig. 15. Moscow, “Tatar” Mosque, demolished 2011. Photograph by Macs24, Wikimedia Commons, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=10968711>.

Historical localness and (post-)imperial claims

On the other hand, the nature and stylistic origins of 'local' architectural forms in the region deserve scrutiny, too. Though beyond this article's scope, the plans, types, and styles used in new mosques in imperial Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries were often less local than one might imagine. In both empires, various directives and sometimes even detailed prescriptions existed about how mosques ought to be constructed in territories under or formerly under Muslim rule. Mosques were thus symbols of both empire (and its mechanisms of control and regulation of the Muslim community) and imperial integration and tolerance of Islamic culture. The classical or eclectic rectangular, hip-roofed mosques were a product of their age and their Russian imperial context, just as the earlier single-domed edifices with their slender minarets were a product of the classical Ottoman and Crimean Khanate periods.⁸²

Replacing this late-imperial architectural style with a new one (or a new traditional one, in the neo-Ottoman case) can thus be seen as a post-, neo-, or counter-imperialist stance. A new mosque in Moscow, the Moscow Cathedral Mosque (*Moskovskaya Sobornaya Mechet*), is a case in point.⁸³ The new mosque was built atop the site of the oldest congregational mosque in Moscow, a historical mosque also known as the "Tatar Mosque" because its congregation consisted mainly of ethnic (Kazan) Tatars. Constructed in 1904 in the late imperial style on the design of Nikolai Alekseevich Zhukov (d. 1913), the mosque was removed from Russia's national historical heritage list in 2008 and, despite long protests, was subsequently dismantled as part of an ostensible renovation effort in 2011 on the pretext that it was not properly situated toward Mecca (Fig. 15). Once dismantled, however, authorities declared the building's reassembly unfeasible and instead replaced it with a new monumental building, the Moscow Cathedral Mosque, that was stripped of any connection to its historically rooted community and place.⁸⁴ The new mosque was officially inaugu-

82 Crews (2014); Avcioğlu (2013). For mosque construction in the 19th-century Ottoman realms, see Katipoğlu Özmen (2014, 2018). For mosques erected during the reign of Abdülaziz in different parts of the Ottoman Empire, see Hızlı & Kılınç (2013).

83 For images of this mosque, see the gallery on its official web site: <https://www.mihrab.ru/history/istoricheskaya-galereya>, accessed April 16, 2023.

84 "Moscow Cathedral Mosque," *Wikipedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_Cathedral_Mosque, accessed April 16, 2023. Also see the official page of the new mosque at <https://www.mihrab.ru/>, accessed April 16, 2023.

rated on September 23, 2015, by the chairman of the Mufti Council of Russia at a ceremony attended by Putin and several Muslim leaders, including the presidents of Turkey and Palestine, and the leaders of the Russian Federation republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Tatarstan. The new Moscow mosque was built in an eclectic post-modern style with a huge dome, providing space for 10,000 people to pray, and two minarets that double as sightseeing towers. The interior decoration was designed by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Turkish Religious Affairs Foundation, and executed by Turkish artisans and the well-known calligrapher Hüseyin Kutlu in the “style of ... classic Ottoman art” (Fig. 12).⁸⁵ The eclectic forms of the mosque’s exterior, however, follow the post-modern ahistorical style also employed in the Kul Sharif Mosque in Kazan, which opened in 2005. In sharp contrast to the imperial style of 19th-century tsarist Russia that is still visible in other mosques in Kazan, the Kul Sharif Mosque was constructed in a new repertory form that combines neo-historicist and neo-Orientalist styles, neither of which has much in common with the region’s architectural heritage.

This new design for monumental mosques recently constructed on Russian territory can be seen as an expression of Russia’s most recent Eurasian turn and thus as in opposition to the tsarist approach and the European-oriented Enlightenment ideology on which its architectural style was based. Chechnya’s most recently constructed mosque, the “Pride of Muslims” Mosque in Shali (near Grozny), built once again by Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov and opened in 2019, is another example of this new trend. If the Akhmad Kadyrov Mosque in Grozny was a copy of an Ottoman mosque, this newly erected mosque, although still drawing heavily on the Ottoman idiom with its central dome and four half-domes, also departs from it: the dome’s drum is raised and the minarets are not the slender pencil-like Ottoman-style ones, but show instead multiple diverse influences that point to the post-Timurid, Eurasian realms. With space for a total of 70,000 people to pray (30,000 inside), it surpasses even the new Çamlica Mosque in Istanbul, opened the same year but designed in the classical Ottoman idiom, with its capacity for 63,000 people.⁸⁶

85 “Moscow houses largest mosque in Europe,” *Daily Sabah*, September 24, 2015, <https://www.dailysabah.com/religion/2015/09/24/moscow-houses-largest-mosque-in-europe>; “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Moskova Merkez Camii’nin açılışında konuştu,” *Haber Türk*, September 23, 2015, <https://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/1131928-cumhurbaşkanı-erdogandan-rusyada-cami-acilisi>.

86 Sameer Khan, “Chechnya has Europe’s biggest, most beautiful mosque,” *The Siasat Daily*, July 25, 2020, <https://www.siasat.com/chechnya-has-europes-biggest-most-be>



Fig. 16: Aqmescit/Simferopol, Aqmescit Cuma Camisi (Friday/Cathedral Mosque). Photograph by Oles Kolodyazhnyy, Fotobank Lori.ru, ID no. 36732920.

It is worth highlighting here the manner with which the grandeur of these new mosque projects is so often projected, through impressive numbers and superlative expressions such as “Europe’s biggest, most beautiful mosque” (in the case of the “Pride of Muslims” Mosque, Chechnya), “the largest mosque in Europe” (Moscow’s Cathedral Mosque), the “largest mosque in Crimea” (the Friday/Cathedral Mosque in Aqmescit/Simferopol), and so on. Such expressions suggest that these buildings are not just places of piety and prayer, but also, much like their tsarist and Ottoman precedents, symbols of political, ideological, and territorial power.

autiful-mosque-1928840/; “Pride of Muslims’: Chechnya’s leader Kadyrov inaugurates ‘Europe’s largest mosque,’” *RT*, August 23, 2019, <https://www.rt.com/russia/467152-europes-largest-mosque-chechnya/>. For images, see the “Pride of Muslims” page on Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Pride_of_Muslims.

Conclusion

The article has offered examples of different kinds of heritage politics and patrimonialization in the historical and cultural context of Muslim (mainly Crimean Tatar and Ottoman) material heritage in Crimea. The discussion of this heritage is not possible without understanding the present geopolitical situation in the region, which is much more complex than that in other regions that are similarly contested but less centrally located, such as Meskheti, Georgia.

This heritage illustrates the various approaches adopted toward the material remains, buildings, and sites in Crimea. Among these attitudes are immediate or later destruction, transformation, transformative reconstruction, and, only rarely, adequate protection. Even when buildings are restored and protected, the way they are restored is often destructive. One of the rare exceptions to this tendency is the excellent archeological investigation and restoration of the former palace complex in Bağçasaray's suburb of Salaçıq. Aside from this one example, since Crimea's annexation by Russia in the 18th century, the territory has witnessed constant, multiple re-creations of manipulative narratives that have privileged the peninsula's antique Greek and (early) Christian past while sidelining the long history of Islam, the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate, and the Ottoman and later Muslim communities under Russian rule.

It has to be mentioned that such narratives were never as dominant in Ukraine, and that in recent decades, Ukraine has embraced a more integrative vision of the interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim entities in Crimea and the role of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine's formation as an independent state. These efforts have increased in light of the recent political situation, and inclusive heritage protection in Ukraine has gained prominence, as, for example, in the inclusion of Crimean Tatar architectural examples in the Pyrohiv (Pirogov) Museum of Folk Architecture and Folkways of Ukraine near Kiev.⁸⁷

Since Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014, an extremely calculating ideological discourse, both visual and verbal, has become common in the peninsula, supported by the construction of mosques like the Friday/Cathedral Mosque and the Seytsettar Mosque. This discourse seeks to assure the Crimean Tatars

87 "Ukrayna'nın başkenti Kiyiv'de Kırım Tatar Konağı projesi tanıtıldı," *Kırım Haber Ajansı*, December 9, 2021, <https://www.qha.com.tr/haber-arsivi/ukrayna-nin-baskenti-kiyiv-de-kirim-tatar-konagi-projesi-tanitildi-359147>.

that they are welcome, well-integrated subjects of Russia. The architecture chosen for these mosques can be understood as an instrumentalization of the Ottoman legacy and its transposition onto (local) Crimean Tatar culture on different levels by Russia and, although for different reasons, by Turkey. This is possible thanks to the multilayered meanings inherent in these visual and architectural forms, and the creation of new narratives presenting a once-rejected and dissonant legacy as patrimony.

However, this narrative, which seems to favor the Crimean Tatars and appears to enjoy some support among the community, aims to replace the organically and historically rooted layers of the past with a new, fabricated vision of an ideal past. It manipulatively suggests that Russia's Muslim community both inside and outside the peninsula is integrated into the contemporary state apparatus, an integration symbolically represented in the monumental 'Cathedral Mosque.' This monumentality seeks to present itself as the official face of the Muslim community in Crimea. Yet in doing so, it imposes a 'de-culturalization' and 'de-historization' of the peninsula's Muslim heritage, and can thus be seen as a complex instance of what has been called "spatial violence."⁸⁸ By radically redefining the monumental expression of what is seen and accepted as past glory, this narrative attempts to portray a bright and shining future for Russian Muslim and Crimean Tatar culture and its heritage – a future that, seen from the outside, seems more uncertain than ever.

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Approaches toward the *Evkaf* built heritage on British-ruled Cyprus

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Abstract: *The Ottoman waqf institution played a key role over the centuries in the formation and upkeep of the built environment in Cyprus. Operating as an autonomous system, it ensured the longevity of built properties by providing the necessary resources and recruiting local communities to monitor their status. However, the successive ‘modernization’ drives, which started during the late Ottoman era and were continued by the British administration, resulted in the dissolution of its sustainable elements. British rule (1878–1960) on the island also coincided with the modern conservation movement emergence in the West. The uneven and sometimes conflicted adoption of modern Western conservation practices on waqf built heritage selectively prioritized the protection of the medieval/Latin origin waqf properties and disregarded those of Ottoman origin. This article derives from my archival research and publications on the changing role of the Ottoman waqf institution and approaches towards its built legacy in Cyprus. It illustrates Orientalism’s role in how the Ottoman waqf heritage was viewed and administered.*

Introduction

In its aftermath, the Ottoman Empire left a rich architectural legacy throughout its former territories, in what were newly independent nation-states in its European lands and the North African and Middle Eastern territories, recently or newly colonized by the British and French empires. Throughout the Ottoman era, most urban facilities like mosques, schools, commercial structures, and residential buildings were constructed and maintained through the *waqf*¹ system. *Waqfs* were independently formed and autonomously run pi-

1 The word ‘waqf’ has been transliterated in numerous forms in different languages, such as, *wakf*, *vakf* and *vakıf* (plural *awqaf*, *aukaf* and *evkaf* – Islahi [2003]). The

ous Islamic endowments. *Waqf* founders built these facilities, stipulated the management mechanism and endowed resources for their upkeep and maintenance to ensure their longevity. However, the *waqf* institution was troubled by mismanagement practices during the Ottoman Empire's decline. This provided the pretext for centralizing this autonomous institution under the regional *Evkaf* offices working under the auspices of the Imperial *Evkaf* Ministry in Istanbul, established in 1826. Foreign powers' colonization of Ottoman lands caused further complications within the already troubled system during the first half of the twentieth century. *Waqf* laws were enacted in almost all Muslim countries and several communities to establish a Ministry of *Evkaf* or General Directorate of *Evkaf*.² From then on, the institution turned into a branch of government, managed in the same way that other branches of the public sector were managed.

Cyprus, an Ottoman land since 1571, became the first of the Middle Eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire to become part of the British Empire. Therefore, British Cyprus offers insights into the changing dynamics of the island's Ottoman *waqf* institution and the broader British colonial context. This article draws from my research in British colonial era archives belonging to the Cyprus *Evkaf* Administration³ and publications.⁴ It offers insights into the Eurocentric paradigms of Orientalism and ethno-nationalist political agendas which underpinned the colonial treatment of *waqf* heritage. In my previous research, I documented how the Ottoman *waqfs* in Cyprus had a well-established building upkeep tradition pre-dating the British colonial era, which actively involved community participation.⁵ According to the existing archival records,⁶ the colonial rulers immediately asserted that Cyprus's *Evkaf* were a dated Ottoman institution that needed to be administratively reorganized under the 'exemplary' British administration. The present article seeks to illustrate how

official departments which have been established to control the administration of *waqfs* are often named with the plural. For ease of understanding, this article uses the word 'waqf' as it has commonly been used and turned into a global term in English literature. On the other hand, staying true to its officially used name since the late Ottoman era, 'Evkaf' is used referring to the Waqf Department in Cyprus.

2 Assi (2008).

3 Sabri (2013). British era files are coded with BEF pretext throughout this paper. The copyright of the BEF coded documents belongs to the Cyprus *Evkaf* Administration.

4 Sabri (2015, 2016, 2017, 2019).

5 Sabri (2013), pp. 75–83; 98–103; (2019), pp. 32–58.

6 Seager (1883); Sabri (2013).

the British colonial authorities substantially altered the Ottoman *waqf* institution's traditional building upkeep procedures and how this led to a subjective handling of *waqf* heritage. In the following section, I will briefly explain the traditional maintenance system of *waqf*-built properties as a basis for understanding the changes during British rule. This will be followed by a detailed explanation of the colonial approaches to the *waqf* institution and practices relating to *waqf* properties with Ottoman origins.

The Ottoman *waqf*'s traditional building upkeep and maintenance system

A *waqf* is a charitable trust created per Islamic law. To establish a *waqf*, a person proclaims a portion of their property as henceforth inalienable and designates persons and public utilities as beneficiaries of its yields.⁷ In the original Ottoman system, each *waqf* was an autonomous unit, administered by the *mutawalli* (trustee) according to the principles put forward by the donor in the original *waqfiyya* (endowment deed) and supervised by the *qadi* (the local judge).⁸ Traditionally, most endowments comprised built properties such as mosques, *tekke* complexes, schools, libraries, soup kitchens, and fountains. These structures were either newly constructed or renovated from the existing buildings.⁹ The revenue from specifically endowed assets was used to pay for the services provided at these facilities. Amongst the income-bearing assets were commercial facilities such as *khans* (inns), souks (bazaars), *hammams* (public baths), aqueducts, and residential properties. Because the continuity of the *waqfs* depended on the survival of their assets, *waqf* founders prioritized regular maintenance and repair of the endowed buildings.¹⁰ As a result of this self-sustaining system, not only was a wide variety of buildings erected, maintained, and revitalized, but their functions were also sustained throughout the centuries, thanks to the protective legal measures written into the endowment deeds.

7 Kozłowski, et al. (2010).

8 Akgündüz (1996); Yediyıldız (2003).

9 Behrens-Abouseif (1994); Singer (2002); Madran (2004).

10 Bakırer (1973); Madran (2004); Akar (2010).




Fig. 1.a-f: Views of various waqf buildings with Ottoman origins: a) Bayraktar Mosque in Nicosia/Lefkoşa, b) Büyük Han in Nicosia, c) Mevlevi Tekke in Nicosia/Lefkoşa, d) Arabahmet Mosque in Nicosia/Lefkoşa, e) Sultan Mahmut II Library in Nicosia/Lefkoşa, f) Hala Sultan Tekke in Larnaka/Larnaca. Photographs by author, 2013.

Throughout the Ottoman era, the establishment of *waqfs* in newly conquered regions was a standard practice.¹¹ Thus, several *waqfs* were established in Cyprus during the Ottoman era between 1571 and 1878.¹² Not only were new buildings erected during this period (Fig. 1), but many buildings with Latin origins that had been abandoned due to war were re-adapted for *waqf* purposes (Fig. 2).¹³ *Waqfs* in Cyprus established practices for maintaining their endowed buildings so that they continued operating as urban public facilities while generating income that was wholly or partially re-invested in upkeep.¹⁴




Fig. 2.a-c: Views of various *waqf* built properties with pre-Ottoman origins a) Lala Mustafa Paşa Mosque (former Latin cathedral of St Nicholas) in Famagusta/Gazimağusa, b) Selimiye Mosque (former Latin cathedral of St. Sophia) in Nicosia/Lefkoşa, and c) Haydar Paşa Mosque (former Latin cathedral of St. Catherine) in Nicosia/Lefkoşa. Photographs by author, 2013.

However, as part of the Ottoman *waqf* system, the *waqf* institution in Cyprus witnessed a first transition during the Tanzimat Era, with the centralization of the Cypriot *waqf* administration under the Imperial *Evkaf* Ministry in Istanbul. Established as a regional office in the 1830s, Cyprus's *Evkaf* Department started to control the *waqfs* on behalf of the Ministry. Authorization of upkeep and maintenance works, both in the Empire's center

11 Barnes (1987).

12 Yıldız (2009).

13 Altan (1986); Bağışkan (2009); Jennings (1993).

14 Sabri (2013), pp. 77–81.

and the provinces, was connected to the Ministry.¹⁵ While this introduced long-distance bureaucracy to the authorization process of projects, technical planning continued to be undertaken with locally sourced materials on the island, and upkeep works continued to benefit from local knowledge of construction techniques.¹⁶

'Modernizing' *Evkaf*: British colonial transformations in the traditional *waqf* building upkeep systems

The convention signed between the Ottoman and British imperial authorities in 1878 provided a dual-delegate system for managing the island's *Evkaf* department. However, the power and duties of these delegates, consisting of one British and one Cypriot Muslim representative, were not defined. Convinced that this three-centuries-old unique Muslim institution had not been appropriately administered, and aiming to grant *Evkaf* the exemplary government it deserved, the British High Commissioner ordered a more comprehensive inquiry into the state of the *waqfs*. M. B. Seager, a British official, was appointed to carry out the inquiry, which took place from 1880 to 1882. In his final report, Seager provided details about the maladministration of some *waqfs* and the corrupt practices of their trustees, and used these instances to disregard the institution's communal benefits.¹⁷ He believed that devising a sustainable supervision method for the *waqfs* was a complicated task and recommended the immediate expropriation of the institution or, alternatively, its gradual dissolution after collecting all *waqfs* under one category.

The opinions expressed in Seager's report are essential to understanding the prejudiced approach towards the Ottoman *waqf* institution at the outset of the British colonial period. The colonial ideas concerning the future of this historically rooted and uniquely Muslim religious endowment institution indicate a lack of understanding of the institution, its communal benefits, and the particulars of the original system that had ensured its survival on the island for more than three hundred years. Seager's criticisms were partly based on the recent ineffective attempts to centralize the institution and the subsequent maladministration on the part of some of the trustees. This negative out-

15 Akar (2009), pp. 55–9.

16 Sabri (2013), pp. 98–103.

17 Seager (1883), p. 90.

look was also influenced by Western perceptions of Ottoman institutions and ideas as corrupt and backwards.¹⁸

Seager's report provides us with an understanding of early colonial ideas about the *waqf* as a backward and burdensome Ottoman institution in need of modernization. It also revealed the reasons behind this interest in this 'modernization': its financial resources and critical socio-religious role within the Muslim community. Colonial authorities understood that *Evkaf* needed to be brought under the control of the colonial government immediately. A letter dated December 23, 1882, informs us that Sir Robert Biddulph (the High Commissioner from 1879 to 1886) was so pleased with Seager's report on the inquiry into the island's *waqfs* that he forwarded it to the Colonial Office in London with a request that it be printed. He thought it included information on the subject that had hitherto been inaccessible to British officials. As such, it could be of great use to other British embassies and colonial officials like those in Egypt and Istanbul.¹⁹ Apparently, when their imperial power over Islamic societies was at its peak, the British had yet to acquire adequate knowledge about this widespread institution. Seager's report was printed in 1883 and remained in use for many years, as references were made to it in documents in subsequent years.²⁰ However, presumably due to its political implications, the British rulers abstained from putting into practice the radical decision recommended at the report's conclusion regarding the expropriation of *waqf* assets in Cyprus. Instead, the alternative recommendation mentioned in the report was put into practice: the gradual dissolution of the institution over time.

According to Seager,²¹ the *Evkaf* needed reform, and its current head, the official holding the post of *mouhasebedji* (Turkish *muhasebici*, accountant), was unable to do so without the government's help. He emphasized that only British officials should supervise the *Evkaf*.²² From the beginning, British colonial officials had expressed their opinion that natives were unfit to take on jobs with responsibilities.²³ This was consistent with the patronizing, Orientalist prejudices, common since the Middle Ages, that had gained currency with

18 Ansari (2011).

19 Document in BEF-1882-8-240.

20 Document no: 661, dated 21 January 1885, in BEF-1885-3-57.

21 Seager (1883), pp. 6–7.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

23 Schaar et al. (1995), p. 22.

European imperialism.²⁴ Convinced that ‘Western’ people were progressive and civilized, and that ‘Eastern’ societies were backward and primitive, British colonial administrators sustained a well-developed sense of a rational Western self and an irrational, superstitious Eastern ‘other’. These attitudes and biased perceptions, as also argued by Burke and Prochaska,²⁵ underlaid the forms of governance of the colonial territories.

