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NON-TERRITORIAL AND TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ETHNOREGIONAL PARTIES

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Abstract: In Central and Eastern Europe, even the post-socialist period has not made it easy for ethnic communities to exercise their linguistic and cultural rights, and territorial autonomy or self-government, as a risk to territorial integrity, has been granted only in exceptional cases. This paper focuses on the main objectives of ethnoregional parties to reorganise the power structure of the national political system. The study is based on an analysis of core documents from 92 parties in 15 Central and Eastern European countries, identifying and classifying the objectives set out in these documents. The results highlight the ethnoregional objectives in Central and Eastern Europe, including not only the cultural-linguistic dimension but also the need to change internal/external borders or the division of power within each state, highlighting the diversity and complexity of the problems and objectives underlying each category.

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Introduction

Social cleavages, which play a decisive role in the formation of parties and party families, appear not only in the classical theory of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), but also in the works of other scholars (Seiler 1982, Seiler 1985, von Beyme 1985, von Beyme 1996) who attempt to systematise parties, to characterise and examine individual party systems. In addition to the “classical” parties classified on ideological grounds, these systematic works often include a party family composed of ethnic and regional (geographically and/or nationally peripheral) political organisations. Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rokkan (1970), and then Rokkan and Urwin (1982) mention peripheral movements emerging along the centre-periphery cleavage; Seiler (1985) refers to parties representing the interests of the periphery; while von Beyme (1985) distinguished the category of regional and ethnic parties. Nonetheless, there is no scientific consensus surrounding the delimitation of party families, and especially the definition of regional, subnational parties as one of these families. Criticisms are primarily aimed at the fact that these parties are ideologically extremely diverse (Strmiska 2002), so they can hardly be interpreted as an independent category in a grouping that basically uses ideology as a category-forming criterion. Some critics even suggest that it would be more useful to divide this party family and to classify parties according to their ideology (Mair and Mudde 1998), while others claim, that, although their internal logic differs from other party families, they form a coherent group (Miodownik and Cartrite 2006).

However, the independent ethnic and regional party family, legitimised and thus accepted by the literature, points to its diversity and the existence of (at least) two subgroups even in its name. Ethnic (Horowitz 1985, Bugajski 1995, Chandra 2011, Chandra 2012) and regional parties (Rokkan and Urwin 1982, van Houten 2007, Raos 2011, Massetti and Schakel 2020) are fundamentally different from each other, as they are organised on completely different bases. Still, the two sets do have an intersection, in which the group of ethnoregional parties is found, combining their essential characteristics. The acceptance of the presence, name, and role of ethnoregional parties is growing in political science, and even their appearance and importance in CEE is becoming less and less debatable.

Several attempts have been made to define ethnoregional parties, however, the term ‘ethnoregional’ is not commonly accepted either. In the literature, scholars use many terms for this type of party (Hepburn 2009, Salat and Székely 2018). The double bind idea presented above is supported by Rokkan and Urwin’s (1982) definition of parties as identifying with areas and groups that do not coincide with state boundaries and national populations and representing them in opposition to central governments. Similarly, Türsan (1998) also emphasises the two interconnected dimensions by defining ethnoregional parties as a supporter of nationalism based on ethnic distinctiveness and territorial claims. According to Müller-Rommel (1998: 19), ethno-

regional parties are organisations “referring to the efforts of geographically concentrated peripheral minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes even the democratic order of a nation-state by demanding recognition of their cultural identity”. De Winter (2001: 4) adds that the aim of ethnoregional parties is “the reorganisation of the power structure of the national political system, for a certain degree of self-government for the region”. Although for such organisations in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) the term ethnic party is more common (Zuber and Szöcsik 2012), this paper uses the more expressive ethnoregional term.

Even though several ethnoregional parties in CEE are much smaller and less relevant than those in Western Europe, some organisations are significant actors in their political and party systems (Zamfira 2015), characterised by a permanent presence in the Parliament and occasionally in governments (Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia or in Serbia; Turks in Bulgaria). Regardless of their size, many parties are members of international organisations, they have joined European parties or parliamentary groups of the European Parliament (and not necessarily the European Free Alliance), and often they have representatives in the EP. Therefore, they have caught up with Western European parties.

Academic interest towards ethnoregional parties in CEE is growing, and the literature is mainly dominated by case studies, country studies or studies focusing on the organisations of one ethnic group (Kiss et al. 2013, Zuber 2013, Harrach 2016). However, comprehensive studies covering the whole region have also been published, sometimes with the aim to develop typologies (Nedelcu and DeBardeleben 2016) or to compare and to summarise processes in the CEE region (Kostadinova 2002, Bochsler 2006, Nakai 2009, Bernauer and Bochsler 2011, Bochsler 2011, Székely and Horváth 2014, Strijbis and Kotnarowski 2015, Szöcsik and Zuber 2015, Koev 2022), although they generally cannot cover all ethnoregional organisations in CEE due to their thematic and methodological nature. Such a wide-ranging analysis was last seen in Bugajski's (1995) detailed presentation and typology of ethnic politicisation in Central and Eastern Europe, distinguishing five different stages (cultural revivalism, political autonomy, territorial self-determination, separatism, irredentism). Since then, some of the aspirations have already been fulfilled (especially in the territory of the former Yugoslavia), several organisations disappeared or replaced by another, and new identities awakened or entered another phase of ethnic politics.

The aim of this paper is therefore to renew the typology using elements from Western European classifications and to summarise the macro regional characteristics of the types of ethnoregional parties in CEE seeking to involve in the research as many of these organisations as possible. The passage of time and the changes mentioned above both call for a reassessment of ethnic politics and a review of their types in CEE. This attempt has been facilitated by Dandoy's (2010) typology of ethnoregional parties in

Western Europe, which is based on – among others – Bugajski's (1995) work. His classification assessed parties according to the nature of their goals and demands.

Therefore, this paper provides a renewed typology for CEE parties based on an analysis of statutes and political programs of ethnoregional parties published on their websites. Due to historical reasons and political considerations, it is not certain that ethnoregional communities choose to form a party and to participate in elections as a solution for asserting their interests, as there are other ways besides the elections (Rokkan and Urwin 1982, Chandra 2011), such as community engagement (Park and Kim 2014). Moreover, it is common for a community to be represented by more than one organisation, as the community members, thus political parties, may have different ideas about the nature of representation and aspirations (Schrijver 2006). In total, 105 ethnoregional communities have been identified in 16 CEE states, and the typology provides an overview of 92 ethnoregional parties (Appendix 1).

