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# Interregional Connectivity among Indian Immigrants: A Series of Protests against Exclusion from Canada, the US Mainland and Manila in the Early 20th Century

Kaori Mizukami

## Abstract

This paper examines a series of refusals to admit Indian immigrants into North America in the early twentieth century and the resulting protest movements in Canada, the US mainland and the Philippines. By examining these events, the study aims to enhance our comprehension of Indian immigrants' agency in shaping their interregional mobility and connectivity. Indians repeatedly faced de facto exclusion from these places, but they devised strategies to facilitate migration, and in response, Canadian and US authorities tightened control, leading to further resistance. Throughout these cycles of restriction and resistance, Indian migrants combined the knowledge and experiences acquired in Manila and North America, countering immigration policies and strengthening interregional connectivity. Understanding the interregional connectivity among Indian immigrants is key to understanding why Indians from different regions were actively involved in the anti-British Ghadar movement and the Komagata Maru incident. This paper focuses on the agency of Indians in Manila and examines the reasons behind their engagement in these events.

**Keywords:** Indians, immigrants, agency, Manila, North America, Anti-British movement, protests, Ghadar Movement, Komagata Maru Incident

While studies on the history of Indian<sup>1</sup> immigration to the Philippines, the US and Canada have tended to describe Indian immigration activities in terms of current national borders (La Brack 1988, Rye 1993, Gould 2006, Bhatti 2007),<sup>2</sup> more studies have been published in recent years that place the movement of Indian immigrants in the early twentieth century across multiple regions. In

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particular, in relation to the Komagata Maru Incident<sup>3</sup> and the Ghadar Movement,<sup>4</sup> which were political events associated with Indians in North America and other parts of the world, studies have extensively explored the interregional movement of Indians and the stringent restrictions and surveillance imposed upon them by the British Empire.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to these studies, research on the history of the Punjabi Sikh diaspora, which made up the majority of Indians who went to North America in the early twentieth century, has discussed how the British Empire determined the transnational mobility or immobility of the Indian population (Ballantyne 2006, Jackson 2012). Tony Ballantyne explains that Punjabis, people from the Punjab region of north-west India, were drawn into the “international webs of the British imperial system”, including the military and police forces of the British Empire and the steamship and telegraph networks that connected the Empire, and moved from place to place (Ballantyne 2006: 69–70).

Although there is no doubt that the British imperial system was highly influential in enabling or restricting Indian mobility during the British colonial period, it is vital to recognise that emphasis on this aspect can obscure the role of Indians’ own agency in choosing to migrate and shaping their own lives. In particular, it is imperative to reinterpret Indian migrants to the Pacific coast of North America in terms of their agency in order to better capture the uniqueness of their migration across multiple regions. They actively sought out and expanded space for mobility, capitalising on diverse avenues such as labour demands along the Pacific Coast in Canada and the United States, links between ports on the Pacific route, and territorial contiguity between the US mainland and the Philippines (which was then under US jurisdiction). Their creative attempts to achieve entry developed further as restrictions on Indian immigration became stricter in Canada and on the US mainland.

1 This paper uses the term “Indians” to indicate people from areas considered to be India during the British colonial period, which include today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In historical sources on North America, these people are usually referred to as “East Indians” or “Hindus” for the purposes of distinguishing them from Native American peoples.

2 Exceptionally, a study by Joan M. Jensen (1988) attempted to interpret the Indians’ flow in the broader context of North America, and a study by Buchignani et al. (1985) focused primarily on Canada but also considered Indian movements across both the US mainland and Canada.

3 The Komagata Maru incident involved a group of Indian nationals who arrived in Vancouver aboard the steamship Komagata Maru in 1914, only to be denied entry into Canada (Johnston 1989, Kayanoki 2013, Mawani 2018, Akita / Hosokawa 2021).

4 The Ghadar movement was an anti-British colonialism movement that aimed to achieve “revolution” to end British rule by fomenting rebellions in India. *Ghadar* means “mutiny” in Hindustani and Punjabi, and was also meant to be a revival of the mutiny of 1857. The movement’s headquarters was in San Francisco, and they attempted to acquire participants, funds and arms mainly among Indian overseas migrants. The majority of participants were Indians who resided along the Pacific Coast of North America, including students, laborers and anticolonial activists. Beginning in 1913, weekly Ghadar newspapers were published, and circulated from San Francisco to India and other parts of the world where Indians lived. For more detailed accounts for the Ghadar movement, see Bose 1971, Sareen 1979, Puri 1993, Ramnath 2011 and Sohi 2014.

5 See Kayanoki 2013, Sohi 2014, Roy / Sahoo 2017, Chattopadhyay 2018, Roy 2018, Mawani 2018, Dhmoon et al. 2019, Akita / Hosokawa 2021.

Efforts to re-evaluate the history of Indian migration during the British colonial era in terms of people's agency have been undertaken by scholars such as Marina Carter, who examined the history of indentured migration in nineteenth-century Mauritius (Carter 2009). However, regarding Indians migrating to North America in the early twentieth century, while much research has explored the impact of the British Empire on their interregional migration, there remains a gap in understanding the process of the deepening interregional connectivity of Indian immigrants and how this relates to the agency of Indians themselves.

Consequently, my aim in this paper is to address these gaps by examining the ways in which Indians who migrated to North America faced repeated ostracism and consistently resisted exclusion. As the number of Indians arriving on the Pacific Coast of North America increased in the early twentieth century, anti-Indian sentiment also rose, leading to restrictive measures against Indian entry into Canada and the US mainland. Despite these challenges, Indians actively devised strategies to facilitate migration, pushing back against the restrictive measures. In response, Canadian and US authorities tightened their control, prompting Indians to counter yet again. This paper aims to demonstrate how, through these cycles of restriction and resistance, the knowledge and experiences gained by Indians from different regions in asserting their right to move influenced one another, fostering interregional connectivity among Indian immigrants in Canada, the US mainland and the Philippines.

Understanding the interregional connectivity among Indian immigrants, with an emphasis on immigrants' agency, is key to comprehending the factors that led to the active involvement of Indian participants from different regions in political events such as the anti-British Ghadar Movement and the Komagata Maru Incident. I aim to shed light on this point, with particular attention to Indians in Manila.<sup>6</sup> Previous studies have shown that Indians in Manila were mobilised by Indian leaders arriving in Manila from other places to become involved in the Komagata Maru incident and the Ghadar movement (Bose 1971: 75, Sohi 2014: 126, Johnston 1989: 29–31). Yet they have not satisfactorily explained why Indians in Manila chose to work with those leaders and what advantages there were in doing so. Therefore, this paper is centred on the agency of Indians in Manila and examines the reasons for their involvement in political activism. Through discussing this point, I argue that individual Indian migrants, as well as political leaders, facilitated the development of interregional political movements as an extension of migrants' activism in asserting their right to mobility.