Unsurprisingly, the colonial reforms of the Cypriot *waqf* system started with administrative restructuring. The British High Commissioner replaced the Ottoman Imperial *Evkaf* Minister, and the expenditures now required the final approval of the British High Commissioner. On paper, the institution was managed by a British and a Muslim delegate, but the latter’s absence in the correspondence throughout this period suggests an inactive or silent partnership. The Cypriot Muslim delegate seems to have been given a symbolic responsibility, overseeing the processing of the low-budget upkeep works in all *waqf* categories. The processing of the high-profile and costly upkeep works was the responsibility of the British delegate.²⁶

Among the early procedural changes were new arrangements regarding the upkeep of *waqf* built properties. Similar to the late Ottoman period, the users of the assets remained as the key stakeholders, initiating upkeep projects from the bottom upwards for the relevant built properties.²⁷ The users’ engagement in preventive maintenance assisted in extending the lifecycle of the buildings with minimal physical interventions or financial expenditures. It prevented their further dilapidation by exerting pressure on the officials concerned. While, in general, the initiation process enjoyed continuity from the late Ottoman era, there were also indications of change: the colonial authorities gradually got involved in the process of forwarding petitions and sometimes mediating between the petitioners and the *Evkaf* administra-

24 Ansari (2011); Said (1993).

25 Burke & Prochaska (2008), pp. 23–8.

26 Sabri (2019), p. 163.

27 See for instance the petitions from the imam of the Mosque at Dali (Aziziye) requesting various maintenance works in 1882 (BEF 1882-4-72), in 1888 (BEF 1888-26-656), in 1891 (BEF 1891-48-1212) and in 1893 (BEF 1891-48-1212). Also see requests for repairs to the roofs of the Tahtakale Mosque in Nicosia (BEF 1895-86-2059) and the Zuhuri School in Larnaca (BEF 1896-80-1898).

tion.²⁸ In other words, the colonial Government started to configure itself as the authorized and effective agent in *Evkaf* affairs early on. As a result of these actions, the community started to recognize the government as the higher authority. This is evident because the petitions began to be sent from the rural areas to the commissioners of the towns or the high commissioner himself, instead of being sent to the *Evkaf* administration.²⁹ The government's involvement in the initiation stage of upkeep projects was an indication of a key transition in customary practice, transferring the initiation process from the responsibility of the built properties' users to the realm of the colonial bureaucracies.

The government referred to the Ottoman *Waqf* Ordinance of 1863 as the main guidance in financial matters, but implemented it in part only. For instance, the categories for financing the upkeep works were implemented, but the regulations that established the control of the authorities in Istanbul's Imperial *Evkaf* Ministry were bypassed. The authority for sanctioning expenditure, which included the upkeep works for the *waqf* built properties on the island, were taken over by the British High Commissioner.³⁰

Another change in the traditional system was delegating to the government's engineer a central role relating to the upkeep works for *waqf* properties. This involved the authorization of work, preparation of cost estimates and arranging for tenders, as well as supervising the execution of the upkeep works. The British administration preferred the Government Engineer's services no matter what the cost estimates were. However, there were concerns over the applicability of the new arrangements. Seager noted that this speedy settlement between the government and the *Evkaf* was disputed by Muslim dignitaries, including the mufti, who expressed their reservations about the new arrangement.³¹ Trusting the decisions concerning expenditure to the government's engineer, who was not connected with the *Evkaf*, caused some discontent among them.

28 See BEF 1886–10-286 for the involvement of the Commissioner of Famagusta as a mediator between the local community and the *Evkaf* regarding the required repairs at Ayasofya Mosque.

29 See for instance the petitions regarding the case of the mosque at Kalipornou (BEF 1887–19-502) and the case of the Saghir Mosque at Ktima (BEF 1891–55-1352).

30 Seager (1883), p. 6, 89, 91.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 79.

In all likelihood, the native Muslims, being used to having the *waqf* properties regularly maintained at a low cost, were skeptical of the new arrangements. These events were an early sign of tension between the colonial rulers and the Muslim community. As understood from Seager's following comments, the colonial administration's understanding of the traditional system was rather superficial: "We knew that the native mind could not grasp the idea of spending hundreds of pounds on buildings that for ages had only had hundreds of piasters spent on them."³² Presumably, Seager knew nothing about the *waqf*'s traditional building upkeep system and was more concerned with the political implications of the new arrangements. The language of his analysis, as typical for the period, Orientalized the Muslim natives and rendered their concerns infantile.

The colonial government used this Orientalist paradigm as justification to take over the management of the *Evkaf*'s immense array of resources, which indirectly exerted control over the local Muslim community. However, in order to not upset the Muslim community, they decided to limit the involvement of the government's engineer and the Public Works Department (PWD). There was no further opposition to this arrangement in the subsequent decades, perhaps because the government adopted a more conciliatory approach in dealing with *waqf* properties – or because the Muslim community came to see the changes as a necessary 'modernization'.³³

While the long-distance bureaucracy was lessened by bypassing the *Evkaf* Ministry in Istanbul, increasing government control weakened the traditional system that originally relied on local administration and know-how. The replacement of the local masons and their construction skills with Western engineers and expertise instigated a shift that turned the upkeep process into a specialized profession. Alienating the local community from the management and technical planning processes was another interruption to the traditional *waqf* system, which relied on community monitoring of the *waqf* buildings and regular maintenance. This system was gradually dissolved in the following decades.³⁴ Following the island's annexation as a British crown colony in 1925 and an Order in Council in 1928, the *Evkaf* became a government department, fully incorporated into the colonial bureaucracy. Its resources were channeled

32 Seager (1883), p. 79.

33 Sabri (2019), pp. 137–40.

34 Sabri (2013), pp. 203–39; (2015), pp. 518–20; (2019), pp. 81–101.

to the Turkish community's newly emerging needs rather than the old *waqf* buildings' protection.³⁵

British colonial approaches to Ottoman *waqf* built legacy: An Orientalist mindset in the age of the modern conservation movement

The Orientalist mindset, which considered 'Ottoman' a synonym for stagnation, was at its height when Cyprus came under British control in 1878. The relative decline of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century coincided with the evolution of heritage discourses in the West, where architectural inheritances were regarded as evidence of national grandeur, required for consolidating nascent national identities and for absorbing or neutralizing the potentially competing heritages of others.³⁶ In line with this, the 19th century witnessed the rise of the modern architectural conservation movement in Western Europe, which prioritized protecting the medieval era's built legacies as national heritages.³⁷ At the same time, Eurocentric politics fostered a sense of ethnic identities in former Ottoman territories and paved the way for idealizing pre-Ottoman medieval architectural inheritances, aiming to promote antagonism towards the Ottomans.³⁸ Consequently, 'Ottoman' came to be identified with oppression in many of the empire's former territories. The emerging nations in Southeast Europe disassociated themselves from the former hegemon by denying its built inheritance a legitimate place in national heritage discourses.³⁹

When Cyprus came under British control in 1878, the Gothic architectural legacy was popular in the national heritage discourses in Britain.⁴⁰ The colonial rulers in Cyprus considered the medieval-Latin monuments (many of which were allocated for *waqf* purposes after the Ottoman conquest) their inheritance and appointed themselves as their guardians.⁴¹ The British Government in Cyprus lacked the financial or technical resources to undertake a

35 Sabri (2015), p. 523; (2019), p. 140.

36 Graham et al., (2000).

37 Glendinning (2013).

38 Reid (1992); Sanders (2003), (2008); Watenpaugh (2007).

39 Todorova (1996).

40 Glendinning (2013); Emerick (2014).

41 Given (1998), p. 7

wholesale conservation programme for the medieval monuments. However, the *Evkaf* had upkeep resources for those adopted for *waqf* purposes. As I detailed elsewhere,⁴² the converted Gothic cathedral mosques received immediate attention from the beginning of the British period. Necessary repairs were undertaken under the supervision of British engineers employed in the PWD.⁴³ With the establishment of the Curator of Antiquities (CAM) office in 1903, this role passed to the CAM. George Jeffery, a British conservation architect who held the post of CAM between 1903 and 1934, became the consultant for restoration works on ancient monuments belonging to *waqfs*. It must be noted here that in 1905 the first colonial antiquities law was enacted, having a cutoff date of 1571 (the beginning of Ottoman rule on the island). Therefore, while the *waqf* properties with medieval-Latin origins were brought under statutory protection, those with Ottoman origins were excluded.

Jeffery was in touch with the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB), which valued medieval buildings in Britain as the primary components of British national heritage and prioritized their preservation.⁴⁴ According to Pilides,⁴⁵ Jeffery was a faithful follower of early SPAB principles. He continuously reported the existing condition of medieval buildings in Cyprus to the conservation elites in London, and his efforts to find solutions for their preservation in line with SPAB's conservative principles were tireless.⁴⁶ However, Jeffery's actions were reflective of British Orientalist bias: Cyprus' medieval era, according to him, ended with the beginning of the Ottoman period, and the buildings erected during the Ottoman period were ordinary modern buildings with incongruous architectural features.⁴⁷ This was very much in tune with the approach adopted during this period in the former Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire, where in accordance with imperialist politics, Ottoman architecture was dismissed as devoid of originality or evidence of progress.⁴⁸ Thus, the maintenance of the Ottoman public buildings on the island, the majority of which were owned by the *Evkaf*, continued to be undertaken via traditional sys-

42 Sabri (2016).

43 *Ibid.*, pp. 234–40.

44 Miele (2005).

45 Pilides (2009), pp. 19–62.

46 Emerick (2014), pp. 115–48.

47 Jeffery (1918), p. 83, 98.

48 Sanders (2003), pp. 191–4.

tems, which allowed for extensive physical interventions on the fabric without paying attention to their architectonic values.⁴⁹

Even so, the *Evkaf* authorities, from time to time, sought solutions by turning to Jeffrey's expertise before physical interventions to those properties built during the 16th and the 17th centuries and considered examples of classical Ottoman architecture. As an example, in 1927, when upkeep works were required at the Büyük Han (Great Khan, an urban inn, built the 1570s) in Nicosia, *Evkaf* authorities consulted Jeffery. He inspected the building alongside the mason Kolumbries, one of the experienced builders often commissioned by the *Evkaf* Administration to undertake repair work. His letter addressed to the *Evkaf*'s delegates reveals that, following the inspection, Jeffery recommended substantial reconstruction work based on a new design and materials.⁵⁰ Accordingly, there were structural defects in the arcade on the upper floor of the west side. He advised the *Evkaf* to remove all of the vaulting in that arcade and construct a light roof instead of the vaulting after repairing the arches and columns. He also recommended rebuilding the vault over the back entrance differently. Overall, Jeffery suggested physical alterations involving reconstruction and remodeling in order to ensure its continuity as building stock. In a way, his proposals echoed his earlier comments: the Büyük Han, apart from "conferring a certain oriental air upon the centre of Nicosia," Jeffery had written in 1918, "was not in any sense an architectural monument."⁵¹ It must be noted that later, in 1921, he described the Ottoman-era fabric in Jerusalem and elsewhere throughout (formerly) Ottoman territories as similarly lacking architectonic values and, as such, found them not worthy of consideration in terms of architectural or artistic styles.⁵² His suggestions for improvements to the Büyük Han in Nicosia were no more ambitious than keeping its overall Oriental ambience.

Having been labeled as ordinary structures that did not warrant any statutory protection, Ottoman-era buildings were repeatedly subjected to demolition until the 1930s as part of urbanization schemes, as was the case in the colonized Arab territories,⁵³ the former Balkan territories of the Empire and in

49 Sabri (2015), pp. 518–20.

50 George Jeffery's letter-report to the Delegates of *Evkaf*, document dated 3 August 1927 in BEF 1927–180-4057.

51 Jeffery (1918), p. 98.

52 Almog (1996), p. 186.

53 Sanders (2003), p. 191.

Turkey.⁵⁴ The enactment of the Municipality Law in 1885 gave municipalities in Cyprus the authority to order the demolition of any built property within the municipal limits for the sake of urban improvement or if they were threatening public health.⁵⁵ The demolition of the Büyük Medrese (Grand Madrasa) in Nicosia during the early 1930s to open space for a roundabout is one of many examples.⁵⁶

Albeit in a limited manner, the 1930s also witnessed a shift in interest towards the Ottoman built legacy. A new Antiquities Law in 1935 identified buildings erected up to 1700 as ancient monuments warranting statutory provisions. Their conservation was centralized under the Department of Antiquities (DoA), established in 1935. It is worth emphasizing that Cyprus lagged behind many European countries in this respect. Most of which had by then revised legislation to cover architectural properties up to the second half of the 19th century.⁵⁷ The Director of the DoA replaced the CAM as the key professional bureaucrat in initiating conservation projects relating to the Ottoman built properties that were declared ancient monuments. A. H. S. Megaw, the DoA Director between 1936 and 1960, became the highest authority regarding the listing, planning, and execution of physical interventions to the scheduled Ottoman monuments until the end of the colonial era in 1960. However, as indicated by the low number of listed Ottoman properties belonging to *Evkaf* between 1935 and 1959,⁵⁸ this was given a low priority. Although a highly reputed scholar, Megaw looked at ancient buildings purely through the lens of architectonic values and, listed or not, the Ottoman architecture in Cyprus did not fully receive his appreciation. Like his predecessor Jeffery, Megaw was more concerned with the neglected state of the island's pre-Ottoman medieval monuments.⁵⁹ As indicated by his directions in various instances, he prioritized the preservation of the *waqf* built properties with Western origins. For instance, he declared the conservation projects for the converted Gothic cathedral-mosques in Nicosia and Famagusta as possessing a unique character. He ensured that these projects were prepared by the DoA.⁶⁰ On the

54 Todorova (1996), pp. 57–9; Altinyıldız (2007), p. 296.

55 Biddulph (1885).

56 Bağışkan (2009), p. 502.

57 Brown (1905); Delafons (1997).

58 Sabri (2017), p. 64.

59 Rosser (2007), p. 152.

60 Sabri (2013), p. 269.

other hand, Megaw was happy with the *Evkaf* preparing and implementing conservation works on the listed *waqf* properties with Ottoman origins as long as his permission was sought.

Evidently, even after their listing, Ottoman ancient monuments were left in poor condition. If, for instance, it had not been listed as an ancient monument in the Second Schedule of the Antiquities Law, the *Büyük Han* in Nicosia would have been demolished in 1937. The *han* was rented by *Evkaf* to families who migrated to Nicosia from villages, and Dr. Derviş, the then mayor of Nicosia, declared it derelict and unsuitable as a residence.⁶¹ Accordingly, the mayor announced that if *Evkaf* needed to use it for residential purposes, the building had to be pulled down and reconstructed in accordance with a plan to be drawn up by the municipal engineer. Since the *han* was a listed monument, its demolition was out of the question. However, when consulted, Megaw did not see anything of a special character requiring his expertise. Thus, plans for an invasive renovation were forwarded to the PWD, and were prepared and executed under the supervision of PWD engineer Joseph Gaffiero.⁶² Accordingly, Gaffiero's project involved, among other actions, pulling down the intermediate walls of two sets of rooms near the main gate and making them into one room.

These radical physical interventions contradicted the evolving conservation principles in the West. Correspondence shows that Megaw had no issue with knocking down walls wherever required or replacing original components with new ones. His only objections were to the alterations on the exterior fabric. That in 1941 the building was overhauled at the municipality's request reveals that the Director of Antiquities was not proactive in inspecting and initiating the required conservation works himself. While Megaw kept an eye on the physical interventions to the scheduled Ottoman buildings, he always intervened whenever there were intrusions to the external fabric or maintenance works for which his permission had not been sought.

Megaw's disinterest in the Ottoman fabric remained noticeable until the end of the colonial period. This is exemplified by the continuing derelict condition of the *Büyük Han* until the mid-1950s, captured in photographs published

61 Letter by Dr. T. Derviş, dated 26 March 1937, addressing the Delegates of *Evkaf*, in BEF 1935–245–5038.

62 Specifications of the Contract Signed by the Delegates of *Evkaf*, Contractor and the Government Engineer, 11 August 1936, in BEF 1935–245–5038.

in the London daily *The Times* on 19 October 1954.⁶³ Trying to find a solution to the problem, Megaw declared that there would be no objection from the antiquities angle if the building were subjected to a major overhaul (including rooms being merged, extra window space being created, or an additional entrance into the courtyard), as long as the *han* continued to “look inwards”.⁶⁴ Despite the fact that the *han* was a listed ancient monument, the Director of the DoA was not entirely convinced that it had much architectural significance. However, there were no public resources for its restoration, and *Evkaf*, by that time, had lost its capacity to allocate financial resources for major repair work on *waqf* properties because those resources were directed to other needs of the Turkish Cypriots.⁶⁵

A shift in colonial politics: Reconsidering the value of the Ottoman *waqf* built heritage

With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, there was a change in European imperialist cultural heritage politics in former Ottoman territories. By the 1930s, nationalist heritage projects focused on the pre-Ottoman medieval periods had yielded some positive results. Through eventual disassociation from that past, the Ottoman legacy was no longer a threat. Thus, albeit in a limited scope, the hitherto neglected Ottoman-era fabric began to receive some preservation attention in Turkey and the Arab territories.⁶⁶ Partially coinciding with these developments elsewhere, a set of Ottoman buildings were covered by the revised Antiquities Law of 1935 in Cyprus, as mentioned in the previous section.

The 1930s were a politically problematic period in Cyprus. The island’s proclamation as a British colony in 1925 had further encouraged the Greek *enosis* (“union,” that is, the independence of Cyprus and unification with Greece) sentiment, in turn intensifying the Turkish community’s ethno-nationalist awakening. The 1931 revolt, organized by Greek Cypriots seeking

63 Mentioned in the document, dated 3 November 1954 in BEF 1927–180-4057. Also see the letter from the Colonial Office in London to Fletcher-Cooke (Colonial Secretary in Cyprus), dated 19 October 1954, in BEF 1927–180-4057.

64 Report titled “Future of the Buyuk Han: Preliminary conclusion of the governmental meeting,” dated 19 November 1954, in BEF 1927–180-4057.

65 Sabri (2015), p. 523; (2019), p. 140.

66 Altınyıldız (2007), pp. 296–9; Sanders (2008), p. 16.

independence, ultimately triggered the colonial government's attempts to prevent the further evolution of ethno-national identities.⁶⁷ Attempts were, in part, focused on diverting the Turkish Cypriots away from subscribing to the Kemalist nationalism of Turkey, but to no avail.⁶⁸

These developments led to conflicting colonial and local agendas for monument-making and conservation processes regarding Ottoman buildings. The British rulers adopted a political position that influenced such processes, and a political shift from the Orientalist bias regarding the Ottoman buildings' architectonic values gained visibility. The colonial government's strategic approach to the Ottoman legacy can be traced back to the moment when the architectural vestiges with a construction date up to 1700 were included in the revised Antiquities Law of 1935, as mentioned above. Bayraktar Mosque (Fig. 1a), built in the Constanza Bastion at the Nicosia fortifications, which is known as the spot where the standard bearer first flew the Ottoman flag during the Ottoman conquest of 1571, was the first Ottoman building to be listed as an ancient monument after the enactment of the 1935 Antiquities Law.⁶⁹ The fact that the existing building dates to the late 18th and early 19th century and lacks the architectonic values of Ottoman classical architecture suggests that its appreciation was due to its symbolic and associative values. Yet the colonial authorities were cautious: they initiated the monument-making process, but were also very slow at increasing the number of inscribed properties on the list. Only a small set of Ottoman-era built properties were added to the list between 1935 and 1960, and the DoA ensured that their overall appearance reflected an acceptable state of preservation and presentation with minimal effort.

The restoration of Mevlevi Tekke in Nicosia (Fig. 1c) to serve its original function in the wake of the 1931 revolt is another significant case of governmental involvement with political implications. It must be emphasized that this building was not actually listed as an ancient monument. Nevertheless, although providing loans for the restoration of Ottoman buildings was not a standard option and petitions by the sheikh of the *Tekke* for repairs had been rejected in the past, the government now undertook a wholesale restoration, which would continue until the late 1930s.⁷⁰ The official gazettes regularly em-

67 Given (1998).

68 Nevzat & Hatay (2009).

69 Blackall (1935), pp. 324–8.

70 Sabri (2015), pp. 514–52.

phasized these buildings' benefit to the Muslim community.⁷¹ Not only had the government provided the required funding, but George Jeffery's expertise was also sought for the planning and supervision of the work.⁷²

Yet, as I have demonstrated elsewhere,⁷³ once secular forces became more powerful within the Turkish community, its involvement in the upkeep of the Ottoman religious buildings declined. This was particularly the case with the *tekke* complexes. Dr. Fazıl Küçük, then the Turkish Cypriot community's leader, adopted a negative stance toward the restoration of the *tekke* buildings despite the fact that the newspapers in the 1940s reported their ruinous condition.⁷⁴ He saw these buildings as representing an outdated Ottoman identity and promoted their replacement with modern buildings, following the footsteps of the then Kemalist leadership of Turkey.⁷⁵ This negative stance would continue until the final years of British rule. Notwithstanding the objections of the community leaders, a few years later, in 1953, the island's governor initiated a rehabilitation project to improve the presentation of the Hala Sultan Tekke in Larnaca (Fig. 1f).⁷⁶

Conclusion

When Cyprus came under the control of the British Empire in 1878, it was their first Ottoman acquisition. Evidently, the British did not have more than a fleeting knowledge regarding the *waqf* institution when they acquired control of Cyprus.⁷⁷ The initial investigations indicated the importance of this historically rooted Islamic institution in the lives of Muslim communities. Its immediate abolition was not possible for two reasons: first, this would have caused a diplomatic crisis between the Ottoman and British empires. Second, the initial

71 Godwin-Austen & Munir (1936), pp. 235–6; Godwin-Austen & Munir (1937), p. 137.

72 Sabri (2017), p. 66.

73 Sabri (2013, 2015, 2017, 2019).

74 Sabri (2017), p. 75; (2019), pp. 125–6.

75 Sabri (2017, 2019).

76 Sabri (2017), pp. 68–76.

77 Although the British encountered the *waqf* system previously in India, the Indian Religious Endowments Act of 1863 had allowed for autonomous management of *waqfs*. According to Beverly (2011, p. 162), “the colonial state in India had rhetorically upheld religious freedom in the personal domain, and in doing so left avenues open to Muslim elites for maintaining their privileged status.”

investigations revealed that the *waqf* institution was going to be instrumental in consolidating power amongst the island's Muslim-Turkish community. The British rulers ensured the local partners remained tranquil while actual control was exercised by the British authorities, allowing them to take the required legislative, administrative and financial steps to integrate the Ottoman *waqf* institution into the colonial bureaucracy. The British colonial authorities argued that the *Evkaf* needed 'modernization' and 'good governance'. Orientalism had become a convenient way to justify British colonialism. Based on their opinion that the native people were incapable of professional conduct, the colonial authorities in Cyprus ensured that technical planning and implementation of prestigious projects for *waqf* properties remained in the hands of British engineers in the newly established PWD. The British Orientalist views were instrumentalized throughout the 'modernization' and administrative restructuring processes until the early 1930s.