Regional characteristics in historical perspective

The situation of CEE states is undoubtedly unique in geographical, geopolitical, and historical terms, as expressed by the term “Lands in Between” (Batt 1998: 7). The region's specific indeterminacy, its ambivalence towards (Western) Europe, its peripheral location, its economic and social backwardness, its remoteness, its ethnic diversity, and the determining reasons were analysed in historical depth. According to Szűcs (1981) and Bibó (2016), the roots of the different development of historical regions go back to the time of the organisation of states. As they state, western-style integration developed organically, organised from the bottom up, along the lines of fiefdom treaties, while in the CEE region – drifting from the eastern periphery to the western – it was achieved rapidly, because of non-organic development, and directed from above, so that the western structural elements appeared somewhat distorted and muted (Szűcs 1981, Bibó 2016). This distortion and incompleteness persisted in later periods.

The need for 'national self-determination' emerged, and after World War I this was manifested in the dissolution of empires on the one hand, and in the competition of nations for territories on the other hand (Hajdú 2008). The new nation-states faced significant internal challenges and difficulties in the interwar period, which was then interrupted by the state-socialist period (Batt 1998), bringing similar features for CEE countries, such as dictatorial regimes, ideologically driven social changes, then deep transformation, and many challenges in the transition period (Gherghina and Jigla 2011, Jigla and Gherghina 2011).

Different development, including different social development of the previous periods, resulted in an intermediate state even after the transition – as Kulcsár (2016) concludes, the “hybrid” or the “in between” status of CEE can be understood also in the

democratisation period, as although the structures of the market economy and civil democracy followed the Western patterns; but the operating mechanisms, the values and behaviour prevailing in society are more Eastern (e.g. weaknesses of the system of checks and balances, paternalistic elite, revival of the oligarchy, “socialist-feudal” behaviour, weak and vulnerable civil society). Today, as Rovny (2023) argues, democratic backsliding is also a feature in the region, especially in countries that were previously at the forefront of the transition and have relatively homogeneous societies. Even though democratic backsliding can be interpreted as a natural consequence of consolidation (Berman 2019), it may also be the result of democratisation that has taken place too quickly, under external influences rather than organically from within, and which the CEE countries have not yet been able to internalise successfully.

The nationalist rhetoric, which was revived in the period after the transition, (re)ignited ethnic antagonisms, generating conflicts between the majority and minority nations that make up the states. These conflicts then led to the dissolution of federations, the creation of a whole series of nation-states and the re-emergence of internal tensions (Batt 1998). Due to the features of historical past and ethnic conflicts in CEE, almost all ethnoregional communities in the region formulate protectionist demands related to fundamental rights. The absence of a stable, long democratic past, the (perceived or real) territorial and ethnic grievances still play a significant role in the life of states and nations. The (armed) conflicts of the recent and present have all contributed to the fact that the status of ethnic communities in the CEE region is often unsettled (e.g. denial of citizenship in the Baltic States) and ethnic rights are scarce and uncertain (e.g. there is no explicit minority law in Romania summarising and detailing these rights). The ethnic issue is often a tool of national and territorial protection. Especially in states where communities live in large numbers or even concentrated, and (at least according to the state or the majority society) they potentially threaten the stability and territorial integrity of the state, certain rights of communities are denied, or they are kept in limbo (cf. nationalising state, Brubaker 1995). During the accession negotiations, the European Union only indirectly formulated expectations in the field of minority protection (Brusis 2003), so the EU membership by itself does not guarantee a certain level and quality of ethnic rights. Still, the EU's role in minority protection is important, as it has played a significant role, together with other international organisations, in the resolution and mitigation of ethnic conflicts, especially in the Balkans (Vizi 2013).

A region, in Western terminology, means something quite different from what exists in CEE, often in the form of a mere statistical unit. During the transition, the emphasis was placed on the elements of horizontal power sharing, and the vertical dimension received little attention (Myśliwiec 2016), mostly only in connection with the EU accession (Brusis 2002). As Saarts emphasises (2020: 629), “regionalization in CEE has thus always been rather a normative and externally imposed issue, rather than a natural bottom-up initiative or a goal in itself, as in the West”.

Regarding the regions, CEE states can be characterised as follows: (1) very strong state centralist tradition; (2) lack of territorial units that have their own distinct history, identity and culture, even in historical regions; (3) weak regional civil society and underdeveloped regional civic networks; (4) ethnic regionalism has served rather as a counter-productive factor concerning greater devolution and decentralisation; (5) regionalisation has been 'administrative–statistical'; (6) although the EU's impact has been very significant and multi-layered, it has not been as pervasive and omnipotent as previous studies have claimed it to be (Saarts 2020). In contrast to organic development in the West, there is much less tradition of wider territorial autonomy in CEE, and the limited role of the regions can be traced back to the still lack of self-governments (Masetti and Shakel 2020). Moreover, instead of using decentralisation to accommodate national minorities (Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013), the states preferred to divide, through regionalisation, the regions with strong historical or ethnic (e.g. Slovakia) identities (Saarts 2020). Thus, apart from the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, no ethnic (or ethnoregional) community has an institutionalised region: either they have no political representation at the regional level or the regional division cuts across their place of residence (Szöcsik and Zuber 2021).

Significant differences between states in CEE were noticeable during the democratic transition, both socio-economically and politically. von Beyme (1996) and Seiler (1995) have noted that state socialism has also created new fault lines in the region, unknown in the West, while some of the classic social conflicts have faded. The capital-labour cleavage is one of the latter, and the specific features of the state socialist system – nationalisations, abolition of the bourgeoisie – made this type of conflict irrelevant but it was later revived in relation to the market economy. The new cleavages, that were primarily the basis of party formation in the transition period, were revived based on the attitude towards the transition and the state-socialist system. The existence of these splits is confirmed by the party family structure created for the CEE region, which included a group of reform communists and forum parties, as well as regional and ethnic parties (von Beyme 1996). Kitschelt (1992) also considered the nature of the previous regime(s), but especially of state socialism and transition, as decisive in emergent cleavages. According to him, the society was divided by conflicts along the dimensions of citizenship (cosmopolitans and particularists), political establishment and decision-making (authoritarians and libertarians), and socio-economic distribution, resources, and attitudes (market distribution and political redistribution). He divided CEE states into three types (patrimonial systems; bureaucratic-authoritarian systems; and national-commodity systems), whose different development paths were determined by the socio-cultural development of the countries, the education of the electorate, the nature of the socialist and pre-socialist systems, the specificities of the transition, and the nature of the new political institutions.