In an effort to illustrate the interregional activities of Indians, I examine various primary sources drawn up in the UK, India, the US mainland, Canada, the Philippines and Japan. Notably, records of the British Foreign Office and

6 A similar perspective could be argued for Indians in Hong Kong and Shanghai, but these areas are discussed in a separate paper.

the Indian Emigration Branch, along with newspapers published in Manila at the time, are crucial for understanding the voices and activities of Indians in Manila, which have not yet been revealed in previous studies. Furthermore, in order to gain a deeper understanding of interregional connectivity, it is essential not only to examine various historical sources, but also to gain a comprehensive grasp of the historical backdrop of Indian immigration in Canada, the United States and the Philippines. Therefore, the discussion begins by situating the Indians who made their way to the Pacific Coast of North America within a historical framework of alternating restrictions and resistance.

## Influx and exclusion of Indians on the Pacific Coast

Indian immigrants began arriving on the Pacific coast of North America, straddling Canada and the United States, in the early twentieth century. Let us first review the situation on the Canadian side. Statistical recording of the number of Indian immigrants to Canada did not begin until the Canadian fiscal year of 1905.<sup>7</sup> In 1905, the number of Indian arrivals was 45; in 1906, it was 387; in 1907, 2124; and in 1908, 2623. This indicates a sharp increase in arrivals from 1906 onwards (Das 1923: 4–5). Most Indian immigrants to Canada were Punjabi, with the Pacific Coast as their destination, and many worked in the lumber industry or railway-related jobs after immigration (Jensen 1988: 24, 27; Mizukami 2014: 127, 131).

Among the factors that led to international migration from Punjab, a particularly important reason was that Punjabi Sikhs were often recruited to the colonial Indian Army and police forces and further dispatched to foreign countries, such as Hong Kong, Shanghai and British Malaya. Some of these soldiers or police officers had opportunities to travel upon retirement from the service or while on a leave of absence. As a result, some of them reached Canada. After the first group discovered the advantages of living in Canada, they wrote letters and invited their relatives and acquaintances to join them (Das 1923: 3–4; Tatla 2004: 47, 49–50; Bhatti 2007: 28–30). In addition to the call from Indians themselves, extensive travel advertising by the Canadian Pacific Railway also attracted many Indians to Canada.<sup>8</sup> Between March and August 1907, it

7 Subsequent statistics on the number of Indian immigrants to Canada are also by fiscal year, but it should be noted that the scope of what a fiscal year refers to varies from period to period. The Canadian fiscal year of 1905 was from 1 July 1904 to 30 June 1905, and the 1906 fiscal year was similarly a 12-month period beginning in July. The 1907 fiscal year was a transitional year, lasting nine months from 1 July 1906 to 31 March 1907. Fiscal year 1908 was from 1 April 1907 to 31 March 1908, and the Canadian fiscal year thereafter was 12 months beginning in April (Canada Census and Statistics Office 1915: 85).

8 The company sought Indian passengers to compensate for the loss of business it suffered after the Chinese Immigration Act of 1904 raised the head tax for Chinese immigrants to \$500, thus decreasing the number of Chinese steerage passengers. Agents of the Canadian Pacific Railway in Calcutta and Punjab promoted travel to Canada and sold steamship tickets (Buchignani et al. 1985: 8–9, Bhatti 2007: 38–39).

is estimated that more than 1200 Indians travelled to Canada on tickets provided by the Canadian Pacific Railway (Bhatti 2007: 39).<sup>9</sup> As noted above, the annual number of Indians who entered Canada during the same period was around 2000; therefore, it is clear that the Canadian Pacific Railway had a decisive impact on the flow of Indians into Canada.

This increase in the number of Indian arrivals to Canada led to an increase in the number of Indian arrivals to the US mainland as well. According to the US Immigration Commission, prior to 1905, Indians who entered the US mainland mainly comprised a small number of professional workers, traders and travellers with destinations on the East Coast, including New York, whereas after 1905 the number of labour migrants with destinations on the Pacific Coast increased rapidly. Indian labourers who entered the Pacific Coast of the US between 1905 and 1909 were mainly those who had migrated from British Columbia, on the Pacific Coast of Canada. They moved from Canada after hearing that they could earn better incomes in the United States, and numerous Indians were employed in lumber mills in Washington around 1906 (US Immigration Commission 1911: 328–9, 331).<sup>10</sup> Thus, Indians who entered Canada did not necessarily stay in Canada but moved to the US mainland for economic opportunities.

As the number of Indian immigrants increased, they were subjected to anti-Asian fervour, both in Canada and the US, previously directed at Chinese and Japanese migrants. There was a strong antipathy towards Indians, especially among white factory workers, who felt that cheap Indian labour might take away their job opportunities. In 1907, a riot broke out in Bellingham, Washington, when hundreds of white workers attacked barracks where Indian workers lived and tried to expel them from their jobs as well as from the town. A few days after the Bellingham riots, larger anti-Asian riots broke out in Vancouver. The Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, formed in San Francisco in 1906 and acting out of hostility towards Asians, was involved in the Bellingham and Vancouver riots. After the riots, the League changed its name to Asian Exclusion League and added Indians to its targets of exclusion (Jensen 1988: 44–49, 66–68; Lee 2007; Sohi 2014: 25).<sup>11</sup>

In response to this anti-Indian fervour, measures to restrict the entry of Indians were considered in both Canada and the United States, but special considerations were needed to implement such measures in Canada, which was then a British Dominion. In principle, subjects of the British Empire could move freely

9 National Archives of India, Delhi (NAI): Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration Branch, 1907, September, Part A, No. 13–14 (File No. 74), Commissioner of Police at Calcutta to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, General Department, 8 August 1907.

10 The study by Jensen also showed the testimony of an Indian who actually moved from Canada to the US around 1907 after being encouraged by friends to work in the US (Jensen 1988: 29–30).

