

## The Attitudes of Citizens of the Republic of Croatia Towards Moral Issues: Conservative or Liberal?

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## THE ATTITUDES OF CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TOWARDS MORAL ISSUES: CONSERVATIVE OR LIBERAL?

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### Abstract

This article is based on the results of the third wave of the European Values Study conducted in Croatia in 2017 and 2018, on a sample of 1488 respondents, and a partial comparison with the results of the EVS research from 1999 and 2008. The article analyses attitudes towards some moral questions from the sphere of individual and social morality, and the correlation between those attitudes and religiosity, trust, political orientation (left-right), national identity and consumption of/trust in the (traditional) media and social networks, alongside the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents as an independent variable.

On the basis of the results obtained in the study, we have concluded that religious people are less permissive, particularly in the field of personal morality, and in the field of soft drugs and sexuality, in terms of their attitudes to morality, than non-religious people, they have trust in institutions, they are politically more »right wing«, and they have a stronger national identity than those with a European identity.

Furthermore, younger respondents, better educated male respondents, residents of larger towns and cities, residents of Istria and Primorje County, show greater permissiveness in their attitudes towards morality.

We have concluded that morality in Croatia is relatively stable, with a slight shift towards permissiveness, and Croatian society is quite homogeneous in terms of its significant value foundations.

*Key words: European Values Study, Croatia, attitudes to morality, religiosity, trust, political orientation, collective identity, the media*

## Introduction

In the period of the post-modern, which Bauman states is characterised by »morality without an ethical code«, and claims that »we are moving towards an understanding that the moral capacity of human beings is what makes us so obviously capable of forming societies and, despite all the challenges, to ensure their – more or less happy – survival«,<sup>1</sup> moral capacity encompasses individual and social morality which is researched in this article on the basis of the results of the third wave of the international empirical research, the European Values Study (hereinafter: *EVS*) from 2017/2018 for Croatia.

In so doing, the results of previous research into morality will also be taken into account, that is the project entitled Faith and Morality in Croatia (1997-2001)<sup>2</sup> and the *EVS* from 1999 and 2008.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Zygmunt BAUMAN, *Postmoderna etika*, Zagreb, 2009, 44.

<sup>2</sup> The project was run by Marijan Valković PhD, and after his death in 2000 it was completed by Prof. Stjepan Baloban, PhD. Articles based on the project were published in a thematic edition of *Bogoslovska smotra*, 68 (1998) 4, under the title *Socio-Religious Research: Faith and Morality in Croatia. Partial Report*. For additional data on the project see: Marijan VALKOVIĆ, *Etičko-moralna problematika. Uloga teologa*, (ed. Stjepan BALOBAN), Zagreb, 2017.

<sup>3</sup> The project head for Croatia was Prof. Josip Baloban, PhD. Articles based on the *EVS* 1999 project were published in a thematic edition of *Bogoslovska smotra*, 70 (2000) 2, under the title *European Values Study – EVS 1999*

*Data for the Republic of Croatia Partial Report*. Articles based on the *EVS* 2008 project were published in a thematic edition of *Bogoslovska smotra*, 80 (2010) 2, under the title *European Values Study – EVS 2008 Data for the Republic of Croatia Partial Report*. Three books were published on the basis of the *EVS* research: Josip BALOBAN (ed.), *U potrazi za identitetom. Komparativna studija vrednota: Hrvatska i Europa*, Zagreb, 2005; Josip BALOBAN – Krunoslav NIKODEM – Siniša ZRINŠČAK, *Vrednote u Hrvatskoj i u Europi. Komparativna analiza*, Zagreb, 2014; Gordan ČRPIĆ – Jasna ČURKOVIĆ NIMAC – Željko TANJIĆ, *Vjersko uvjerenje i moralno ponašanje. Teorijska rasprava i empirijska analiza o utjecaju religije na moral u hrvatskom društvu*, Zagreb, 2016.

The very distinction between individual and social morality<sup>4</sup> indicates that the heart of individual, personal morality is a question of the condition of the moral integrity of human existence. It is not strictly »private morality«, whose obligatory nature we would agree solely with ourselves, because personal morality is intersubjective since we need to justify our actions to others. As well as in the personal realm, morality also includes social morality. It additionally encompasses principles that are relevant both for the ethical consciousness of society, and for the formation of fundamental social institutions. The questions of fairness and equality are central.<sup>5</sup> In our time, personal and social morality, and especially the important dimension of the connection between them, have been facing many challenges, from economic crisis<sup>6</sup> to the rapid development of communications technology, which is already forming or will form our social and moral existence. Medical ethics is therefore extended to include digital ethics.<sup>7</sup> In relation to Croatia, the results of the EVS research in 1999 showed that Croatia, in terms of personal morality, belonged to the group of traditional, Catholic countries. In the field of social morality there were clear, high moral standards, according to which it could be expected that in Croatia behaviours such as bribery, corruption, tax avoidance etc. would not be acceptable.

However, Stjepan Baloban and Gordan Črpić concluded, on the basis of other research and their own experience, that the reality was very different, that is, that there was a high level of permissiveness present in the realm of social morality. People with less trust in the fundamental institutions of the social system (such as: the parliament, the police, the education system), those who value their free time more, and people who tend more towards alternative lifestyles and not classical religiosity demonstrate greater permissiveness in the

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gordan ČRPIĆ – Jasna ĆURKOVIĆ NIMAC – Željko TANJIĆ, *Vjersko uvjerenje i moralno ponašanje*. The dimension of social morality with respect to Croatia was explored in the article: Gordan ČRPIĆ – Marijan VALKOVIĆ, *Moral u Hrvatskoj u sociologijskoj perspektivi*, in: *Bogoslovska smotra*, 70 (2000) 1, 1-63, 59.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Herlinde PAUER-STUDER, *Einführung in die Ethik*, Wien, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Martin L. HOFFMAN, *Empathy and Moral Development*, Cambridge, 2000; Guenter WILHELMSS – Helge WULSDORF, *Verantwortung und Gemeinwohl. Wirtschaftsethik – eine neue Perspektive*, Regensburg, 2017; Valentin ZSIFKOVITS, *Wirtschaft ohne Moral*, Innsbruck, 1994.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Joseph WEIZENBAUM, *Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgement to Calculation*, San Francisco, 1976; Max SENEGES – Lisa HORNER, *Values, principles and rights in internet governance. Report for the Freedom of Expression Project*, 2009, [https://www.gp-digital.org/wp-content/uploads/pubs/values\\_principles\\_and\\_rights\\_internet\\_governance\\_senges\\_horner.pdf](https://www.gp-digital.org/wp-content/uploads/pubs/values_principles_and_rights_internet_governance_senges_horner.pdf); Rafael CAPURRO, *Ethik im Netz*, Stuttgart, 2003; Rafael CAPURRO, *Homo Digitalis. Beiträge zur Ontologie, Anthropologie und Ethik der digitalen Technik*, Heidelberg, 2017.

realm of morality. Younger people and men are also more permissive than older women.<sup>8</sup> Along the lines of this reality, the research question in this study is: Are the attitudes of the citizens of the Republic of Croatia towards questions of personal and social morality, on the basis of *EVS 2017/2018*, conservative or liberal, traditional or permissive?