Methodology

Study area

The geographical scope of the research is CEE, although the delimitation – and even the naming – of the region is not entirely obvious (Butt 1998, Haughton 2007). Authors from different historical periods and disciplines have developed various concepts of Europe in two, three or four divisions, based on a variety of perspectives and approaches, which have been described in detail by Okey (1992), Probáld and Szabó (2005) or Páthy (2022). CEE is sometimes referred to by other names in these divisions (Mitteleuropa, Zwischeneuropa), and the picture is also mixed in terms of the included states. Within the region, further sub-regions can be distinguished (e.g. V4 countries, Baltic States, the Balkans), although some countries are not always included in political (the Baltic was part of the Soviet Union) or geographical terms (the Balkans can be interpreted as a separate category as South-East Europe) (Szabó 2022). It is precisely the lack of clear geographical boundaries and the diversity as a “hallmark” (Batt 1998: 3) of the region that gives researchers the freedom to define it according to their own convictions and ideas. In so doing, this paper uses the term CEE in a political rather than a geographical sense and it considers the states as part of the region that was democratised after the socialist era in the early 1990s and those that were created/-independent states, except for the current members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Therefore, within this paper CEE includes: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

Analysis of ethnoregional parties

As defined above, ethnoregional parties are political organisations representing territorial concentrated ethnic communities. Minority groups living in border or multiethnic regions (Berceanu et al. 2023) are special cases of so-called ethnoregional communities. Parties are interpreted according to the following three criteria: first, all organisations that present candidates or lists for any election are treated as a party (Sartori 2005). As there is no common legal status required to participate in the elections in the concerned states, the research covers not only those registered as political parties, but also all other organisations (associations, movements). Secondly, parties represent a territorial concentrated ethnic community that does not constitute the majority society of the state. This criterion excludes pure ethnic and regional parties, as well as majority (nationalist) parties. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina – like in Belgium (Raos 2011) – parties representing the three constituent nations are treated as ethnoregional. Thirdly, by definition, parties target some degree of self-government for the community/region that they represent and it can vary from cultural protectionism to separatism (De Winter 2001).

The following steps were needed to identify ethnoregional parties. First, ethnoregional communities across CEE were identified based on census data. Difficulties caused by the fact that states hold censuses at different times, at different intervals, provide results at different levels of detail, and there is not necessarily a formal way or individual intention to record the ethnic identity. The problem can be further complicated by ethnic boycotts declared in protest of a particular conflict. At present, only a few states (e.g. Slovenia) use register-based censuses, but this may become commonplace in the future, so that this information based on individual declarations may disappear. The limitations of censuses are therefore obvious but, in the absence of any other and more reliable reference, this data collection should be used as a basis for defining communities. The most recent census data, which are best suited to reveal the main characteristics of each ethnoregional community, were used to define them.

In any case, the communities were delimited in the most generous way possible: (1) the legal status (recognised, non-recognised) of the community was ignored; (2) no lower limit was set for the size or proportion of the group within the society; (3) no strict proportions were applied to the degree of spatial concentration; and (4) the characteristics were examined on a spatial scale adapted to the ethnic group, sometimes crossing the administrative boundaries. Only historical ethnic communities were included, so transnational communities or migrant groups of the past decades were not part of the research. The Roma, a transnational minority present in large numbers in almost all regions of Central and Eastern Europe, have many political parties but they are insignificant in relation to their share of the population (Dobos 2013). However, immigrant groups, forming ethnic enclaves mostly in urban areas (Schafft and Kulcsár 2015, Andersen 2019), do not typically form parties.

As a second step, election databases and results were examined to identify organisations representing ethnoregional communities. As previously specified, “organisations stand for any election”, not just national (parliamentary or presidential), but all levels of subnational elections were also considered. The third step was to examine these parties' websites. The existent website was a necessary but not sufficient condition for classification. Most of the time, websites contain the statutes and programs governing the functioning and the basic characteristics of the parties. Nowadays, it is also a common phenomenon that political communication and contact with the voters is shifted to social media platforms, in which case the website may be neglected, it is less frequently updated, or, in extreme cases, it is even closed by the organisations, so that the documents of relevance to the research are not available. So, these parties were not included in the research.

The classification of ethnoregional parties is therefore based on an analysis of the main objectives manifested within the parties' basic documents. As the aim was to categorise them by general objectives, the statutes and framework programmes were the main

basis for the analysis. Election programmes, and other information on the websites (“about us”, “objectives”, etc.) were analysed only in their absence. To explore these objectives, a qualitative content analysis was carried out on the parts of each document that contained information on basic non-territorial and territorial demands. To explore these objectives, a qualitative content analysis was carried out on the parts of each document that contain information on basic non-territorial and territorial needs.

For the analysis, the relevant and mandatory chapter of the party statutes, usually entitled “objectives of the organisation”, was used. If the organisation had a general framework programme, the descriptions contained in it were used for typing, as these are generally more detailed texts containing more and more precise information than the statutes. If no organisational document was available on the party's website, but there was some official information on the objectives (“about us”, “our mission” sub-page), this was considered for the classification. However, for constitutional or strategic reasons, a party may not necessarily set out its true aspirations in its documents. To verify and validate the results, a questionnaire was sent to the parties, but due to the low response rate, this could not be considered in the analysis. This potential for error was considered in the research, and therefore the results were validated with information from other data sources and databases. All parties are included in the typology based on the “highest level” of its aspirations. Parties can be grouped into categories based on their documents, within which further subcategories can be developed that include important differences.

Dandoy (2010) grouped ethnoregional parties into three main categories that pose different challenges to their environment. Protectionist parties' objects are related to issues of cultural autonomy and political representation, i.e., these parties fight for the recognition of their community, the elimination of discrimination, the guarantee or even the extension of their rights (conservative), or for the representation of the community in the Parliament and the change of the electoral system (participationist). Decentralist parties formulate their territorial demands within the state, seeking to transform the vertical division of power and to change internal borders. A distinction can be made between a subset of parties that seek self-government exclusively for the region inhabited by the community (autonomist), a subset of parties that seek general autonomy, i.e., broader autonomy for all territorial units of the country (federalist), and organisations that see the region as the depository of sovereignty and that wish to decide for themselves what powers to delegate to the state level (confederalist). The territorial demands of secessionist parties go beyond the current national borders, and they are therefore already being expressed in the international arena. In these cases, the territorial claims are directed towards a well-defined, specific territory, and the ownership of which these parties wish to change. This can take the form of a demand for the creation of an independent state (independentist), the annexation of a territory to an existing state (irredentist) or the annexation of a region to another state (rattachist).