11 Indians in Washington feared further violence and moved south to Oregon and California after the Bellingham riot (US Immigration Commission 1911: 331, 334–336).

within the British Empire. Given that the so-called “Queen’s Proclamation”, made by Queen Victoria in 1858, proclaimed the equal status of Indians compared to other subjects of the British Empire, Indians were supposedly granted the freedom to enter Canada (Kayanoki 2013: 37–38; Akita / Hosokawa 2021: 43–44, 77–78). However, an official speech made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the Colonial Conference of 1897, while pointing out that the British Colonies should not restrict the entry of British imperial subjects on the grounds of race or colour, indicated the policy that the decision as to whether an immigrant was undesirable should be based on the immigrant’s uncleanness, immorality, poverty and other characteristics (Dan 1987: 21–22, Kayanoki 2013: 39–40).<sup>12</sup> This policy checked any overt exclusion of British imperial subjects in the British colonies but left room for the arbitrary exclusion of subjects by singling them out as “undesirable immigrants”.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the Canadian authorities searched for ways to effectively exclude Indians without explicitly declaring them in the legal text as objects of exclusion. This purpose was gradually achieved by applying Order-in-Council No. 27 of 1908 to Indians. Under this order, to enter Canada, immigrants had to travel by direct passage from the country of their birth or citizenship, or if they chose to travel by way of another country, they had to buy tickets for their entire trip before departure.<sup>14</sup> The Order-in-Council was originally issued to restrict the entry of Japanese immigrants,<sup>15</sup> but Canadian authorities sought to apply it to Indians as well, on the assumption that there were no steamship companies in India selling tickets for the entire journey from India to Canada (Kayanoki 2013: 42–43, Akita / Hosokawa 2021: 81–83).

In response to this measure, Indian immigrants did not simply accept it or give up, but resisted with various strategies. For example, they engaged steamer ticket brokers in India to prepare tickets for the entire journey, combining a Canadian Pacific Railway Company steamer ticket between Hong Kong and Canada with another company’s steamer ticket between Calcutta and Hong Kong (Buchignani et al. 1985: 24–25). Moreover, even when they were refused entry after arriving in Canada, they initiated proceedings with the British Columbia Court of Appeal to repeal their repatriation orders. In some of these cases, deficiencies in Order-in-Council No. 27 of 1908 were pointed out, and the Indians were allowed to enter the country (Kayanoki 2013: 43–44).<sup>16</sup>

12 “Proceedings of Conference between Secretary of State for Colonies and Premiers of Self-Governing Colonies, at the Colonial Office, London, June and July 1897”, in *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1897, C. 8596, pp. 13–14.

13 In line with this policy, the Australian Federal Immigration Restriction Act 1901 practically restricted the entry of non-European immigrants by imposing language tests, and Indians were also prevented from entering (De Lepervanche 1984: 54–55, Kayanoki 2013: 40).

14 Orders-in-Council of Canada, P. C. 27, 8 January 1908.

15 After the US Government restricted Japanese immigration to the US mainland via Hawaii in 1907, the number of Japanese immigrants attempting to enter Canada from Hawaii increased rapidly. This Order-in-Council was a measure to stop such Japanese entering Canada via Hawaii (Kayanoki 2013: 42–43, Akita / Hosokawa 2021: 81–83).

16 *British Columbia Report* 13, 1908, pp. 415–416.



The Canadian federal government responded to this resistance by deliberately fostering conditions that ensured the exclusion of Indians. First, pressure was exerted on the Canadian Pacific Railway Company to prevent Indians from boarding steamers between Hong Kong and Canada. As the steamship company had to bear the cost of repatriation if a passenger was refused entry, the Canadian Pacific Railway Company agreed to the government's request, in order to avoid this risk. The Canadian federal government further developed a new Order-in-Council and Immigration Act while correcting the problems identified in court with Order-in-Council No. 27 of 1908. In addition, in June 1908, an Order-in-Council requiring all Asian immigrants landing in Canada to carry \$200 was issued.<sup>17</sup> As a result of these policies, the number of Indians who entered Canada, which was 2623 in the year 1908, fell sharply to 6 in the year 1909 (Buchignani et al. 1985: 25–26, Kayanoki 2013: 44–47).

In the same period, in the United States, a bill to impose a literacy test on entry, to restrict immigration from Asia and Southern Europe, was introduced in Congress as early as 1897, but a presidential veto prevented its passage. Congress debated a similar bill in 1907, but President Theodore Roosevelt, concerned about the impact on diplomacy, remained opposed to the legislation, and it was never passed. Even though there were no laws that explicitly excluded Indian nationals from entering the country, the immigration of Indians would be substantially restricted by stricter controls at the border. From 1909 onwards, under the direction of the US Federal Immigration and Naturalization Bureau, each immigration control site took steps to deny entry to Indians on the grounds that they fell under the category of “persons likely to become public charge” under the Immigration Act, i.e., indigent persons who might need assistance in the form of public benefits (Jensen 1988: 139–140, Sohi 2014: 28–29). In addition to an increase in the number of Indian immigrants who were refused entry at immigration checkpoints, a decline in the number of Indians entering Canada led to a decline in the number of Indian arrivals on the US mainland. As a result, the number of Indian arrivals fell from 1710 in US fiscal year 1908<sup>18</sup> to 450 in 1909 (US Immigration Commission 1911: 326).

17 Orders-in-Council of Canada, P. C. 1255, 3 June 1908. This was intended for “all Asian immigrants”, but the real target was Indians because there were separate regulations and agreements for the Chinese and Japanese (Buchignani et al. 1985: 25–26, Kayanoki 2013: 44–47).

18 Subsequent statistics on the number of Indian immigrants to the US are also by fiscal year. The US fiscal year 1908 ran from 1 July 1907 to 30 June 1908. Similarly, with regard to the time period covered in this paper, the US fiscal year was a 12-month period beginning in July, which differs from the Canadian fiscal year in the period covered from 1907 onwards. The numbers of Indians entering the United States mentioned here do not include the number of Indians who landed on the Philippine Islands (see Table 1 of the *Annual Reports of the Commissioner-General of Immigration* for the years of 1899–1920). After the US fiscal year 1909, Indians entering the United States were divided in two categories: “immigrants” seeking permanent residence in the US and “non-immigrants” staying in the US for a certain period and for different purposes. This paper adds the total from these two categories to calculate the number of Indians who entered the US.



However, the directions given by the Federal Immigration and Naturalization Bureau were not necessarily thoroughly implemented at all immigration control sites. On the contrary, the Commissioner of Immigration in San Francisco, Hart North, considered Indians a necessary labour force for California's economic development and allowed them to enter (Jensen 1988: 103–108, Sohi 2014: 31–32). Consequently, the number of Indian arrivals in the United States in 1910 reached 1886, the highest number of Indian arrivals between 1899 and 1920 (Das 1923: 10–12). This sharp increase suggests that Indians, who had almost been shut out of Canada and were increasingly being refused entry to the US mainland, rushed to San Francisco after sharing information that they could enter the US at this particular port of entry. It can be said that Indians recognised the discrepancy between the US immigration policy and its practical implementation and leveraged this difference to create their own immigration opportunities. However, US authorities responded swiftly to halt the entry of Indians, resulting in North's suspension from duty in October 1910 (Jensen 1988: 108–117, Sohi 2014: 32–33).<sup>19</sup> Subsequently, in 1911, the number of Indians entering the US fell again to 575 (Das 1923: 11–13).

