

## Mutual responsibility of the state and society in governing through cooperation

Timofeeva, Lidiya N.

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# ВЗАИМНАЯ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ ГОСУДАРСТВА И ОБЩЕСТВА В УПРАВЛЕНИИ ЧЕРЕЗ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО

**ЛИДИЯ НИКОЛАЕВНА ТИМОФЕЕВА** – заместитель заведующего кафедрой политологии и политического управления по научной работе Института общественных наук  
Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации (119606, Российская Федерация, Москва, проспект Вернадского, 84). E-mail: timofeeva-lidiya@inbox.ru

**Аннотация:** В статье дается авторская концепция управления через сотрудничество российского государства и общества на основе анализа социологических исследований, связанных с развитием их взаимоотношений в постсоветский период. В основу положена теория модернизации Р. Инглхарта и К. Вельцеля, которая опирается на основные выводы классических концепций модернизации К. Маркса и М. Вебера. Подлинная демократия зависит от степени соучастия народа в управлении. Эмансипация общества, способного к управлению через сотрудничество с государством, проходит определенные этапы его модернизации: социально-экономическое развитие приводит к системному сдвигу от традиционных ценностей к ценностям самовыражения и создает условия для формирования демократических институтов. Эффективная демократия с большей вероятностью возникает в обществе, где носителями ценностей самовыражения являются более 45% населения. Естественно, что при возникновении угрозы физическому выживанию людей преобладающее значение получают ценности выживания, что ведет к упрочению института авторитаризма, и тогда вопрос об управлении через сотрудничество государства и общества не актуален, либо это сотрудничество превращается в формальную демократию, когда имеются «бутафорские институты», гражданские и политические права, но правящая элита игнорирует их и действует по собственному усмотрению. Такая ситуация может спровоцировать неконвенциональные формы поведения граждан. Ответственность за результат управления через сотрудничество в равной степени несут обе стороны.

**Ключевые слова:** управление через сотрудничество, модернизация, ценности самовыражения, ценности самовыживания, эффективная демократия, формальная демократия, ответственность правящей элиты, ответственность активной общественности

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## MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN GOVERNING THROUGH COOPERATION

**LIDIYA N. TIMOFEEVA** – Deputy Head of the Political Science and Political Administration Department of the Institute of Social Sciences  
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (84 Prospect Vernadskogo, Moscow, Russian Federation, 119606). Email: timofeeva-lidiya@inbox.ru.

**Abstract:** The author's concept of governing through cooperation of the Russian state and society is given in the article on the basis of the analysis of sociological studies related to the development of their mutual relations in the post-Soviet period. The theory of modernization of R. Inghart and K. Veltzel is based on the main conclusions of the classical concepts of modernization by Karl Marx and M. Weber. True democracy depends on the degree of people's participation in governance. The emancipation of a society that is able to manage through cooperation with the state passes through certain stages of its modernization: socio-economic development leads to a systematic shift from traditional values to values of self-expression and creates conditions to form democratic institutions. Effective democracy is more likely to emerge in a society where more than 45% of population bears the values of self-expression. Naturally, when there is a physical threat to survival of people, the values of survival are of paramount importance, which leads to strengthening of the authoritarianism institution and then the issue of governance through cooperation between the state and society is not relevant, or this cooperation turns into a formal democracy, when there are "sham institutions", civil and political rights, but the ruling elite ignores them and acts at its own discretion. Such a situation can provoke nonconventional forms of behavior for citizens. Both parties share the responsibility for the result of governing through cooperation equally.

**Keywords:** governing through cooperation, modernization, values of self-expression, values of self-survival, effective democracy, formal democracy, responsibility of the ruling elite, responsibility of active society.

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### Introduction

True democracy depends on the degree of people's participation in governance. The emancipation of a society that is able to manage through cooperation with the state passes through certain stages of its modernization: socio-economic development leads to a systematic shift from traditional values to values of self-expression and creates conditions to form democratic institutions.