Results

De Winter's (2001) definition on ethnoregional parties anticipates the possibility of categorising organisations and setting up typologies. The parties' objectives can vary from cultural protectionism to separatism, and this points to the factors on which parties can be classified into different types. Classifications were generally developed based on Western European parties. These typologies categorise ethnoregional aspirations into cultural and territorial types, and within the territorial one, they distinguish between intra-state and cross-border attempts, with significant differences in terms of categories and approaches by scholars (Snyder 1982, Rudolph and Thompson 1985, Mikesell and Murphy 1991, Keating 1996, De Winter 1998, Ishiyama and Breuning 1998, Coakley 2002, Wolff 2004, Seiler 2005, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro et al. 2006, Jenne 2007, Dandoy 2010).

The different development trajectories of the Western and (Central and) Eastern European regions make it difficult to treat them together or even to compare them, so typologies typically do not include CEE parties. Moreover, the only comprehensive typology on ethnic politicisation in CEE was developed by Bugajski in the early '90s (Bugajski 1995), which, in terms of methodology, undoubtedly fits into the range of Western European classifications. In his basic work, he distinguished five stages of ethnic politics: cultural revivalism, political autonomism, territorial self-determinism, separatism, and irredentism. In the following, the types (Figure 1), and subtypes of ethnoregional parties in CEE are described, based on the analysed party documents: protectionist (conservative, participationist), decentralist (exclusively decentralist, regionalist, autonomist, federalist), and separatist ([r]attachist) parties.

Most ethnoregional parties in the CEE region represent protectionist claims. As seen above, democratisation, state and nation building took place in parallel after the transition, thus the rebuilding of different national or ethnic identities have sometimes worked against each other, generating conflicts. Within this paper, the detailed rights granted to minorities is not analysed, but there are obviously significant differences between minorities among countries, and even within the same country (Poland, for example, has established three categories of ethnic groups in the country, with different rights: national minorities, ethnic minorities, and regional languages).

Typically, communities represented by conservative parties already have a legal status and definitive individual and/or collective ethnic rights, but, naturally, they seek to maintain and to extend them as widely as possible (e.g. Poles in Lithuania, Croats in Serbia, Serbs in Kosovo). The most frequent demands include the elimination of discrimination against minorities, the expansion of the use of the mother tongue, the provision of education in the mother tongue, finally, the provision and expansion of the conditions necessary for the protection and preservation of identity. In CEE, especially in the Balkans, it is a peculiar phenomenon that the ethnic and religious

cleavages sometimes coincide (typically the case of Albanians, Bosniaks and Turks), and the parties wish to ensure the free exercise of religion in parallel with the expansion of minority rights as well.




Figure 1. NUTS 3 regions by party formation by ethnoregional communities and types of ethnoregional parties in CEE

Note: As there are no defined NUTS 3 regions in Montenegro, the whole country is marked on the map

States in CEE use different solutions to ensure the representation of minorities. Juberías (2000) categorises the states as opposer, ignorer, supporter, and granter of ethnic representation, while the states are making ethnicity the basis of political representation. Today, there is no country that prohibits ethnic organisation in practice, although the differences between countries in electoral systems are significant – there is a wide range of solutions: no guaranteed representation or special electoral preference (Baltic States, Czech Republic, and Slovakia); electoral preference (Poland, Serbia); guaranteed mandate (Kosovo, Romania, and Slovenia); minority constituency (Croatia, Montenegro). However, the benefits of electoral systems do not always apply to all ethnic groups in a given state. A group of parties wish to strengthen the ethnic communities' political representation through changing the electoral method, by ensuring (more) guaranteed seat in the Parliament, a proportional representation for the community in the Parliament (e.g. Turks in North Macedonia), or other, by local representative bodies, and by reinforcing the local governmental participation.

Decentralist parties, in general, formulate territorial claims that go beyond the ethnic rights discussed above. According to these parties, only territorial self-governments can ensure the interests of ethnic communities. In all cases, the aim of the organisations is to claim autonomy for the area inhabited by the ethnoregional community. This area can be an existing, delimited territorial unit or a region that can only be created through administrative reform. In CEE, the lack of general decentralisation, the insufficient depth of vertical power sharing and the disparities between natural, sometimes historical regions and the artificial administrative units have given rise to four subtypes of decentralist parties.

First, exclusively decentralist parties do not strive for a radical transformation of the state power system, although they are mostly dissatisfied with the current territorial structure, and their demands for decentralisation can be realised through territorial reforms and internal border corrections. Parties belonging to this subtype often hide their aspirations in the regional categories created in the European Union and, because of integration, they are almost completely banishing the radical term 'territorial autonomy' from their vocabulary. Mainly these organisations are strongly integrated into the party system, they have parliamentary representation, and they sometimes hold government positions as well. To maintain their coalition potential, they have a specific interest in moderate politicisation and the careful and considered demand for territorial needs.

Although regionalisation is also a form of decentralisation, it creates a more stable situation, providing constitutional status for the established territorial units. Along this argument, regionalist parties can be distinguished. Some of these organisations advocate a reorganisation of the territorial division of the state based on natural, historical, economic, and cultural borders (Hungarians in Slovakia), while others promote regionalisation, even in its asymmetric form (some Hungarian parties in Romania, Bakk and Székely 2012), as a kind of modernisation reform, and a genuine European solution. In the latter cases, parties expect that regionalisation is easier to accept than territorial autonomy, which is perceived as a potential threat in the region.

Autonomist parties do not strive to put their demands into a form acceptable to the majority society, so these organisations focus only on their own region (Bosniaks in Serbia, Silesians in Poland). A group of parties wants autonomy for the historic region (Sandžak, Upper Silesia) inhabited by the ethnoregional community, which previously had independence or a special status, and in some cases after the transformation of the administrative boundaries or the territorial division. Another group of parties envisages the creation of a smaller self-governing territorial unit within the framework of territorial autonomy (Hungarians in Serbia or Ukraine). Such solutions typically arise in multi-ethnic regions, which currently exist either in a unit with a special status (Vojvodina) or in a unitary structure (Transcarpathia).