In view of the fact that previous research showed that there is a connection between the attitudes of the citizens of the Republic of Croatia towards personal and social morality and religiosity and trust in institutions, the research question in this study aimed to research political orientation in addition to these factors, and collective identity and consumption of/trust in the traditional media and social networks, and their connection with morality.

In processing the research questions on the theoretical level, we started with the important integrative function of morality for society, which was pointed out by the sociologist Emile Durkheim (*The Division of Labour in Society* and *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*) and Max Weber, who researched the influence of religiosity and ethics on the development of society, in particular in his works *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, and *Sociology of Religion*.

Weber in particular, according to Rudolf Heberle<sup>9</sup>, influenced the formulation of three moral or social types<sup>10</sup> by American sociologist David Riesman (together with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney) in the book *The Lonely Crowd*<sup>11</sup>, which we have taken as the theoretical framework of this research. Riesman speaks about the »social character« which denotes »the components of character that are shared among significant social groups«<sup>12</sup> and which is generalized in society, and therefore on the basis of this we can discuss the character of classes, groups, regions and nations.

Riesman distinguishes three »ideal types« of character and society. The first type consists of *tradition-directed* individuals and society. Culture, therefore, provides rituals, routine and religion, which orient all the members of the society. The second type consists of *inner-directed* individuals and society. This

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Stjepan BALOBAN – Gordan ČRPIĆ, Moral u tranzicijskoj Hrvatskoj, in: Josip BALOBAN (ed.), *U potrazi za identitetom. Komparativna studija vrednota: Hrvatska i Europa*, Zagreb, 2005, 235-255.

<sup>9</sup> Rudolf HEBERLE, A Note on Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd*, in: *American Journal of Sociology*, 62 (1956.) 1, 34-36.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. William K. FRANKENA, *Etika*, Zagreb, 1998.

<sup>11</sup> David RIESMAN (in conjunction with Reule DENNEY and Nathan GLAZER), *The Lonely Crowd. A Study of the Changing American Character*, New Heaven – London, 1967.

<sup>12</sup> David RIESMAN, *The Lonely Crowd*, 4.

is a society which provides more choice, and in which a character type arises that can live in the society without strict and self-evident tradition-direction, but with inner-direction, which gives individuals orientation and which people receive from their elders early in life. The third type, *other-direction* individuals and society, occurs as a result of the growth of city populations, urbanization and industrialization. Families in cities are smaller, child-rearing practices are more permissive, the influence of schools, peer groups and the mass media is stronger, as Riesman points out, in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in particular films, radio and popular media culture in general. Therefore, for the character type that emerges in that context, the source of direction for individuals are their contemporaries, whether they know them personally or do not know them at all – they are acquainted with them indirectly through friends or the mass media. William K. Frankena points out that these three types can also be interpreted as moral or social types.<sup>13</sup> Riesman's theoretical framework, particularly his emphasis on the source of direction in the formation of morality, which may be 1. tradition, 2. inner 3. other, is the theoretical foundation for research into the factors which have the most influence on individual and social morality in Croatia. In the context of Riesman's first type, »tradition-direction«, we study religiosity (H1) because precisely this contributes to the preservation of tradition in a moral sense too. In the context of Riesman's second type, »inner-direction« we study trust in institutions (H2)<sup>14</sup>, which in the previous results of the EVS was shown to be an important predictor affecting morality<sup>15</sup>, and the effect of political orientation is also be researched (H3).

According to Riesman, the second type provides more choice, as well as in relation to the attitudes of individuals, and this also relates to the political sphere when discussing trust in institutions and political orientation. In a democratic society, the source of direction for choosing specific attitudes will be aimed at the »internal« and not imposed from the outside. In the context of Riesman's third type, »other-direction« we research the collective identity and consumption of the media and trust in the media (H4, H5), because they comprise important forms of direction in the formation of morality by »others«. The first factor is the collective identity, because in Croatia, alongside the national identity, since

<sup>13</sup> William K. FRANKENA, *Etika*, 7.

<sup>14</sup> Inner-direction gives individuals orientation and can therefore be analysed in the context of social morality. Trust is also an important part of morality [cf. Walter PFANNKUCHE, *Vertrauen – Eine Frage der Moral?*, in: Heidi MÖLLER, (ed.), *Vertrauen in Organisationen*, Wiesbaden, 2012, 47-62].

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Stjepan BALOBAN – Gordan ČRPIĆ, *Moral u tranzicijskoj Hrvatskoj*, 235-255.

joining the European Union, we talk about the European identity as well, as an aspect of collective identity. The second factor which Riesman points out in particular are the media (traditional and social networks) as an important source of direction for the formation of attitudes in the form of »other«, which we also include here.<sup>16</sup>

Starting from the theoretical framework of David Riesman's three types of character and society, six hypotheses were formulated which are tested in the study:

- H1 – Religious people are less permissive than non-religious.
- H2 – Trust is positively correlated with traditional morality.
- H3 – People who are politically more left-wing are also more permissive.
- H4 – People with a firmer collective identity are less permissive.
- H5 – People who frequently follow traditional media (TV, radio, the press) are less permissive.
- H6 – We presume that younger people, the better educated and those from larger settlements are more liberal.

On the basis of the data from the latest wave of the EVS – 2017/2018, this article offers an overview of the attitudes towards the question of individual and social morality and explores the connection between the research factors and individual and social morality in Croatia in 2017/2018.

## 1. Research method

The empirical part of this study was based on the third wave<sup>17</sup> of empirical research which was part of the EVS, conducted in Croatia in the period from 15 October 2017 to 1 February 2018.

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<sup>16</sup> Articles and books based on the EVS data (2017/2018) that analyse some aspects of the research themes as this article include Eva-Maria EUCHNER, *Morality Politics in a Secular Age: Strategic Parties and Divided Governments in Europe*, Cham – Springer, 2019; Ahmet FIDAN – Rezzan ALAGOZ – Nuray KARAMAN, Liberal sexual morality, religion, and attitudes toward abortion in Turkey, in: *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 2021, 1-20; Emma BUDDE – Stephan HEICHEL – Steffen HURKA – Christoph KNILL, Partisan effects in morality policy making, in: *European Journal of Political Research*, 57 (2018) 2, 427-449; Hermann DÜLMER, The Impact of Modernisation and Culture on Morality and Moral Change in Europe: From Universalism to Contextualism, in: *The Aoyama Journal of Global Studies and Collaboration* 3 (2018), 81-107. These studies are however country-based and none of them approach the topic of individual and social morality from the theoretical framework as it is the case in this article.