Governing through cooperation of the state and society is a new vector of socio-political thought and practice. Some authors tend to associate this with a change in intergenerational value orientations, as well as with the difference in the value orientations of people in developed and developing countries. In particular, R. Inglehart and K. Welzel are pushing this assumption: socio-economic development leads to a systematic shift from traditional values to values of self-expression. Secular-rational values and values of self-expression are characteristic for the young people in developed countries rather than for the older generation. But in the same society, values of self-expression are inherent for economically protected citizens, and for unprotected ones it is more about values of self-survival. Economic and physical security, financial well-being, intolerance for dissent, xenophobia, low assessment of freedom and human rights, readiness to accept authoritarianism, obedience, inclination into religion are all considered to be survival values, while values of self-expression are the high appraisal of personality, freedom, civil and political rights, financial benefits, success, "responsiveness" of the state, gender equality concern, etc. [Inglehart, Welzel, 2011. P.143].

Other researchers – M.V. Gorshkov and N.N. Sedova – believe that in Russia it is not because of the generation gap, although it does occur, but rather because of the fact that socio-economic and socio-political changes in society provoked a "quiet social revolution". An impressive group of "self-sufficient" Russians emerged, assuming responsibility for what is happening in their lives, confident in their ability to provide for themselves and their families and not needing the state support. And this is not a social periphery, not a marginal stratum, but a significant and growing group expressing the trend towards formation of an independent and activist dominant in the society. The share of such Russians was 44% of the population in the spring of 2015 and 34% in 2011. The group of "dependent" people, who are incapable of solving their problems without state help, was 56%. At the same time, the share of "dependent" for this period decreased from 66 to 56%, which means both groups are comparable in number. Self-sufficiency is more common for young people (57%) and middle-aged people (50-52%). Most importantly, scientists conclude that despite the fact that "self-sufficient" citizens are more focused on resolving purely personal tasks, a lot of them still would like to be useful to the state and society (43%). In this sense, they are slightly inferior to "dependent" citizens, 51% of who consider it important to be useful to the state [Gorshkov, Sedova, 2015.

P.10-11]. In other words, under certain conditions they are ready to cooperate with the state.

There is also a third point of view that was expressed by A.M. Starostin. He believes that cooperation of the state and society in governance can acquire an imitative nature today due to the adoption of these democratic practices from the experience of highly developed countries. If we start with the theory of innovation, a certain degree of phasing transfer of innovation follows, together with a change in cultural values. And these are not just some seemingly pejorative names, but complex, increasingly complicated and increasingly adequate ways, patterns, and technologies of social practice that need to be mastered and applied in order to "catch up and overtake" [Starostin, 2016; Starostin, Ponedelkov, Shvets, 2016].

Disappointment in Russian democratic practice explains the weak desire of society to cooperate with the state – according to V.A. Petukhov. Since democratic freedoms came to Russians "from above", they do not have emotional and careful attitude towards them and democracy in general – in contrast with Americans. The systematic opposition represented by the parliament is perceived by many citizens as part of the ruling elite, whose role is to channel public discontent into the direction preferred by the authorities. And the non-systematic opposition still seems suspicious. Fading interest in economic rights and freedoms can only be explained by inability to fight for these rights with legal tools in today's Russia. Additionally, in his opinion, numerous NPOs, which are mostly "agents" of local officials and their affiliated business structures and are not able to survive without grants, – have a very distant relation to the genuine civil society. Constantly declining indicators of the level of confidence in these institutions are a very clear evidence of this [Petukhov, 2013].

Hence our first thesis and the question of who is ready to take responsibility for real cooperation today, and who is not able to do it for the time being?

The second thesis: in an effort to expand the cooperation of the state and society, we must be aware that it has its borders for a number of reasons. When it comes to public administration, then, first, it means subject-object relations, otherwise it loses meaning; secondly, any expansion of state administration through co-creation with citizens does not mean the unlimited emancipation of all social groups – some of them will still have greater access to power; thirdly, the state is the only universal political organization to which all citizens are subordinate, and for whose it is responsible. In addition, only the state has the right for legal violence. For the illegal violence or unleashed state terror, it must incur criminal responsibility before its people and the court of history. Even when we raise the issue of public administration, despite our desire to equalize the possibilities of state and non-state actors in the process of co-management, the public tends to eventually ask for more from the state: whether for the excessive authoritarianism of actions, or for the lack of initiative. In modern Russia, with all attempts to make the administration "more public", we more often than not blame the first person of

the state for the lack of new political developments in the country, as well as for the collapse of the Soviet Union in the past. It turns out that the state is responsible for self-survival and self-expression of citizens, isn't it? And what about the active society (intellectuals, students, prekarat, etc.)? Are the non-state actors so defenseless and even irresponsible to the state in the process of co-management? However, according to the law society is also responsible for illegal actions under the Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: "It is prohibited to create and operate public associations whose goals and actions are aimed at violent change of the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation. Undermining the security of the state, the creation of armed groups, the incitement of social, racial, ethnic and religious discord".