The federalist party is a rare phenomenon in CEE. Federalism – if it has no traditions of state organisation – can be the guarantee of a peaceful coexistence or living side by side in multi-ethnic states and societies with pillars. In the region, during the transition, the federations broke up peacefully (Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union) or through armed conflicts (Yugoslavia). The need for federalisation is typical among ethno-regional organisations operating in historical (Moravia) or multi-ethnic regions (Transcarpathia) that have developed permanently separately from the rest of the state. Currently, only Bosnia and Herzegovina have a federal (but not organically formed) structure. Croatian parties (most of them) wish to transform the federal system by the creation of the third, Croatian entity, on the territory of the Federation of BiH.

The quasi-absence of the secessionist type can be traced to recent ethnic conflicts and wars. As a result of dissolution of federations, many ethnic communities and nations have established their own independent states, and thus such aspirations in CEE have (temporarily?) disappeared. Of course, the creation of new state borders – or their establishment and definition in peace negotiations – new communities were forced into minority existence. The dissatisfaction with the situation takes the form of demands for border adjustments, but only to a minimal extent. Based on the examined party documents – although the literature suggests that several parties can be characterised by secessionist aspirations – only one organisation could be classified in the (r)attachist subtype.

Discussion

In line with its original objectives, the present study has classified ethnoregional parties of the CEE region into: protectionist, decentralist and secessionist types, following the Western European typologies. Given the previously described problems, it is not surprising that almost all examined organisations could be classified as conservative. It is worth noting that parties of the non-recognised, or constitutionally-legally not determined ethnoregional communities, have also a “higher” territorial demand based on their historical past (antecedents) and historical regions. This is the case in some geographical-historical regions (Moravia, Pirin Macedonia, Samogitia, Timok Valley, Upper Silesia) where parties represent communities whose independent existence is at least disputed. The majority society considers these communities as a subset of the nation, and their language as a dialect of the majority language. In states with a significant minority (Albanians in Northern Macedonia, Hungarians in Romania or Slovakia, Serbs in Montenegro), ethnoregional parties represent communities whose status is recognised in practice, but they are fighting for constitutional amendment or at least legislative reforms to acknowledge them as a minority, to regularise their status as an equal state-forming nation, or to affirm their existing practical ethnic rights. These parties also have territorial claims due to the communities’ indigenous status, size, and territorial concentration.

Related to this, one may legitimately ask whether the chosen research methodology was appropriate to establish the parties' objectives beyond reasonable doubt. The answer is clearly no. It is obvious that there is often a discrepancy between what is stated in the documents and what is said in the political arena. The gaps in the documents and the differences in its content are also striking, given that small parties have much more limited (material and human) resources, the electoral participation of some organisations is often nominal, and therefore the range of their written documents is more limited and less developed. However, there was no other somewhat coherent base available for a more comprehensive mapping, comparison, and typology of ethnoregional parties.

In the light of all this, it is necessary to verify and to validate the results presented above by analysing the relevant findings of databases compiled by other authors. It should be noted that no data set was found to cover all cases in our research, whether communities or parties, so the validation cannot be complete. The verification of the results is firstly carried out in a broader framework, and then typological classifications of Hungarian parties in Romania (Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania, RMDSZ; Hungarian Civic Party, MPP; Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania, EMNP – the latter two organisations merged in 2022 under the name of the Transylvanian Hungarian Alliance, but they are still listed here as separate parties; the documents of the new party are not yet available) is validated, of which information were found in almost all databases.

Regarding the databases used for validation, it should be stressed below that they cannot be used to check the totality of our detailed results, but only to check the general findings. In our research, we have tried to examine all ethnoregional parties in the region – even this will likely contain outdated elements due to the dynamism of the party activity. The other databases available to us, however, contain information on a much narrower range of organisations due to the different research approaches. The FraTerr database (Elias et al. 2023), for example, cannot be used for general validation, as it mainly covers Western European organisations.

The most comprehensive dataset is undoubtedly the Manifesto Project Dataset (Lehmann et al. 2022), which contains information about the election programmes of all those parties that gained one or two mandates (this is the case in CEE) in the national elections to the lower chamber, as well as those parties that were relevant actors in the past. Since not the electoral success but setting up candidates or lists in an election was the selection criterion in the research, information on a narrower range of parties is available in this database. For validation, the variable on support for decentralisation (per301) was used – the variable indicates the percentage of the text of the given election programme that addresses the issue of decentralisation. The average value of this variable among organisations classified as protectionist in the database was 2.58%,

with extreme values of 0% (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, BG), and 7.75% (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, HR). Among the so-called decentralist parties, the average value is 4.31%, and the two extremes are 0% (Democratic Community of Magyars of Vojvodina, RS), and 9.81% (German Minority, PL). Although the difference between the average scores of the two groups is not spectacular or extreme, it does provide some justification for the distinction, although it does not seem to apply to the programs of all parties. While recognising the possibility of mistake, the difference can also be explained by the fact that the main objectives set out in the parties' framework programmes are not necessarily reflected in the programme for a given election year, since its content may be influenced by other factors (e.g. current political considerations, crisis situations), even at the expense of the emphasis on the core objectives.

The second round of the EPAC dataset (Zuber and Szöcsik 2019) contains policy positions of 222 political parties evaluated by experts in 20 multinational European democracies. Ethnoregional (ethnonational in that research) parties were included in the database if they won at least one seat in the national Parliament, or at least one seat and at least 3% of the sub-national vote in at least one region as of September 2016. Non-ethnic parties were entered in the dataset if they obtained at least 5 percent in national elections according to the above conditions. In addition, all EPAC parties in 2011 were included in the survey regardless of their current electoral success. For validation, the differences between the variable expressing support for territorial autonomy (ter) and the variables expressing the importance of cultural (cusal) and territorial autonomy (tersal) were used in the case of every ethnoregional party. As far as territorial demands are concerned, based on the average of the experts' impressions, they are more serious matters than can be inferred from the party documents. In general, it is true that in the case of the parties that we classify as decentralist and even secessionist, the experts also believe that the parties support territorial autonomy by orders of magnitude more than protectionist parties. However, there are of course exceptions. For example, for Lithuanian Poles (Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania), the average value of 7.6 (on a scale of 10) seems a bit high and exaggerated, while for Kosovo Serbs (Serb List), the expert assessment (9.9) is probably closer to reality than the non-territorial target system that can be read from the party programs. But, we cannot find an example of what we call a decentralist organisation being characterised by experts as a party that does not support territorial autonomy. With a few exceptions (Democratic Party of Albanians, RS; Serbian Democratic Party, BIH; National Democratic Revival, MK; Forca for Unity, ME), we see that cultural autonomy is more important for parties than territorial autonomy, regardless of the type of ethnoregional party. The expert evaluations confirm our previous statement that there is much to be done in fundamental minority rights in the CEE region, and that all parties are formulating goals in this area. At the same time, it is also true that the difference among protectionist parties between the importance of territorial and non-territorial goals is

greater (2.5 compared to 1.1) than in the case of decentralist and secessionist parties (for which, in some cases, the territorial aspect is even more important).