On the one hand, the 'modernization' drives dissolved the *waqf*'s traditional upkeep and maintenance system, which relied on community participation and effective use of endowed resources in the upkeep of the buildings. On the other hand, the British authorities adopted a selective conservation approach. They prioritized the conservation of the medieval-Latin origin properties belonging to the *Evkaf*. Many of these properties were examples of Gothic architecture, which was seen as a highpoint of Western European national heritages. Hence, though confined to a few examples, these properties benefited from government attention from the outset of the colonial period on the island. At the same time, the colonial authorities neutralized the *waqf* properties with Ottoman origins as ordinary assets devoid of historical and architectonic values.

The changing political climate following the proclamation of the island as a British colony in 1925 introduced a new layer to the Ottoman *waqf* legacy. The Ottoman Empire was dissolved after WWI and was no longer a threat. The emerging Kemalist nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots after the 1931 Greek Revolt prompted the British administration to reconsider their approach toward the Ottoman built legacy. Henceforth, they strategically selected a set of properties to help consolidate religious identity among the island's secularizing Turkish community.

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Unmixing peoples, delineating properties

The legal regulation of *waqf* property in 19th-century Serbia

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Abstract: *This article argues that in 19th-century Serbia, the Islamic endowments (waqf) underwent a redefinition – from a non-secular, shared notion of ‘bequest’ (zadužbina), and an Ottoman legal shortcut designating both Muslim and Christian forms of religious/economic/social organizing – into a new concept of “vakuf” that denoted a foreign and specifically religious property tied to a minoritized Muslim population. The process of redefinition was inseparably tied to the ‘un-mixing’ of the population, i.e., the expulsion of the Muslim population from the Serbian Principality, informed by racial and colonial imaginaries and endorsed by the European powers at the Kanlica Conference (1862). Together, the redefinition of waqf and the expulsion of the Muslim population resulted in a high degree of waqf destruction, and a highly uneven process of patrimonialization in the aftermath of empire.*

Introduction

That the ‘ruins of the empire’ are not a metaphor but a reference to actual, material rubble, as Edin Hajdarpašić powerfully warns,¹ is nowhere a more striking image than when embodied by the ruins of *waqf* buildings in the post-Ottoman period. Scholars of Southeast Europe agree that for centuries, *waqf* properties represented the ‘cornerstone of cities’, essential for the functioning of urban life and the founding of new urban centers.² However, the destruction and decline of the *waqf* in the post-Ottoman period remains underexamined. This is

1 Hajdarpašić (2008), p. 730.

2 Zirojević (2018), p. 103; Handžić (1983).

in stark contrast to the excellent studies produced on the *waqf*'s decline in other areas once ruled by the Ottoman Empire, which focus on secularization, privatization, and appropriation of *awqāf* by colonial powers,³ or on the negative effects of late-Ottoman centralization.⁴ Recently, research on Islamic endowments in the modern period has been renewed under the emergence of studies on colonial legalities and decolonial law, which put a spotlight on the roles law and lawmakers played in redefining, racializing, secularizing, and appropriating certain types of landed property in colonial contexts.⁵

For the most part, scholars have not regarded *the waqf* in the Balkans as a case comparable to the rest of the former Ottoman Empire territories or within the framework of coloniality,⁶ due to two main assumptions. First is the assumption that colonial law would only exist where there is direct colonial rule, and such a form of rule did not exist in the Balkans, apart from Habsburg Bosnia, where the colonial character of the Habsburg rule is still disputable for some researchers.⁷ Second, because mosques and other *waqf* buildings became an object of genocidal violence during and beyond the 1990s wars, researchers assume that the institution was similarly destroyed in ethnically motivated violence in the early post-Ottoman period. Thus, even though the general outline of (destructive) legal regulation of *waqf* property in post-Ottoman Serbia is well-established in scholarship,⁸ Serbia remains, like Greece and Bulgaria, an exception to the main body of research on *waqf* properties in the modern period.

However, an examination of the way law was used to undermine the *waqf* in the Serbian Principality after 1830, as well as of the more general discourse on the *waqf* that developed in the 19th century, shows remarkable parallels with the colonial legislation used at that time or later in European colonies. Characteristic of this approach is a redefinition of *waqf* from a highly versatile socio-economic institution into specifically Muslim religious property. For example, in her sophisticated study of the *waqf* in Lebanon, Nada Moumtaz argues that under the French Mandate, “a process of secularization of land and of *waqf*”

3 Powers (1989); Oberauer (2008); Moumtaz (2021).

4 Barnes (1986); Öztürk (1995).

5 Bhandar (2018).

6 For an exception, see Bečić (2017).

7 Detrez (2002).

8 Nedeljković (1936); Karčić (1983); Kolaj Ristanović (2019).

took place, in which secularization entails “the continuous quest of separating religion from economy.”⁹ While the original meaning of *waqf* belonged to a non-secular sphere that did not differentiate between ‘religion’ and other areas of human activity, the French Mandate law circumscribed the meaning of the *waqf* as “the religious patrimony of the still undifferentiated Muslim community.”¹⁰ Other scholars take earlier examples of French Algeria and British India to point out that redefinition of the *waqf* institution,¹¹ including the moral questioning of its charitable aims, must be understood in the context of the colonial struggle for (extensive) *waqf* land as a resource that had hitherto been in certain ways excluded from the open market.

Similar trends can be observed in 19th-century Serbia, which throughout the century steadily moved from the Ottoman sphere into the periphery of European coloniality. First, as this article demonstrates, over the course of that century, the meaning of the *waqf* and its property were secularized. I trace the shift in the shared meaning of *waqf* from a non-secular idea of ‘bequest’ (*zadužbina*), understandable to both Muslim and Christian communities, and an Ottoman legal shortcut to explain the financing and function of both Islamic endowments and monastic communities, into a new concept of ‘vakuf’ (a commonly used, corrupted version of the word “vakuf”) that denoted a foreign and specifically religious property tied to the minoritized Muslim population. In this process, the work of German-educated liberal political economists, who translated *waqf* into “mosque’s property,” was crucial in enabling the privatization of most *waqf* land.

Second, the process of the *waqf*’s redefinition was inseparably tied to the process of ‘un-mixing’¹² populations, i.e., the expulsion of the Muslim population from the Serbian Principality. Here, I use the term ‘unmixing’ following its critical examination by Aslı Iğsız,¹³ to denote the policy of forced segregation of groups which are imagined to be racially different from each other, yet homogenous within themselves, and where each purportedly corresponds to a “designated geography of belonging.”¹⁴ While ‘unmixing’ is usually discussed in the context of 1923 compulsory population transfer between Greece

9 Moumtaz (2021), p. 4, following the work of Hussein Ali Agrama.

10 Ibid., p. 6.

11 Powers (1989), pp. 535–6.

12 Iğsız (2018); Abbas (2019).

13 Iğsız (2018), pp. 9–10.

14 Ibid., p. 10.

and Turkey, I show below that the same logic informed the expulsion of Muslim population from the Serbian Principality more than half a century earlier.

In this process of expulsion, the Muslim population – as well as ‘typically Muslim’ forms of property holding, including the *waqf* – were racialized as both foreign and on a lesser civilizational plane compared to those of Christians. Such racialization, together with the actual displacement of the Muslim population, resulted in the *waqf* legislation’s enabling of a much higher degree of *waqf* destruction compared to places that had a significant Muslim population after the end of Ottoman rule.

Yet, there is no direct comparability between the political position and actual power of the 19th-century Serbian Principality and a colonial power like France. In the period under consideration here (early 19th century to 1868), Serbia was one of Ottoman Empire’s privileged provinces that emerged in the context of transimperial competition and were regulated by international law and Ottoman edicts.¹⁵ Its autonomy, which in the scholarship is often teleologically portrayed as a step on the clear road to independence, was actually a precarious one, squeezed between two voluminous empires in a highly volatile situation, shorthanded as the “Eastern Question.”

Internally, this autonomy engendered a specific legal geography of power-sharing. After 1830, six fortified cities in which the Ottoman army was stationed, and the Muslim population living in those cities and in some places in the suburbs as well, remained under direct Ottoman jurisdiction, while the Orthodox Christian population (later also extended to Jews and Roma) and the rest of the territory was placed under Serbian administration. Belgrade itself was split under this dual administration.¹⁶ The rest of the Muslim population had been expelled with the Ottoman edicts (*hatts*) of 1829, 1830, and 1833 based on the conditions previously negotiated between the Porte and the Russian Empire. Serbia paid a yearly sum to the Ottoman Porte to compensate for their estates, as well as for other taxes and property incomes that the Ottoman state had previously drawn from the territory of the principality.

In such a context, in Serbia’s elites’ eyes, the key to Serbia’s political survival was the production of the kind of political, social, and cultural narratives that would place it firmly among the European states and enable it to climb the racial and civilizational hierarchy established in the context of 19th-century

15 Can & Genel (2020), p. 468.

16 Jovanović (2016), Aytekin (2016).

colonialism. In this context, the key role was played by mostly Serbian intellectuals, economists, engineers, and artists coming from, or at least educated in, Austria-Hungary and Germany, and working for the Serbian government. As people able to translate between the European colonial and racial imaginaries and the local realities, they represented an enormously important capital in Serbia. It is not without irony that they were able to use a colonialist vocabulary in an anti-imperial struggle, presenting Serbia as a European country temporarily suspended in its development by an 'Asiatic' empire. This constellation had major consequences for the redefinition of property, including the *waqf*, in and beyond the 19th century.

The shared concept of endowment/bequest

In 1862, the State Council of Serbia asked the local authorities in all cities and counties to provide a detailed list of *vakuf* (*waqf*) properties, documenting who was renting them, at what price, and for how much they could be sold if they were to be privatized.¹⁷ This was done in order to provide a basis for a comprehensive law that would, for the first time, regulate the status of Islamic endowments in the autonomous Ottoman province of Serbia.

The lists local authorities sent back to Belgrade showed that there was considerable confusion not only about the extent of possible *waqf* properties, but also about the meaning of the word *vakuf* itself. In some cases, local authorities reported all church property as *waqf*, including the small land plots on which the village churches and schools were constructed. A longer report to the State Council warned about the mix-up, saying that: "According to the popular understanding of the word *vakuf*, local authorities seem to have mixed the real *waqf* lands with other church lands," thus making the lists useless.¹⁸ The "popular understanding" differed from that of the Serbian administrators who were in charge of drafting the law. The leader among them, the German-educated political economist Kosta Cukić explained to the Council several years later that "*vakuf* was the name of those immovable properties that belong to mosques."¹⁹

17 State Archives of Serbia (hereafter AS), State Council (hereafter DS), 1862–1867, p. 64, 77. Cf. Kolaj Ristanović (2019) p. 214.

18 AS, DS, 1862–1867, pp. 141–4.

19 Ibid., p. 1.

The 'popular understanding' that conflated *waqf* and church lands thus juxtaposed the 'expert' definition of *waqf* as a mosque's property. Yet the latter was also an innovation that contradicted the classical understanding of the Islamic endowments as trusts established according to Islamic law and principally dedicated to pious and charitable purposes. According to Islamic law, the property thus endowed does not belong to mosques; it passes from human hands into the realm of God.

The confusion was more than just a symptom of amnesia about the *waqf* that had settled into Serbian society by the 1860s. Rather, it indicated a transformation in understanding of the *waqf*, and property more broadly, that unfolded during the 19th century in and beyond the Middle East. This transformation had its roots in secularizing and colonial interventions but was, in the Serbian case, exacerbated by the expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants. It took the form of categorizing and ordering property along the imagined hierarchy of property forms, which awarded the *waqf* a low position.

The 'popular understanding' that conflated church and *waqf* properties was not accidental. By the 1860s, due to a legal arrangement made in 1839, churches had been drawing income from Islamic *waqf* properties for about two decades. Yet the popularly understood connections between Islamic and Christian endowments were much older than this legal regulation. The tendency to such an understanding was embedded in the shared Ottoman context and was actively present in the early period of Serbian autonomy. It had two intertwined sources. First, it was anchored in a shared, non-secular understanding of endowment or bequest (Serbian *zadužbina*) as a moral and pious act that bridged the distinction between the material world and the eternal. Second, it also derived from the comparable, if competitive, way the Islamic and Christian endowments were organized and administered by the Ottoman state.

The shared, moral, and non-secular meaning of endowment is perhaps best reflected in the definition given in 1818 by the famous Serbian linguist and ethnographer Vuk Stefanović Karadžić in his *Dictionary of the Serbian language* (1818). The significance of his *Dictionary* transcended matters of linguistics, and it is not an overstatement to say that his definitions continued to influence lawmakers, ethnographers, and historians in Serbia throughout and sometimes beyond the 19th century. The *Dictionary* does not define *vakuf* as a word at all, but it does define *endowment* or *bequest* (sr. *zadužbina*). Moreover, it makes

no differentiation between Christian and Muslim endowments,²⁰ but rather merges the common definition of endowing in one telling paragraph:

It is the highest [form of] endowment to build a monastery or a church, as did the [medieval] Serbian tzars and kings; and it is also [a form of] endowment to build a bridge across some sort of water or a pond; to pave a bad road; to bring water and establish [a fountain] near the road (and that is called: to make oneself an endowment [i.e., for one's own soul, J.R.]); to plant or graft a fruit tree near the road; to feed the hungry, give water to the thirsty, and to clothe the naked (and this is called to do/make an endowment [i.e., as charity for someone else, J.R.]), and such. The Turks today still build and make all of those endowments. Many Bosnian beys oversee and repair the fountains and bridges around Serbia, built by their ancestors a century ago.²¹

After giving two examples of Muslims repairing such endowments in his home region, he cites a folk poem which identifies the Studenica Monastery as an endowment of the “emperor Simeun,” in other words Stefan Nemanja, the founder of the medieval Nemanjić dynasty.²²

Thus, in the *Dictionary's* assemblage, the phenomenon of endowment exists beyond the boundaries of specific religion, in an explicitly non-secular, moral context. An endowment is a soul-saving act (Serbian *za dušu*, for the soul), whether performed by the Muslim Bosnian *beys*, or the Christian medieval kings. But the boundaries of religion are not the only ones that endowments cross. Endowments exist across multiple temporalities, connecting the past generations of kings and *beys* with the humans of the present. They also cross the boundaries between the material world – in which there are incessant bodily needs to fulfil, and in which the crumbling materiality of built endowments is itself always in need of repair – and the eternal world in which the soul is rewarded. In the coming decades, as I will demonstrate below, such a shared and non-secular understanding of endowment, one which does not differentiate between religious, economic, or other aspects of human activity, would

20 This is also true of the German translation, which the dictionary provides as “die fromme Stiftung” (in English sometimes encountered as “pious foundation”) and which is likewise applied to different religions.

21 Stefanović Karadžić (1818), p. 191, translated into English by the author.

22 Interestingly, the excerpt comes from the poem “Miloš u Latinima,” in which the list of monasteries serves in an interconfessional competition, but with the Catholics.

become increasingly rare, and the moral value of bequests would be reserved for the Christian context only.

Beyond the shared understanding of the practice of endowing/bequeathing, there were also more practical factors that connected Orthodox Christian and Muslim endowments in the Ottoman context. Ottoman authorities considered church and monastery properties within the broader *waqf* framework. Such status enabled continuity of the life and property ownership of many monasteries after the Ottoman conquest. The legal status of monasteries as large landowners was occasionally a matter of dispute, in particular at times of land tax reforms. The best-known such case in scholarship is the so-called ‘confiscation of monasteries’ in the Balkans, in which the monasteries lost a significant part of their property before eventually reaching a compromise with the state.²³ During this dispute, the famous Ottoman jurist Ebüssuud clarified that Christians could found a *waqf* to support “monks, the indigent, bridges and fountains,” but not for supporting the churches and monasteries themselves.²⁴ Yet this ruling did not become a guideline applicable always and everywhere, nor were there any strict and uniform legal rules defining the property of Orthodox churches and monasteries.²⁵ What is more important is that there was a custom of governing both Islamic *waqf* properties and monasteries – explicitly or implicitly – in the same way, and that the word *waqf* was one which made similarities between them immediately recognizable.

Lastly, this legal solution came from the resemblances in the organization and social functions of Christian and Muslim endowments in the Ottoman context.²⁶ Both were social spaces commanding a stunning multiplicity of fiscal and communal functions. They were places of worship, religion-grounded education, and welfare as well as lively economic activities. They organized taxation, were entitled to land tithes, lent out cash, and drew income from a range of commercial buildings (predominantly urban shops and inns for the Islamic urban *waqf*, and rural/agricultural properties for monasteries, including wineries, watermills, fulling mills, and lathes).²⁷

With the beginnings of Serbia’s autonomy in the 1830s, the comparative, if competitive, relationship between Christian and Muslim endowments char-

23 Fotić (1994); Kermeli (1997).

24 Kermeli (1997), p. 147.

25 Kolovos (2016), p. 104.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 106.

27 See Jovanović (1885), p. 182.

acteristic of the Ottoman context was replaced by their gradual disentangling and uneven treatment, even if the first legal regulation of *waqf* properties still bound them together.

The 1830s edicts that granted Serbia autonomy explicitly deliberated on some types of property, most prominently large estates (*timar* and *zeamet*). However, unlike in the case of Greece, *waqf* properties in Serbia were not explicitly mentioned in these settlements, but were left ambiguous. The reasons for this are not clear. Karčić suggests that *waqf* property was also in this case treated as Ottoman state property, but it was neither claimed by the Ottoman state, nor was it openly claimed by Serbia – which was not an independent state – for several decades.²⁸ It is also possible that landed *waqf* holdings outside of the six cities were comparably small (the mentioned lists that mix this land with church properties contain a total of 464 land plots) because the repeated Habsburg-Ottoman wars and the two Serbian uprisings meant continuous waves of destruction of *waqf* property.²⁹ In this case, the direct naming of *waqf* properties in the agreements would have been more costly for the Ottoman government in the eyes of public opinion. For example, in negotiations around the Kanlica conference, the Ottoman side requested that the mosques be preserved in order not to turn the Muslim population against the Ottoman government.³⁰

In the initial years of autonomy, Serbian authorities started to privatize *waqf* property outside of the six cities where the Muslim population resided, selling it primarily to those who owned buildings on it. However, this process was abruptly reversed in 1839, when the opposition to Knez Miloš – which requested security of property in general – gained the upper hand, and the Ottoman Empire's influence again grew stronger in Serbia.³¹ The prior sales were annulled. In the later wording of Knez Aleksandar Karađorđević, the decision to sell was claimed to be inappropriate (*neumesna*) “for higher political reasons

28 Karčić (1983), p. 143.

29 The only two endowments renewed after the two decades of Habsburg rule in the Smederevo *sancak* were those of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and Yahyapaşaoğlu Bali Bey; Fotić (2001), p. 449.

30 Ristić (1872), p. 74.

31 AS, DS, 1862–1867, p. 4, pp. 141–144; Najviše rešenje od 5. Juna 1852, *Zbornik zakona* VI (1852), p. 108.

based on the character of *waqf* property.”³² The reasons to not privatize *waqf* properties are thus ambiguous: they are based both on the Ottoman Empire’s power, and on the special character of *waqf* property. The latter informed the first relatively comprehensive Serbian regulation of *waqf*, which in August 1839 transferred *waqf* properties to the custody of local churches. By this decision, local churches became holders – though not owners – of *waqf* property that was outside of the Muslim-populated areas. The churches could draw income from renting out such land, but they could neither sell it, nor build on it.³³ Moreover, church and *waqf* lands became the only lands on which the peasants living on them did not receive ownership rights guaranteed by Serbian laws and constitution.³⁴

In practice, the decision to award the income of *waqf* lands to the churches led to numerous misunderstandings. The layered property rights affected the renters of *waqf* property, who in many cases owned buildings on such land and sometimes refused to pay land rents, considering the land their own. Already in the 1850s, local churches started to petition the central authorities to allow them to sell the land, in order to avoid conflict with the local population, which was damaging to their reputation.³⁵ Eventually, the church authorities emerged as the main lobbyist for a comprehensive *waqf* law in the 1860s.

From bequests to *vakuf*: The unmixing of peoples and property

Two processes were the key for the dissolution of *waqf* property in the 1860s. The first was the delineation of the *waqf* as a separate, foreign form of property. This process is inextricably tied to the political project of ‘unmixing’ populations, which in the 1860s took shape in the expulsion of the remaining Muslim population from cities in Serbia. The second process was the (at least attempted) shift of Serbia’s economy to centralized and rationalist models of Smithian capitalism. This school of economic thought arrived in Serbia via German-educated political economists, such as Kosta Cukić, who promoted physiocratic

32 Najviše rešenje od 5. Juna 1852, *Zbornik zakona i uredaba*, VI (1852), p. 109. Other documents show that this legal prescription was not always uniformly followed, and occasionally the state appropriated *waqf* property, AS, DS, 1862–1867, p. 141–4.

33 AS, DS, 1862–1867, p. 1.

34 Nedeljković (1936), pp. 183–4.

35 AS, DS, 1862–1867, p. 30, 45, 53.

economic policies based on an efficient and rational usage of resources. In a predominantly agricultural society, the main such resource was land itself.

The process of ‘unmixing’ populations in Serbia predated the 1860s, but in 1862 it received a completely new justification in international law. As has already been mentioned, in the 1830s, the Muslim population had been officially limited to six garrison towns and, in some cases, their suburbs, which remained under the Ottoman jurisdiction. However, the relationship between the Serbian government and the Ottoman Porte became tense after the return of the Obrenović family to power in 1858, and in particular after the formulation of Knez Mihailo’s program at the Parliament session of 1861, which intended to consolidate Serbian power at the expense of the Ottomans.³⁶ Serbia renewed the request for the expulsion of Muslims from all areas stipulated by the 1830s edicts, a task which it entrusted to Jovan Ristić, who was appointed Serbian representative in Istanbul.³⁷ The disagreement between the governments spread into the local population. In 1862, skirmishes between the Ottoman army and the Serbian police in Belgrade left several dead. After a night of fighting, the Muslim population gathered in the fortress, and the Ottoman army bombarded the *varoš* suburb from the fortress, causing a major international crisis. Although the Ottoman central authorities were at pains to deny any involvement in the bombardment (though Ristić considered them responsible), Serbian statesmen were able to capitalize on the incident, drawing heavily on the fact that the Concert of Europe accepted the Ottoman Empire among their members, but still treated it as a semi-civilized state – an idea that the Ottoman attack on their own civilian subjects only seemed to confirm. Ristić cast the Ottoman army and the fortress itself as the main threat to peace and economic progress in Serbia. In his diplomatic work, as well as in later books he wrote on the topic, he represented the bombardment as an uncivilized act that damaged the *varoš*, endangered the civilian population, and stopped the flow of economic investment.³⁸

In the aftermath of the bombardment, the representatives of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia (Italy) met with the Ottoman government at Kanlıca in Istanbul to discuss the “Affairs of Servia.” Even though Serbian representatives (not present at the conference) organized their requests around the bombardment and the presence of the Ottoman

36 Ristić (1872), p. 1–3.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 5, 9–10.

38 Ristić (2010 [1881]), p. 149, 186.

army, the Conference concluded with a stipulation to expel the Muslim civilian population living in the multireligious neighborhoods around the Belgrade fortress, but to keep the Ottoman army in four fortresses (Belgrade, Šabac/Böğürdelen, Smederevo/Semendire, and Kladovo/Fethülislam), while tearing down the fortifications in Užice and Soko.