And who implemented the revolutions of 1917 and 1993? Was and is this governing conducted through cooperation? Or is it just a "democratic camouflage", the limit to which comes with a riot?

### The formation of democracy in each country is a unique process

When we argue that governance through cooperation between the state and society is a new vector of socio-political thought and practice, we rely on the conclusions of scientists who studied modernization processes for many years and have affirmed that the basis for large-scale changes in social, cultural and political spheres lies in the socio-economic development. This was the result of surveys conducted by the World Values Survey Association (WVSA) from 1981 to 2014 in 97 countries, which covered a total of 90% of the population of the planet. They confirmed the classical conclusions to which K. Marx and M. Weber once came. One of them believed that socio-economic development affects the aspirations and actions of people. Another one claimed that beliefs and motivations prevailing in the society are determined by their cultural heritage. As organizers and participants of this large-scale world research of values R. Inglehart and K. Welzel believe, "the process of industrialization brings along rationalization, secularization and bureaucratization, but the emergence of "the knowledge society" results in changes of a different kind, going in a new direction – increasing the role of independence (or individual autonomy), self-expression and

freedom of choice. The assertion of self-expression values transforms modernization into a process of human development, thus forming a humanistic society of a new type – in the center of it there is a person" [Inglehart, Welzel, 2011, Pp. 10, 11]. At the first stage of modernization, there is mobilization of the masses, which provides the prerequisites to establish democracy in a broad sense. And at the industrial stage of modernization, the society increasingly demands the greater freedom of choice for its own way of life. Thus, the process of establishing democracy depends on the deep-seated value orientations in people as a whole. These orientations encourage people to demand freedom and "feedback" from the authorities – and to back up words with actions that ensure such a result. True democracy, its capacity depends on the constant participation of people. In other words, the dynamics for human development looks like this: economic development generates the movement of societies from traditional values to secular-rational and from values of survival to values of self-expression, and this cultural dynamics influences the formation of democracy (see **Table 1**).

Naturally, when there is a threat to physical survival of people, the values of survival prevail, which leads to strengthening of the institution of authoritarianism and then the issue of governance through cooperation between the state and society is not relevant.

Taking in general the theory of R. Inglehart and K. Welzel as the basic matrix of democratic modernization and finding certain confirmations of its functionality in the research and statements of Russian scientists, we still need to clarify that each country has its own peculiarities in this process.

In this regard author shares the position of A. Martelli that modern society is in a state of constant change, the processes of transformation and modernizations not only continue to develop, but also deepen and expand. At the same time, global movements of people, exchange of technologies, ideas, symbols, capital, expand day by day, while values, institutions and practices that justify them lag behind in time [Martelli, 2006]. Moreover, where the formation of values of self-expression is "delayed", the emergence of democratic institutions does not save the situation. People get used to them, but they don't become means of self-expression. Institutions cannot function until the public considers their norms as their own. This especially applies to democratic institutions, which depend on the approval and support of the masses. An example is the United Kingdom, where there is no constitution at all, and democratic institutions exist only in the form of a non-formal system of norms shared by the majority in society [Inglehart, Welzel, 2011, Pp. 234-235]. Conversely, the existence of a democratic con-

**Table 1. The process of human development [5, p. 46]**

	Socio-economic dimension	Cultural dimension	Institutional dimension
Processes, conducive to human development	Modernization	Change of Values	Democratization
Components of human development	Socio-economic resources	Values of self-expression	Civil and Political Freedoms
Factors	Enhancing people's ability to act	Increasing the priority of freedom of choice at one's own discretion	Empowerment of people to act
Leitmotif	Expanding the choice (humanization of society)		
Source: Weizel. 2002. 46			

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stitution, but not supported by the masses and the set of democratic norms that people have learned, does not guarantee effective democracy.