Although within the decentralist party type several categories can be developed and even hierarchised, these types are not necessarily experienced. In this paper, we used a 'state perspective' approach to assess each aspiration and to rank them according to their (potential) threat to territorial integrity. In this approach, territorial autonomy can be seen as a more radical demand (e.g. a first step towards an independent state) than the general or even asymmetric regionalisation. At the same time, from the point of view of state structure and vertical power sharing, territorial autonomy, when implemented in a unitary state typical of CEE, leads to more limited territorial change than regionalisation, which is limited to a single region and it is, therefore, a less radical form.

In the light of the above, the claim that the RMDSZ is proposing a more radical solution than the other two Hungarian parties in Romania should be interpreted. The correctness of the typological classification is confirmed by the answers to the questionnaire survey (which was originally part of the research but it was not used due to many non-responses; its purpose was to supplement, specify and clarify the characteristics and aspirations of organisations), in which the RMDSZ indicated the option of "territorial self-government within a unitary state" as the most ideal solution for the interests of the community, while the EMNP chose the option of "territorial self-government with asymmetric decentralisation/regionalisation". It is also important to note that when indicating the main aspiration of the parties, the RMDSZ did not indicate a territorial objective, while the EMNP did.

The fact that there are different emphases between the parties' priorities and the importance of each priority is also highlighted by the two EPAC surveys conducted so far (Szöcsik and Zuber 2015, Zuber and Szöcsik 2019). In the first EPAC survey, only the RMDSZ and the MPP participated, and the experts' opinion is that territorial autonomy is more important for the latter organisation. In the 2017 expert study, the EMNP was also included. According to the results, the priorities of the MPP and the EMNP are in the same order, with territorial autonomy following ethnonationalism, while cultural autonomy is the least important, with territorial autonomy being the last priority for the RMDSZ.

Similar to our research, the database of the FraTerr project (Elias et al. 2023), which is based on a detailed examination and coding of segments of party documents, confirms the above: according to the latest documents processed in detail, a significant part of the territorial demands (TD) of the EMNP (manifesto, 2012) aim at the creation of a federal structure (although we classified the party into the regionalist type based on its explicit objectives), while the RMDSZ (manifesto, 2016) places greater emphasis on changing the distribution of power instead of the state structure. The MPP's document (political statement, 2008) also emphasises the need to transfer competencies to

subnational levels, but the framework program (2009) already shares the EMNP's point on asymmetric regionalism.

This study has addressed only a relatively narrow segment of the topic of ethnoregional communities and parties. Although the results contribute to our knowledge of the wide range of ethnoregional parties in the region, the research cannot be considered completed. In the future, it is worth comparing and complementing the results with those of other relevant research on ethnic spatialisation and dynamics (Rotaru et al. 2023), the socio-economic consequences of identity assumption (Schafft and Kulcsár 2015), identity change (Crețan et al. 2014), the politicisation of identity (Muś 2021), the (potential) role of ethnic groups in the development policy (Péti and Mozga 2023), ethnic mobilisation (Olzak 1983, Jigla and Gherghina 2011), motherland policies towards abroad communities and its consequences, and the response of majority parties (Doiciar and Crețan 2021).

Conclusions

A comprehensive analysis of ethnoregional communities, regions, and parties in Central and Eastern Europe requires further study. In our research, we have sought to identify ethnoregional communities and their parties in Central and Eastern Europe, which, to our knowledge, has not been done on such a broad scale before. In this study, we have shown how ethnoregional parties can be grouped according to the objectives that can be extracted from the documents of the organisations, using a classification similar to Western typologies, and how they can be characterised along the lines of their main objectives. The results show what non-territorial or territorial objectives are present in the CEE region and what kind of conflicts can be expected along these lines. The database containing the data collected during the research, which will be made publicly available, will provide an opportunity for further analysis of ethnoregional parties and communities.

There is no doubt that the roots, paths, perspectives, and advocacy strengths of the parties in CEE are different from those in Western Europe, and radical changes are not expected any time soon. The drivers and experiences of ethnic mobilisation are quite different in this region, and the short democratic period since the transition has not been able to overcome these determinants. In line with Myśliwiec's (2016) argument, the importance of examining ethnoregional parties within the CEE in terms of aspirations and changes in aspirations, as well as other approaches, should be highlighted. Any such attempt and analysis can only capture a snapshot in time, since, as Bugajski (1995) and Schrijver (2006) emphasise, the aims of organisations are constantly changing, and their aspirations are moving to a new level and a new stage of ethnic politicisation. One source of this change can be the reaction of the state and other actors in the political system, which can strengthen or weaken the aspirations, role, and potential of

ethnoregional parties (Rokkan and Urwin 1982). The range of state responses to ethnic or ethnoregional demands can vary from disregard to restriction to a wide spectrum of electoral concessions (Juberías 1998, Juberías 2000). Experience shows that negotiated conflict resolution, institutional restructuring and political coalition building can temporarily work towards moderating the aspirations (Gadjanova 2015).

The results of the analysis clearly show that the ethnoregional demands of CEE are dominated by protectionist and decentralist demands. Among the protectionist parties, the conservative subtype is the most populous, which highlights the insufficient level of individual and collective rights of minorities. The participation subgroup consists of Balkan parties, which mostly wish to strengthen their already existing parliamentary or local representation by modifying the electoral system. Despite many theoretical and structural differences, the territorial claims are in practice all directed towards territorial autonomy. The different forms of aspirations are determined by history, tradition, the territorial organisation of states, the historical, multi-ethnic character or the former autonomy of the regions seeking self-determination. The states in CEE are reluctant to guarantee any form of deep territorial self-government, as they are protective of their sovereignty. Consequently, decentralist and regionalist parties use modern and EU terms instead of the radical term 'territorial autonomy' to gain social acceptance and to dispel the concerns about territorial integrity.