The Kanlıca Conference's justification was particularly significant; in the opening paragraph of its protocol it stated:

In order to prevent the possibility of conflict arising from the intermixture in the same locality of Mussulman and Serbian population, the Ottoman government will transfer in full property to the Serbian government, on condition of indemnifying the proprietors, all the Lands and Houses in the Suburb of Belgrade, belonging at the present time to Mussulmans.³⁹

In other words, the signatory countries of the Conference eventually all agreed that it was the living together, the *intermixture* of the Muslim and Christian population, that presented the security risk, and that the solution to this situation was to separate communities that had lived together for centuries.⁴⁰ However, this had not been the initial position of all European states, nor of Serbia. In the two years leading up to the Kanlıca Conference, Serbia sent missions to Istanbul with the task of convincing the Porte to place the Muslim population under Serbian jurisdiction, but the Porte did not agree.⁴¹ The original French project for the conference likewise rejected the expulsion of Muslims and supported instead the establishment of full Serbian jurisdiction, noting that the cause of the clashes was “the dual government and not the incompatibility between the two races.”⁴²

It is not clear why this suggestion was never accepted. Ristić blamed the Ottoman Porte, who argued that the Muslims would have never stayed under Serbian rule anyway; however, “during the displacement it showed that

39 English text as given in Trifunovska (1994), p. 42–8.

40 Karčić (2013), 77.

41 Ristić (1872), p. 5. Later in 1862, Serbian authorities requested that Ali Pasha either send a commissioner to negotiate the expropriation and displacement of Muslims, or allow them to be put under Serbian jurisdiction; Ali Pasha considered this an insult (Ristić 1872, pp. 25–6). Karčić (2013, p. 82) rightfully notes that based on prior experience, Muslims could not have counted on fair treatment by the Serbian administration.

42 Ristić (1872), p. 61–2; Russia later endorsed this view, p. 69.

many would have stayed on their properties.”⁴³ In a recognizable ‘civilizing’ discourse, Ristić further claimed that the Porte really just did not want to see Muslims “develop under Christian rule” into “citizens, bureaucrats, and parliament members,” i.e., members of a civil(ized) society, a vision that he claimed to be possible in Serbia as a European state. However, it is questionable whether the Ottoman Porte had anything to do with the formulation on “intermixture,” and it is surprising that it signed such a document, since legal and jurisdictional pluralism, as well as “intermixture,” were facts on much of its territory. One of the documents published by Ristić shows that the British representative’s protocol spoke about a “separation of Turks and Serbs” as one of the two “principles” for arranging matters in Belgrade.⁴⁴

The “unmixing” was thus legally enshrined. The separation of populations, and expropriation, was entrusted to the mixed Ottoman-Serbian commissions and undertaken over the next months. In this way, the Kanlica Conference inaugurated an ominous precedent into international politics, which would find its full expression in the “management of alterity” during the Greek-Turkish population exchange, and beyond, as the historian Aslı Iğsız (2018) convincingly argues.

Political economists redefine the *waqf*

The ‘unmixing’ had far-reaching consequences. It decreased the extent of Ottoman jurisdiction both politically and spatially, giving Serbian jurists more leverage and access to more land. Moreover, it affected the way property was conceptualized at a moment when a capitalist economy was on the rise. The new, rational conceptualization of property had a particular effect on the *waqf* lands, which, just like the Muslim population, were racialized as foreign and incompatible with modernity, in addition to being regarded as economically unproductive.

Such reconceptualization of the *waqf* had much to do with the new generation of liberal political economists working in Serbia. These economists, predominantly educated in Germany, brought about a shift to the newly created science of (political) economy, which postulated economic progress based on rational usage of resources. The most prominent among them was Kosta

43 Ibid., p. 75.

44 Ibid., p. 120.

Cukić (1826–79), the first professor of Political Economy in Belgrade (a post created for him specifically) and, from 1861 on, Minister of Finance. Cukić was a doctoral student and follower of the famous German political economist Karl Heinrich Rau (1792–1870) at the University of Heidelberg.⁴⁵ Rau had developed a teaching of state economy based on the liberal ideas of Adam Smith and similar thinkers. Like them, Cukić considered private property the basis of economic productivity and personal freedom – though he also seemed able to reconcile this teaching with the forced expropriation and displacement of Muslims happening in the same period in which he was writing, a topic on which he remained silent. While Smith and other political economists put the individual at the center, Cukić followed the German school, which gave major significance to the state and the nation. In Serbia, he introduced the first credit institution, and unsuccessfully attempted to establish income-based taxation and the land register.⁴⁶ In addition, he ushered in a set of new laws that regulated in an ever more centralized and uniform way the usage (and expropriation) of land and forests, the regulation of customs, and the construction of infrastructure.

For his students, as well as the intellectuals in Serbia, Cukić published a three-volume textbook on *The foundations of national economy* (1851–62), based on Rau's own three-volume *Political economy* and organized in the same way. Economic historians consider the work a watershed in economic thought in Serbia. Following Rau's structure, Cukić's textbook introduces the main aspects of liberal political economy based on the ideas of free competition, meritocracy, and efficiency as the guidelines for the state. But the main claim the book actually makes is that Serbia's economy is a European one, or, rather, that it can be one by following the rational, efficient, and scientific rules of political economy. Although published in the period in which Serbia was an autonomous Ottoman province, all the examples, histories, and statistics are those of other Western and Central European countries. The Ottoman Empire exists either as an item in the Serbian budget, or as a backward place where unmotivated peasants are inefficiently working land they do not own.

Cukić's book does not speak of the *waqf* directly, treating it only indirectly through the discussion on charity and welfare. According to Cukić, the modern era ushered in masses of the poor, and the systematic care of the poor is the state's duty,⁴⁷ which can be performed best by municipalities and (secular)

45 Leovac (2014), p. 119–20.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

47 Cukić (1862), p. 501.

private institutes. Churches and monasteries, which had historically been in charge of charity, are unsuitable because they leave the poor of other religious beliefs unattended. Moreover, they are also not following rational rules in giving out charity.⁴⁸ In his view, charity should only go to those who are “truly poor” and not simply “unwilling to work.” The laxness in distributing charity otherwise causes proliferation of the poor, characteristic of Southern Europe and the “Mohammedan countries.”⁴⁹

Cukić’s understanding of private property, demonstrated in the textbook, was also in play in his legal work, which directly affected the *waqf* institution. During his work on the committee on the Law on *Waqf* Lands, Cukić made two seemingly small interventions that actually had far-reaching consequences for *waqf* property. The first was the already mentioned redefinition of *waqf* as “a mosque’s property.” Such a reformulation took *waqf* property outside of the traditional Islamic legal definition in which it belonged to God, and reformulated it into the private property of a new legal subject, the property-holding mosque. With this reformulation, Cukić actually joined a much larger trend that combined secularization and the normalizing idea(l) of private property. Moumtaz has shown that the view of the *waqf* as a legal person that can buy and sell property started to enter late-Ottoman practice, affecting Ottoman law only at the turn of the 20th century, while French colonial law redefined the *waqf* entirely as a legal subject that owns assets – a change with legacies lasting into the present.⁵⁰ The redefinition of the *waqf* as “a mosque’s property” had several consequences. First, it legitimized the appropriation of land belonging to mosques that were destroyed or not functional. Second, it contributed to an almost exclusive focus on mosques, both in the legislation of the time and in subsequent scholarship, while obscuring the endowment status of other land and buildings, including baths, schools, libraries, and elements of infrastructure. (In fact, it is completely unclear from these documents which other *waqf* properties existed on this territory in the 19th century.) Lastly, it cemented the understanding of the *waqf* as specifically religious property.

Secularization also affected the Orthodox church and monastic property – likewise redefined as a church’s property – but only to a certain extent. The absolutely privileged status churches and monasteries had enjoyed since autonomy was curbed in the 1860s. The 1862 Law on Orthodox Church Authorities,

48 Ibid., p. 538.

49 Ibid., p. 536.

50 Moumtaz (2021), p. 31–67.

also authored by Kosta Cukić, subjected the work of church authorities and its judiciary to regular state control by the Ministry of Education and Church Affairs.⁵¹ In addition, this law (Article 7) denied the church full control over its property, mandating that it could not be sold, gifted, or mortgaged without the Ministry's permission. The real value of church and monastic property shrank, amounting to at least a 3% decrease during the 1870s, and an 18.46% decrease during the 1880s, the result of state appropriation of forests and the establishment of new local churches.⁵²

The second intervention made by Cukić is the usage of the word *vakuf* itself, which cemented a new, separate status for the Islamic endowments in comparison to their Christian counterparts: one that paralleled and complemented the unmixing of populations. My intention is not to argue that he had been the first person to use the word *vakuf*, which had been locally in circulation at least in its Turkish form for centuries. However, his choice of a word the origin and perception of which were marked as foreign by that period signaled a clear removal of the *waqf* from the shared context of bequests, as defined by Vuk St. Karadžić above. While the word *zadužbina* was widely known and venerated, *vakuf* was a word which by that time, as the anecdote from the previous section clearly shows, was not well understood even by the more educated among the general population. This case is comparable to the “politics of non-translation,” invoked recently by the scholar of Islamic law Lena Salaymeh.⁵³ Focusing on scholarly texts, Salaymeh argues that non-translation of Islamic terms not only makes the texts difficult to read, but also leads to “exotification, miscomprehension, miscommunication, and inaccessibility.” More importantly, “non-translating insinuates that a term is incomprehensible in the target language and in the target culture.”⁵⁴ A similar process was at play here. In the process of legislation, there was no attempt to reach a clear understanding of what *waqf* was, nor that the word was also used in the Christian context. The choice of the word contributed to ‘*waqf* amnesia’, the legacy of which remains today.

The secularized definition of *waqf* property as exclusively religious, and its foreign status, continued to be significant among other intellectuals and economists. Vladimir Jovanović (1833–1922), another German student and one of the founders of the Serbian Liberal Party, explicitly discusses the *waqf* in

51 Zakon o crkvenim vlastima pravoslavne vere, 30. Septembar 1862.

52 Jovanović (1885), p. 86, 95, Jovanović (1895), p. 20.

53 Salaymeh (2021).

54 Ibid., p. 255.

his *Political dictionary*.⁵⁵ There, he writes: “Vakup, from the Turkish word vakuf or vakf, means the property that belongs to a mosque (like our monastery or church property).” After emphasizing the foreign origin of the word, and the foreign status of *waqf* compared to *our* church or monastery, he presents the *waqf* as a parasite on the state’s economy: “There is no tax paid on the *waqf*; and, since their number grows from year to year, the state’s annual revenue decreases.” Lastly, he explains that many of the *waqf* lands are such only in name, in order for their owners to avoid tax.⁵⁶ These definitions of *waqf* were not unique; like the secularizing redefinition, they were in circulation throughout the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire. The difference between the last definition and that of Vuk Karadžić shows the striking transformation of the understanding of *waqf* over only a few decades.

Bajrakli Džamija and the mosque’s new meaning

While the original international property agreements stayed silent concerning *waqf* property, the Protocol of the Kanlica Conference nominally protected specifically “Religious Edifices and Tombs,” which “shall be scrupulously respected” (Article I). In negotiations with Serbia, the Ottoman government likewise requested that the mosques and graveyards in the Belgrade *varoš* remain “under its discretion,” but the Serbian government argued that such a prescription would form an obstacle to urban regulation.⁵⁷ Some scholars argue that the Ottoman government, as in the 1830s, regarded the nine million piastres Serbia paid in 1865 as compensation “for all requests defined by the Kanlica conference,” as implicitly including *waqf* properties.⁵⁸ This claim is based on the work of Felix Kanitz, who wrote that the “[By paying compensation] Serbian government obtained the unwillingly given right to demolish those mosques that stood in the way of urban regulation.”⁵⁹ Either way, *waqf* property more generally came to be understood as a specifically religious property of the Muslim community, and in the eyes of the state, the absence of such a community

55 Jovanović (1872), p. 355.

56 Ibid.

57 Ristić (2010 [1881]), p. 81.

58 Nikić (1958), p. 161; cf. Karčić (1983), p. 144.

59 Kanitz (1868), p. 435.

made this property itself obsolete and an obstacle to capitalist urban development.

In 1867, the Ottoman army withdrew from the remaining four fortresses, ceremonially handing over the keys of Belgrade, and leaving only the Ottoman flag. The withdrawal was negotiated between Serbia and the Ottoman Porte, amidst changes in international politics and the war in Crete. The Ottoman army withdrew to Vidin, bringing along the movables from the fortress mosques.⁶⁰

The same years saw the final privatization of *waqf* property. In 1866, Cukić wrote to the State Council, stating that all of the *waqf* regulation was patchy, causing much disagreement. Thus it was in the interest of both the church and private persons to address the issue of the *waqf* lands because “there was no reason why the question of *waqf* lands should be left unresolved,”⁶¹ a statement that could only be read in light of the Muslims’ displacement. The 1867 Law on *Waqf* Lands made it mandatory for churches to sell the landed properties of Islamic endowments to those people who were holding and using them. The law’s third article extended privatization also to “those properties that had been paying *waqf* rights to the mosques prior to 1862,” which meant all of the *waqf* properties beyond the fortresses. The Metropolitan of Belgrade, much displeased with the new law, requested the transfer of these lands fully into church property, with sales being optional (which indeed had been the first solution Cukić had proposed); he also requested a clarification as to whether the newly available *waqf* property within fortresses, including the graveyards, would be awarded to churches or to municipalities.⁶² However, the legal committee led by Filip Hristić neither clarified this, nor heeded his requests in general.

The displacement and expropriation of the Muslim population opened the way for Belgrade’s urban regulation, and in 1867 the first regulation plan was drawn up by the Vienna-educated engineer and mathematician Emilijan Josimović. After 1862, the number of sixteen mosques, which appears to have been stable since the 1830s, started to decline: Josimović’s plan accounted for seven mosques in the *varoš*, to which two fortress mosques and the central Batal Mo-

60 Ristić (2010 [1881]), p. 81.

61 AS, DS 1862–1867, p. 1.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 153, 156.

sque should be added for the full number.⁶³ Four were slated for demolition.⁶⁴ By early 1878, five mosques remained, and in the meantime, most were left to neglect. They figured as empty signifiers and soon became treated like exotic ruins, depicted by photographers and artists educated in Austria: photographer Anastas Jovanović and his son, architect Konstantin A. Jovanović, theater painter Antonije Kovačević, scholar and lithographer Felix Kanitz, and Russian photographer Ivan Groman. Various drawings preserved the appearance of twelve Belgrade mosques, and six were photographed.⁶⁵

With the last wave of expulsion of Muslims and compensations for their property, the process of unmixing populations and property came to conclusion in autonomous Serbia. This period's peak was the reopening of the Bajrakli Džamija in Belgrade in 1868, after the last Ottoman Muslims had been displaced the year prior. In 1868, Knez Mihailo ordered that a mosque be renovated and put into use for the Muslim community in Belgrade. But which community? The Education Minister's letter identified the mosque's purpose as "the religious consolation" of "those Mohammedans who are in Belgrade on business."⁶⁶ In contrast, there seems to have been a small population of around thirty Muslims living in Belgrade as craftsmen, which the letter characterized as too poor to support the imam and the *müezzin*; the majority of the Muslim population, registered as Roma, actually lived along the Ottoman border.⁶⁷ The engineering experts chose the Bajrakli Mosque as the most suitable. The strongly built mosque is dated to the 17th century; in the 18th, under Austrian rule, it had been converted into a Jesuit church, and then back into a mosque, with some traces of the church building still visible.⁶⁸ This choice ignored the more magnificent Batal Mosque, standing in the place of today's Serbian Parliament building, which was abandoned and later demolished in 1869 or 1870, in spite of proposals to turn it into a national museum or state archives, the latter suggested by Knez Mihailo.⁶⁹

The main aim of reopening the Bajrakli Mosque, once that Muslim community was not present anymore, was to serve as a proof of religious liberty in

63 Đurić-Zamolo (1977), p. 67. Five of these mosques still received *waqf* income in 1862: Tamis (Kör Mustafa), Defterdar, Ali Pasha, Zircirli, and Bajrakli (AS, DS 1862–1867, 77–8).

64 Jovanović (2016), p. 81.

65 Đurić-Zamolo (1977), p. 21.

66 Hodžić (1957), p. 95; Zirojević (2018), p. 111; Šaljić (2019).

67 Šaljić (2019), p. 79.

68 Ibid., p. 78; Đurić-Zamolo (1977), p. 24.

69 Đurić-Zamolo (1977), p. 30.

Serbia, and a token of the Serbian ruler's good will toward the now minoritized Muslim population. At the time of the Berlin Congress, it enabled Jovan Ristić to claim that,

of all the countries in the East, none is as tolerant in religious questions as Serbia ... Even though in the capital of Serbia there is no Mohammedan population, the government is paying for one mosque for just those Muslims that would be passing through Belgrade.⁷⁰

The ruling Obrenović family continued to follow this model, reopening the mosque once again in 1893. The chronogram created in that year celebrates Aleksandar Obrenović and the Belgrade municipality, concluding that "today Christian bread repaired the Bajrakli Mosque".⁷¹

Rather than a revival, as seen by some scholars, the reopening of the Bajrakli Mosque represented a complete break with tradition. On the one hand, it symbolically ended the traditional existence of the *waqf* in 19th-century Serbia, as it was the state and not the *waqf* that now financed the renovation and upkeep of the mosque, or paid salaries to its *imams* and *müezzins*, selected and brought from Bosnia. On the other hand, the event marked a transition in the way Serbia perceived the remaining Muslims. The latter not only moved from Ottoman to Serbian jurisdiction, but for the first time started to be regarded as a minority: that process comprised not only numerical and cultural marginalization and racialization, but also a new definition of minority as an 'anomaly' to the normalized hegemony of the nation-state.

Conclusion

Patrimonialization in the aftermath of empire is a contingent and uneven process, in which the elusive notion of value is ever subject to various power relations and contested histories. In 19th-century Serbia, this process depended on the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and its autonomous province, but also on the highly volatile transimperial context in which Serbian statesmen saw an exit from its precarious position through an alignment with European powers.

70 Ristić (1987 [1887]), p. 210–1 (translation by author).

71 Hodžić (1957), p. 99.

Here, I have shown how Serbian intellectuals and legislators transformed the meaning of the *waqf* by resorting to the repertoire of colonial and racial imaginaries developed in the context of European colonialism. While the original shared understanding of *waqf* in the Ottoman context stemmed from the non-secular, moral concept of bequest as much as from similarities in organization and function of Islamic and Christian endowments as religious-social-economic institutions, it was translated into – or replaced by – the term ‘vakup/vakuf’, perceived as a foreign concept reduced to a type of religious property tied to the minoritized Muslim population.⁷² The narratives of economic progress based on rational usage of resources further cast the *waqf*, re-defined as private property of the mosque, obsolete. This was the case especially in the aftermath of the expulsion of Muslims, whose depiction as an obstacle to Christian-led modernization was promoted by Serbian statesmen, endorsed by European powers, and legally enshrined at the 1862 Kanlıca Conference.

As shown above, some of the criticism of the *waqf* also applied to Orthodox churches and monasteries, the property of which also decreased to some extent. The public opinion on monastic properties was also changing: even conservative authors of the older generation at the time, such as Milan Đ. Milićević, criticized from a moral perspective the amount of monastic possessions, as these institutions no longer played the same roles in education and welfare that they did under Ottoman rule. He suggested keeping only the architecturally and historically significant monasteries, while turning others into churches, which would also mean their dispossession.⁷³ Yet it was precisely this idea of ‘architecturally and historically significant monasteries’ – the leading idea of patrimonialization – that allowed for the preservation of a much higher share of their properties. From very early on, there were state-sponsored efforts to describe, catalogue, and preserve in drawing and photography the Orthodox Christian – and pre-Christian – monuments. Most famously, the Serbian Learned Society supported the project pursued by the architects Mihailo Valtrović and Dragutin Milutinović between 1871 and 1884, which served to establish the political legitimacy of Serbia’s borders.⁷⁴ During the 19th century, such treatment was never extended to mosques, which were, for the most part, in the literal sense turned into the ruins of empire.