<sup>17</sup> The first wave of research was conducted in Croatia in the period from 31 March to 30 April 1999 (N=1003). The second wave of research was also conducted in Croatia in the



The response to participation in the research was 36.7% and a total of 1488 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted by GFK, a market research agency from Zagreb, it was conducted using the CAPI (computer assisted personal interviews) method, and supervision of the work of the surveyors was provided through the possibility of recording their conversation with respondents. The respondents were citizens older than 18 years who, at the time when the survey was conducted, had temporary or permanent residence in the Republic of Croatia, regardless of whether they were Croatian citizens or not.

The sample covered 162 municipalities in the Republic of Croatia. From each municipality, 25 households were randomly selected using the random-walk method. From each household the respondent was chosen using the last birthday method. Before starting the survey, all households were listed with possible respondents, a total of 4050. The survey contained a total of 111 questions with 282 variables, where the questions mainly had the identical content to the questions used in the previous two waves of the EVS in 1999 and 2008, which allows for data comparability. Statistical analysis in this study consisted of three parts. In the first part descriptive analysis of the selected variables was used and they are presented graphically, which was followed by comparative analysis of certain variables between the three EVS waves. For the purpose of this analysis a graphical presentation is also used showing the respondents' responses in the three waves. In the second part of the analysis, factor analysis of the main components was used in order to create dependent variables. The independent variables cover selected concepts from the survey. Multiple regression analysis was used in the third part.

## **2. Theoretical and empirical discussion of the attitudes of citizens of the Republic of Croatia to individual and social morality**

In the analysis of data we used, as previously stated, descriptive, inferential statistics and multiple regression analysis, where the results from the criteria represent factor scores based on the factor analysis conducted. In the first, descriptive analysis, we review the results obtained from the EVS research conducted in 2017/2018. On the basis of the descriptive analysis, we provide an overview of the results from all three waves. In the further analysis we reduce the realm of morality by factor analysis. We store the factors obtained as factor

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period from 31 April to 31 October 2008 (N=1525). Both waves were conducted using the face-to-face direct survey method.




scores and, with these variables as criteria variables, we conduct regression analysis of six different predictor sets, as presented in detail in chapter 2.4. *Regression analysis*.<sup>18</sup>

### 2.1. Descriptive analysis

An initial insight into the respondents' attitudes on the extent to which individual behaviour and practices can be approved is provided by the results of descriptive analysis, presented in Graph 1. We present a summary overview of the percentages on the dichotomized scales. The instrument analysed consists of 15 variables with scales on a continuum of 1-10, where 1 denotes »it can never be justified« and 10 »it can always be justified«.<sup>19</sup>

**Graph 1. Attitudes towards moral issues.**



Graph 1 shows the following relevant results: the attitudes of Croats to morality are almost homogeneous, whether they accept or reject something. This, already on this descriptive level, sheds doubt on the theory we often hear

<sup>18</sup> All levels of research aim to give an insight into the development tendencies of individual and social morality. However, the interpretation of results are normative statements that do not predict actual behaviours.


<sup>19</sup> This means that the dichotomized scale is constructed where 1-5 denote »it cannot be justified« and 6 to 10 »it can be justified«.

in the public – about the great divisions, especially in terms of morality – in Croatian society. Of the 15 attitudes examined to specific life practices, we collected responses to 11 of them where more than 3/4 of the respondents mainly rejected or accepted a specific practice. The greatest division was found with reference to the bioethical questions of euthanasia, divorce and abortion, which were rejected in principle by more than 2/3 of the population, apart from divorce, which was not accepted by 61% of respondents.

2.2. Comparative analysis of the results of the EVS in 1999, 2008 and 2018, relating to morality

An analysis of the results of the three waves of the EVS on the respondents examined is presented in Graph 2.

**Graph 2. Comparison of the attitudes in three waves of the European Values Study (1999, 2008 and 2018) on the individual and social dimension of morality (the reply: THEY DO NOT APPROVE).**



From the comparative results presented in Graph 2, we observe that there were no radical changes in the sphere of attitudes to morality, that is, the situation pertaining morality in Croatia is quite stable. A slight shift was registered towards permissiveness in the realm of bioethical issues, but it is still fairly stable within the domain of the conservative-traditional range of values. We should

state that from these questions it is not possible to make a general assertion that, for example, a referendum on abortion would pass, as this question does not probe that specific issue. The question is posed in principle. It is another matter how people may specifically decide in relation to possible legislation. We have therefore examined the attitudes towards specific practices, and not the readiness of an individual to practice them or not. However, these attitudes create a specific climate in the society, which, when considering Croatian society, should certainly be taken into account.

### 2.3. Factor analysis

In the next step, factor analysis was conducted, and three factors were obtained with 11 variables, where 60.2% variance was interpreted. The scales consisted of 10 levels, from »never« to »always«. For each issue, the question was asked, »Can it be justified or not?« using the ten levels.

**Table 1. Factor analysis: individual and social morality and death penalty and political violence.**

|                             |   | <b>Individual morality</b> | <b>Social morality</b> | <b>The death penalty and political violence</b> |
|-----------------------------|---|----------------------------|------------------------|---|
| <b>Do you approve of...</b> | Abortion  | .840                       |                        |   |
|                             | Divorce   | .832                       |                        |   |
|                             | Homosexuality                                       | .780                       |                        |   |
|                             | Euthanasia  | .704                       |                        |   |
|                             | Suicide   | .552                       |                        |   |
|                             | Tax fraud   |                            | .793                   |   |
|                             | Receiving a bribe at work                           |                            | .773                   |   |
|                             | Applying for state benefits you are not entitled to |                            | .703                   |   |
|                             | Not paying public transport fare                    |                            | .695                   |   |
|                             | Death penalty                                       |                            |                        | .810  |
|                             | Political violence                                  |                            |                        | .627  |

The first factor extracted was termed *individual morality*. Here we mainly examine bioethical respondents, to what extent abortion, divorce, homosexuality, euthanasia and suicide are justified or not justified. We termed the other

factor *social morality*, since it comprised questions related to the public and social sphere: tax fraud, receiving bribes, requests to obtain something from the state to which a person is not entitled to, and failure to pay fares on public transport. The third factor extracted were the terms *death penalty* and *political violence* and given it consisted of only two variables, it is not be included in the further analysis. We obtained the factor *soft drugs and sexuality* as a separate factor, which constitutes three variables: (not) justifying prostitution, casual sex and soft drug abuse. Here we obtained a one-factor structure and interpretation of 63.5% of variance of the analysed variables.

Table 2. Factor analysis: *soft drugs and sexuality*.

|                      |                 | Soft drugs and sexuality |
|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| Do you approve of... | Prostitution    | .819                     |
|                      | Casual sex      | .789                     |
|                      | soft drug abuse | .782                     |

The gender analysis in relation to the factors obtained shows, as may be seen from Table 3, that in relation to gender there is a statistically significant difference. Men are generally more permissive than women. This difference was not found only for the first factor – individual morality, which examines bioethical topics. In the other two dimensions, men were found to be statistically significantly more permissive.