During the transition and the Balkan wars, and in the years since then, ethnoregional communities have demanded the creation of their own state instead of territorial autonomies. Accordingly, new state borders were formed explosively in the CEE region, and perhaps by now all states that were desired have been created. It follows from the above that today we hardly come across secessionist aspirations (at least as described in the documents). At the same time, such far-reaching and ethnoregional events as the current war in Ukraine can also affect the territorial processes in the region. However, it is not yet known how the war and its outcome will affect the ethnic relations in CEE, and whether it will radicalise or soften ethnoregional aspirations. It is likely that a possible loss of territory by Ukraine would trigger processes with unforeseeable consequences in CEE, especially in the parts of the Balkans with fragile stability.

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Appendix 1. Ethnoregional parties of Central and Eastern Europe

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Albania	Greek	Greek Minority for the Future	Minoreti Etnik Grek Per The Ardhmen	MEGA	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	Missing
Albania	Macedonian	Macedonian Alliance for European Integration	Aleanca Maqedonase për Integrimin European	MAEI	Protectionist	Conservative	Other	Missing
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian	Croatian Party of Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Hrvatska stranka prava Bosne i Herzegovine	HSP BiH	Decentralist	Federalist	Other	2015
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian	Croatian Democratic Union 1990	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 1990	HDZ 1990	Decentralist	Federalist	Program	Missing
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian	Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Herzegovine	HDZ BiH	Decentralist	Federalist	Program	2019
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian	Croatian Republican Party	Hrvatska republikanska stranka	HRS	Decentralist	Federalist	Program	Missing
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian	The Croatian Peasant Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Hrvatska seljačka stranka Bosne i Herzegovine	HSS BiH	Protectionist	Participationist	Statute	2012

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State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosniak	Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina	Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu	SBiH	Decentralist	Exclusively Decentralist	Program	Missing
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosniak	Party of Democratic Action	Stranka demokratske akcije	SDA	Decentralist	Exclusively Decentralist	Program	2019
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosniak	Movement of Democratic Action	Pokret demokratske akcije	PDA	Decentralist	Exclusively Decentralist	Other	Missing
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serb	Democratic National Alliance	Partija demokratskog progresa	PDP	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2015
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serb	Serb Democratic Party	Srpska demokratska stranka	SDS	Decentralist	Exclusively Decentralist	Program	2010
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serb	United Srpska	Ujedinjena Srpska	US	Decentralist	Exclusively Decentralist	Program	Missing
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serb	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats	Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata	SNSD	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2019
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serb	Demokratikus Nemzeti Szövetség	Demokratski narodni savez	DNS	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	Missing
Bulgaria	Macedonian	United Macedonian Organization Ilinden–Pirin	Obedinena makedonska organizatsiya: Ilinden–Pirin	OMO "Ilinden" – Pirin	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	Missing

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Bulgaria	Turkish	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi	DPS	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2016
Croatia	Czech	Federation of Czechs in the Republic of Croatia	Savez Čeha u Republici Hrvatskoj	SCRH	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2017
Croatia	Hungarian	Democratic Community of Hungarians in Croatia	Demokratska zajednica Mađara Hrvatske	DZMH	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2010
Croatia	Slovakian	Association of Slovaks	Savez Slovaka	SS	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2015
Croatia	Serb	Party of Danube Serbs	Partija podunavskih Srba	PP	Protectionist	Participationist	Program	2016
Croatia	Serb	Independent Democratic Serbian Party	Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka	SDSS	Decentralist	Excusively Decentralist	Program	1997
Czech Republic	Moravian	The Moravians	Moravané	Moravané	Decentralist	Federalist	Program	Missing
Czech Republic	Moravian	Moravian Land Movement	Moravské zemské hnutí	MZH	Decentralist	Federalist	Program	Missing

Non-Territorial and Territorial Objectives of Central and Eastern European Ethnoregional Parties

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Estonia	Russian	Estonian United Left Party	Eestimaa Ühendatud Vasakpartei	EÜVP	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2014
Kosovo	Ashkali	Movement for Integration	Lëvizja për Integrim	LpB	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2018
Kosovo	Bosniak	Social Democratic Union	Socijaldemokratska Unija	SDU	Decentralist	Exclusively Decentralist	Statute	Missing
Kosovo	Egyptian	New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo	Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës	IRDK	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	Missing
Kosovo	Egyptian	Egyptian Liberal Party	Partia Liberale Egjiptiane	PLE	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2018
Kosovo	Gorani	Civic Initiative of Gora	Građanska Inicijativa Gora	GIG	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2013
Kosovo	Macedonian	Democratic Party of the Macedonians in Kosovo	Partia Demokratike e Maqedonasve të Kosovës	PDMK	Protectionist	Conservative	Other	Missing
Kosovo	Serbian	Serb List	Lista Serbe	LS	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2017
Kosovo	Turkish	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo	Partia Demokratike Turke e Kosovës	KDTP	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	Missing

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Lithuania	Polish	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance	Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija – Krikščioniškų šeimų sąjunga	LLRA–KŠS	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2012
Lithuania	Russian	Lithuanian Russian Union	Lietuvos rusų sąjunga	LRS	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2005
Lithuania	Samogit	Samogitian Party	Žemaičių partija	ZP	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	Missing
Montenegro	Albanian	New Democratic Force	Nova Demokratska Snaga	FORCA	Protectionist	Participationist	Statute	2011
Montenegro	Bosniak	Bosniak Party	Bošnjačka Stranka	BS	Decentralist	Regionalist	Statute	2021
Montenegro	Bosniak	Justice and Reconciliation Party	Stranka Pravde i Pomirenja	SPP (M)	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2017
Montenegro	Croatian	Croatian Civic Initiative	Hrvatska građanska inicijativa	HGI	Protectionist	Participationist	Program	2013
Montenegro	Serb	New Serb Democracy	Nova srpska demokratija	NSD	Protectionist	Participationist	Program	2009
Montenegro	Serb	Democratic People's Party in Montenegro	Demokratska narodna partija Crne Gore	DNP	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2014
North Macedonia	Albanian	Alternative	Alternativa	A	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2021

Non-Territorial and Territorial Objectives of Central and Eastern European Ethnoregional Parties