72 Cf. Mirkova (2017), p. 78; Moumtaz (2021), p. 89.

73 Milićević (1865), p. 582; Milićević (1867), p. 10.

74 See Ignjatović (2014).

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From Muslim piety to Turkish reason

Kemalist reinterpretations of the *vakıf*

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Abstract: *When the Republic of Turkey inherited Ottoman Empire's remaining territory, the Kemalist regime endeavored to foster a national culture that was to be distant enough from its predecessors and close enough to the West. The official discourse on cultural heritage in the decades following the republic's establishment in 1923 placed great emphasis on the material remains of Anatolia's pre-Islamic civilizations. This paper questions whether a kind of parallel discourse, led by the bureaucrats of the Directorate of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü), who had been entrusted with the task of rehabilitating and maintaining the Ottoman Empire's architectural heritage, can be identified.*

When the Republic of Turkey inherited the Ottoman Empire's remaining territory, the Kemalist regime endeavored to foster a national culture that was to be distant enough from its predecessors and close enough to the West. In other words, the new nation required a historical pedigree that extended beyond the Ottoman period. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, newly established state institutions such as the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) and the Turkish Language Association (*Türk Dil Kurumu*) worked towards creating the scientific backbone of this project by conducting targeted, systematic research. The so-called People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) and their elaborate communication networks were to simultaneously spread these findings and the ideals they represented throughout the country.¹

The official discourse on cultural heritage in the decades following the republic's establishment in 1923 placed great emphasis on the material remains

1 For the origins and functioning of People's Houses see, for example: Karpat (1963 and (1974); Şimşek (2005); Toksoy (2007); Çeçen (2015).

of Anatolia's *pre-Islamic* civilizations. Supported by state-sponsored excavations and research, this process was shaped by the effort to locate a more ancient Turkish presence in Anatolia, while downplaying the more recent Ottoman past.²

This paper questions whether a kind of parallel discourse, led by the bureaucrats of the Directorate of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*), who had been entrusted with the task of maintaining the Ottoman Empire's architectural heritage, can be identified. This discourse's formation will be reconstructed based on the texts aimed to reframe *vakıf* heritage from a Turkish national perspective and that were written by the members of the directorate. These sources uniquely document a process in which a patrimonialization of Ottoman-period buildings was advanced even within the prevalent national historical narrative of the 1930s and 1940s.

Vakıflar in transition

In the Ottoman and wider Islamic context, *vakıfs* (religious endowments) may be described as mostly philanthropic establishments that delivered various social services, such as health, education, and social welfare.³ They functioned largely independently of state authorities, managing their own assets according to their own regulations.⁴ Not only active in charitable work but also in housing and building activities, *vakıfs* were an essential part of daily life in the Ottoman Empire.⁵

Although the first efforts to centralize the system go back to the mid-18th century, it was only in 1826 that the foundation of a ministry titled *Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezareti* (Ministry of Imperial Endowments, a.k.a. *Evkaf Nezareti*) made permissible substantial intervention by the state.⁶ In 1924 it was transformed into a general directorate that functioned under the republic's prime ministry. In 1937 a programmatically named "Committee for the Abolishment of the *Vakıfs*" then initiated a country-wide process of redistribution of *vakıf*

2 For critical approaches to the period's heritage perception, see for example: Tanyeri-Erdemir (2006); Redford (2007); Atakuman (2008) and (2017).

3 For detailed analyses of the *vakıf* system in the Ottoman Empire, see for example Öztürk (1995); Çizakça (2000); Zencirci (2015).

4 Öztürk (1995), p. 31.

5 Güzel (1986), p. 203.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

properties. This invasive process continued into the 1950s.⁷ As the majority of Islamic period monuments (as well as pre-Islamic ones that were put under the jurisdiction of a foundation in the Ottoman period) were related to a *vakıf*, the republican directorate had now a major role in the management and maintenance of this heritage.⁸

What makes the transformation and adaptation of this institution significant for the purposes of this study is twofold. First, as previously emphasized by Zencirci, the transformation of *vakıfs* was a central question in Turkey's aspiration to become a self-sufficient economy. Once the foundations were no longer able to continue their social and religious functions, their assets' sale became a significant source of state income.⁹ Second, as a newly founded agency of the republic, the directorate had to go through a period of reinventing itself and adapt to the requirements of being an institution of a modern nation state. With the societal and religious prominence of the foundations being toned down, the republican directorate emerged as a key player in safeguarding cultural heritage – both practically and discursively. As the historical buildings the directorate owned began to be promoted as 'national monuments' by the mid-1930s, *vakıf* registers and deeds (*vakfiyes*) were promoted as historical sources through systematic classification, translation, and publication efforts. Through the efforts of its bureaucrats, the institution, and the heritage it represented, pursued a changed position within the new historical narrative. By tracing the institution's origins to the pre-Islamic period and emphasizing their essentially secular nature, this discourse attempted to reconfigure the *vakıflar* as a genuinely 'Turkish' creation compatible with modern life and nation-state identity. The publications discussed in the following pages offer a glimpse into the reconfiguration of the discourse on this heritage.

The process of redefining the directorate paralleled a broader reorganization in which the authority over historical properties was redistributed among the new institutional players.¹⁰ A refunctioning of historic building complexes composed of different buildings with different functions allowed for their individual sections to be placed under the authority of different governmental bodies. It was, for instance, agreed that school buildings should be transferred to

7 Çizakça (2000), p. 56.

8 Akar (2023), pp. 167–8. According to Akar, 80% of the historical monuments in Turkey are connected to *vakıfs*.

9 Zencirci (2015), p. 537.

10 A thorough review of this legal process is to be found in Madran (1996).

the Ministry of Education, and waterworks (including artistically relevant objects such as *sebils*, *çeşmes*, and *şadırvans*) and cemeteries to the municipalities, while mosques and *mescids* were to function under the authority of the General Directorate of Foundations.¹¹ Various institutions, some with relevant expertise, some without, were thus put in charge of maintaining Ottoman monuments and making weighty decisions regarding their future.

In 1936 a new law regarding the foundations was issued that transferred responsibility for the historical *vakıf* buildings to the Directorate (Law no. 2762). This law also stipulated that buildings of architectural and historical value must not be sold. All this necessitated some organizational changes in the institution. For instance, the directorate was now allowed to hire external experts for the interventions it was to undertake.¹² The texts produced by the directorate from the second half of the 1930s and into the 1950s offer valuable insight into this transitional period. Hence, a closer examination of these sources provides us with clues as to where (and how) the directorate sought to position itself and the heritage it represented.

The Republic as a traditional institution's reinvigorator

The first publication important for the context of the *vakıf* institution's changing role in public discourse is titled *Cumhuriyetten önce ve sonra vakıflar* ("Endowments before and after the [establishment of the] Republic").¹³ It was published in 1937 by the Directorate of Foundations on the occasion of Turkish Historical Society's second national historical congress and accompanying exhibition. The mere fact that the general directorate was included in this major event is telling. Established under the supervision of Atatürk, the Turkish Historical Society began work in 1930 as the "Türk Tarihi Tetkik Heyeti" (Committee for the Study of Turkish History) with the primary mandate of scientifically researching the historical roots of the Turkish people. The same year, a text entitled *Türk tarihinin ana hatları* ("An outline of Turkish history") was produced by an interdisciplinary team; it would define the national historical discourse of the following decades. The preliminary findings and theories regarding the

11 Madran (1996), pp. 65–6.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 78–9.

13 *Cumhuriyetten önce ve sonra* (1937). All translations are the author's.

origins and history of the Turkish people were presented to a mostly local audience in 1932 at the first congress of the Historical Society in Ankara. The second congress of 1937 was organized on a much larger scale and brought together a diverse international audience in the former Ottoman palace in Istanbul, Dolmabahçe.¹⁴

While the researchers delivered their current findings, the congress was enriched with field trips, an exhibition, and coincided with the opening of the Museum of Painting and Sculpture.¹⁵ The so-called *Exhibition of Turkish History and Antiquities* (“Türk Tarihi ve Eski Eserler Sergisi”) that accompanied the congress exhibited the history of the Turks beginning with prehistory and continuing into the Republican reforms. Combining artifacts from national and foreign museums with visuals consisting of photographs, texts and graphics, this exhibition was a literal visualization of the period’s dominant historical narrative.¹⁶ Particularly interesting for this study were the sections on Republican reforms and activities, for which several ministries, directorates and governmental institutions had been asked to contribute. With each governmental body responsible for its own section, they were instructed to visually present their Republican accomplishments and outlook.

The General Directorate of Foundations was a part of this section as well. In accordance with the guidelines provided by the Historical Society, the Directorate put together a display showing the history and evolution of the institution, supported with documents and visual material (Fig. 1). The first historical section was to be followed by the Republican principles and plans of the directorate, accompanied by related quotes and instructions of the President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü. They were also asked to provide interior and exterior photographs of buildings constructed by the Directorate after the advent of the Republic. To create contrast, the exhibition would also include a section on the corrupt state of the Directorate in Ottoman times. This section was to be supplemented with any historical documents or photographic evidence that clearly conveyed the message that, under Ottoman rule, *vakıfs* as institutions had continuously been corrupt.¹⁷

14 Tanyeri-Erdemir (2006), p. 383, 385.

15 Köksal (2021), p. 94–5.

16 For details on the objects and topics handled in this exhibition, see Özkılıç (2016).

17 Türk Tarih Kurumu (1937), p. 66–67. I am grateful to my colleague Merve Özkılıç for sharing this publication with me.




Fig. 1: A photograph showing the section of the General Directorate of Foundations at the exhibition at the Turkish Historical Congress in 1937. The branches on the first two images symbolize the principles of the directorate, while the last one refers to the institution's corrupt state during the Ottoman period. Source: *La Turquie Kemaliste* 21–22 (1937), p. 90.

The aforementioned text that accompanied the congress narrated a history of *vakıfs* and attempted to locate them and their buildings within the dominant discourses of the period. It is a richly illustrated text with black and white photos of selected buildings. The opening statement elaborated on the historical connections between institution and nation:

The foundations were born out of the generosity and patriotism in the soul of the Turks. The history of the endowments begins with the history of the Turks ... The Republic is trying to rebuild the monuments that the empire left in ruins. During the reign of the sultanate, there was a deficit in the budget of the endowments. The principle of Republican endowments is: balanced budget, regular payment. One for all, all for one.¹⁸

According to this representation, the *wakıf* as an institution had been in a deplorable state before the Republic came to its rescue. After a discussion on foundations' origins and significance for Turkish culture, the narrative details the reasons for why and how practices came to be so corrupt. Regarding the period before the 18th and 19th centuries, the foundations were represented as characteristically Turkish institutions that produced remarkable works of architecture and helped those in need. The text's anonymous authors also claim that the charitable works of the *wakıflar* played a significant role in the Republic on the road to becoming a modern state.¹⁹

The book's next section was dedicated to the mismanagement of the endowments in the Ottoman period. The *Evkaf Nezareti* (Ministry of Endowments), established in 1826, was blamed for not having been able to manage continuous corruption and misuse. This caused numerous historical monuments in Istanbul and the countryside to be neglected.²⁰ The text supports its case with examples of archival documents that clearly portrayed the decisions made in the period as being substantially faulty. It claims that truly sustainable improvements in the system were only implemented in the republican period, when determined measures were taken to save monuments from complete disintegration. This was announced in the book with a new chapter programmatically titled: "[When the] Republic was born, endowments were reinvigorated."

The section most interesting for the purposes of this paper is the overview of protection and repair projects undertaken by the directorate. Here, again, the negligence of the Ottoman administration was represented as the principal

18 "Vakıflar Türkün ruhundaki cömertlikten ve ulusseverlikten doğdu. Vakıfların tarihi, Türkün tarihile [sic.] başlar. [...] İmparatorluktan bir harabe halinde aldığı âbideleri cumhuriyet mamure haline getirmeğe çalışıyor. Saltanat devrinde vakıflar bütçesinde açık vardı. Cumhuriyet vakıflarının prensibi: denk bütçe, düzgün ödeme. Birimiz hepimiz, hepimiz birimiz için." *Cumhuriyetten önce ve sonra* (1937), p. 3.

19 *Cumhuriyetten önce ve sonra* (1937), pp. 5–8.

20 *Ibid.*, 10.

reason behind the ruination of many monuments. Following the disposition of the sultanate, the administration of endowments had joined the efforts of the Republic to save this heritage.

The text also explained the principles underlying preservation and restoration work. Priority was given to monuments that were in serious danger of collapsing. However, the area around them was also seen as a space of improvement potential. Now, monuments were no longer regarded as isolated entities. Ideally, the surroundings of monuments were cleared by removing later additions and better maintaining green areas and courtyards. Once again, contemporary efforts were contrasted with alleged negligence during the Ottoman administration. The latter had shamefully tolerated the attachment of newer additions – mainly shops – to the walls of historical buildings. Similarly, more recent paintwork in the interiors was considered bad practice examples that covered the earlier, beautiful, (more) ‘Turkish’, decoration.²¹

According to the text’s authors, the preservation of antiquities and the safeguarding of national monuments had become fundamental tasks of the directorate. The centuries-long neglect that caused irrevocable damage would not be repeated under the republican regime, which was committed to saving this heritage.²²

The new *Vakıflar* administration, like many other early Republican institutions, was evidently aware of the advantages of visual representations. Following its participation in the Turkish Historical Society’s exhibition, the directorate created two different displays (one in Ankara called *Vakıflar Galerisi* and one in Izmir International Fair) that told the story of this institution and its current activities. It is possible to attempt a reconstruction with the help of the catalogue and visual material. The larger and more comprehensive of these displays was in the building of the newly established directorate in Ankara. According to its catalogue, the exhibition consisted of seven panels and two show-cases that included original documents.

The first panel attempted to make a correlation between the difficulties mankind encounters, its need to improve lives and the creation of the *vakıf* system. Under the heading “Humankind and Nature,” the striking collage in this panel contrasted images of prehistoric “cave man” with photographs of various *vakıf* buildings from Anatolia as symbols of advancement and civilization (Fig.

21 *Cumhuriyetten önce ve sonra* (1937), pp. 31–2.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 34–5.

2).²³ The next panel offered the visitor an overview of the history of *wakıfs* as an institution, which began – in line with the dominant narrative of the period – with the Hittites.²⁴ After the third panel, the gallery informed the visitor about the Turkish *wakıfs* beginning with examples of various public facilities, such as a hospital, a school, a soup kitchen, libraries, bridges, etc.²⁵ The fourth panel was dedicated to the monumental *wakıf* buildings erected in various periods and those that were being restored at the time. The text accompanying these images read that these monuments were threatened by destruction, and it was a “a national matter and the state’s duty” (*yurt davası and devlet işi*) to protect and save them (Fig. 3).²⁶ The exhibition’s fifth section presented the scientific activities of the directorate with examples of historical documents. The text on this panel was relatively long, listed a general outline of research activities and presented the preliminary results; these included scientific investigations, documentation, restoration, and publications (Fig. 4). The sixth and seventh panels were about the directorate’s sources of income, the first one listing the properties that were being rented, and the second, agricultural lands.²⁷

This so-called gallery was not intended as a static display, but also included an archive and a library in which scholars could conduct research (Fig. 5). Located centrally in the exhibition space was also a bust of then president İsmet İnönü in front of a map of Turkey showing the administrative structure of the directorate (Fig. 6).

23 *Vakıflar Galerisi* (1939), p. 3.

24 *Ibid.*, 4.

25 *Ibid.*, 7–8.

26 *Ibid.*, 9–10.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 12–3.



Fig. 2: Photograph from the section on “nature and humankind” in the Vakıflar Galerisi in Ankara. Source: Vakıflar Galerisi hakkında, Fig. 8.




Fig. 3: A view of the section dedicated to historical monuments at the Vakıflar Galerisi. Source: Vakıflar Galerisi hakkında, Fig. 11.



Fig. 4: A view of the section on the scientific activities of the Directorate of Foundations. Source: *Vakıflar Galerisi hakkında*, Fig. 14.



Fig. 5: A view of the library of the *Vakıflar Galerisi* in Ankara. Source: *Vakıflar Galerisi Hakkında*, Fig. 15.



Fig. 6: A general view of the gallery, with the bust of Ismet İnönü in front of a map showing the directorate's network. Source: Vakıflar Galerisi hakkında, Fig. 3.



Fig. 7: Period photograph of the Vakıflar Pavilion at the Izmir International Fair. Source: SALT Research, Ali Saim Ülgen collection, TASUH5476.




Fig. 8: Vakıflar Pavilion, interior courtyard. Source: Tansu (1938), 250.



Fig. 9: Vakıflar Pavilion, interior. Source: See Fig. 8.

A smaller-scale version of this exhibition was opened in the “Vakıflar Pavilion” of the Izmir International Fair, in a building today more commonly known as *Pakistan Pavyonu* (Fig. 7–9).²⁸ In a similar fashion to the aforementioned exhibitions, these displays also narrated the history of the *vakıfs*, with special emphasis on the Republican reforms. The small brochure prepared for this pavilion underlined the administration’s duties in the areas of “aesthetics and archaeology”. Preservation of national monuments had recently gained a significant place in their agenda.²⁹ The directorate was contributing to the efforts of the republican government and had focused on restoration works.³⁰ In addition to this scientific repair program, research and documentation efforts were also underway. The gallery established in the directorate’s headquarters in Ankara was collecting books, documents, photographs and any other material related to the *vakıfs*.³¹

Tracing the pre-Islamic origins of Islamic foundations

In 1938, a public official named Halim Baki Kunter penned a lengthy article entitled “Türk vakıfları ve vakfiyeleri üzerine mücmel bir etüd” (“A concise study on the Turkish *vakıfs* and *vakfiyes*”), in which he attempted to encapsulate supposed misconceptions about the history of endowments.³² The text, which appeared in the directorate’s periodical and was published as a booklet one year later, is a systematic and academic foray into the history and origin of Turkish endowments, based on historical sources and accompanied by many images.

Kunter’s text argued that research on these social institutions was generally lacking. If it this were done properly, certain misconceptions regarding the nature of the foundations could be rectified, and younger generations could learn to appreciate them. According to Kunter, one major misconception had been the direct association people commonly made between *vakıfs* and Islam. This belief had created the idea that a *vakıf* was a principally religious institution, concerned mostly with spiritual matters, thus disregarding their social

28 Built in 1937 by Harbi Hotan, the design of this small pavilion attempted to match the institution it represented. Kayın (2016), p. 15.

29 *Izmir Enternasyonal Fuarında* (1937), p. 21, 23.

30 *Ibid.*, 24.

31 *Ibid.*, 25–6.

32 Kunter (1938) and (1939).

functions appreciated by so many. With strong emphasis on the national character, the text goes on to claim that the endowments not only aspired to help people, but also served to spread Turkish culture through art.³³

Paralleling the period's official heritage discourse, this text also introduced the Hittites as, supposedly, the pre-Islamic creators of the *vakıfs*. It associated the later corruption of *vakıfs*, here presented as actually "products of realist thinking," with practices in the Ottoman period.³⁴ Kunter presented as evidence for his claim a Hittite tablet from the 13th century BC, preserved in what is now the Istanbul Archaeological Museums. This tablet documented how the properties in a conquered territory were to be managed. The text recounted that the Hittite king dedicated the property to the goddess Ishtar and put his son in charge of managing the foundation. The historical narration of the *vakıfs* continued with endowment documents found during archaeological excavations in Turkestan.³⁵ By tracing the history of the foundations to the (pre-Islamic) Uyghur Turks, the author conveniently filled the gap in the sequence until the institution was appropriated by the Ottomans. The text strongly emphasized the non-religious, rational, character of the *vakıf* institution. What had caused problems was the increasing religious connotation it acquired in the last centuries. Now it was the duty of the Republican regime to reveal the real essence of this primordially Turkish institution.

In 1941, in a small booklet entitled *Vakıflarımız* ("Our Foundations"), Kunter's chronology was repeated with great emphasis on the national character of the endowments and the artworks produced within their realm. Preservation of this heritage, representing "the unique monuments of our national art and culture," was identified as one of the directorate's main duties.³⁶ The directorate, under the republican regime, had already demonstrated its dedication to this duty by allocating almost 1.3 million lira to restoration projects since 1924.³⁷

33 Kunter (1938), 103–4.

34 *Ibid.*, 105.

35 *Ibid.*, 117.

36 *Vakıflarımız* (1941), p. 26.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Restoring the Turkishness of the *vakıfs*

Another text illustrating the new policies adopted by the *vakıf* administration is from 1943 and was published to honor the Republic's 20th anniversary.³⁸ This publication, titled *20. Cumhuriyet yılında vakıflar* ("Foundations in the 20th year of the Republic") also offered a lengthy elaboration on the alleged pre-Islamic origin of the *vakıfs* and the degeneration that they suffered at the hands of the Ottomans. It then informed the reader about the directorate's new legal and financial organization, before it detailed the restoration and repairs of monuments.

In this anonymously authored text, the *vakıfs* were described as institutions that originated in compassion, humanism and patriotism. Again, the roots of Turkish endowments are traced back to the Hittites and Central Asia. Documents such as the aforementioned Hittite tablet and the Uyghur documents were once more presented as proof for the anteriority of this Turkish arrangement;³⁹ the later decades of Ottoman rule were represented again as a period during which the endowments, like many other institutions, suffered. The establishment of the *Evkaf Nezareti* had not been sufficient to reverse their decline. Following years of war and neglect, the republic had inherited *vakıfs* in an unkempt state.⁴⁰

After sections on the legal and financial aspects of this transitional period during the early years of the republic, the book features a chapter dedicated to architectural monuments, the maintenance of which was considered a priority. It recounts that, since 1936, the general directorate had documented 3456 mosques throughout the country and classified them based on their historical and artistic values. While some 914 of them were excluded from the list, 1000 buildings were classified as significant.⁴¹ These buildings, considered repre-

38 *20 Cumhuriyet yılında* (1943).

39 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

40 *20 Cumhuriyet yılında* (1943), p. 6.

41 *Ibid.* (1943), p. 15. Kunter would reevaluate these efforts in an article he penned as a "Vakıflar İdare Meclisi Üyesi" nine years later. These selected buildings, he considered, required additional measures in terms of their preservation. He admitted that in the last decades the maintenance of these buildings had not been ideal, which, he suggested, might have been due to the low salaries of the staff. He then provided a detailed comparison of the numbers of former and existing staff, implying that a better organized and larger group of people would be needed to maintain these monuments (Kunter 1952).

sentatives of Turkish national art history (“milli san’at tarihimizin hayatı”), were meticulously studied, documented and photographed. Documentation and repair work were being done very carefully; even the smallest details of the interventions were being recorded for present and future generations. The results of the systematic restoration and documentation efforts of the previous years were compiled in an exhibition named *Vakıflar Galerisi*, already discussed above. It reportedly attracted several experts on architecture and the decorative arts.⁴² This ‘gallery’ exhibited photographs of *vakıf* buildings from different parts of the country. In the future it would display a fine selection of Turkish decorative arts. In 1938 a smaller version of this exhibition was opened at the Izmir International Fair, in a building highlighted because it “carried the characteristics of Turkish architecture.”⁴³

The mere existence of this ‘gallery’ in the headquarters of the Directorate in Ankara,⁴⁴ interestingly, also reflects where the directorate positioned itself in the new republic. A Museum of Foundations (*Evkaf Müzesi*) had already opened its doors in 1914 in Istanbul, presenting a collection of items that had come into the possession of the Ministry of Foundations.⁴⁵

It is important to note that the emphasis on research was not limited to this gallery. Simultaneously, the directorate had begun to systematically classify and translate endowment deeds. This work had been ongoing since 1936 and would help elucidate enlighten the history of the *vakıfs*. Publications on monuments also constituted a large part of this project and, in addition to their periodical, *Vakıflar Dergisi*, nine monographs and many brochures and reports were circulated.⁴⁶

As research and restoration efforts on *vakıf* buildings progressed, the restorers and bureaucrats who were involved in these projects began to share

42 20 Cumhuriyet yılında (1943), pp. 15–6.