### The value scale for Russians has a hybrid character

What is happening in Russia in connection with the issue of modernization, value system changes and society participation in governing? This question is not a simple one, because there are various theoretical and methodological approaches to it. Besides, society and the state as a whole are still transforming, and according to M.F. Chernysh, in a transforming society there are factors of social stratification, not predicted by any theory and specific for the given society [Chernysh, 2001. P. 88]. Moreover, there is a lack of broad empirical basis for building more complex generation models in Russia, and therefore a culturological approach predominates, presupposing descriptive analysis of typical patterns for mass generation behavior.

One of the major researchers of youth, V. T. Lisovsky, shortly before his death wrote that today "the social values that the "fathers" lived in, in the new historical situation had lost practical importance and, therefore, are not inherited by "children" because they are not suitable neither for the present, nor for the future life" [Lisovskiy, 2000. P.166]. Y.A. Levada and T. Shanin held this same view in their publications on this subject, believing that the main problem of Russian society is in value orientations disharmony of "fathers and children" [Levada, Shanin, 2005]. In his report "Modernization of economy and the value system", Professor of the Higher School of Economics E. Yasin summed up: "Russian values today are a three-layer pie of our state symbols: traditional Russian values are the two-headed eagle of Paleologs; Soviet values are Mikhalkov's hymn; new democratic values are in the Russian tricolor. In this confusion one can see the contradictions of the era of fractures in our country's history" [Yasin, 2003. P.4]. He assesses traditional Russian and Soviet values as attractive but mostly traditional, and the economy and society as a continuation of feudal hierarchical structures. However, Russian reforms, in his opinion, change society. He notes with satisfaction that in the post-reform Russia the thesis that values transform under the influence of changes in the economy and politics is confirmed. Russian civilization shows flexibility and dynamism, close to the West, including its values. As a confirmation for his words, he refers to the results of surveys conducted by the "Liberal Mission" Foundation in 2002, where the agreement with traditional judgments on the "proper" and "correct" values was expressed by 19.6%; with the Soviet judgements – 27.5%; with liberal judgements – 45.1%. In his opinion, it takes time, continuation and completion of liberal institutional reforms to develop these positive changes, consistent democratization, humanization of power, politics, and public life.

It should be emphasized that during the years of restructuring and reform, Russians themselves have really changed as well. The results of the Levada Center

poll "How people and power changed over 20 years" (July 2013) are very eloquent<sup>1</sup>.

At first, sociologists have noticed changes in the self-sense of society since 1993. Among the positive features acquired in the post-Soviet period, according to the data from Levada Center, Russians highlighted the awareness of their own freedom (29% of respondents) experienced by the residents of modern Russia and expansion of horizons after the fall of the iron curtain. *Approximately 20% of the Russian Federation citizens stressed the possibility of being independent of politicians and superiors. The same number noted that the times of capitalism made their compatriots more robust and practical.* But at the same time people have become more calculating and cold – 58%, more intolerant towards each other – 35%.

Secondly, sociologists received assessments of power that are not very flattering. Every second respondent noted that the authorities have stopped thinking about ordinary people, pursuing only their own interests. 43% are sure that the current leadership of the country cannot deal with existing problems. At the same time, the share of those who believe that the state has done much to make Russia respected abroad is 20%. The same number of Russians is convinced that the political elite is not capable of raising the prestige and authority of the Russian Federation.

And what should the government and the state do, according to the citizens? The same Levada Center, which has been watching changes in the relations between authorities and the society all these years, cites such data: if in 1999 52% of respondents believed that the state should ensure a normal level of well-being for all its citizens, in 2008 it was already 61%.

Both then and now 35% of respondents believed that the government must rely on people and they should be united in their goals and aspirations. *41% believed that authorities and people should respect each other and cooperate in accordance to the principles established by the law.*

*It turns out that the value scale for Russians has hybrid character.* Russia, on the one hand, is close in values to the pole of survival with its expressed traditional values, the hope for the paternalism of the state, like Ireland, almost all countries of Latin America, India; on the other hand it is rational like Germany, Norway and Denmark.

If we follow the theoretical constructs of R. Inghart and K. Veltzel, *Russia needs to engage in social and economic development and disseminate the values of self-expression for further personal emancipation. At the same time, citizens should be educated about the functions of civil society and encouraged to cooperate with the government in the field of state governance.*

<sup>1</sup> The Levada Center studies were conducted on December 20-24, 2013, on a representative all-Russian sample of 1,603 people in 130 localities in 45 regions of the country. The statistical error does not exceed 3.4%. See: "How have people and power changed in 20 years. The poll of the Levada Center" (July 2013). <http://www.levada.ru/tag/vlast/page/12/> (Date accessed – April 1, 2017).