Table 3. Gender analysis.<sup>20</sup>

|                          | women  | men    | t      | sig.  |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Individual morality      | .0259  | -.0540 | 1.451  | >.005 |
| Social morality          | -.1340 | .1724  | 5.511  | .001< |
| Soft drugs and sexuality | -.2970 | .3261  | 12.286 | .001< |

#### 2.4. Regression analysis

In the further analysis of the results, we stored the factors obtained as factor scores, and continued our analysis of the variables created thusly. These variables served as criteria, and we took the different sets of variables from the survey as predictors, in line with our hypotheses.

<sup>20</sup> Here a t-test was performed.

**The first predictor set** was taken from the sphere of religiosity. For this purpose, we used the following variables: attendance of religious services<sup>21</sup>; attendance of religious services at the age of 12 years; belief in God, life after death, heaven, reincarnation; the importance of God in life; prayer; trust in the Church; the adequacy of the Church's response to: moral problems and the needs of individuals, problems of family life, the spiritual needs of people, social problems in our country. Therefore the predictor set *religiosity* covers beliefs, alternative beliefs, practice, and the public role of the Church.

**The second predictor set** comprises trust, that is, both in people and in institutions.

For the former we used the variables of trust: in one's own family, people in the neighbourhood, people the respondent knows personally, meets for the first time, as well as people of other religions and nationalities; whilst for trust in institutions we had the variables of trust in: the Church, the army, the education system, the press, the unions, the police, the Parliament, the public services, the social security system, the European Union, the United Nations, the health care system, the justice system, major enterprises, environment protection organizations, political parties, the authorities and state administration, and social networks.

**The third predictor set** comprises attitudes towards democracy and political orientation, where we used the variable of the respondents' political orientation as »left-right«, and the variables of the respondents' evaluation of the importance for democracy of the following statements: »governments tax the wealthy and help the poor«, »the religious authorities give the final interpretation of the law«, »people elect their leaders at free elections«, »people receive help from the state when they are unemployed«, »the army takes control when the government is incompetent«, »civil rights protect people from state oppression«, »the state equalizes citizens' incomes«, »people are obedient to their leaders«, and »women have the same rights as men«. Three variables were also used which measured their assessment of the importance of life in a country ruled democratically, the respondents' satisfaction with the level of democracy, and the degree of functioning of the political system in our country.

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<sup>21</sup> In view of the tested population and the size of the sample, in more than 95% of cases this means attending Mass, therefore we occasionally use that term as a synonym.

**The fourth predictor set** comprises the collective identity. For this purpose we used the following variables: readiness to fight for one's country in case of war, a feeling of closeness towards one's town, region, Croatia, Europe and the world, a feeling of pride in Croatian citizenship, assessment of the characteristics that are important for »true Croatian citizenship« (being born in Croatia, respect for Croatian political institutions and laws, Croatian origin and language, living according to Croatian culture), as well as an assessment of what is important for »being European« (being born in Europe, having European origins, being a Christian, living according to European culture).

**The fifth predictor set** comprises consumption of the media and trust. In this set we used the variables: trust in the press and social networks, assessment of how far the television news favours the ruling party during elections, and whether journalists cover elections fairly, and following politics using individual forms of media (television, radio, daily papers and social networks).

**The sixth set** comprises socio-demographic predictors, with the variables of the respondents' gender, age, size of settlement/town, and level of education and income.

#### 2.4.1. Religiosity and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality

In view of the first predictor set, *religiosity*, the question arises not only whether religiosity affects morality, but also what kind of influence religiosity has. Authors such as Arthur C. Brooks<sup>22</sup> point out a large amount of data that confirm that religion has a positive effect on individuals and society, whilst some, like Martin L. Hoffman<sup>23</sup> argue that moral behaviour is not strongly connected to religion.<sup>24</sup> In Croatia, this subject was also researched empirically from 1997 through the project *Vjera i moral u Hrvatskoj* (Religion and Morality in Croatia) headed by Prof. Marijan Valković, PhD and Prof. Stjepan Baloban PhD<sup>25</sup>, and the *EVS* in 1999<sup>26</sup> to the latest in 2018 the results of which are presented in Table 4.

<sup>22</sup> Arthur C. BROOKS, *Who Really Cares. The Surprising Truth About Compassionate Conservatism*, New York, 2006.

<sup>23</sup> Martin L. HOFFMAN, *Empathy and Moral Development*.

<sup>24</sup> For more details about the relationship between religion and morality, see: Gordan ČRPIĆ – Jasna ĆURKOVIĆ NIMAC – Željko TANJIĆ, *Vjersko uvjerenje i moralno ponašanje*.

<sup>25</sup> See footnote 2.

<sup>26</sup> Stjepan BALOBAN – Gordan ČRPIĆ, *Moral u tranzicijskoj Hrvatskoj*, 235-255.

**Table 4. Religiosity and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality.**

|                 |                                 | R    | R <sup>2</sup> | predictors  | β     | par. corr. |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|------|----------------|---|-------|------------|
| <b>Criteria</b> | <b>Individual morality</b>      | .533 | .285           | Trust in the Church   | -.291 | -.242      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | The adequacy of the Church's response to problems of family life              | -.136 | -.138      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | The importance of God in life   | -.127 | -.109      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | Belief in reincarnation   | .106  | .121       |
|                 |                                 |      |                | Attendance of religious services  | -.088 | -.079      |
|                 | <b>Social morality</b>          | .119 | .014           | The importance of God in life   | -.111 | -.103      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | The adequacy of the Church's response to people's spiritual problems          | -.095 | -.080      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | The adequacy of the Church's response to problems of family life              | .154  | .121       |
|                 |                                 |      |                | The adequacy of the Church's response to social problems in our country today | -.094 | -.074      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | Belief in reincarnation   | .066  | .067       |
|                 | <b>Soft drugs and sexuality</b> | .460 | .212           | The importance of God in life   | -.198 | -.145      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | Trust in the Church   | -.193 | -.161      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | Belief in reincarnation   | .112  | .124       |
|                 |                                 |      |                | The adequacy of the Church's response to people's spiritual problems          | -.082 | -.081      |
|                 |                                 |      |                | Belief in God   | -.082 | -.067      |

In the set of variables describing religiosity a significant correlation was found between the concept of religiosity and individual morality. Of 14 variables describing religiosity on the level of trust, practice, the public role of the Church, and alternative beliefs, it was found that this predictor set interprets 28.5% of the variance criteria.

Those who have less trust in the Church, who more rarely believe that the Church gives adequate responses to questions related to family life, to whom God is less important in their lives, more often believe in reincarnation and more rarely attend religious services and show greater tendency towards permissiveness in relation to individual morality. Social morality is much less strongly explained by the predictor set given. The coefficient of multiple determination was .014 which means that this predictor set interprets 1.4% of the variance criteria. That means – almost nothing.