In this way, while Indians were repeatedly subjected to entry restrictions on the Pacific Coast of North America, they persistently resisted them through legal appeals and by sharing their knowledge with each other about possible ports of entry. Even after entry through San Francisco was no longer viable, Indians continued to seek other ways of entering the country. The option of travelling via Manila then began to capture Indian immigrants' attention.

## Via Manila to the US Mainland

In December 1910, nineteen Indians arrived in Seattle via Manila. While initially refused entry, they legally challenged the decision. Ultimately, the Secretary of the US Department of Commerce and Labor decided that the provisions of the existing law were insufficient to deny entry to Indian travellers arriving from Manila and allowed them to enter the country, which led to an increase in Indian immigration to the US mainland via Manila (Sohi 2014: 117–120, 122).<sup>20</sup> Thus, even though a route to the US mainland via Manila was not prescribed in legal texts at that time, the appeal by Indians successfully established a precedent to permit the arrival of future Indian travellers through Manila.

19 *The San Francisco Examiner*, 9 August 1910, p. 6; *San Francisco Chronicle*, 26 October 1910, p. 18; *The San Francisco Call*, 28 October 1910, p. 1.

20 US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA): RG85, File 53173/40, Commissioner-General of Immigration and Naturalization to Immigration Commissioner of San Francisco, 31 October 1911 (Micro film Z167, Reel 25).

The acting British Vice-Consul in Manila recorded that after May 1911, Indians seeking to enter the US mainland began regularly visiting the British Consulate-General in Manila to apply for passports. Once would-be immigrants had arrived in Manila, an Indian “headman” named Barkat Ali, who worked as a watchman at the Insular Cigar Factory in Manila, took them to the British Consulate-General.<sup>21</sup> Barkat Ali himself later became involved in the Ghadar movement, discussed later. It is likely that the knowledge he had in his capacity as a headman was shared among Indians in Manila, helping them to travel to the US mainland.

The acting British Vice-Consul reported that Indians used to stay in Manila for about six months to obtain residency certificates and passports before embarking on the Great Northern Railway Company’s steamship “Minnesota”, which was providing regular passage at that time, leading to an average of 150 Indians arriving annually via Manila to the US mainland.<sup>22</sup> According to the US immigration Act at that time, those who tried to enter via this route were not required to possess residency certificates or passports (US Department of Commerce and Labor 1911: 32–33). However, Indians made efforts to obtain these documents, hoping that doing so would enhance their prospects of gaining entry.

As US immigration authorities aimed to prevent a further influx of Indians, they required new statutory provisions, which took time to arrange because the departments in charge of immigration matters differed between the US mainland and the Philippines.<sup>23</sup> The authorities concerned – the US Department of Labor, US Department of War and the Philippine Bureau of Customs – deliberated and finally agreed to amend Rule 14 of the US Immigration Laws to halt the flow of Indians arriving through Manila. After the amendment, Rule 14 prescribed that foreigners travelling from the Philippines to the US mainland were exempt from immigration inspection on the mainland if they carried the required documents issued in the Philippines (US Department of Labor 1913: 32–33).<sup>24</sup>

21 NAI: Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration Branch, 1912, July, Part B, No. 17 (File No. 82), “Memorandum on British Indians in the Philippine Islands”, by M. Paske Smith (Acting British Vice-Consul at Manila), 29 April 1912.

22 Ibid.

23 Whereas the US Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Bureau of Immigration after 1913) under the US Department of Commerce and Labor (Department of Labor after 1913) oversaw immigration matters in other insular areas, such as Hawaii and Puerto Rico, immigration matters in the Philippines were under the control of the Bureau of Customs of the Government of the Philippines, which fell under the US Department of War. To halt Indian migration via the Philippines, the Department of Commerce and Labor requested the cooperation of the Department of War (US Department of Commerce and Labor 1910: 7; Institute for Government Research 1924: 12). The Philippines’s unique position in the US immigration administration also contributed to the US authorities’ inability to immediately stop the flow of Indians coming through Manila.

24 NARA: RG85, File 53173/40, Acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor to the Secretary of War, 12 July 1912; Assistant Secretary of War to Secretary of Commerce and Labor, 30 October 1912; Acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor to Secretary of War, 14 November 1912; Secretary of Labor to Secretary of War, 7 April 1913 (Micro film Z167, Reel 25).

Although this amended provision appeared to ease the movement of foreigners, it was in fact intended to be a measure of selection, because the authorities could restrict the movement of certain persons from Manila to the US mainland by refusing to issue the necessary certificates in the Philippines to those whom they wanted to exclude.<sup>25</sup> Taking up his post as US Commissioner of Immigration in June 1913, Anthony Caminetti<sup>26</sup> further amended this provision with the approval of the US Secretary of Labor so that foreigners coming from the Philippines would also have to undergo immigration inspection on the US mainland (Jensen 1988: 148; Sohi 2014: 122, 124).<sup>27</sup> Caminetti also met representatives of several steamship lines in an informal capacity and implicitly requested them to suspend services for Indians (Jensen 1988: 147).

At the end of June 1913 and given the circumstances outlined above, 77 Indians arriving in Seattle and 35 Indians arriving in San Francisco from Manila were deported on the grounds that they were “likely to become public charges”. These two cases in Seattle and San Francisco went to trial and the validity of the detentions was contested in court (Jensen 1988: 147–9, Sohi 2014: 124). As in the case of Canada, steamship companies had to bear the cost of repatriation if a passenger was refused entry into the United States (Jensen 1988: 110). Steamship companies were hence discouraged from selling tickets to Indians and instructed their agents in Manila to refuse passage to all Indians in the future. Consequently, over 100 Indians were denied passage in 1913, despite having already purchased steamship tickets.<sup>28</sup>

Indians in Canada, who had been continuously pursuing lawsuits against the rejection of Indian immigrants since 1909 (Buchignani et al. 1985: 37–39), protested against the denial of entry of Indians via the Manila route. The United India League, whose main members were Indians residing in Vancouver, held protest meetings. In September 1913 at a meeting in Vancouver of the Khalsa Diwan Society, a Sikh organisation, \$24,000 in donations were collected to support legal action for those Indians who were refused entry into Seattle. The collection of this large sum was intended to demonstrate the community’s economic power and to underline that it was unreasonable to apply the phrase “likely to become public charges” to Indians (Sohi 2014: 125).<sup>29</sup>

25 NARA: RG85, File 53173/40, Immigration Commissioner of San Francisco to Commissioner-General of Immigration and Naturalization, Washington, D. C., 21 November 1911 (Micro Film Z167, Reel 25).