43 *Vakıflarımız* (1941), p. 23.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

45 Eldem regards the opening of this museum as a politically informed undertaking by the Ottoman Empire, which sought to adopt the museum as a Western concept that, at the same time, kept their heritage safe from the Europeans. The museum, according to Eldem (2016, p. 120, 123), was a “local version” of recent exhibitions of Islamic arts in Europe rather than offering a coherent narrative. Cephaneçigil (2015, p. 490) also interprets this museum’s opening as a “reaction” to the increasing cases of lootings as works of Islamic arts had become more desired in Europe.

46 20 Cumhuriyet yılında (1943), pp. 22–3.

their critical opinions. One example is a lengthy article penned by Ali Saim Ülgen, a prominent architect and restorer of the period. Writing in the bulletin of the Touring and Tourism Association of Turkey, Ülgen reviewed the restoration practices of the *vakıf* buildings. For him, the many regulations regarding the maintenance of these historical buildings and the existence of a team of craftsmen that constantly worked on them enabled their survival. The *vakıf* system had suffered immensely from corruption in the last century of Ottoman rule. In the early decades of the republic, monument protection had not been a priority due to general restructuring efforts, which was understandable.⁴⁷

Conclusion

In this paper, I have focused on the discourse put forward by the General Directorate of Foundations in the late 1930s and 1940s, a period during which the republic's redefined historical narrative was being consolidated. The publications discussed were contributions to a discourse on cultural heritage in which the Directorate of Foundations claimed a stake in the Republican project. In doing so, it also situated the remains of the Ottoman period within the Republican historical narrative. By disassociating the institution from its Islamic character and attributing to its management new duties – such as research on heritage objects, documentation, restoration – this discourse also impacted practices in the following decades. The bureaucrats of the directorate not only created a parallel narrative; they also directly contributed to the safeguarding of specific monuments and the sacrificing of others.

Contrary to a paradigm in scholarship on heritage perceptions in modern Turkey, some ruptures were not as rigid as commonly purported. The rediscovery and appreciation of Ottoman-period architectural heritage, which is usually thought to coincide with the end of single-party rule in 1945, has its roots in the 1930s. While the new nation's archaeologists and anthropologists looked for traces of its ancient ancestors, the bureaucrats and affiliated preservationists of the restructured directorate were the initiators of a parallel discourse aimed at influencing the nation's perception of a less distant past.

47 Ülgen (1946), pp. 13–4.

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Ottoman *divān* literature in the Turkish literary-historical canon

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Abstract: *This article revolves around the modern historiography of Ottoman literature produced between the 14th and 19th centuries. Manuscripts constitute the primary material for Ottoman literary historiography. 186,444 manuscripts are registered in Turkey alone,¹ and these manuscripts were nationalized by the Republic of Turkey through the liquidation of vakıf library collections. This vast manuscript heritage was used to construct a national identity, especially in the early years of the republic. The aim and scope of this study is to discuss the historiographical problems that emerged during this process of nation-building. They continue to have an impact today through the influential opinions of the field's founding figures.*

Goal and scope

Another property of the human mind is that, when people can form no idea of distant and unfamiliar things, they judge them by what is present and familiar.²

The establishment of national identities through literary works has been on the agenda of European historians since the 18th century. The late Ottoman and early Republican historians who worked on the Ottoman literary past followed the footsteps of their European counterparts. Therefore, the scope of this

1 T. C. Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı 2019–2023 stratejik planı (2023), p. 32. This article is based on the first chapter of my PhD thesis (Akyol 2023, pp. 22–76).

2 Vico (2013), p. 76.

study covers the ideas and enterprises of three literary historians of early modern Ottoman literature: Elias John Wilkinson Gibb (1857–1901), Mehmed Fuad Köprülü (1890–1966) and Ali Nihad Tarlan (1898–1978). As such, this study is focused on the period slightly before and after the founding of the Republic of Turkey, but because the strong influence of these names still continues today, it will also go beyond that limit.

This critique of Ottoman literary historiography seeks to inquire how a discipline, after being dominated by descriptive studies that eventually led to a vicious cycle, could be liberated from the ideological remnants of the 19th century.

The term “vicious cycle” refers here to a metaphorical pit in which the overwhelming majority of the field, that is, researchers in Ottoman literary historiography, could barely produce analytical knowledge in the last several decades. Even though there has been an increase and improvement in the field in recent years, these improvements are still mostly individual enterprises, not scholarly schools or institutions, and they are few in number.

“Ideological remnants” refers to the waning of a mentality’s influence, which has decreased in comparison to the past, but not yet come to an end. National literary histories, which have been used as an ideological apparatus of modern identity since their inception, still maintain their teleological structure, sometimes obviously and sometimes implicitly. Indeed, literary histories written in the 21st century do not bear all the hallmarks of literary histories of the 19th century. While other perspectives than the national one have surfaced in literary studies, Pascale Casanova has argued that they have not superseded it.³ In this context, the same teleological approach is still prevalent in studies on the history of literature in Turkey, especially in those produced in Turkey.

The criticism of a methodology cannot just be conducted through the motives inherent to literary history because the discipline is encumbered with the entanglement of different ideologies that go hand in hand with the sociopolitical currents in the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic. This encumberment requires us to look at the historical context of literary historiography: the circumstances under which it was produced, the motivations that triggered it, the authors’ identities, and the like.

3 Casanova (2007).

The first examples: A very brief overview of the European corpus

The first histories of Ottoman literature in a modern sense were composed in the West in the first half of the 19th century. The underlying reason modern literary histories were written was precisely to build a national identity or to prove national legitimacy through literary histories. Comparable to the Greek case, which has been analyzed by Gregory Jusdanis, nationalistic literary narratives were motivated and triggered by a feeling of belatedness against their Western contemporaries.⁴ In this process, the role of literary works was of great significance. In the rivalry of being the oldest civilization on earth, literary works were used as an instrument of nationalism⁵ so that developing nations could be traced back to their 'ancient' cradles.

The professionalization of literary history-writing in the West commenced with Romanticism in the late 18th century,⁶ and then climbed to its zenith during the burgeoning Herderian linguistic nationalism of the 19th century.⁷ Indeed, Western scholars had previously dealt with the literature belonging to the 'other' geographies of the world, but were now looking at them with different eyes.⁸ Thus, the eyes of Western scholars sooner or later would turn to Ottoman literature.⁹ The distinguishing features of the Ottoman literary his-

4 Throughout his suggestive work, *Belated modernity and aesthetic culture*, Gregory Jusdanis investigates the central role of literature in building the Greek nation at that time when the Greeks revolted against the Ottoman Empire (Jusdanis 1991).

5 Damrosch (2018), p. 64.

6 Neubauer (2007), p. 127; also see Perkins (1992).

7 Aytürk (2004). For the term linguistic-nationalism, see Anderson (2006), p. 109; Casanova (2007), pp. 34–5.

8 Several books can be mentioned in the Ottoman context: Herbelot (1697); Toderini (1787); Donado (1688). Herderian literary histories assumed that nations were entities with specific linguistic and cultural properties. On Herder's ideas on historiography, there is a considerable corpus written in English and German. To acquire relevant information firsthand, one can look at Johann Gottfried Herder's two important works, *Ueber die neuere Deutsche Litteratur* (Riga, 1767) and *Von Deutscher Art und Kunst* (Hamburg, 1773). Among the secondary literature, I relied primarily on Rölleke's short but explanatory study (2005).

9 Among the pioneering 19th-century works on early modern Ottoman literary history are Thomas von Chabert's *Latifi oder biographische Nachrichten von vorzüglichen türkischen Dichtern* (1800), Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall's *Geschichte der osmanischen Dichtkunst bis auf unsere Zeit* (1836), Édouard Servan de Sugny's *La muse ottomane* (1855), Dora D'Istria's "La poésie populaire des Turcs Orientaux" (1873) and *La poésie des Ot-*

ories of the 19th century were manifold: they were to present to Western readers Ottoman-Turkish literature; to distill a Turkish national genius in literary works; to propose a canon of authors and works identifiable as 'national'; and to confirm ancient myths and legends as the reflections of national grandeur in the past. These hallmarks were some of the most significant components of building a pedestal that would rise on the ground of language, history, and literature. On top of this pedestal stood national identity.¹⁰

Taken together, the mentality of 19th-century scholars working on Ottoman literary history was still strong at the beginning of the next century, and the discussion that revolved around this mentality would shape the literary histories to come. Its Herderian ideas, *text-oriented*¹¹ canonical perspective, and tendency to read Ottoman *dīvān* literature as a projection of state history are currently the most troubled parts of Ottoman literary historiography, and were inherited from that 19th century historiography. It could not be expected that such strong tendencies would suddenly disappear.

Gibb: The lack of Turkishness in Ottoman literature

European literary historiography in the 19th century was laudatory and unifying when writing national literary history. At the same time, it was slanderous, discriminative, and even sardonic when writing about the literary past of others. Therefore, it had a dual effect on the Ottomans: engendering influence and triggering reaction. On the one hand, 19th century Ottoman intellectuals, who oriented themselves towards Paris,¹² comprehended the function of liter-

tomans (1877), Stanley Lane-Poole's and Charles Wells's *The literature of the Turks: A Turkish chrestomathy* (1891).

10 Perkins (1992), pp. 1–4.

11 The materiality of texts, such as manuscript editions, linguistic and stylistic analysis, and the formal organization of literary works, are the main topics of the text-oriented approach. This approach basically excludes the historical context, and the social and material conditions in which the work was written.

12 Casanova had every reason to call Paris as Greenwich of world literature in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, see Casanova (2007), p. 87.

ary history in creating national consciousness in Europe and wanted to reproduce it in their own context.¹³

On the other hand, they also had to react to European claims. Because their European counterparts considered Ottoman literature an imitation of Persian models, an originary 'Turkish' contribution was contested. This implication would force Ottoman intellectuals, who were accused of not being 'authentic' in the age of nationalism, to prove otherwise.¹⁴

The ideas and discussions by Şinasi, Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa paved the way for teleological Ottoman literary histories in the second half of the 19th century.¹⁵ This trio of Tanzimat intellectuals saw language and literature as one of the keys to the modernization of society and emphasized the importance of Turkish and Turkish literature. Thus, the first modern Ottoman literary histories were not full-fledged works based on historical research but pedagogical attempts to demonstrate a notable tradition of literary expression in Ottoman Turkish.

Today, it is generally held that the first modern example of an Ottoman literary history is Abdülhalim Memduh's *Tārīḫ-i Edebiyât-ı 'Osmāniye*, which was published in 1888/9. This *Tārīḫ* was a work of transition between tradition and modernity, and had a pedagogical approach toward Ottoman literary history. Whatever discussions it may have caused, this work *per se* must have been found rudimentary by its contemporaries. It had, therefore, only weak influence on following Ottoman literary historiography.

No other book of similar content was published in the Ottoman Empire from 1888/9 until 1910, but this is not to say that literary historiography went into hibernation. Just a few years before Abdülhalim Memduh's work, apart from articles concerning literary history in printed media, the leading novelist Halit Ziya authored his *Garptan Şarka Seyyâle-i Edebiyye Fransız Edebiyatı'nın Nümûne ve Tarihi* (1885/6). Also, Frédéric Lolié's *Tableau de l'histoire littéraire du monde* (1899) was translated into Turkish under the title of *Tārīḫ-i Edebi-*

13 There is an enormous secondary literature on this topic, but Gül Mete Yuva's book (2006) is particularly important because it deals directly with French influence on the intellectual atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire.

14 Çelik (2020), p. 13.

15 For details, see Yuva (2006), pp. 15–6 and 26; Akün (2012), pp. 76–7; Ziya Paşa (1999), p. 25; Kurnaz (1997); Namık Kemal (1999), p. 20.

i 'Âlem (1902/3).¹⁶ This was fertile ground for Ottoman and Turkish literary histories of the first half of the 20th century.¹⁷

Not only via these works but also given the national education and its curriculum, the concept of literary history as a pedagogical tool found a lively atmosphere and rich soil in which it could flourish in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. Looking at the biographies of the late Ottoman Empire's literary historians, or following Agah Sırrı Levend's comments on the issue,¹⁸ official institutions such as the *Darülfünun* and *Mekteb-i Sultani* were the places where the idea of the nation became crystallized, perhaps the most significant ones.

In the same time frame, an influential book on early modern Ottoman literary history was written by a Scottish Orientalist, Elias John Wilkinson Gibb. His multivolume *History of Ottoman poetry* came out in England at the beginning of the 20th century, and was perhaps the last important and influential Ottoman literary history published in Europe.¹⁹ Though it appears to have been a result of 19th-century mentality, Gibb's work was not completely encumbered by his predecessors' concepts. *A history of Ottoman poetry* was, above all, a literary history of a caliber surpassing all previous Ottoman attempts.²⁰ This history's collective view on Ottoman *divân* poetry, with its specific views on the world, nature, religion, and culture, brought for the first time a relatively analytical approach to the field. Its impact was vast compared to the previous histories.

Nevertheless, from where we stand today, we can see that the currents of Orientalism and nationalism of the 19th century pervaded Gibb's work. This situation is more pronounced in the sections in which Gibb dealt with Ottoman literary history before the 19th century in comparison to the parts in which he scrutinized modern Ottoman literature under Western influence. For him, all

16 I heard of this work during Halim Kara's speech entitled "Osmanlı'dan cumhuriyete: Türkiye'de modern edebiyat tarihçiliğinin oluşumu" within the scope of *Usulden yöntemle: M. Fuad Köprülü'nün edebiyat tarihçiliği*, a workshop organized to discuss Köprülü's methodology for literary history. He also kindly sent me the mentioned source. With this, I would like to thank him for providing me with Loliée's *Tarih-i Edebî-i 'Âlem*.

17 Rezaizade Mahmud Ekrem, Diyarbakirli Sait Paşa, Muallim Naci, Mehmed Celal, and Hacıbeyzade Ahmed Muhtar should be mentioned among those who produced works exhibiting some literary history aspects.

18 Levend (1973), p. 481.

19 Details about Gibb's life and work can be found in the following sources: Okuyucu (2007); Mengi (1999); Cür (2018); Koncu (2007).

20 Selim Sırrı Kuru indicates that Gibb's work is still the most detailed Ottoman literary history; see Kuru (2012), p. 549.

the positive aspects of Ottoman poetry began with Şinasi, who was the leading herald of modern Ottoman literature, while traditional Ottoman literature was “helpless into the stagnant swamp of a dead culture”.²¹

In regard to the 19th century, like his predecessors, Gibb also believed that general “characteristics of the Turkish nation” must have been reflected in the poetry. Connected with this idea, he first and foremost searched for the “Turkishness” in *divân* poetry. In the end, what he found was only imitation; Turkish poetry was considered not original. To him, the Ottomans were the parrots of the Persians, seeing the world through Persian eyes.²² He believed that the

great race to which the Ottomans belong ... has never produced any religion, philosophy or literature which bears the stamp of its individual genius. This is because the true genius of that race lies in action, not in speculation.²³

One may think that his ideas would have offended the intellectuals in Istanbul. However, responses to Gibb would be only be articulated after 2000, when *A history of Ottoman poetry* was translated into Turkish. Before that, his work appears to have been read and criticized by very few literary historians in Turkey.²⁴

Even the arguments developed by Fuad Köprülü, whose ideas overlapped with Gibb's concerning Ottoman poetry's imitation of Persian poetry, were facile when he criticized Gibb. To him, the primary deficiency in Gibb's work was neither the method nor the analysis but its scope:²⁵ Gibb's *History of Ottoman poetry* restricted itself to Ottoman poetry. By contrast, Köprülü pursued the aim of writing a more comprehensive Turkish literary history to prove that Turkish literature, and hence the Turkish language and national identity, was as ancient as the literature of every civilized nation was supposed to be. This was the approach of a whole generation of Turkish literary historians in the first half of the 20th century.

21 Gibb (1907), p. 3.

22 Gibb (1905), p. 5.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

24 Here, Halide Edip Adivar's attempt in the 1940s to translate *A history of Ottoman poetry* into Turkish should be mentioned. Her translation was canceled with the opinion that Gibb's work was no longer relevant. See Okuyucu (2007), p. 615.

25 Köprülü (1999), pp. 3–47.

Köprülü: Extending Turkish literature beyond the Ottoman past

In an environment in which the idea of the nation was focused on language as a principal marker of identity, a history of literary works was central. Thus, Ottoman intellectuals from a Muslim and Turkish-speaking background were prompted to legitimize their community's ancientness by pointing to a history of profound literary production.

By its very nature, this new idea reposed on a concept called 'the Turkic world', finding unity among the world's Turkic peoples. This brought a teleological structure to the Turkish literary history that would be produced in the following years. Many decades later, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü would identify this response as a feature belonging to the Romantic period of "the concept of national history."²⁶ Even today, this structure continues to haunt Ottoman literary historiography.

In the first half of the 20th century, Köprülü and some other literary historians eagerly read names such as Hippolyte Taine, Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve, Gustave Lanson, Gaston Paris and Léon Cahun, i.e., the inheritors of Johann Gottfried Herder.²⁷ The nationalist, teleological, and Orientalist perspectives of the West pushed Ottoman literary historians into a defensive-reflexive position. Such an atmosphere prevailed in the literary historiography of the 1910s and, as can be expected, in the early Republican period.²⁸ The literary histories that Faik Reşad, Şehabeddin Süleyman, Köprülü and Mehmed Hayreddin wrote only years apart, to be taught at the *Darülfünun* and at high schools,

26 "Millî tarih telâkkisinin romantik devrini, Türk nasyonalizmi de tabiatıyla görmüştür; Avrupa tarihçiliğinin Türkler hakkında hiçbir ilmî esasa dayanmayan çok haksız menfî telâkkîleri karşısında, bizim romantik tarihçiliğimizin aksül'ameli de ister istemez çok müfrit ve mübalâgalı olacaktı ve hakikaten öyle de oldu." Köprülü (1962), XXIII.

27 Şehabeddin Süleyman, Agah Sırrı Levend and others.

28 The most exceptional specimens of this atmosphere can be seen in the discussions made around the journal *Genç Kalemler*: "Bizim de edebiyatımız mahduddur, lakin edebiyatımızla mübahî, müteheyyic olmalıyız. Ne olursa olsun, edebiyat-ı garbiyye parlak imiş, bülend imiş; Hoca merhumun canına rahmet. Bana ne, sana ne?! ... Bir Türk, ibtida-yı emirde Türklüğü, Osmanlılığı edebiyatına varıncaya kadar öğrendikten sonra kemalat-ı garbiyyeye ittılâından memleketini müstefid kılabilir. Maamafiñ o ittıla da öyle üstün körü, yani, sathi olmamak şartıyla!" Ali Kemal (1999), p. 33.

should be seen accordingly.²⁹ Yet, among these names, one would come to the foreground: Mehmed Fuad Köprülü.³⁰

In 1913, Köprülü published his famous article “Türk edebiyatı tarihi’nde usul” [“Method in Turkish literary history”] in *Bilgi Mecmuası*, a periodical of *Türk Bilgi Derneği*. Among its members were Yusuf Akçura, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, and Ziya Gökalp. The journal was established to research Turkish language, literature, and history.³¹ A new age began in Turkish literary historiography with the publishing of “Türk edebiyatı tarihi’nde usul,” because it was the first serious attempt to create a methodology for literary history in Turkish.

The influence of Köprülü’s article is still felt today, perhaps more than when it was written, and there is no historian of Ottoman literature today on whom his influence is not felt.³² Indeed, his ideas were so pervasively extended to the universities, and so acutely determined the direction of inquiry, that one does not even have to read his works to be affected by him.

However, it does not seem entirely possible to say that his impact has always been positive. Köprülü’s legacy in literary historiography, and how that heritage has been perceived and adopted, have sometimes blocked the road in the field and triggered or induced problems literary historians are still struggling with today.

Looking at the article written under the impact of the *Genç Kalemler* circle and Gustave Lanson in particular, we see that the concept of nation has a central place in Köprülü’s methodology. Accordingly, the entire field of literary history aims to reveal the character of a nation from past to present through the literary ‘masterpieces’ it produced in the past.³³ These two cornerstones of literary historiography, that is the concept of nation and the masterpieces that were produced in the long course of history, still excessively occupy the agenda of Ottoman literary historians.

Considering his period, Köprülü’s article was highly innovative in terms of Turkish academic literature, and for that matter, notwithstanding the nationalistic ideology and its projections in his article, the article retains some points

29 Levend (1973), pp. 480–2. For a review written by Köprülü of the first two works, see Köprülü (1914), p. 2.

30 See *Mehmed Fuad Köprülü bibliyografyası* (2017). In the first volume of this bibliography, there are 1572 entries relating to him. This number alone is enough to show his importance for the field.

31 Kaya (2020), pp. 85–109; Toprak (1987), pp. 247–54.

32 For a concise study evaluating Köprülü’s career as a historian, see Berktaş (1983).

33 Köprülü (1999), p. 25.

that preserve their value even today. With this article, Köprülü discussed the methodology of the history of Turkish literature at a very early point.³⁴ The theoretical basis of his debate consists of scientific objectivity and the function of literary history as a scholarly field.