On the level of correlations, we see that those for whom God is important in life, and who believe that the Church gives an adequate response to the spiritual and social needs of people, are relatively less permissive in the public realm, whilst those who believe in reincarnation and hold that the Church gives adequate answers to problems of family life, are more permissive in relation to the variables considered. With regard to the variable *soft drugs and sexuality*, we have a much more significant correlation. That is to say, the coefficient of multiple determination was .212, which means that the predictor set interprets 21.2% of the variance of the variables considered. The trend is the same as in the previous cases. Those who believe more that God is important in life, who have greater trust in the Church, who believe that the Church responds adequately to the spiritual needs of people, and those who believe in God, are less permissive of soft drugs and sexuality, whilst those who believe in reincarnation are more permissive.

#### 2.4.2. Trust and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality

The next predictor is *trust* which received particular attention within the framework of political culture from Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in their book *The Civic Culture* (1963) but it particularly came to the fore as part of the concept of social capital developed by Robert Putnam, which advocates differentiating trust in people and trust in institutions or political authority.<sup>27</sup> Trust in people or generalized trust is still designated as »social trust« and designates horizontal trust towards an undefined other, trust in »everyone«<sup>28</sup>, that is, it indicates trust between citizens of a specific political community.<sup>29</sup> In the predictor set »trust in people« low coefficients of multiple determination were obtained of .028 for personal morality, and .042 for soft drugs and sexuality, hence we exclude this dimension of predictors of trust from further analysis, because it was shown to be unpredictable.

Another important dimension of trust is trust in institutions, and this, according to Putnam, consists of citizens' vertical trust in institutions of authority, as well as in social and political institutions. Precisely trust in institutions in complex societies means trust in the legitimacy of the institutions themselves.<sup>30</sup> According to Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, institutions are the load-bearing

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Robert PUTNAM, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York, 2000.

<sup>28</sup> Sandra SEUBERT, *Das Konzept des Sozialkapitals. Eine demokratietheoretische Analyse*, Frankfurt/Main, 2009, 192.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Robert PUTNAM, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Dieter FUCHS – Oscar W. GABRIEL – Kerstin VÖKL, Vertrauen in politische Institutionen und politische Unterstützung, in: *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politik*, 31 (2002) 4, 427-450.

pillars of society and in our non-personal modern world, social and political stability, as well as integration depend more intensely on trust in institutions than on trust in individuals, because living institutions mean more for democracy than good quality interpersonal relationships between citizens.<sup>31</sup> Whilst in the view of trust in people no significant correlation was found between that predictor set and the criteria considered, more serious correlations were found with respect to trust in institutions, especially in relation to personal morality, where, as Table 5 displays, about 24.7% of variance was interpreted.

**Table 5. Trust and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality.**

|                  |                                 | R     | R <sup>2</sup> | Predictors          | β                              | par. corr. |       |
|------------------|---------------------------------|-------|----------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|------------|-------|
| <b>Criterion</b> | <b>Individual morality</b>      | .497  | .247           | <b>Trust in ...</b> | The Church                     | -.406      | -.369 |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | The army                       | -.121      | -.119 |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | The justice system             | -.053      | -.057 |
|                  | <b>Social morality</b>          | .260  | .068           |                     | The police                     | -.183      | -.166 |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | The European Union             | -.083      | -.077 |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | Social networks                | .093       | .092  |
|                  | <b>Soft drugs and sexuality</b> | .431  | .185           |                     | The Parliament                 | -.068      | -.062 |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | The Church                     | -.295      | -.266 |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | The police                     | -.074      | -.068 |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | Social networks                | .107       | .110  |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | The army                       | -.090      | -.081 |
|                  |                                 |       |                |                     | The government and state admin | -.070      | -.065 |
| The press        | -.064                           | -.064 |                |                     |                                |            |       |

The results in terms of individual morality show that those who have greater trust in the Church, the army and the justice system are less permissive. Thus, those who have greater trust in the set of state institutions (the Church evidently fits in that group), have a more traditional world-view regarding bioethical issues. In this case too our predictor set only poorly interprets the dimension of social morality, where 6.8% variance was interpreted. On the level of correlations, those who have more trust in the police, the European Union and Parliament are less permissive in terms of social morality, whilst those

<sup>31</sup> Kenneth NEWTON – Pippa NORRIS, *Confidence in Public Institutions. Faith, Culture or Performance?*, in: Susan J. PHARR – Robert D. PUTNAM (ed.). *Disaffected Democracies. What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, New Jersey, 2000, 52-73.

who have more trust in social networks show a higher level of permissiveness. Two variables are significantly linked to the criteria, and they are trust in the Church and in organizations that protect the environment. Greater trust in those institutions brings a lower level of permissiveness in terms of the variables under consideration. Lastly, soft drugs and sexuality have a coefficient of multiple determination of .185, which means that there is some correlation between the criteria and the predictor set indicated. Those who have more trust in the Church, the police, the army, the government and state administration and the press are less permissive, whilst those who have more trust in social networks are more permissive of soft drugs and sexuality.

#### 2.4.3. Democracy and political orientation and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality

In the next regression analysis, the predictor set was *attitudes to democracy* and *political participation*. Attitudes to democracy include assessment of the important characteristics of democracy, the importance of democracy, assessment of the degree of democracy, and satisfaction with the functioning of the political system, which provide an important insight into people's political orientation, which is extremely important for the functioning of the political system.<sup>32</sup> This predictor set includes political orientation, which Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba deal with in their work *The Civic Culture Revisited. An Approach to Civic Culture*<sup>33</sup> in which political culture is defined precisely as a set of political orientations<sup>34</sup> which includes a series of attitudes towards the political system, as well as the role individuals themselves have in that system. The dominant trend in political orientation may hypothetically give an insight on the level of the congruence between political

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Oscar W. GABRIEL, Politische Unterstützung, in: Dieter FUCHS – Edeltraud ROLLER (ed.), *Lexikon Politik. Hundert Grundbegriffe*, Stuttgart, 2007, 477-483; Brigitte GEISSEL, *Politische Kritik – Gefahr oder Chance? Normative Grundlagen politischer Orientierungen*, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Discussion Paper SP IV 2006-401, 2006.

<sup>33</sup> Gabriel ALMOND – Sidney VERBA, *The Civic Culture Revisited. An Approach to Civic Culture*, Newbury Park: California, 1989.

<sup>34</sup> Political orientation as an integral part of the political culture is categorized by Almond and Verba in three dimensions: firstly, the parochial system, which is characterised by political distance and absence of either knowledge or any perception of the political system. The second dimension is subject political culture, in which there is a perceptive and normative orientation towards the political. The third dimension is participant political culture, in which citizens are active participants in the political system (Gabriel ALMOND – Sidney VERBA, *The Civic Culture Revisited*, 17-18). In this study, political orientation focuses on the choice of left or right wing political options. The very fact of the existence of orientation (left or right) speaks of the existence of political orientation in the second and third dimensions, according to Almond and Verba.

culture and the political structure of a country.<sup>35</sup> In the context of the regression analysis in this study, we researched how this predictor set influences individual and social morality, and attitudes towards soft drugs and sexuality.