### Civil society in the “transition period” and its responsibility to the state

In Russia, it is customary to express doubt that civil society exists. Indeed, polls show that Russians sometimes do not understand the difference between society and civil society, which we characterize as the sphere of self-manifestation for free citizens and voluntarily formed non-profit associations and organizations, protected from direct interference and arbitrary regulation by state authorities and businesses, and also other external factors.

The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion – the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), conducted a survey of the population on the topic “What is “civil society?”” in September 2015<sup>2</sup>. Respondents were asked the question “Have you heard already or do you hear the expression “civil society” for the first time?”; 52% answered that they knew or heard something, 33% said they hear about it for the first time, and 15% found it difficult to answer. The next question was for the 52% of respondents who know what civil society is. The question was: “In your opinion, is there now a civil society in Russia or there is no civil society?” The answers were distributed in the following ratio: 31% answered that there is; 13% – said no; 8% couldn’t answer.

However, citizens’ awareness is growing. In January-March 2016, the laboratory “Problems of Improving the Efficiency of State and Municipal Management” of the URIU RANEPa under the President of the Russian Federation conducted an expert survey in 13 regions (subjects) of the Russian Federation on quota sampling. Responses and assessments were given by different categories of experts: scientists, state and municipal employees, businessmen<sup>3</sup>. To the question of whether it is possible to say that civil society has now been formed in Russia, in the Rostov region in 2012 26.1% of experts answered yes rather than no, and already in 2016 – it was 47.3%. If you look at the results of the survey in all 13 regions, not including the most “emancipated” subjects such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, combining the answers to this question with statements – “yes, absolutely” (10.3%) and “rather yes, than no” (40.4%) it will be 50.7%, which is every second opinion. Would it seem that the values

**Table 2. What mechanisms for attracting the society to public administration seem to you most effective at the moment?**

№	Variants of answers	2016, RO	2012, RO	2016, all regions
1	Formation of public representatives institutions	36.4%	30.2%	34.9%
2	Creation of advisory councils at state bodies	25.4%	26.5%	28.4%
3	Conferences, scientific-practical seminars, round tables	20.9%	20.3%	19.4%
4	Difficult to answer	17.3%	23%	17.3%

of self-expression have already won? No. Answers with a degree of doubt that it was formed (30.6%) and total denial of its existence (9.6%) gave an equally impressive result – 40.2%.

Among answers to the question “What mechanisms for attracting the society to public administration seem to you most effective at the moment?” the formation of institutions of public representatives (34.9%) came first, the second was the creation of advisory councils with state bodies (28.4%), the third – conferences, scientific and practical seminars, and round tables (19.4%). (See Table 2).

The analysis of the table shows that the Rostovites, who were polled twice, have somewhat abated their hope for cooperation with the state, however, only within the limits of statistical error. But in general, the figures for Russia seem to be optimistic. Although, as we already mentioned it in connection with the Levada Center research, it is symptomatic that despite the fact that active public is critical to the work of the state authorities, it is ready to cooperate with the authorities, offering them alternative solutions to the urgent problems. Alternativeism in the relations of the active public with the power seems to be a positive trend. But the authorities need time to start cooperating with the alternativeists<sup>4</sup>. Otherwise, we can get the same result as in 1991, when the Soviet government while holding on to the monopoly of the CPSU and not recognizing the practice of cooperation with alternativeists, have received a radical anti-communist opposition and collapsed under its blows.

Critical researchers (one of them is V.V. Petukhov) note, that despite pessimistic assessment for the current state of civil society in Russia, there is still a small but clearly expressed increase in political awareness of our fellow citizens about processes happening in the country, and their confidence in their right to influence power. So, the intricacy

2 What is a “civil society?”. FOM website, electronic data. <http://fom.ru/TSenosti/12375> (Date accessed – April 1, 2017).