26 Prior to his appointment as Commissioner of Immigration, Caminetti was a democratic senator from California with an anti-Asian platform. Immediately after his appointment as Commissioner of Immigration, he focused his efforts on stopping the influx of Indians (Jensen 1988: 146).

27 NARA: RG85, File 53173/40A, “Memorandum for the Secretary”, Commissioner-General of Immigration to Secretary of Labor, 16 June 1913 (Micro film Z167, Reel 25).

28 The National Archives of the UK, Kew (TNA): FO371/1860/44048, A. E. Wileman (British Consulate-General at Manila), to A. H. McMahon (Secretary of the Foreign Department, Government of India), 19 August 1913, enclosed in Wileman to Edward Grey (Secretary of State for Foreign Office), 20 August 1913.

29 NARA: RG85, File 52903/110C, “Report of Proceedings at Meeting of Hindus held in O’ Brien Hall, Vancouver, B. C., on 29 September 1913” (Micro film Z167, Reel 22).

Even as Indians resisted immigration restrictions through litigation in the US mainland and through protest rallies in Canada, this North America-centred resistance was connected to Indians in the Philippines, who expanded protest efforts in the capital of this Southeast Asian country.

## Protests by Indians in Manila against US immigration policy

At the end of June 1913, at approximately the same time that Indians were being excluded from the route to the US mainland via Manila, an Indian political activist named G. D. Kumar arrived in Manila from San Francisco.<sup>30</sup> Prior to his arrival in Manila, Kumar had served as secretary of the Hindusthane Association in Vancouver and had been active in protest movements against the exclusion of Indians from Canada while based in Vancouver and Seattle (Bose 1971: 52–53). In the course of his activities, he had worked with the Khalsa Diwan Society<sup>31</sup> and with Hussain Rahim, who founded the United India League (Buchignani et al. 1985: 40).

Kumar's activities in North America had been monitored by British authorities as early as 1910 because they were considered to be of a nature to incite armed uprising in India (Sohi 2014: 53).<sup>32</sup> A study by Bose explains that Kumar's purpose in visiting Manila in 1913 was to establish a revolutionary group to serve as a secret base for transporting arms, personnel and propaganda literature. Bose notes that Kumar established a Manila branch of the Hindusthane Association and received significant funding from Indians living in Manila, but states that "not much is known about their activities before the war [World War I]" (Bose 1971: 75).

Bose does not clarify why Indian immigrants in Manila chose to collaborate with Kumar. However, given the timing of Kumar's arrival in Manila and his experience working with major Indian organisations in Canada in the resistance movement against the exclusion of Indian immigrants, it should be assumed that Kumar not only propagated revolutionary thought in Manila, but was also working on the issue of Indians' entry into the US mainland via Manila. For Indians in Manila who needed to resolve the issue of travel to the US mainland, there were advantages in working with Kumar, who had experience of tackling similar problems in North America.

The connectivity between Indians in Manila and North America was not created by Kumar alone, but rather through the collaborative efforts of Kumar

30 TNA: FO371/2784/14059, Memorandum by M. Paske Smith, 14 October 1915.

31 NAI: Department of Commerce and Industry, Emigration Branch, June 1911, Part B, No. 3 (File No. 5), Resolutions dated 24 April 1910 and 16 April 1911, enclosed in Viceroy of India to Department of Commerce and Industry, the Government of India, 31 May 1911.

32 British Library: IOR/L/PJ/12/1, J. C. Ker, Circulation No. 12 of 1912.

and fellow Indians in Manila. Archival records confirm that the Hindusthane Association in Manila “inherited” the experience of Indian political activism that had developed before Kumar’s arrival. For example, one of the board members of the association in 1915, Kewell Din,<sup>33</sup> had already been engaged in protecting the rights of Indians in the Philippines as early as in 1911. When Filipinos attacked several Indians in 1911, Din was one of the Indians who contacted the British Consulate-General in Manila and urged British authorities to protect Indians as British subjects.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, almost all of the Indian security guards working in the Philippines joined the association, whose secretary and president were elected from these local / Manila-based Indians, while Kumar was regarded only as an “adviser”.<sup>35</sup> This means that the association’s overt leadership was composed of local Indian residents in Manila, with Kumar assisting them.

On 30 January 1914, the Hindusthane Association held a mass meeting in Manila and unanimously passed a resolution that asserted their right to enter the US mainland. The resolution was accompanied by a cover letter addressed to the British Consul General in Manila, indicating their intention to submit the resolution to various prominent authorities, including the Governor-General of the Philippines, the President of the United States, the British Ambassador in Washington, the Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, India Office, the Governor-General of India and various media in India.<sup>36</sup> As indicated in the previous section, the authorities that directly prevented Indian immigration via Manila to the US mainland were the US Bureau of Immigration, US Department of Labor, US Department of War and the Bureau of Customs of the Government of the Philippines. However, there are no indications of intent to send the resolution to these specific departments, as the resolution was not intended as a direct protest against the relevant authorities of the US mainland and the Philippines. Rather, it was meant to serve as a petition to the higher administrative authorities of the US and the Philippines, as well as to the British and Indian authorities. These British and Indian officials were viewed as capable of protecting the rights of Indians who were British subjects.

Sending resolutions to various administrative departments as well as the press was a strategy that Kumar had adopted when he protested the exclusion of Indians from Canada. In 1910 and 1911, Kumar organised meetings in Vancouver, during which participants united to pass resolutions denouncing legislative measures that aimed to curtail Indian immigration to Canada under the Canadian

33 TNA: FO371/2784/14059, Memorandum by M. Paske Smith, 14 October 1915.

34 TNA: FO371/ 1274/ 15513, Wileman to Grey, 22 March 1911.

35 TNA: FO371/2784/14059, Memorandum by M. Paske Smith, 14 October 1915.

36 TNA: FO371/ 2154/ 11355, A cover letter and a resolution enclosed in Wileman to Grey, 7 February 1914.

Immigration Act. In addition to the Canadian Authorities, those resolutions were addressed to the Governor-General of India, the Secretary of State for India Office and the press in India.<sup>37</sup> Although the name “G. D. Kumar” does not appear in the Manila resolution of 1914, given his role as an adviser in the Association and the character of the resolutions he prepared in Canada, it can be presumed that he contributed to drafting the resolution and that he provided the idea of sending it out to various authorities. This indicates a synergistic effect between the knowledge acquired by Kumar through his political activism in Canada and the knowledge developed by the Indians in the Philippines, a synergy that significantly strengthened the latter’s resistance movement.