**Table 6. Democracy and political orientation and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality.**

|   |                                  | R    | R <sup>2</sup> | Predictors                         | β  | par. corr. |       |
|---|----------------------------------|------|----------------|------------------------------------|--|------------|-------|
| <b>Criterion</b>                                      | <b>Individual morality</b>       | .433 | .196           | Political orientation – left-right | -.233  | -.238      |       |
|   |                                  |      |                | <b>In a democracy...</b>           | People are obedient to their rulers                                | -.171      | -.173 |
|   |                                  |      |                |                                    | The religious authorities give the final interpretation of laws    | -.150      | -.149 |
|   |                                  |      |                |                                    | Civil rights protect people from oppression by the state           | .121       | .133  |
|   |                                  |      |                |                                    | The army takes over when the government is incompetent             | -.065      | -.066 |
|   | <b>Social morality</b>           | .270 | .073           | The importance of democracy        | -.158  | -.159      |       |
|   |                                  |      |                | <b>In a democracy...</b>           | Women have equal rights to men                                     | -.089      | -.088 |
|   |                                  |      |                |                                    | The government taxes the rich and helps the poor                   | -.081      | -.080 |
|   |                                  |      |                |                                    | The army takes over then the government is incompetent             | .096       | .094  |
|   |                                  |      |                |                                    | People are obedient to their rulers                                | -.102      | -.100 |
|   | Political orientation left-right | .063 | .063           |                                    |  |            |       |
|   | <b>Soft drugs and sexuality</b>  | .279 | .078           | Political orientation left-right   | -.104  | -.100      |       |
|   |                                  |      |                | <b>In a democracy...</b>           | The religious authorities give the final interpretation of the law | -.107      | -.100 |
|   |                                  |      |                |                                    | People are obedient to their rulers                                | -.079      | -.077 |
|   |                                  |      |                |                                    | Civil rights protect people from oppression by the state           | .076       | .073  |
| The government taxes the rich and helps the poor      |                                  |      |                |                                    | -.056  | -.054      |       |
| The importance of democracy                           |                                  |      |                | -.110                              | -.110  |            |       |
| Assessment of the degree of democracy in this country |                                  |      |                | -.078                              | -.075  |            |       |

The assumption we started with in the selection of the predictor sets was that morality and political orientation and the greater or lesser preference for a

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Sofia KAVLIN, *Understanding the Evolution of Political Cultures in France, England and U.S.A.*, in: *Carleton Review of International Affairs*, 4 (2017), 17-44; Petra STYKOV, *Vergleich politischer Systeme*, Paderborn, 2007.

democratic political system are correlated to a certain extent. That is to say, the coefficient of multiple determination is .196, which means that 20% of variance is explained. Those who are positioned to the left are in general more permissive on the scale of political self-identification, they believe less often that the characteristics of a democracy are that people are obedient to their rulers, that the religious authorities have a key role in interpreting the law, and that the army takes control when it sees that the government is incompetent. On the other hand, we have a positive correlation with the idea that civil rights protect people from oppression by the state – they show a higher level of permissiveness in terms of individual morality. When analysing *social morality* from this perspective we did not find any significant correlation, the coefficient of multiple determination is .073, therefore it interprets 7.3% of the criteria variance. On the level of the correlation analysis, People who were found to be more permissive tend to display the following attitudes: they rarely believe that certain practices are important for the functioning of democracy (such as women having equal rights to men, that the work of the government is to tax the rich and help the poor, that people should be obedient to their rulers), they tend more towards the idea that in case of the government's incompetence the army is to take the control, and they are politically slightly right-wing.

And finally, 7.8% of the variable *soft drugs and sexuality* is interpreted by the given predictor set. Therefore, again a low correlation. On the level of correlation, these are more permissive, more politically left-wing oriented citizens for whom it is less important that the country is ruled democratically, they have a lower assessment of the degree of democracy in the country, they more often believe that it is not relevant as a characteristic of democracy that the religious authorities give the final interpretation of the law, that people are obedient to their rulers or that the government taxes the rich, and they tend more to believe that it is important for a democracy that civil rights protect people from oppression by the state.

#### 2.4.4. The collective identity and attitudes towards individual and social morality and soft drugs and sexuality

Given that morality is closely connected to *ethos*, which originally means *abode*, *custom*, *meaning*, or, if we take the Latin version of the Greek word, *custom*, *conduct*, *behaviour*, it may be understood that this abode, the anchorage in which a person feels »at home« has an important influence on the concept of morality in society. Therefore, we took as a predictor set the variables which aim at identity precisely from that angle.

The predictor, »collective identity« is based on the classical distinction of the individual<sup>36</sup> and the collective<sup>37</sup> identity, according to which the latter relates to collectives, such as for example interest groups, religious communities, nations etc.<sup>38</sup> In the context of the collective identity, the relationship between national and European identity is currently particularly in focus, which is also reflected in the literature<sup>39</sup> and precisely that dimension of the collective identity is researched as a predictor in the following regression analysis.

**Table 7. Collective identity and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality.**

|                  |                                 | R    | R <sup>2</sup> | Predictors  | β     | par. corr. |
|------------------|---------------------------------|------|----------------|---|-------|------------|
| <b>Criterion</b> | <b>Individual morality</b>      | .506 | .256           | Being European means being a Christian  | -.333 | -.311      |
|                  |                                 |      |                | Being a true Croatian citizen means having Croatian roots                                   | -.167 | -.159      |
|                  |                                 |      |                | Pride in Croatian citizenship   | -.119 | -.118      |
|                  |                                 |      |                | Being European means living in line with European culture                                   | .134  | .146       |
|                  |                                 |      |                | In case of war, would fight for one's country   | -.094 | -.102      |
|                  | <b>Social morality</b>          | .301 | .091           | Being a true Croatian citizen means respecting the political institutions and Croatian laws | -.247 | -.240      |
|                  |                                 |      |                | Feels close to Europe   | -.083 | -.081      |
|                  |                                 |      |                | Feels close to Croatia  | -.060 | -.057      |
|                  | <b>Soft drugs and sexuality</b> | .434 | .188           | Being European means being a Christian  | -.295 | -.294      |
|                  |                                 |      |                | Feels close to Croatia  | -.150 | -.149      |
|                  |                                 |      |                | Being a true Croatian citizen means respecting the political institutions and Croatian laws | -.097 | -.101      |
|                  |                                 |      |                | In case of war, would fight for one's country   | -.073 | -.076      |

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Erik H. ERIKSON, *Identität und Lebenszyklus*, Frankfurt/Main, 1980.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Heiner KEUPP – Renate HÖFER (eds.), *Identitätsarbeit heute. Klassische und aktuelle Perspektiven der Identitätsforschung*, Frankfurt/Main, 1997.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Dieter NOHLEN – Rainer-Olaf SCHULTZE (eds.), *Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft. Band 1 A-M. Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe*, München, 2005.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Gerhard GÖHLER, *Nationale und Europäische Identität*, in: Beate KOHLER-KOCH (ed.), *Staat und Demokratie in Europa*, Wiesbaden, 1992; Bettina WESTLE – Paolo SEGATTI, *European Identity in the Context of National Identity: Questions of Identity in Sixteen European Countries in the Wake of the Financial Crisis*, New York, 2016.