The text-oriented approach, which had been prevalent until then, does not exist in Köprülü's studies. To him, literature itself was a social phenomenon. Moreover, he was well aware of the fact that a literary history cannot be written using only literary texts. His methodology was mainly based on the text's historical context and involved all kinds of written sources, such as official documents, correspondence, registers, miscellanies, and all types of literary texts. Therefore, his relationship with literary history was holistic and in constant dialogue with the historical context and literary texts.³⁵

However, Köprülü's literary history methodology remained inconclusive even in his own time. The scope we see in Köprülü's methodology, that is, the effort to understand literature in the integrity of not only literary works but the whole past, was not as broad in his successors' method. For this reason, even in Köprülü's period, we do not encounter any other name that approached literary historiography from a broader perspective. This has resulted in the historiography of early modern Ottoman literature being stuck in a narrow field that limited itself mainly to literary texts. The roots of today's Turkish literary historiography, primarily based on the publishing of transcribed Ottoman texts and non-analytical studies, lay here. As Selim Sırrı Kuru states, Köprülü's most distinctive hallmark was his holistic approach to literary history. It was an effort to understand literature in the historical context, using every kind of written source.³⁶

The second point is the ongoing decisive and foundational position of the concept of nationalism, the route followed by Köprülü in Ottoman literary studies. Those who will read these lines may think at first glance that it is an oxymoron to see the concept of nationalism as a problem, because the reason for the establishment of an entire field – literary history – was the ideology

34 Köprülü summarizes the things prospective literary historians do as follows: i) to understand the literary work in the historical context; ii) to find the individual and original literary pieces; iii) to determine the imitational literary works; iv) to make a classification of genres; v) to study the influence of the literary work on the society. Köprülü (1999), p. 33. All translations are the author's unless otherwise stated.

35 Kuru (2008), p. 21.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

of nationalism. Köprülü would become aware of the downside of nationalism, albeit he recognized it relatively late. At the beginning of the 1940s, he would confess that the influence of nationalistic romanticism prevailed in his previous works.³⁷

Köprülü's confession seems to have been forgotten or overlooked by his successors. Nationalism's gradual fade in literary historiography on a global scale would become a rising trend by the second half of the 20th century, and beginning from the 1990s, it would lose its central role in mainstream literary historiography.³⁸ Ottoman literary historiography, however, does not seem to have followed these developments, even from afar. Other than a few historians who approached Ottoman literary history from a non-nationalist perspective and whose strength did not suffice to change the field altogether, Ottoman literature from the premodern period (ca. 15th to the early 19th centuries), is still treated as a national artifact. Because of the point global literary historiography has reached, approaching literary history from a national perspective is equivalent to not being able to see a massive forest for a couple of trees, as the German proverb says.³⁹

Although many Ottoman historians commenced criticizing Köprülü's ideas in the second half of the 20th century,⁴⁰ the same criticism for the methodology he improved in literary historiography occurred only in the 2000s.⁴¹ Yet, Köprülü has so far maintained his immunity and god-like status among early modern literary historians.⁴² In a preface Köprülü wrote in 1966 for the book in which he collected his selected articles, Köprülü stated his

37 Köprülü (1962), p. XXIII.

38 In 1970, Hans Robert Jauß discussed the gaps found in literary historiography in great detail, heralding a new age in literary studies. See, Jauß (1970), pp. 11–66; also Perkins (1992), pp. 1–28, discusses this issue in detail.

39 "Den Wald vor lauter Bäumen nicht sehen."

40 Among them, Oktay Özel's and Halil Bertay's names are particularly worth mentioning. Özel (2012), pp. 267–75; Bertay (1983), p. 80.

41 Selim Sırrı Kuru maps the early development of Köprülü's ideas on literary history in two articles (Kuru 2007, 2008). Furthermore, an online workshop on the same topic was held in Samsun: *Usulden yönteme: M. Fuad Köprülü'nün edebiyat tarihçiliği*. Apart from these examples, Hatice Aynur (2009) and Semih Tezcan (2019, pp. 255–67) heavily criticized Köprülü's anachronistical term "Türkî-i Basit".

42 To give an example, Kazım Yetiş's stance reflects the typical attitude in the field of Ottoman literary history towards Köprülü as a founding father. In his two laudatory articles, Yetiş (2013, pp. 351–8; 2014, p. 672) extols Köprülü as a so-called savior who preserved "the value of Turkishness" against the Westerners.

awareness that there had been no groundbreaking developments in Ottoman literary history that could change the road he had paved.⁴³

In literary history, Nihad Sami Banarlı was Köprülü's most prominent successor, but Banarlı has never been treated as a serious literary historian because Banarlı's works were primarily prepared for high schools or written for popular ends. Banarlı's stance was conservative, and mixed with nostalgia for the imagined grandeur of the Ottoman literary past. Hence, Kazım Yetiş, a nationalist literary historian, was right when he described all of Banarlı's activities in literary history as "showing the beauty of Turkish literature."⁴⁴ In Banarlı, we see a defensive positioning against those who criticized *divân* literature; therefore, his efforts carried the signs of a nationalistic conservatism, striving to prove "the immortal place of Turkish classical literature that reflected the esthetical lives of the Turks."⁴⁵

Tarlan: Rehabilitating Ottoman literature's Turkishness

Ali Nihad Tarlan was the first scholar to obtain the title "doctor of literature" from the *Darülfünun* in Republican Turkey. In 1922, before he received his doctoral degree under the supervision of Köprülü, he taught literature and language at various high schools in Istanbul, notably at *Mekteb-i Sultani*, as many Ottoman intellectuals who wrote works on literary history did in the same period. Eventually, after the university reform in 1933, he was assigned as an associate professor to the Department of Turkish Language and Literature at Istanbul University, where he continued a prolific scholarly life until his retirement.⁴⁶ Among the students trained by Tarlan were many researchers who steered the field of early modern Ottoman literary history.⁴⁷

As a literary historian, Tarlan followed a different track than Köprülü, if not in his goal, but in his methodology. He believed, as Köprülü did, in the ideological necessity of writing a national literary history. Not only at the inception of his career but also in a late period like 1977, Tarlan described the primary goal

43 Köprülü (1999), p. XIII.

44 Yetiş (2014), p. 675.

45 Ibid., 683.

46 Çelebioğlu (1989), p. 6.

47 Names such as Halûk İpekten, Amil Çelebioğlu, Abdülkadir Karahan, Mehmet Ali Tanyeri, Gönül Tekin, Harun Tolasa, Günay Kut and Mehmed Çavuşoğlu are the most well-known. See Kut (2011).

of his research as “to reveal the artistic genius of the great Turkish nation we belong to.”⁴⁸ Accordingly, *dîvân* literature was one of the most important cultural products of Turkish national history:

Our *dîvân* literature is a work of art that we can present to the civilized world with great pride ... Calling *dîvân* literature the literature of the upper class and not considering it a national literature is as ignorant as thinking that the upper class in a nation does not belong to the same nation. Does a person who reaches a high level of contemplation and taste necessarily resign from his nationality? Nationality is not a dress. It is an entity that circulates in the veins.⁴⁹

The most distinctive feature of Tarlan’s methodology was his ‘text-oriented’ approach, focusing only on the analysis of literary texts, which separates him from Köprülü. As his professional title, *metinler şerhi profesörü*, suggests, his specialty was the exegesis of Ottoman literary texts.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the most remarkable and fundamental feature of his approach is that he introduced the basics of edition critique to the field and developed a new analysis method that synthesized the old exegesis understanding with modern touches to Ottoman literary historiography. He worked on many subjects related to *dîvân* literature: the biography and psychology of poets, relationships and comparisons between Ottoman and Persian poetry, and so on.

This method of literary history was to display not the individuals but the journey of art, and that art is like a wind blowing in the garden of language,⁵¹ one should follow the influence of this wind in the garden and ignore the individuals. Accordingly, for him “literary history is primarily the history of literary products.”⁵² As an achievement of Ottoman literary historiography, Tarlan

48 Tarlan (1989), p. 112.

49 “Dîvan edebiyatımız, medeniyet âlemine büyük bir iftiharla sunabileceğimiz bir sanat mahsulüdür ... Dîvan edebiyatına havas edebiyatı deyip onu millî bir edebiyat saymamak, bir milletin içinde havassın o millete mensup olmadığını sanmak kadar cahilane bir hükümdür. Tefekkürü ve zevki yüksek bir seviyeye erişen bir insan, muhakkak, milliyetinden istifa etmiş mi sayılır? Milliyet, bir elbise değildir. O, damarlarda dolaşan bir varlıktır.” *Ibid.*, p. 112.

50 Açıl (2018), p. 87.

51 Tarlan (1948), p. III.

52 *Ibid.*, p. III.

is foremost among the researchers who best applied this method in the *école* he founded.

Tarlan was born in an era in which Ottoman *divān* literature was disappearing as an art form and bore witness to the last moments of a dying imperial giant which had enjoyed a six century lifespan. Contrary to today's researchers, he did not learn of this poetry later in his life but was born into it. He was, first and foremost, a keen reader of Ottoman *divān* poetry, not a student who learned it at university. Therefore, his perspective on Ottoman poetry was not an outsider's, but rather an insider's. He could clearly see the place of Ottoman poetry within the Islamic literary tradition, mainly its relationship with Persian classical poetry. Today, Tarlan's method has become institutionalized and diverged into some sub-branches, but it took its original form in the early republican period.

Tarlan's methodology should be approached from this point of view. On the one hand, the changing daily life came as an offspring of modernism and the divergence from the old culture stemmed from the decisions of modern state ideologists.⁵³ On the other hand, the language reforms instituted through the establishment of the Turkish Language Association,⁵⁴ the Latinization of the Turkish alphabet in 1928, and the appearance of purist linguistic-nationalism in the 1930s made *divān* literature, which was already a complicated field of study, a topic of academic study. From then on, Ottoman literary history became a subject that only well-equipped specialists could understand.

In fact, as a consequence of the modernization of Ottoman state and society, traditional Ottoman *divān* literature had withdrawn gradually from Ottoman life since the 19th century, drifting away and becoming more challenging to understand. Even the most distinguished names who worked on *divān* literature in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such as Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem, Tahirül-Mevlevi, Ahmed Talat Onay, and Ali Nihad Tarlan were aware that they could not understand every detail and intricacy of this literature.⁵⁵

53 For a while in the early republican period, *divān* literature was not considered sufficiently 'Turkish' and was therefore excluded from the national narrative. On this issue, see Andrews (2004); Holbrook (1994).

54 Today, the website of *Türk Dil Kurumu* still welcomes its readers with the motto "our language is our identity" (*dilimiz kimliğimizdir*) on the homepage <https://tdk.gov.tr> (accessed on 8 February 2023).

55 Olgun (1995), p. 21, 72, and 102. For more on the difficulties of understanding Ottoman language, see Akyol (2022).

In a time when early republican ideology tried to erase the Ottoman literary past and replace it with Turkish folk literature, Tarlan's position as a scholar who worked on Ottoman *divân* literature was not easy.⁵⁶ Apart from his nationalistic views, Tarlan mainly concerned himself with his research and publications. These motives explain why Tarlan gave importance to preparing new editions of early modern Ottoman literary works and the accompanying text exegeses. Quite naturally, it was an effort to make *divân* poetry, which had become an obscure historical relic even at that time, much more comprehensible. That effort, however, did not mean that his method was free from problems.

The problem with Tarlan's method from the beginning was that it was stuck in a narrow space, that is, text-centeredness. His approach was based on two simple points called 'external' and 'internal': by the former, he referred to some elements that he held as external to literary work, such as the period and milieu in which literary work was written, and the information about the manuscripts, including the differences between every copy; by the latter what he meant was the religious or mystical aspects of the literary work, the traces of life, individuals and the literary artistic features such as metaphors, allusions, wordplays, and so on.⁵⁷

Even though he described his approach as such, Tarlan's focal point was to publish an Ottoman text with the Latinized alphabet and to introduce the thematic elements in the text. He was inclined to define his subject's historical background mainly by using dated secondary literature without consulting the Ottoman primary sources such as chronicles, archival documents, and the like, as often or as comprehensively as Köprülü did.

The approach Tarlan established was institutionalized in all its aspects in Istanbul University. Then it was spread by his students, who would open new departments at different universities founded in Turkey. Thus, it gradually became the guiding ethos of mainstream Ottoman literary studies in today's Turkey.

Furthermore, one ought not to forget that the path Tarlan followed was shaped by the necessities of his time. For want of a developed historical field, such as the Ottoman historical studies of today, Tarlan's research had to be carried out within a limited scope. In addition to the technical problems such as the establishment of the field from scratch, the lack of relevant studies in fields

56 About these discussions, see Hollbrook (1994), pp. 13–31.

57 Tarlan (1964), p. X.

such as linguistics, anthropology, history, and psychology, the fact that modern Ottoman historiography was in its infancy, and society's distancing from the classical Ottoman literature and language on the way to modernity forced Tarlan to conduct preparatory works. Thus, what determined the characteristics of modern Ottoman literary historiography were the structural problems and the circumstances of the period in which Tarlan began his career. Therefore, we must turn our attention not to Tarlan as an individual historian, but rather to his standardized approach that still maintains its pivotal position in the field.

The legacy of Köprülü and Tarlan still holds a dominant place in the historiography of Ottoman literature. This situation raises ideological, methodological, and theoretical problems, which will be discussed below. For this reason, studies on the Ottoman literary past are still dominated by textual and text-centered approaches that are stuck in their compartments.⁵⁸ In contrast, an analytical approach that asks questions to the text, tries to evaluate a literary work in its context and acts in collaboration with other disciplines can be seen only in the practices of individual researchers rather than in mainstream historiography. General Ottoman literary histories covering the 14th to 19th centuries still lack this analytical approach. And those that are analytical are limited to a few monographs and articles.

Indeed, historians of Ottoman literature, with few exceptions, analyze Ottoman *dīvān* literature as a museum object frozen in a specific moment of the past and do not see it in its historical context. In other words, they often study it as an isolated or unique case, even within its history, let alone attaching it to world history. With some exceptions, this closeness leads to both not benefiting from the discussions in international literary studies and not contributing to them.

To summarize, the main reference books published under the rubric of Ottoman literary history still typically follow approaches established in the early 20th century. Studies that transcend these approaches are exceptions. Thus, the written culture of the Ottoman past is still waiting to be revisited in an analytical way. For these reasons, I believe that without criticizing the fundamental problems of this school, the belatedness in the field cannot be overcome.

58 By 'textual' I mean an approach that exclusively focuses on literary texts and excludes historical material (archival documents, non-literary texts, architecture, painting, music, etc.).

Conclusion

If you put the entirety of Turkish literature in one pan of a scale, and *Dede Korkut* in the other pan, *Dede Korkut* still tips the scale.⁵⁹

Every student who graduates from Turkish literature and language departments in Turkey is aware of this quote from Köprülü. When I first heard it, I could not entirely comprehend the logic underneath. It was clear that Köprülü, as a literary historian, set a great deal of importance on this medieval epic,⁶⁰ and no other literary work written in Western Turkish was as crucial as *The book of Dede Korkut*. But why? Why, for instance, could no other work change the balance of the scale? Why not the eloquent and flowery examples of the Ottoman literary canon such as the works of Baki, Nefi, or Nedim, but only *Dede Korkut*, which was a literary work written by an anonymous writer using plain Turkish without being equipped with stylistic, refined, and sophisticated literary arts, as Ottoman *divân* poets were?

These questions remained unanswered until I came across a sentence that reminded me of Köprülü's phrase: "I have never found one among them [i.e., Orientalists] who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia."⁶¹ This quote belonged to Thomas Babington Macaulay, a 19th-century British historian and politician who believed that European literature was far more advanced than Oriental literatures, reflecting the time's European colonialist state-of-mind.

The parallel between these two phrases may not be evident at first glance. Macaulay's statement was a part of a speech in the British Parliament that emphasized a more developed European literature against the Oriental ones, thereby trying to legitimize the British colonial regime's control over Oriental education systems.

59 Mehmed Fuad Köprülü's famous phrase: "Bütün Türk edebiyatını terazinin bir gözüne, *Dede Korkut*'u öbür gözüne koysanız, yine *Dede Korkut* ağır basar." Ergin (1969), p. IX.

60 The earliest surviving example of the Oghuz epic, a collection of twelve prose stories written in Turkish. See İz (2012).

61 I first read Macaulay's statement in Benedict Anderson's influential study on nationalism, *Imagined Communities* (Anderson 2006, p. 91), and to satisfy my curiosity, I looked up the source of the quotation. I found the exact mainstream Orientalist state-of-the-mind of the 19th century described by Edward Said in detail in his text *Orientalism*. For the original text, see Macaulay (1920), p. 109.

Returning to Köprülü, his statement had nothing to do with the colonial mentality, and he was not comparing Turkish literature with any nation's literature or trying to declare that Turkish literature outdoes other literatures of the world. He juxtaposed a product of Turkish literature side by side with the entire corpus of Turkish literary history, emphasizing that *Dede Korkut* is by far the most important Turkish literary work ever written.

The reason lurking behind Köprülü's statement was structurally similar to Macaulay's: trying to legitimize and thus establish the solid existence of Western Turkish literature before the Ottomans, whose spoken and literary language was an amalgam of foreign elements such as the two major languages, Arabic and Persian, as well as Greek, Italian, Kurdish, Hebrew, and so on. To Köprülü and his followers, notably the famous Turkish language historian Muharrem Ergin, *Dede Korkut* was a genuine epic of the Oghuz Turks, the forefathers of Turkish existence in Anatolia, the homeland of the newly founded Republic.⁶²

With this work in hand, Köprülü believed that he could prove the possibility of a full-fledged and developed existence of Turkish literature and, subsequently, the Turkish language and race, remembering once again the Herderian revolution. Therefore, he and his like-minded successors tried to date *Dede Korkut* to an imaginary past in which Oghuz Turks could compose such successful literary works.⁶³

This so-called contextualization was a delicate effort and can be approached from two different angles. First, Köprülü tried to prove the existence of a genuinely Turkish literary product, which is based on a vernacular version of Western Turkish, freed as much as possible from the "foreign elements" with which Ottoman *divân* literature was stained. This stemmed from the early republican search for such 'pure' language works that were uncontaminated by elements the nationalist ideologues believed foreign.

The second angle is the position of Turkish literature on the world stage. The works of Dante, Boccaccio, Chaucer, and many other authors who used their vernacular language in preference to Latin had been integrated into national narratives in Europe when Köprülü uttered the statement mentioned above. That the nationalistic literary historiographies proudly presented literary works written not in Latin but in vernacular languages, which were seen

62 Ergin (1969), p. XIV.

63 Although it is generally accepted that the work was written in the second half of the 15th century, some argue that the stories in the work date back to the 6th century.

as a vital basis of their nations, must have influenced Köprülü. The importance he attached to *Dede Korkut* emphasized that Turks, too, produced their national epics as early as their European counterparts, or maybe even much earlier, if one thinks of *Dede Korkut*'s oral origins, which were believed to be far older than the written text.

A Turkish national epic needed to be found for the sake of national identity. It was already known that the Oghuz Turks had an epic, *Oğuzname*, but it did not exist as a whole, and historians knew of its existence mostly from historical references. *Dede Korkut*, in this sense, was seen as a part of this lost Turkish epic. Therefore, it was dated back not to the time when it was put to paper but to an unknown time span during which it was believed *Dede Korkut* might have been created within the oral tradition of the *Oğuzname*.

In parallel to these ideas, Köprülü tried to identify a pure Turkish linguistic vein in Ottoman literary history. Köprülü engaged in multiple attempts, one after the other, on the matter in question. Collecting literary works written in all branches of the Turkic languages under a single roof, as if there were organic ties between them,⁶⁴ nationalizing the 'aşık tradition,⁶⁵ and proving the existence of Ottoman *divân* poets who preferred to write in Turkish with a purist understanding were some of the issues that Köprülü pursued.

Köprülü's thesis of an Ottoman-period literary movement promoting a plainer Turkish (*Türki-i Basit*) has been met with increasing criticism since the 1990s.⁶⁶ Increasingly criticized since the 1990s, Köprülü's efforts have never been completely discarded in literary history.⁶⁷ With this claim, Köprülü purported to prove the existence of Ottoman *divân* poets who wrote consciously in Turkish. Thus, Köprülü tried to create a national narrative— if teleologically— of Ottoman *divân* poetry, by more-or-less cherry-picking some examples deliberately from a wide variety of literary products. Because of the linguistic discrepancy between Ottoman and modern Turkish, Köprülü did not see *divân* literature as a national product. By way of the *Türki-i Basit* concept,

64 While the Turkic languages are related in terms of linguistics, there has not always been a relationship between the literary works produced in these languages.

65 An 'aşık was a minstrel who played and sang his own or others' poems on a string instrument and told folk tales.

66 Köprülü (1999), pp. 271–315.

67 Köprülü's stance on the "Türki-i Basit" was widely accepted and promoted by Nihal Atsız, Agah Sırrı Levent, Nihat Sami Banarlı, Ahmet Kabaklı, Hasibe Mazıoğlu, Faruk Kadri Timurtaş, Kemal Sılay and many other historians. See Aynur (2012).

he would both have identified an authentic ‘Turkish’ vein of Ottoman literature, which he criticized for being an imitation of Persian literature, and have shown that there was a tendency among *divān* poets to prioritize the Turkish language over the Arabic and Persian elements in Ottoman Turkish. By doing so, he attempted to put Ottoman *divān* literature into a national framework.

Ali Nihad Tarlan took a more contentious approach than his predecessor by severely criticizing the notion that *divān* literature is ‘not national’ and approaching that attitude as an indicator of ignorance. Although Tarlan was conscious of the fact that the *divān* poets did not have a sense of nationality in modern terms,⁶⁸ he went so far as to claim that “*divān* literature is the Turks’ own property.”⁶⁹ Thus, from a nationalist point of view, Tarlan tried to prove that *divān* literature was a national literature to nationalists who claimed the opposite.

Among the representatives who followed Tarlan’s nationalist approach up to the present day were some who took it to a more ideological level, and Ottoman literary historiography still carries these ideological burdens of nationalism. The motives for the beginning and continuation of this field’s historiography have always been feelings of ‘belatedness’ in comparison to the West and the task of establishing one’s own national past.

Accordingly, what did not fit the ideological commitments of the founding fathers, i.e., what was defined as not “ours” or not desired, was left out, not seen, not taken in, censored, or outright rejected. As Cemal Kafadar states, it was difficult to comprehend in the national age the fluidity and permeability of identities during the Ottoman early modern era.⁷⁰ In particular, Persian, Arabic, Armenian, Kurdish, Hebrew, and Greek works are barely evaluated in this context. The nationalist focus is almost entirely on Ottoman works written by Turkish Muslim men. Here, ‘Turkish’ refers to an anachronistic ethnicity, ‘Muslim’ to Sunni Islam, and ‘men’ to the masculine, assumed to have a heteronormative sexual orientation.