The resolution was communicated to various authorities and the Indian media over a period of a few months.<sup>38</sup> One such prominent media outlet was *The Indian Review*, an English-language magazine based in Madras, which had a considerable influence on the Indian freedom movement (Sen 1974: 245). In an article entitled “Indians in the Philippines [sic]”, the magazine quoted excerpts from the resolution.<sup>39</sup> This article was later reprinted in *The Indian Emigrant*, another English-language magazine published in Madras, potentially reaching a broader readership.<sup>40</sup> Although the resolution received in different locations showed slight variations in content,<sup>41</sup> we will focus on the initial version received by the British Consul General in Manila. Its opening paragraph reads as follows:

We, the undersigned, British Indians, subject to his Majesty King George V. now residing at Manila in the islands of Philippines, Hindus, Mohammedan, Sheik [Sikh], Brahman<sup>42</sup> of the Punjab, Sindh, Guyrat [sic], Bombay and United Provinces, beg to approach to

37 NAI: Department of Commerce and Industry, Emigration Branch, June 1911, Part B, No. 3 (File No. 5), Resolutions dated 24 April 1910 and 16 April 1911, enclosed in Viceroy of India to Department of Commerce and Industry, the Government of India, 31 May 1911.

38 The acceptance of this resolution by British Consulate-General at Manila, Secretary of State for Foreign Office and Colonial Office, Governor-General of India and Governor-General of the Philippines can be confirmed by following archival sources: TNA: FO371/2154/11355, Wileman to Grey, 7 February 1914; NAI: Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration Branch, March 1914, Part B, No. 38 (File No. 39 of 1914), Viceroy of India to Commerce and Industry Department, the Government of India, 2 March 1914; TNA: FO371/2154/12345, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 19 March 1914; TNA: FO 371/2154/12843: Wileman to Grey, 26 February 1914.

39 *The Indian Review* 15(3), 1914, March, p. 248.

40 *The Indian Emigrant* 1(3), 1914, October, p. 93.

41 There are two major differences. First, only the resolution received by British Consulate-General at Manila had a cover letter stating how the resolution was prepared and listing the authorities to which Indians expected to send the resolution. Second, the versions of the resolution received by authorities other than the British Consulate-General in Manila had one additional paragraph referring to the legal provisions regarding Chinese immigrants entering the US and arguing that Indian students and traders should be allowed to enter the country in the same way that Chinese students and traders were allowed to enter.

42 It is unclear what “Brahman” refers to here. However, its inclusion alongside terms associated with faiths such as Hindus and Mohammedan suggests that it may mean sympathisers of modern Indian Hindu reformist groups such as Brahma Samaj and Arya Samaj, who advocate the Brahma faith. Kumar is said to have been a devotee of the Dev Samaj, which split from the Brahma Samaj (BL: IOR/L/PJ/12/1, “Indian Agitation in America” by Department of Criminal Intelligence, 1912, p. 28, enclosed in Secretary to the Government of India to Under Secretary of State for India, 27 February 1913), and the wording of this section may be due to that influence.



you with the view that we are about 300 persons in the [Manila] City,<sup>43</sup> some selling goods in the provinces, some of us are money lenders and some are watchmen, who have been in the British Army in India, are police in the Malay States or Hongkong, some of us are farmers and some are students who came here with the object to go to the United States for work and study. We are here for sometime [sic] occupied in our trade and some of us have already gone to the United States and some more are anxious to go there but we find certain difficulty in our way, so we approach you with the object that this difficulty may be removed.<sup>44</sup>

In the resolution, the diversity of religious, geographical and professional backgrounds of Indians in Manila is expressed. This is rather surprising, given that in Manila at the time, most Indians were probably Punjabi Sikhs and their population did not necessarily include people of diverse backgrounds and faiths in equal numbers. This emphasis on Indian solidarity may have been due to the influence of Kumar, who had expressed similar ideas in an essay published in Seattle.<sup>45</sup>

After the introduction, the resolution identified three problems faced by Indians who tried to enter the US mainland via the Philippines: 1) refusals by the Collector of Customs, who oversaw immigration matters in the Philippines, to issue necessary certificates to Indians; 2) the impossibility of procuring tickets in Manila from steamship companies; and 3) possible future regulations in the process of being introduced by William Wilson, US Labor Secretary, to expel Indians in the Philippine Islands to prevent them from travelling to the US mainland. Although the Philippine Bureau of Customs, the US Department of Labor and the steamship companies were not among those to whom the resolution was sent, Indians in Manila accurately recognised that these agencies were the ones directly preventing their travel. Their identification of the third reason is particularly noteworthy as it shows that Indians residing in Manila were seeking to stay informed about the current immigration laws in the US mainland.

Having identified the problems, they claimed to be entitled to enter the United States for various reasons. For example, the resolution stated that “[w]hile the cases are yet pending in Seattle and San Francisco Courts, we prefer to go to

43 Some previous studies cite the view of the immigration authorities in Manila stating that in 1913 there appeared to be 6,000 or 7,000 Indians detained in Manila trying to head to North America (Jensen 1988: 144, Shah 2013: 31). However, it is reasonable to assume that the number of Indians in Manila around 1910 was in the hundreds, given that this resolution of 1914 mentions 300 Indians in Manila and that, as noted in the previous section, a 1912 memorandum by the Acting British Vice-Consul at Manila states that approximately 150 Indians travelled annually to the US mainland via Manila. The figure of 6,000 or 7,000 stated by the authorities should be seen as an exaggeration created by the authorities’ sense of crisis, as they viewed Indians crossing from Manila to the US mainland as a threat.

44 TNA: FO371/ 2154/ 11355, A resolution enclosed in Wileman to Grey, 7 February 1914.

45 In the essay, Kumar stated: “We urge our countrymen in British Columbia to forget the nominal distinction of Sikhs, Hindus, Mohamedans [sic], and be all united into one strong body of the East Indians, as we all belong to India, the Motherland” (BL: IOR/L/PJ/6/1137, File 275, G. D. K. [Kumar], “Hindus in the United States: Activities of the Hindu Students and Laborers on the Pacific Coast”, *The Span of Life* 5(3), 1912, March, p. 6, enclosed in W. C. Hopkinson to W. W. Cory (Deputy Minister of the Interior, Ottawa), 22 April 1912).