The results show that for *individual morality* 25.6% of variance was interpreted. This confirms our presumption. In this sphere of morality, those for whom being a Christian means less in the context of the European identity were more permissive, and more often believed that, in that sense, it is more important to live in line with European culture. For the construction *Croatian identity*, it is less important for them to have Croatian roots, they are less proud of being Croatian citizens, and in case of war it would be harder for them to decide to fight for Croatia. 9.1% of *individual morality* was interpreted by this predictor set. Here, those who believe less that it is important, being a true Croatian citizen, to respect Croatian institutions and laws, and those who feel less close to Croatia or Europe, are more permissive. The concept *soft drugs and sexuality* interprets 18.8% of the predictor set. This is still a weak, but significant correlation with the predictor set. This includes those who are more permissive, for whom being Christian it is less important for European identity, those who feel less close to Croatia, who are less likely to decide to fight for their country, and who less often believe that it is necessary to respect Croatian institutions in order to be a true Croatian citizen.

#### 2.4.5. Consumption of/trust in the media and attitudes towards individual and social morality and soft drugs and sexuality

One of the predictors sets we tried to connect with the criteria in question related to the role of the media in creating social reality. Although the media and their role in the formation / adoption of values are not the original subject of EVS research, as other authors have also mentioned in presentations and analysis of the first wave of research from 1999<sup>40</sup>, from the results obtained, as well as the results of other research, it is still possible to notice a certain correlation between consumption of the media, trust in the media and other institutions<sup>41</sup> and (religious) identity/values of the media audience.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, after earlier research analysed the connection between consumption of media and trust in media, the Church and other institutions and religious identity and practice, in this study we focused on the question of the correlation between the consump-

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Mirko Juraj MATAUŠIĆ – Ivan RIMAC, Praćenje medija i odnos prema vrednotama, in: *Bogoslovska smotra*, 70 (2000) 2, 485-498.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Antonija ČUVALO, Osobine medijskih publika i povjerenje u medije, in: *Medijske studije*, 1 (2010) 1-2, 40-54.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Gordan ČRPIĆ – Mirko Juraj MATAUŠIĆ, Povjerenje u medije, in: *Bogoslovska smotra*, 68 (1998) 4, 673-683.



tion of/trust in the media and attitudes towards moral questions, with the proviso that we support the theory that we cannot unambiguously conclude from that correlation anything about the effectiveness of the media in the formation of those same attitudes, but only about »the relationship towards the media of people who accept or do not accept certain values.«<sup>43</sup>

**Table 8. Consumption of/trust in the media and attitudes to individual and social morality and soft drugs and sexuality.**

|                 |                                      | R    | R <sup>2</sup> | Predictors  | β     | par. corr. |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|------|----------------|---|-------|------------|
| <b>Criteria</b> | <b>Individual morality</b>           | .250 | .063           | Trusts the press  | -.111 | -.113      |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Follows politics on television                                | -.080 | -.081      |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Follows politics on social networks                           | .212  | .211       |
|                 | <b>Social morality</b>               | .279 | .078           | Journalists cover elections fairly                            | -.126 | -.124      |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Follows politics on television                                | -.180 | -.172      |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Follows politics on social networks                           | .106  | .103       |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Trusts the press  | -.080 | -.079      |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Follows politics in daily newspapers                          | .064  | .060       |
|                 | <b>Soft drugs and sexuality</b>      | .353 | .125           | During elections the television news favours the ruling party | .051  | .052       |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Follows politics on social networks                           | .191  | .189       |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Follows politics on television                                | -.206 | -.201      |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Journalists cover elections fairly                            | -.096 | -.097      |
|                 |                                      |      |                | Trusts the press  | -.115 | -.116      |
|                 |                                      |      |                | During elections the television news favours the ruling party | .086  | .089       |
|                 | Follows politics in daily newspapers | .094 | .089           |   |       |            |

As presented in Table 8, we obtained a certain, but small correlation between the predictor sets and the criteria. The strongest correlation was with the concept *soft drugs and sexuality*. In the dimension *individual morality* 6.3% of variance was interpreted. People who have less trust in the press, who follow politics less on television and more often on social media are more permissive. 7.8% of variance was interpreted for *social morality*. People who more rarely follow politics on television and more often on social networks, who more rarely believe that journalists report elections honestly, who have less confidence in the

<sup>43</sup> Mirko Juraj MATAUŠIĆ, *Mediji u krizi vrednota*, in: *Bogoslovska smotra*, 71 (2001) 2-3, 369.

press but more often follow politics in daily newspaper, and more often believe that television news favours the ruling party are relatively more permissive. And finally, *soft drugs and sexuality* was interpreted with 12.5% of variance. Here, people who follow politics more often on social media, less often on television, more rarely believe that journalists cover elections fairly, have less confidence in the press, more often follow politics in daily newspapers, and believe that television favours the ruling party in elections are more permissive.

#### 2.4.6. Socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality

We took as a separate predictor set the socio-demographic variables of *education*, *size of settlement* and *age*. In terms of other socio-demographic variables a t-test analysis was previously conducted with the variable *gender*.

**Table 9. Socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes towards individual and social morality, and soft drugs and sexuality.**

|          |                          | R    | R <sup>2</sup> | Predictors                            | β    | par. corr. |
|----------|--------------------------|------|----------------|---------------------------------------|------|------------|
| Criteria | Individual morality      | .372 | .138           | Higher level of education             | .256 | .229       |
|          |                          |      |                | Size of settlement/town of respondent | .150 | .149       |
|          |                          |      |                | Level of income                       | .066 | .063       |
|          | Social morality          | .354 | .125           | Age/year of birth                     | .332 | .332       |
|          |                          |      |                | Size of settlement/town of respondent | .087 | .092       |
|          | Soft drugs and sexuality | .408 | .167           | Age/year of birth                     | .276 | .276       |
|          |                          |      |                | Size of settlement/town of respondent | .194 | .195       |
|          |                          |      |                | Higher level of education             | .097 | .094       |

The results obtained inform us that a significant correlation was found in the sphere of *individual morality*, 13.8% of variance was interpreted, and it was found that people who are more highly educated, younger and from larger settlements are more permissive. In the sphere of *social morality*, 12.5% of variance was interpreted. The relevant variables were age and the size of settlement, that is, people are more permissive if they are younger and from a larger settlement. The largest correlation was found with the concept *soft drugs and sexuality*, for all three variables considered. 16.7% of variance was interpreted, and, just as for

*individual morality*, it was found that younger people, from larger settlements and those with higher education are more permissive.