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
North Macedonia	Albanian	Democratic Union for Integration	Demokratska unija za integracija	DUI	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2014
North Macedonia	Albanian	The Alliance for the Albanians	Alijansa za Albancite	AA	Protectionist	Participationist	Program	2022
North Macedonia	Albanian	Besa Movement	Dviženje Besa	BESA	Decentralist	Excusively Decentralist	Program	2014
North Macedonia	Albanian	National Democratic Revival	Nacionalna Demokratska Prerodba	RDK	Decentralist	Excusively Decentralist	Other	Missing
North Macedonia	Bosniak	Bosniak Democratic Union	Bošnjački Demokratski Savez	BDU	Protectionist	Conservative	Other	Missing
North Macedonia	Serb	Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia	Demokratska Partija na Srbite vo Makedonija	DPSM	Protectionist	Participationist	Other	Missing
North Macedonia	Turkish	Turkish Democratic Party	Demokratska Partija na Turcite	TDP	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2021
North Macedonia	Turkish	Turkish Action Party	Türk Hareket Partisi	THP	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	Missing
North Macedonia	Turkish	Movement for National Unity of Turks in Macedonia	Türk Milli Birlik Hareketi	TMBH	Protectionist	Participationist	Program	2006

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Poland	German	Social-Cultural Society of Germans in Opole Silesia	Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Niemców na Śląsku Opolskim	TSKN	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2019
Poland	Silesian	Silesians Together	Ślōnzoki Razem	SR	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	2018
Romania	Croatian	Union of Croats of Romania	Uniunea Croaților din România	UCR	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2012
Romania	Czech, Slovakian	Democratic Union of Slovaks and Czechs of Romania	Uniunea Democratică a Slovacilor și Cehilor din România	UDSC	Protectionist	Conservative	Other	Missing
Romania	German	Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania	Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România	FDGR	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2021
Romania	Greek	Hellenic Union of Romania	Uniunea Elenă din România	UER	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	1995
Romania	Hungarian	Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania *	Partidul Popular Maghiar din Transilvania	PPMT	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2012
Romania	Hungarian	Hungarian Civic Party *	Partidul Civic Maghiar	PCM	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	Missing

Non-Territorial and Territorial Objectives of Central and Eastern European Ethnoregional Parties

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Romania	Hungarian	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania	Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România	UDMR	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	2015
Romania	Macedonian	Association of Macedonians of Romania	Asociația Macedonenilor din România	AMR	Protectionist	Conservative	Other	Missing
Romania	Russian-Lipovan	Community of Lipovan Russians in Romania	Comunitatea Rușilor Lipoveni din România	CRLR	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2017
Romania	Rusyn	Cultural Union of Ruthenians of Romania	Uniunea Culturală a Rutenilor din România	UCRR	Protectionist	Conservative	Other	Missing
Romania	Serb	Union of Serbs of Romania	Uniunea Sârbilor din România	USR	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	Missing
Romania	Tatar	Democratic Union of Turkish-Muslim Tatars of Romania	Uniunea Democrată a Tatarilor Turco-Musulmani din Romania	UDTMR	Protectionist	Conservative	Other	Missing
Romania	Turkish	Democratic Turkish Union of Romania	Uniunea Democrată Turcă din România	UDTR	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2020

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Serbia	Albanian	Albanian Democratic Party	Partia Demokratike Shqiptare	PDSH	Secessionist	(R)Attachist	Program	2016
Serbia	Albanian	Alternative for Changes	Alternativa za promene	AP	Decentralist	Exclusively Decentralist	Statute	2015
Serbia	Bosniak	Sandzak Democratic Party	Sandžačke Demokratske Partije	SDP	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2009
Serbia	Bosniak	Bosniak Civil Party	Bošnjačka građanska stranka,	BGS	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2009
Serbia	Bosniak	Bosniak National Party	Bošnjačke narodne stranke	BNS	Decentralist	Exclusively Decentralist	Statute	2012
Serbia	Bosniak	Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak	Stranka Demokratske Akcije Sandžaka	SDA S	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2009
Serbia	Bosniak	Sandzak National Party	Sandžačka Narodna Partija	SNP	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2009
Serbia	Bosniak	Justice and Reconciliation Party	Stranka Pravde i Pomirenja	SPP (S)	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2017
Serbia	Bosniak	Bosniak Democratic Union	Bošnjačke demokratske zajednice	BDZ	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	Missing
Serbia	Bosniak	Party for Sandzak	Stranka za Sandžak	SS	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	2009

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State	Eithnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Serbia	Bunjevac	Association of Bačka Bunjevci	Savez bačkih Bunjevaca	SBB	Protectionist	Participationist	Program	2010
Serbia	Croatian	Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina	Demokratski savez Hrvata u Vojvodini	DSHV	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2009
Serbia	Hungarian	Republican Party	Republikanska Stranka – Republikánus Párt	PC-RP	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2015
Serbia	Hungarian	Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians	Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara	DZVM	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	2010
Serbia	Hungarian	The Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians	Savez vojvođanskih Mađara	SVM	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	2004
Serbia	Hungarian	Hungarian Movement	Magyar Mozgalom – Mađarski pokret	MM-MP	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	2017
Serbia	Montenegrin	Montenegrin Party	Crnogorska partija	CP	Protectionist	Conservative	Statute	2010
Serbia	Rusyn	Together for Vojvodina	Zajedno za Vojvodina	ZzV	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2011
Serbia	Slovakian	Green Party	Zelena Stranka	ZS	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2014

State	Ethnoregional community represented by the party	Name of the ethnoregional party in English	Official name of the ethnoregional party	Abbreviation	Type	Subtype	Basis of classification (type of party document)	Year of publication
Serbia	Vlach	Vlach Party	Vlaska Stranka	VS	Decentralist	Regionalist	Statute	2011
Serbia	Vlach	Vlach National Party	Vlaska narodna stranka	VNS	Protectionist	Conservative	Program	2010
Slovakia	Hungarian	Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance	Madarská kresťanskodemokratická aliancia – Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Szövetség	MKDA-MKDSZ	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2013
Slovakia	Hungarian	Hungarian Forum	Magyar Fórum – Madarské Fórum	MF	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2019
Slovakia	Hungarian	Alliance	Szövetség – Aliancia	Aliancia	Decentralist	Regionalist	Program	2022
Ukraine	Hungarian	Hungarian Democratic Federation in Ukraine	Demokratychna Spilka Uhortsiv Ukrainy	DSUU	Decentralist	Autonomist	Program	2021
Ukraine	Hungarian	Hungarian Cultural Federation in Transcarpathia	Tovarystvo Uhors'koyi Kul'tury Zakarpattya	TUKZ	Decentralist	Federalist	Program	Missing

**The Transylvanian Hungarian People's Party and the Hungarian Civic Party, which have merged into the Transylvanian Hungarian Alliance, are still listed separately here. The documents of the new party are not yet available.*