The same nationalist focus excluded parts of Ottoman literary history that early Republican Turkish nationalists considered inappropriate and incompatible with their ideas. This situation led to age-old censorship. Concerning Ottoman literary historiography, censorship could be a separate field of research – censorship and distortion are most evident in themes involving issues such

68 Tarlan (1989), p. 105.

69 Ibid., p. 108.

70 Kafadar (1995), p. 28.

as love, sexuality, and alcohol consumption. Considering that *divān* literature was intertwined with these matters, the gravity of the issue becomes even more apparent.⁷¹

The reason why Ottoman literary history studies focus on the 16th century is also related to the nationalization process. Modern historians saw the ‘zenith’ of the Ottoman past in the 16th century. In this context, the internal dynamics of Ottoman *divān* literature were interpreted in line with the state’s history, similar to what the 19th-century Orientalists had previously done.⁷² For that reason, the history of *divān* literature was read under the shadow of military victories and the state’s territorial expansion. Because the vast majority of literary historians have not overcome the established metaphor of the Ottoman ‘rise and decline paradigm’⁷³ and continue to work from within that paradigm, they also position the historicity of *divān* literature within this framework.

The root of these problems is the teleological reconstruction of Ottoman literary history. When nationalist ideological motives mandate that the history of literature is read parallel to the history of political victories, the above-mentioned issues become invisible. Literary historians have thus overlooked how the transition from a medieval dynastic state to an early modern bureaucracy⁷⁴ in the late 16th and the early 17th centuries affected the production, content, and circulation of *divān* literature.

In sum, the symptoms of Ottoman literary historiography’s chronic disorders emerged directly parallel to the nation-state construction process.

71 I will limit myself to giving examples such as the fact that even Nefi’s *Sihām-ı Kazā* [Shafts of Doom], the most famous satire collection from the early 17th century, could not be published without censorship until 2018. The previous versions were full of censored words. Gelibolulu Ali’s *Mevā’idü’n-Nefā’is*, too, is a victim of the same censorship which left some parts of the text untranslated because they were deemed “immoral”. For details, see Nefi (2020); Akkuş (1998); Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali (1997).

72 For instance, Servan de Sugny (1855, pp. XXXIV and XXVIII) saw and treated the history of Ottoman poetry as a direct projector of Ottoman political history, just as many literary historians who work on early modern Ottoman literature mistakenly do today. “On the other hand,” he wrote, “it is certain that the phases of poetry in the Ottoman Empire were the same as those of the political state.” Thus, the so-called glorious and sublime days of Süleymān I would find their echo directly in Ottoman poetry, and the phases of poetry coming after would be conveyed in line with the infamous narration of Ottoman decline.

73 For the discussions, see Kafadar (1998), pp. 30–75.

74 Tezcan (2010), p. 10.

Furthermore, it led to (i) a failure to understand multilingualism⁷⁵ and multiculturalism in early modern Ottoman literary culture; (ii) non-analytical approaches and publications; (iii) self-censorship and denial in regard to multiculturalism, minorities, gender issues, pornography, invectives, etc.; and iv) a state-focused literary history, which saw the history of the state and literature in parallel.

Apart from noteworthy studies of a monographic scope, there is still no non-nationalist Ottoman literary history available today that perceives and recognizes the literatures of all the communities of the Ottoman geography as necessary and worthy of study. Instead, the works we have are full of the ideological sediments of the past.

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75 Kim & Bashkin (2021), pp. 130–45.

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Afterword: From patrimonialization to the post-imperial uncanny

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Abstract: *This afterword interrogates the conceptual and political limitations of patrimonialization in order to foster appreciation for what I call the ‘post-imperial uncanny’, while also providing a loose review of the preceding chapters. To begin, I discuss the ‘double movement’ of patrimonialization as both a revitalization of neglected histories and a matter of capitalizing on the past for present aims. I then consider dynamics of how nationalism and Orientalism have shaped post-Ottoman patrimonialization in reference to the volume’s contributions. Following this, I focus on the role of experts in determining the definitions of patrimony and the projects of heritagization that the authors delineate. Finally, I situate patrimonialization in relation to its inverse, ruination, before concluding with a call to consider other post-imperial temporalities, encapsulated by the concept of the post-imperial uncanny.*

The double movement of patrimonialization

Across central and southeast Europe, along the shores of the Black Sea, and throughout the Middle East, patrimonialization of the Ottoman past has gained staggering momentum in recent years. As the contributions to this volume attest, patrimonialization comprises a double movement: It is simultaneously a matter of resuscitating neglected legacies and capitalizing on the past for the purposes of the present. One of this collection’s great virtues is its keen attention to this double movement, with its entangled opportunities and

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foreclosures. Patrimonialization makes the Ottoman past speak, but in doing so, it silences other possible histories.²

As we have witnessed, patrimonialization's double movement extends across multiple forms of patrimony, including material structures such as mosques and tombs, institutions such as the *waqf* (charitable endowments), and discursive genres such as Ottoman *divan* literature. Our itinerary has included a variety of post-Ottoman contexts that are not typically juxtaposed to one another: the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, in particular), Budapest, Crimea, and Cyprus, along with Turkey itself. Undoubtedly, comparable patterns of patrimonialization can be found in other post-Ottoman domains, including the Levant, Egypt, and North Africa. Nor is the Ottoman Empire unique – the ambivalent heritagization of imperial pasts, ranging from Mughal to Meiji, Roman to Romanov, is a fertile topic for comparison.

In what follows, I draw this discussion to an open-ended conclusion by highlighting the lessons that the patrimonialization of the Ottoman past, and imperial pasts generally, offer to scholarship on collective memories and legacies in the present. Patrimonialization provokes dilemmas over identity and difference in the post-imperial nation-state, especially in relation to persistent images of Oriental Otherness. In doing so, patrimonialization relies on the translation and amplification of frequently recondite modes of expertise into public knowledge and consensus. This teleological summoning of imperial heritage to national meaning obscures other relations between the past and the present, including ruination. Consequently, patrimonialization militates against uncanny, peculiar legacies, the curiosities of imperial pasts that the contributions frequently, vividly portray. This call to appreciation of the post-imperial uncanny serves as a fitting, inconclusive endpoint for the volume. In the spirit of Freud,³ I offer the post-imperial uncanny as a placeholder for the 'unhomely' (*unheimlich*) manner in which imperial pasts and national presents intersect and blur in post-imperial contexts. The post-imperial uncanny entails unsettling confusions of imperial pasts and national presents. As such, it is an unsettling concept that is good to think with in post-imperial times and spaces.

2 Trouillot (1995).

3 Freud (2003).

Formations of national identity and Oriental-imperial alterity

Whether in Bakhchisaray or Famagusta or Tuzla, post-Ottoman patrimonialization contends with both the demands of nationalized collective memory and the exoticizing effects of Orientalism. In many of the contexts that this volume explores, the Ottoman past has been refracted and evaluated through the lens of national imagined communities. Ottoman heritage is more ‘difficult’, in Sharon MacDonald’s sense,⁴ in some successor nation-states than others. Simultaneously, longstanding Orientalist discourses intersect with nationalism to situate Ottoman heritage in relation to the present. Nor can Ottoman patrimony be severed from the surrounding, competing sites of imperial heritage that act as its constitutive others, including the Romanov in Crimea, the Habsburg in the Balkans, and the British in Cyprus. Accordingly, patrimonialization is frequently a process of both national self-narration and Orientalist Othering, both identification and differentiation in relation to the Ottoman past.

The volume’s three essays on Crimea, by Stefaniia Demchuk, Anna Guboglo, and Nicole Kançal-Ferrari, dramatically exhibit the dynamics of national identity and Orientalist alterity. For centuries, Crimea was an imperial borderland, a periphery first for the Ottomans, then for the Romanovs and the Soviets, before becoming an object of territorial cupidity for Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Crimea makes little sense according to nationalist geographies, whether Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar, or Turkish. As Demchuk writes in relation to Ukrainian art history, Crimea’s status as a figure of alterity, “the exotic Other of Ukrainian culture,” has persevered despite gestures toward “a different canon ... acknowledging the plurality of art histories on Ukrainian territory.” The terms of Crimea’s identity and alterity were established during the 19th century, shortly after its annexation by St. Petersburg in the 1780s. As imperial successors, the Romanovs found uses for the peninsula’s distant pasts as foils to its more recent Ottoman character. For instance, Guboglo discusses how ancient Greek sites in Crimea were interpreted to “implicitly confirm ... Russia’s legitimacy in the region” at the fin de siècle. Such patterns persist – as Kançal-Ferrari notes, the Genoan legacy of Kefe/Feodosiia is “omnipresent” today, partially because this legacy is more attractive to a Europhilic gaze. By contrast, Crimean Tatar heritage – above all, the Palace at Bakhchisaray – remained an Orientalist bequest throughout the Romanov and Soviet eras,

4 MacDonald (2008).

fixed as Other by Pushkin's famous exoticization in his poem, "The Fountain at Bakhchisaray."⁵ More recently, however, Orientalist aesthetics and Tatar national aspirations have achieved unanticipated, ironic syntheses in Crimea, as Kançal-Ferrari shows. Neo-Ottoman mosques, built by Turkish construction firms, have sprung up across Crimea in recent decades, "a strange situation where efforts to articulate the cultural heritage of local Muslim communities are carried out through reference to a former imperial (for Crimea) or an entirely distinct (for Chechnya) cultural and ideological context, the classical Ottoman past."

Crimea's contradictions have taken shape in comparable yet distinct ways in other post-Ottoman domains. In Cyprus, Reyhan Sabri describes how the Orientalist vision of 19th century British colonial administrators privileged the island's medieval architectural heritage, Gothic Crusader-era churches and cathedrals that were converted into mosques during the subsequent Ottoman era. Although the institutional bedrock for such churches-cum-mosques was the same as that for other mosques and Ottoman public buildings – the *waqf*, or *vakıf* – only the former were valued: "[The] *waqf* properties with medieval-Latin origins were brought under statutory protection, [while] those with Ottoman origins were excluded." For the British administrators, the Ottoman past was simply a matter of discredit, "devoid of originality or evidence of progress" in Sabri's apt phrase, and therefore not eligible for patrimonialization, unlike the island's Crusader remainders.

While the Ottoman era was merely an object of Orientalist scorn for the British Empire, matters were not so simple in the early years of Turkish Republic, when Ottoman legacies complicated emergent ethnolinguistic Turkish nationalism. Both Ercan Akyol and Ayşe Dilsiz Hartmuth convey the early Republic's nationalist and Orientalist anxieties over the Ottomans in relation to literature and processes of institutional reform, respectively. Akyol interprets sociologist and historian Mehmet Fuat Köprülü's elevation of the central Asian epic poem *Dede Korkut* over Ottoman *divan* literature as the fount for a Herderian "pure Turkish linguistic vein in Ottoman literary history." Another semi-

5 As Kançal-Ferrari writes in her contribution to this volume, "[The] poem transformed the palace into an imaginary land of khans and harems. Today, visitors experience the palace through this 'Russian gaze': they are rushed straight to the Fountain of Tears, and to Pushkin's bust, arranged as the heart of the edifice's new interpretation as part of a Russian cultural canon instead of a Crimean Tatar canon." See also Pushkin (1982).

nal literary historian of the early Republic, Ali Nihat Tarlan, “tried to prove that *divân* literature was a national literature to nationalists who claimed the opposite.” In her analysis of the Republican transformation of the institution of the *vakıf* – in particular, its centralization within the Directorate of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*) – Dilsiz Hartmuth describes a similar moment of auto-Orientalist and nationalist repositioning, which traced “the history of the foundations to the [pre-Islamic] Uyghur Turks.” In both cases, nascent Turkish nationalism sought identity in more distant pasts untainted by Ottoman-Orientalist alterity.

Orientalist aesthetics and imperial power achieved equally dramatic juxtapositions in the post-Ottoman Balkans. In Habsburg Bosnia, both Ajla Bajramović and Maximilian Hartmuth show how a deterritorialized architectural style, drawing upon elements from the Islamic architectural heritage of Spain and Egypt, was reterritorialized due to its ostensible appropriateness for the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s new Muslim subjects, despite the historical disconnect between this style and Ottoman architecture and aesthetics.⁶ As Hartmuth aptly writes, in Habsburg Bosnia, “style, perceived as an expression of a community’s collective’s culture, was foregrounded over material historicity.” There are echoes of this privileging of style over historicity in the Neo-Ottoman mosques of Crimea today, as well as in the renovation of Tuzla’s Behrambeg Mosque, where, Bajramović argues, “Orientalizing style as a common denominator ... (re)create[s] narratives which have little in common with the actual building history.” Meanwhile, in the nearby post-Ottoman Kingdom of Serbia, Orientalist reasoning resembled that of the British in post-Ottoman Cyprus, as Jelena Radovanović shows in relation to the institutional form of the *vakıf/vakuf*, which was transformed from a mode of charitable endowment that spanned denominations to a marker of Muslim-Ottoman Otherness.

An aesthetic rule of experts

Throughout post-Ottoman domains, imperial legacies, national imperatives, and Orientalist tastes relate to patrimonialization in a variety of ways, rang-

6 Maximilian Hartmuth’s European Research Council research group, “Islamic architecture and Orientalizing style in Habsburg Bosnia,” which sponsored this volume, represents a thorough interrogation of Austro-Hungarian Orientalism, architecture, and governance in Bosnia.

ing from denials of the past to ahistorical interpolations. In Serbia and Cyprus at the *fin de siècle*, Ottoman and Oriental were synonyms, simple markers of stagnation and alterity that were only worthy of history's dustbin. In Bosnia, Crimea, and Turkey, matters were more fraught – in each, Ottoman-Ottoman legacies retained or achieved value, but in troubled, even ironic ways in relation to new political considerations. All of these contexts, however, shared an important discursive feature: The dilemmas entailed by the Ottoman patrimony were articulated and resolved by cadres of academic and administrative specialists, an aesthetic “rule of experts.”⁷

These essays effectively convey the multiple scales of expertise that established and coordinated Ottoman patrimony. Most immediately, experts have been responsible for the preservation and renovation (or, implicitly, disregard and degradation) of specific sites and structures. Gergő Máté Kovács offers an encyclopaedic account of the history of expert interventions on Budapest's Shrine to Gül Baba (*Gül Baba Türbesi*), a Bektashi dervish who perished shortly after the Ottoman conquest of Buda in 1541 CE, and whose mausoleum remains the city's most prominent Ottoman site. Bajramović's account of the Behram-beg Mosque in Tuzla is similar. In both cases, the deployment of architectural expertise was crucial to renovation and patrimonialization.

While individual experts continue to exert influence over such restorations, the role of expert institutions has increased dramatically in recent decades. In Tuzla, Turkey's Directorate of Endowments – the same institution analysed by Dilsiz Hartmuth – spearheaded the Behram-beg Mosque's recent renovation. More generally, the most enthusiastic institutional actor in the patrimonialization of the Ottoman legacy has undoubtedly been the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (*Türkiye İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı*), known ubiquitously by its acronym, TİKA. TİKA was central to Gül Baba's restoration, as well as to work at many of the sites that Kançal-Ferrari describes in Crimea. TİKA's restorative endeavours reliably conclude with a photographic tableau featuring prominent Turkish politicians, often including President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself – Gül Baba was a case in point – and the agency has been a central player in the geopolitics of Neo-Ottoman patrimonialization in recent decades.⁸

The aesthetic rule of experts is not only a matter of specific restorations and moments of heritagization, however. Patrimonialization as a whole is an

7 Mitchell (2002).

8 Öktem (2012).

expert discourse that has achieved public common sense. Orientalism, in Edward Said's capacious sense,⁹ was a key precursor to the patrimonialization of the Ottoman past, and Orientalist experts appear throughout these pages. In Cyprus, Sabri describes the outsized influence of George Jeffrey, the architect and Orientalist who held the post of Curator of Antiquities between 1903 and 1934, and was principally responsible for the denigration of the island's Ottoman architecture. Radovanović relates a similar figure in the Kingdom of Serbia, Kosta Cukić, a German-trained political economist and Minister of Finance for the nascent state, who argued forcefully for a new, secularized definition of the *vakıf/vakuf* as 'mosque property'. In the field of literature, scholars such as Mehmet Fuat Köprülü and Ali Nihat Tarlan, whom Akyol describes, were crucial to an auto-Orientalist discourse in Turkey that fixed Ottoman literature as definitively past, and of secondary importance to the Turkish nation. Outside of Turkey, poets such as Pushkin and Béla Tóth – the Hungarian folklorist who, Kovács tells us, collected legends about Gül Baba and his mausoleum – helped to embed Ottoman sites in an atmosphere of Oriental romance, and thus recast them as exotic patrimony. The Habsburg *Kronprinzenerwerk* that Hartmuth analyses is a monument to Orientalist expertise – an author of the volume on Bosnia, Johann Kellner, decisively established architecture as "the one fine art in which ... Ottoman culture produced the most notable results." The history of Orientalism as an expert discourse that paved the way for patrimonialization in the former Ottoman world, and beyond, has yet to be fully narrated. These essays together constitute a provocative point of departure for such a history.

Patrimonialization, ruination, other times

At this time of ascendant heritagization of imperial legacies, what might constitute the opposite of patrimonialization? In other words, how might we think against the grain of patrimonialization? The volume's authors have much to say on this score. Jelena Radovanović, invoking Edin Hajdarpašić,¹⁰ stresses that the "ruins of empire" were literal, rather than metaphorical, in the post-Ottoman Balkans. As records of both material and discursive upheavals, post-

9 Said (1979).

10 Hajdarpašić (2008).

imperial ruins are a poignant reminder that the recent romanticization of ruination on the part of much scholarship risks silencing histories of violence.¹¹ Crimea and Cyprus, too, are prominent sites of post-Ottoman ruination; examples from elsewhere could easily be multiplied.

Ruination, with its emphasis on decline, disappearance, and violence, is a key, antithetical concept to patrimonialization, but it also has limitations. Patrimonialization and ruination are opposite sides of a teleological coin – the first envisions the present as a redemption of the past, while the second projects the present as its betrayal. Surely, the possibilities of post-imperial legacies extend beyond the teleological dichotomy of preservation and annihilation. How might we think of other post-imperial times, beyond both patrimonialization and ruination? Ivo Andrić offers guidance, as he often does:

With the Turkish retreat from Hungary there remained outside of the Empire also those properties of the *vakuf* (the religious endowment) from the revenues of which the caravanserai at Višegrad was maintained. Both the people of the town and the travellers who had made use of the Stone Han for the past 100 years had become accustomed to it and had never even considered by what means it had been maintained, how the revenues had been founded, or from what source they came. All had made use of it, profiting by it as from a blessed and fertile roadside orchard which was both nobody's and everybody's; they repeated mechanically 'peace to the Vezir's soul' but did not stop to think that the Vezir had died 100 years before, nor did they ask who now preserved and defended the imperial lands and the *vakuf*. Who could ever have dreamt that the affairs of the world were in such dependence upon one another and were linked together across so great a distance?¹²

In this passage from *The bridge on the Drina*, Andrić captures a moment and an institution that is paramount to many of this collection's discussions: the *waqf/vakıf/vakuf* in its post-imperial but non-patrimonial form. The charitable endowment is a temporal strategy to ensure the persistence of good deeds into

11 Svetlana Boym (2011) provides an eloquent example: "Ruin' literally means 'collapse' – but actually, ruins are more about remainders and reminders. A tour of 'ruin' leads you into a labyrinth of ambivalent temporal adverbs – 'no longer' and 'not yet,' 'nevertheless' and 'albeit' – that play tricks with causality. Ruins make us think of the past that could have been and the future that never took place, tantalizing us with utopian dreams of escaping the irreversibility of time."

12 Andrić (1977), pp. 76–7.

an open-ended, uncertain future. As such, *waqfs* are bridges – figuratively, and sometimes literally – across eras because they foster material continuity across and through political and social change. Consequently, the *waqf* is both a resource for and a foil to patrimonialization.

Radovanović captures this ambivalence superbly in her analysis of post-Ottoman Serbia's secularization of the *vakuf*. Against “a soul-saving act (Serbian *za dušu*, for the soul), whether performed by the Muslim Bosnian beys, or the Christian medieval kings,” the concept of the charitable endowment was removed from “the traditional Islamic legal definition in which it belonged to God, and reformulated ... into the private property of mosque as legal subject, the property-holding mosque.” Radovanović illustrates that this secularization of the *waqf* also involves a reduction of its previous temporal multiplicity, which spanned “across multiple temporalities, connecting the past generations of kings and beys with the humans of the present.”

Toward the post-imperial uncanny

With their appreciation of the uncertain, open-ended temporality of the *waqf* in its non-patrimonialized form, Andrić and Radovanović suggest a fitting point of inconclusive conclusion for our volume. Against the motifs of both patrimonialization and ruination, we might call this, for shorthand, the post-imperial uncanny. In contrast to both the optimistic temporal closure of patrimonialization and the pessimistic resignation of ruination, the post-imperial uncanny foregrounds the unanticipated, even unrecognizable forms that the imperial past may take in the present. Post-imperial contexts frequently entail uncanny, ‘unhomely’ confusions between imperial legacies and nationalized memories. Simultaneously, the uncanny post-imperial entails a commitment to narrating disavowed ‘connected histories’, Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s influential concept which Demchuk invokes in her essay on Ukrainian art history and Crimean heritage.

Uncanny post-imperial sites suffuse these pages. Examples that immediately come to mind include the *Valide-i Şerif Camii*, a late imperial-Roman mosque dedicated to Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna in Akmescit/Simferopol, mentioned by Kançal-Ferrari; Gül Baba’s tomb, which Kovács at one point describes as “an Ottoman shrine with features of a Baroque Jesuit chapel in the garden of a Historicist mansion”; and, Cyprus’s medieval churches recast as mosques, as rendered by Sabri. Each of these sites, and myriad others, artic-

ulate aesthetic, temporal, and political “constellations”¹³ that defy the singular vision of patrimonialization. They exude the post-imperial uncanny, and offer an invitation to as yet unanticipated futures.

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13 Benjamin (1968), p. 263; see also Walton (2019).