## Conclusion

Croatian society has been developing its »social character« under the influence of many factors since the last wave of the EVS (2008), which is also reflected in likely changes in attitudes towards morality – from the traditional towards the more liberal – as well as the pace of those changes. David Riesman, in this sense, systematized three types of society, from individuals and society directed towards tradition, through their inwardly turned direction, to the direction of the individual and society towards the other. One of the central results of the research in this study precisely demonstrates that Croatian society, bearing in mind all three of Riesman's types, is still mainly traditional in terms of attitudes towards morality. The concept of *traditional*, which for Riesman also has negative connotations in his sociological interpretation, especially in the context of the first type<sup>44</sup>, still needs to be illuminated in the sense of the positive meaning of tradition (customs) – both for individual people and for larger groups of people, since tradition is a condition of their identity. Individuals find themselves in a relationship of exchange in relation to the community because they live on the basis of collective customs, but also the customs of the community always gain new life in the individual.<sup>45</sup>

Bearing the results obtained in mind, we can assert that our hypotheses were confirmed to different degrees. As part of Riesman's first moral or social type, »tradition« we researched the independent variable of »religiosity« (H1). In relation to the first hypothesis, our research indicates that people who are religious, in the traditional church sense, are less permissive in all the dimensions of morality considered. However, in terms of the dimension of social morality, that correlation is very low, therefore the hypothesis was not completely proven. Religiosity was shown to be relevant for interpreting individual morality, bioethical questions and questions of sexuality.

Within Riesman's second type, »inner«, we researched the independent variables of trust in institutions (H2) and political orientation (H3). The second hypothesis was also partially upheld – trust in institutions was positively correlated with traditional morality, yet again it was not significant in relation

<sup>44</sup> Cf. David RIESMAN, *The Lonely Crowd*, 12-13.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Walter KERN – Franz-Josef NIEMANN, *Nauka o teološkoj spoznaji*, Zagreb, 1994.

to social morality. With respect to political orientation (H3), it was found that politically more left-wing people also have more permissive moral attitudes, but that correlation was only significant in terms of individual morality, therefore, that hypothesis was also only partially upheld.

Within Riesman's third type, »other«, we researched the independent variables of collective identity (H4), and consumption of the media and trust in the media (H5). The fourth hypothesis was also partially upheld. That is to say, the results showed that people who express a clearer Croatian identity display a greater tendency towards traditional morality, whilst those whose identity is closer to a wider, European identity are more permissive. The fifth hypothesis was also partially upheld. The results of the research show that people who follow the traditional media of television and radio, but not the daily newspapers, although they express greater criticism towards them, are less permissive. And finally, the socio-demographic variables (H6) proved to be a significant predictor of attitudes towards morality. Younger, more educated, men, people from larger settlements, and those from Istria and Primorje County, revealed a higher level of permissiveness in their attitudes towards morality.

In the analyses of the selected predictor sets, those that best interpreted individual morality were: religiosity the most (28.5% of variance), national identity (25.6%) and trust in institutions (24.7%), and less political orientation (19.6%) and consumption of/trust in the media and social networks (6.3%). For the criterion *soft drugs and sexuality*, the variances were somewhat lower: from 7.8% for political orientation, 12.5% for consumption of/trust in the media, right up to 18.5% for trust in institutions and 21.2% for the predictor religiosity. The smallest correlation was found for the criterion social morality: from 1.4% for religiosity, to 9.1% of variance for the predictor national identity.

In the sphere of individual morality, people who demonstrated less traditional religiosity, who tended towards alternative forms of religiosity, who had less confidence in institutions, who were politically more left-wing, less authoritarian, in identity closer to the European identity than the Croatian, and those who follow politics in the press, although they do not trust it so they also find information on social networks, were found to be more permissive. In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, they are younger, more educated respondents with higher incomes, from larger towns, and from Istria and Primorje County. We also obtained similar results for the variable *soft drugs and sexuality*.

In terms of social morality, people who are found to have less permissive attitude are those for whom God is important in life and who believe that the Church responds appropriately to the spiritual and social needs of people,

who have greater trust both in state institutions, and also in organizations that protect the environment, who self-identify as more right-wing on the political scale, and who follow politics more on television and the radio.

In general, the findings of our research indicate some conclusions that should be taken into account that relate to the time period of 2017/2018, which we express here in the form of theses:

- Morality in Croatia is relatively stable, at least with respect to the attitudes towards morality. In relation to the earlier EVS research, there has been a slight shift towards permissiveness, but morality is still stable and traditionally based. Therefore, there is no empirical basis for the theory popular in social that morality in Croatia is in crisis, or that there has been an enormous decline in values and morality.
- There is no basis to conclude that Croatian society is divided in terms of important values. Apart from some bioethical issues, the population is relatively homogenous in a moral sense. Considering that this research did not include media perception of attitudes to morality, it would be useful to study the impression of major divisions regarding moral issues in some future research.
- It is indicative that, according to one finding, social morality was not significantly correlated with the predictor sets used. The reason for this may be because it is relatively highly accepted as a social standard, thus only a slight variance remained to be interpreted in the sense of deviation. Therefore, it is accepted as a social standard, which is also a valuable finding. The open question remains, however, of the correlation between attitudes and practice, however that is a question for some other study.

## Sažetak

### STAVOVI GRAĐANA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE O PITANJIMA MORALA: KONZERVATIVNI ILI LIBERALNI?

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*Rad se temelji na rezultatima trećeg vala Europskog istraživanja vrijednosti (European Values Study) provedenoga u Hrvatskoj tijekom 2017. i 2018. godine na uzorku od 1488 ispitanika, te njihovoj djelomičnoj usporedbi s rezultatima istraživanja EVS iz 1999. i 2008. godine. U radu se analiziraju stavovi prema nekim moralnim pitanjima iz sfere individualnog i socijalnog morala te povezanost tih stavova s religioznošću, povjerenjem, političkom orijentacijom (»lijevo-desno«), nacionalnim identitetom te konzumacijom/povjerenjem u (tradicionalne) medije i društvene mreže, uz sociodemografska obilježja ispitanika kao nezavisnom varijablom. Na temelju dobivenih rezultata u radu se zaključuje kako su – osobito na području individualnog morala, te na području lakih droga i spolnosti – religiozni ljudi u pogledu stavova o moralu manje permissivni od nereligioznih, oni su ti koji imaju povjerenje u institucije, politički su »desniji«, oni su ljudi s jačim nacionalnim identitetom od onih s europskim. Također mlađi, obrazovaniji muškarci, oni iz većih gradova i naselja te iz Istre i Primorja, pokazuju veću permissivnost u stavovima o moralu. Zaključuje se i kako je moral u Hrvatskoj relativno stabilan, uz blagi pomak prema permissivnosti, a hrvatsko društvo u bitnim vrijednosnim polazištima poprilično homogeno.*

*Ključne riječi: Europsko istraživanje vrijednosti, Hrvatska, stavovi o moralnosti, religioznost, povjerenje, politička orijentacija, kolektivni identitet, mediji*