3 The study in 2016 had in fact a paneling character, since 4 years ago, in January-March 2012, a survey of experts on a similar topic and program was conducted in the Rostov Region. About 20 items of the questionnaire coincide. This time, 13 regions were taken: Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan, Belgorod region, Krasnodar region, Nizhny Novgorod region, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Karelia, Rostov region, Saratov region, Stavropol region, Tambov region, Ulyanovsk region, Chelyabinsk region. Politically, the international background in 2012 favored the development of Russia, it accepted the proposal to join the WTO and develop in the direction of greater integration of its system, primarily with EAS and the West as a whole. Economic processes were dynamically positive, an upsurge in the activity of liberal-democratic movements. 2016, on the contrary, faced large-scale sanctions against Russia, pressure from the EEC and NATO, the United States [Power, business, civil society, 2016].

4 An alternative in Latin means choosing one of the two possibilities or the other option(s). Alternativeism – these are ideas, positions, theories, views that do not coincide with the prevailing viewpoint in different spheres of human activity. This is a method of peaceful struggle against stagnation in thoughts and actions. If man did not create alternatives in science and practice, he would become a slave. People always have the opportunity to change the world order that restricts them.

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cies of Russian politics today are clear to 40% of respondents versus 33% in 2005. *In comparison with 2005, by 8% (from 69 to 61%) decreased the number of those who agreed that they do not have and will never have an opportunity to influence the actions of the authorities. On the contrary, 30% of respondents are sure of the opposite. And another 20% of respondents know how to transform this possibility into a concrete political action, that is, to make their voice heard by the authorities. Over the past seven years, the number of those who declared that they are participating in political life rose almost twice (from 25% to 45%), pursuing not just their personal interests and not even to contradict the authorities, but primarily being guided by ideas and values of common good – to change life for the better in your city, town, country. And until more recently, political and public participation, if it did not promise any direct financial or career benefits, would not act as a “social elevator”, it was considered to be an activity that is purely marginal by a large part of the population, including the activist, “advanced” minority. Thus, V.V. Petukhov fixes the trend for the growth of political participation. This could not have been imagined even five or seven years ago [Petukhov, 2013].*

There is an opinion that such an important basis for all forms of activity, including political, as general solidarity, is extremely weakly expressed in Russia. This can be called into question if one would remember what the active public, together with the political opposition, has achieved in 25 years of its existence in Russia. It managed to solve several problems.

The first result of the liberal-democratic opposition, primarily the “Democratic Russia” movement, which appeared in the fall of 1990 under the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, was its non-violent civil resistance to the communist regime, which ultimately led to its peaceful dismantling.

The second result was the destruction of party-political monopoly in the country due to abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR, in which the CPSU was proclaimed “the guiding and leading force of Soviet society, the core of its political system, state and public organizations ...”.

The third result of the liberal opposition was the recruitment and support of its own representative (B.N. Yeltsin) in the first alternative presidential election of Russia and his victory in 1991 in the fight against other contenders (for the first time since the October Revolution, the opposition used peaceful means to put its representative in power).

The fourth result of this opposition was the consolidation of democratic principles in the Constitution of the USSR, and then adoption of a new Basic Law of the Russian Federation in 1993, which included all the articles of the UN Declaration on Human Rights.

The results of the United Opposition activities (G.K. Kasparov, M.M. Kasyanov, B.E. Nemtsov, V.A. Ryzhkov and others) are more modest, in view of the constant disagreements between the leaders and even the withdrawal of some of them from the coalition, but it is still noticeable. A common platform for discussions of various social and political forces has been created; an attempt was made to unite

disparate opposition forces; mass actions were organized to warn the authorities that non-parliamentary public control exists.

The result of the active public's releases “For Fair Election!” in 2011-2012 has consisted of the real steps taken by the President of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the State Duma. They decided on serious changes in electoral legislation aimed to expand the possibilities for political competition. The new law on political parties came in action on April 4, 2012 in Russia. This law has seriously changed the system of party building and the procedure for registering political parties. Under the new law, the procedure of registering parties has become much simpler. The necessary minimum number of political party members was reduced 80 times: from 40 000 to 500 people. As a result, more than 70 parties have already been registered in the country, and there will be even more. Another thing is that these dwarfish parties are unlikely to be able to compete with large parties that have already taken place. Therefore, to the question of sociologists “For whom would you vote at the next elections: for one of the old parties or for some new party?” – more than one third (34%) of Russians do not find the answer, they cannot decide on such a long list of parties, and 61% of respondents prefer the old party (ER, SR, CPRF, LDPR, Yabloko, Patrioty Rossii, Pravoye delo). Therefore, the next step should be the norm for the party units' participation in elections. The threshold for the minimum percentage of votes, which must be obtained from the federal list of candidates for the election of deputies in the State Duma, in order to participate in the distribution of deputy mandates has been lowered from 7% to 5%.