Seattle, Washington, as there are many of our relatives and friends in Vancouver, Victoria, B.C. and they will no doubt help us".<sup>46</sup> Such a statement aimed to imply that none of them would become a burden to the public, as they could rely on financial support from fellow Indians in North America. In addition, they emphasised their position as British subjects and protested:

Thus, we, the inhabitants of India and now residents of Manila strongly protest. We will openly and frankly say that the matter between the British Government and the Colonial Government has already been discussed and the Indian Government is taking [a] strong stand in favor [sic] of the Indians. In the meantime, we, as loyal subjects of his Majesty, the King George V., Emperor of India do not want to be insulted in the way we are being treated by the immigration Department of the United States of America and the Philippine Islands and the companies running between Manila and the United States. [...]

*Zaildar Kirpa Singh, President*<sup>47</sup>

*Ramrakha Bali, Secretary*<sup>48</sup>

As expressed in the above quotation, the treatment of Indians by US and Philippine authorities and the shipping lines was described as an insult to "loyal subjects of his Majesty, the King George V". While the Indians correctly understood who had prevented their passage, they did not attempt a direct negotiation with such departments or companies. Instead, they urged the British and Indian governments to address the problems indicated.

Repeatedly, Manila- and Vancouver-based Indians employed the strategy of appealing to the British authorities for protection by stressing their status as British subjects, as Kewell Din had done in Manila in 1911, or in the resolutions passed in meetings organised by Kumar in Vancouver in 1910 and 1911.<sup>49</sup> Thus the 1914 resolution in Manila was influenced by the experiences of Indians residing in both Manila and Vancouver – indicating that the knowledge accumulated in Manila was amalgamated with that of fellow Indians in Vancouver (i.e. Kumar), ultimately resulting in novel initiatives undertaken by the Hindusthane Association in Manila.

These protests attracted some attention from the authorities who received the resolution. In particular, the British Consulate-General and the Executive Secretary of the Government of the Philippines asked the Bureau of Customs about the regulations on Indians.<sup>50</sup> However, no political measures were taken

46 TNA: FO371/ 2154/ 11355, A resolution enclosed in Wileman to Grey, 7 February 1914.

47 In the original manuscript, this was not written in the Roman alphabet but signed in Gurmukhi, as "ਜੈਲਦਾਰ ਕਿਰਪਾਸਿੰਘ".

48 TNA: FO371/ 2154/ 11355, A resolution enclosed in Wileman to Grey, 7 February 1914.

49 NAI: Department of Commerce and Industry, Emigration Branch, June 1911, Part B, No. 3 (File No. 5), Resolutions dated 24 April 1910 and 16 April 1911, enclosed in Viceroy of India to Department of Commerce and Industry, the Government of India, 31 May 1911.

50 TNA: FO371/2154/12843, Ignacio Villamor (Executive Secretary, The Government of the Philippine Islands) to British Consul-General, Manila, 26 February 1914, enclosed in Wileman to Grey, 26 February 1914.

to secure their migration to the US mainland. Despite these circumstances, Indians in Manila did not give up but found their own way to sail to North America, without government support: they decided to board the Komagata Maru, which Indians had chartered in Hong Kong, to travel to Vancouver. The challenge of the Komagata Maru was the culmination of the resistance in the history of persistent Indian actions against the denial of entry on the Pacific Coast of North America.

## The Komagata Maru and the development of the anti-British movement

The journey of the Komagata Maru fostered more extensive connectivity between Indians in Manila and Indians elsewhere, as will be discussed below. While a comprehensive examination of the passengers on the Komagata Maru from Manila is not available in the current literature, the convergence of numerical figures and timing strongly suggests that they were many of the same individuals who were denied entry to the US mainland via Manila after 1913. Previous research has verified that Harnam Singh, a member of the passengers' committee, facilitated the transportation of 85 Indians from Manila to the Moji Port of Japan, where they embarked on the Komagata Maru on 19 April 1914 (Johnston 1989: 29–31). The approximate count of 85 closely aligns with the estimated number of around 100 Indians in Manila whose tickets to the US mainland were invalidated in mid-1913, and the time they boarded the Komagata Maru was less than three months after the aforementioned meeting of the Hindusthane Association in Manila.

Gurdit Singh, who chartered the Komagata Maru, claimed the right of Indians as British subjects to enter Canada, a British Dominion (Mawani 2014: 116–117). It is worth noting that the strategy of emphasising the position of Indians as subjects of the British Empire, which was a common claim among Indians elsewhere, was also adopted here. However, after the ship reached Vancouver on 23 May 1914, the passengers were prevented from disembarking and the ship was detained for two months. Indians in Vancouver organised the “Shore Committee” to provide legal and financial support to the passengers of the Komagata Maru. Among its key members was Husain Rahim, with whom Kumar had collaborated during his work in Canada, as mentioned above. Rallies protesting the detention of the Komagata Maru passengers were held in Canada and on the US mainland, and donations were collected (Puri 1993: 90–91). In this way, the protest movement spread to the Pacific coast of North America.

At one protest rally in Vancouver, a resolution was reportedly passed arguing that if the passengers of the Komagata Maru were not allowed to disembark, Indians in Vancouver should return to India in groups and stage an armed

uprising (Puri 1993: 91). A similar threat was also made in Manila. Approximately one week after the Komagata Maru was detained in Vancouver, the following article was published in *The Manila Times*:

Revolution is the Alternative – So Say Hindus in Cable to British Officials that the failure of the authorities of Vancouver, B.C., to permit the landing of the Hindus who reached that port on the Kumagata maru [sic], will mean that revolution will break out in India, and that all Hindus in Manila, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore would flock to their homeland to strike the first blow in Calcutta, was the statement made to a *TIMES* man yesterday afternoon by G. D. Kumar, a leader of local Indians. He displayed a copy of a cable which had been sent to Premier Borden of Canada; which stated “Revolution will start India if Hindus not landed Vancouver, B. C.” and was signed “Indians Manila.” Kumar added that copies had been sent by mail to the Indian government, to the Viceroy at Simla, and to Premier Asquith in London. The Kumagata maru [sic] was chartered by a large number of Indians to convey them to British Columbia, and those on board include about a hundred from Manila, who joined the ship in Japan.<sup>51</sup>

According to the article, Kumar sent a cable to the Prime Minister of Canada, which asserted that the Komagata Maru’s detention would lead to revolution in India. Notably, copies of the cable were forwarded to the Governor-General of India and the Prime Minister of the UK and subsequently brought to a local newspaper in Manila. This method of spreading the word is similar to the method adopted by Indians in Manila in January 1914, though now they were not presenting themselves as loyal subjects of the British Empire but as Indians who could cause a revolution even in India itself.