Before the Presidential election in 2018 members of the Federation Council A.A. Klishas, A.I. Shirokov, State Duma Deputy M. Sheremet created the bill to the State Duma No. 114572-7 On Amendments to the Federal Law “On Elections of the President of the Russian Federation” (to clarify the procedure of appointing observers and securing the principle of publicity). It provides the option to refuse to vote with absentee certificates, simplifies the procedure for the observers' work at polling stations and reduces the list of requirements for documents necessary to register. The draft law mitigates the requirements for collected signatures: until now, the smallest inaccuracy, for example, when specifying the address in subscription lists, was used as a basis for withdrawing the candidate. Also, the candidates are allowed to replace the document submitted to the CEC if it was registered with the violation, and to bring the absent document no later than one day before the meeting at which the matter of candidate's registration will be decided. In the course of the recent election campaign, the lack of necessary certificates turned into a refusal to register several dozen people, including former deputies.

One of the important questions is the question about methods of political struggle for the active society, including the non-parliamentary opposition: revolution or cooperation with the authorities? The Levada Center survey, which has already been mentioned, does not yet demonstrate increased protest attitude among Russians and their

willingness to take part in protest actions. Obviously, it is influenced by the Crimea accession euphoria that has not yet passed and the increased patriotic sentiments in connection with international sanctions against Russia. At the same time, during the interviews, the following feature is revealed. Our citizens are more willing to protest because of discontent with the socio-economic situation (13%) than the political one (9%). Simply put, the level of salaries and prices, the situation in the housing and communal services, etc. makes them worry much more than falsifications in the course of elections or other forms of infringement of the opposition rights. Therefore, the attitude towards the president (the governor, the mayor) is primarily determined by their economic abilities, and only then by the political ones.

A more complex picture was revealed by the FOM in 2014, clarifying the respondents' attitude to the rally activity<sup>5</sup>. To the question: "If in the near future where you live there will be rallies, demonstrations of opponents to the current government and its supporters, then how would you most likely act?", the following results were obtained: "I would not support either the opponents or the supporters of the current government" – 61%; "I would go to the rally, a demonstration against the authorities" – 6%; "I would speak out against the authorities, but I would not go to the rally" – 9%; "I would speak out in support of the authorities, but I would not go to the rally" – 11%; "I would go to a rally, a demonstration in support of the authorities" – 2%. These results demonstrate that the share of opponents of the current government is 15%, of which active opponents are 6%. However, the share of open supporters to the authorities is even less – 13%. And 61% prefer to keep neutrality.

And there is one more important point in the interaction of society and the state. The active public prefers more direct dialogue with the authorities, bypassing the mediators – NPOs, SPAs. In this case, there is a rapid process of forming extra-institutional forms of self-organization, which are created and operate in logic that is alternative to traditional political institutions. Some experts even believe that the communicative aspect of democracy, connected with the rapid development of the Internet and social networks, will be more important in the twenty-first century than the institutional one.

In this way, it can be stated that civil society in Russia, albeit slowly, will strengthen eventually, it already demonstrates certain successes in modernizing the country, showing an increased interest in improving social and economic situation in the country, advancing the level and the quality of life, and presenting an outstanding political authority in the affairs of power.

### **The authorities are moving towards civil society**

For more than 20 years, state authorities have been working to create an extensive legislative framework that

allows the public to participate in governance with the state.

*The state takes responsibility for ensuring national security of citizens, which is treated more broadly than state security and this policy concerns, first of all, the internal protection of Russians.* In 2015, an updated "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation" was adopted, which provides a detailed definition of national security. This is the condition of "protection of the individual, society and the state from internal and external threats, which ensures the implementation of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation, decent quality and standard of living, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity, sustainable socio-economic development of the Russian Federation". It is said that one of the main directions to ensure state and public security is the development of interaction between its security bodies and civil society. *The interaction of state and municipal authorities with civil society should be aimed at countering threats to the quality of life of Russians.* The state sees the main task of civil society in the assistance of citizens to solving social problems and to monitoring the work of power structures in fulfilling the social obligations of the state.

*Conditions are created for the emergence of the institution of public control.* Laws were adopted on public associations; on trade unions; on political parties; on the Commissioner for Human Rights; on meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets; on the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation; on providing access to information on the activities of courts, state bodies and local self-government bodies; on an alternative dispute settlement procedure involving an intermediary, etc.

In 2014, the federal law on the foundations of public control in the Russian Federation was issued. This law for the first time spelled out the creation of public councils under the federal executive and legislative authorities, as well as the authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation. They have the right to perform consultative and advisory functions, participate in the implementation of public control, facilitate the recording of the rights and legitimate interests of public associations, human rights, religious and other organizations in the public assessment of their activities. Such councils are formed on a competitive basis and consist only of regular citizens; state and municipal employees cannot be included in their composition. According to this law, public supervisory commissions are created to deal with public control over the protection of human rights in places of detention, as well as public inspections and public control groups in the bodies of state power and local self-government, exercising state or municipal control. For the purpose of information support for social control, its publicity and openness, the subject of social control can create special websites, and in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation – use official websites of state authorities, local governments, state and municipal organizations, and other bodies and organizations. In short, the state legally "felt" its responsibility to society and started creating structures, encouraging practices for governance through cooperation.

<sup>5</sup> The survey of the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) was conducted on January 18-19, 2014, at a representative all-Russian sample among 3000 respondents in 204 settlements in 64 regions of the country.



### Conclusion

According to the modernization theory of R. Inglehart and K. Welzel, which is based on the main conclusions of the classical concepts of modernization of K. Marx and M. Weber, the emancipation of a society capable to govern through cooperation with the state passes through certain stages over the course of its modernization. Socio-economic development leads to a systematic shift from traditional values to values of self-expression and creates the conditions for the formation of democratic institutions.

Russia has already made a certain path in this direction. In the reformed Russia, the thesis is confirmed that values transform under the influence of changes in the economy and politics. Russian civilization shows flexibility and dynamism, close to the West, including its relation to the values. The liberal values or values of self-expression are gradually winning over young people and middle-aged citizens. At the same time, the tradition of hope for the state, for its paternalism, is alive in Russia. The economic crisis of 2008 and sanctions against our country in connection with the entry of the Crimea into the Russian Federation and the support of the Donetsk and Lugansk national republics weakened the social and economic situation of the Russians. Therefore, today the value scale for Russians can be called a hybrid scale. There are simultaneously two orientations in it: the value of self-expression and the value of self-survival.

True democracy depends on the degree of people's participation in governance. Effective democracy is more likely to arise in a society where more than 45% of the population bears the values of self-expression [Inglehart, Welzel, 2011, P.435]. The country is witnessing the formation of a group of self-satisfied citizens, representing 44% of the population, able to live and act without state custody, but ready to take on some of the public concerns. It is still necessary to trace the correlation between the quality of "self-sufficiency" in

this group and the degree of responsiveness to cooperation with the state in the management process, as well as the degree of effectiveness of the civil structures work called upon to cooperate with and control the government. There is some progress in the positive direction.

Other processes are observed simultaneously with positive moments. When there is a threat to physical survival of people, the values of survival prevail, which leads to strengthening of the institution of authoritarianism, and then the issue of governance through cooperation between the state and society ceases to be relevant. Either this cooperation turns into a formal democracy, when there are "sham institutions", civil and political rights, but the ruling elite ignores them and acts at their own discretion. Elements of such democracy we observe in Russia in conditions of sanctions and external threats. The question of the "decency" of the ruling elite and its moral qualities arises. It is no accident that recently a wave of dismissals of governors, major figures in the structures of MVD and MCHS has occurred in Russia in connection with the revealed facts of corruption.

Gradually, the outlines of institutional cooperation of civil society and the state in governing the country are revealed. A serious legislative base for such cooperation has already been created and continues to be formed. Public councils are formed in the bodies of state and municipal authorities. The public chambers are assigned civil control over it.

At the current stage of civil society institutions development, its activists are showing an increasing interest in direct communication with the authorities without intermediaries. This is due to the rapid development of the Internet and social networks. It is predicted that in the 21st century, Internet communication between society and the state will be more important than the institutional one.

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