In addition to the above article, *The Manila Times* ran an editorial entitled “The Sauce for Gander”, which raised doubts regarding the legitimacy of allowing the Komagata Maru passengers to enter Vancouver. The editorial asserted that it would be proper for the Canadian government not to recognise Indians as British subjects with equal rights, since Indians did not recognise themselves as people with equal rights due to the caste system.<sup>52</sup> In response to that editorial, Kumar wrote a profoundly interesting letter to *The Manila Times*:

I shall be very much thankful to you, if you would please publish these few lines in your paper in connection with your Editorial of 2nd June, Sauce for the Gander, in which you conclude through twisted arguments as there is caste system in India and there the higher class of people do not give proper rights to the lower classes and so the British people in the Colonies shut the doors for them. Now the simple question arises whether the caste system is good or bad, if it is bad as is painted by the so called Foreign Missions, then is it not the duty of the Foreign Missionaries and the other good civilized people of the Western countries to help India, to come out of its bondage [...]. Here [in Manila], the people, those who are coming out of India, are not the Scholars, Brahmans and Learned Yogis, rather they are the Agriculturist class of people and when they see that they can earn more in Canada and elsewhere, they are very anxious, naturally, to come out of India and live comfortably and settle there. Is it not the elevation and upliftment of the people?<sup>53</sup>

51 *The Manila Times*, 2 June 1914, p. 1.

52 *The Manila Times*, 2 June 1914, p. 4.

53 *The Manila Times*, 6 June 1914, p. 2.

Kumar argued that if there is an absurdity in the caste system, “civilized people of the Western countries” should help India correct it. Moreover, he explained the problem of Indian immigrants not as one of discrimination against Asians, nor as one of discrimination against people ruled by the colonial government, but as a violation of human rights. Such an interpretation could be expected to elicit sympathy from the readers of *The Manila Times*, which consisted mainly of English speakers from the US mainland (Serrano n.d.: 1–5). Kumar’s argument in this context is based on the idea of the (colonising) civilising mission and shows the diversity of ideas that Indians invoked in asserting their rights.

However, the appeals by Kumar and protests in North America did not convince the Canadian government to allow the passengers of the Komagata Maru to disembark. The passengers were forced to return to India.<sup>54</sup> As the Komagata Maru departed Vancouver, there were widespread calls among Indians living in North America for a mass return to India and a revolution.<sup>55</sup>

Indian immigrants, who had persistently resisted exclusion on the Pacific coast of North America and thereby strengthened interregional connectivity, would use this connectivity to develop the anti-British movement after the return of the Komagata Maru. Kumar himself took action to promote a mass return to India, travelling between Manila, Yokohama, Nagasaki and Hong Kong, in line with the policy of implementing a revolution in India.<sup>56</sup> Indians in Manila also participated in the movement. When the steam ship Korea, with Indian returnees from San Francisco, stopped at Manila in September 1914, two of its passengers, Nawab Khan and Jagat Ram, visited Dost Muhammad Khan, an Indian resident of Manila. They arranged for “a big Ghadr [Ghadar] meeting in Manila” (Singh / Singh 1996: 74–75, 135, 151).

Barkat Ali, the previously mentioned “headman” helping Indians to enter the US mainland via Manila in 1911, also participated in the 1914 meeting

54 Upon their arrival at Budge Budge Port in India at the end of September 1914, a fight broke out between Indian passengers and police officers who stood on alert, which resulted in 26 deaths among passengers, police officers and local residents (Tatla 2007: 74–76).

55 On their return to India, Komagata Maru deportees attempted to launch various rebellions, mainly in the Punjab region, between November 1914 and February 1915. However, every attempt failed due to a lack of cooperation from local Indians in the Punjab area and the close monitoring by British authorities (Puri 1993: 93–102).

56 He sailed from Manila to Yokohama in October 1914, where he waited for the arrival of the steamship Tenyō Maru from San Francisco, which carried 107 Indian passengers to Yokohama. As the Tenyō Maru arrived, Kumar joined its passengers. They proceeded to Nagasaki, where they met 144 Indian passengers of the steamship Mongolia from the US mainland. They then headed for India via Hong Kong. Bhagwan Singh, a close friend of Kumar and a leading activist in the Ghadar movement, was also on board the Tenyō Maru and worked with Kumar. Sources for these facts: The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, Digital Archive: Ref. B03050973900, 4th, 19th–21st, 36th–39th, 46th–47th images; *Kakkoku Naisei Zassan, Eiryō Indo no Bu, Kakumeitō Kankei (Boumeisha wo Fukumu)* [Collection of Miscellaneous Articles on the Internal Affairs of Each Country, British India, Regarding Revolutionary Party (including Exiles)], Vol. 1 (1.6.3.2–21–1) (Collection of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) Governor of Hyogo to Home Minister, Foreign Minister, Governor of Osaka, Kanagawa and Shiga, 16 October 1914; Governor of Kanagawa to Home Minister and Foreign Minister, 7 November 1914; Governor of Kanagawa to Home Minister and Foreign Minister, 9 November 1914; Governor of Kanagawa to Foreign Minister, 15 November 1914; Governor of Nagasaki to Home Minister, Foreign Minister, Governor of Hyogo and Kanagawa, 16 November 1914.

and promised to join the mass return movement (Singh / Singh 1996: 176–177). Hafiz Abdullah and other Indians in Manila who attended the 1914 meeting actually returned to India in January 1915 (Singh / Singh 1996: 137).

The case of Barkat Ali shows that Indians living in Manila who had witnessed the frustrations of their countrymen attempting to travel to the US mainland via Manila became deeply involved with the anti-British movement a few years later. Of course, it cannot be concluded that all of those Indians living in Manila who were prevented from travelling to the US mainland joined the anti-British movement. However, it is evident that the repeated dismissals of Indians' claim to rights as subjects of the British Empire encouraged strong sympathy with anti-British revolutionary ideologies. The Indians in Manila did not join the anti-British movement simply because they were incited by political activists. Rather, their connection with the anti-British movement arose as an extension of the experiences of the immigrants themselves, who had persistently confronted so many obstacles in their attempts to reach North America.

## Conclusion

This paper elucidated the process of resistance undertaken by Indian immigrants against repeated rejections for admission into North America during the early twentieth century and argued that, within the evolution of these protests, inter-regional connectivity among Indian immigrants residing in Canada, the US mainland and Manila was reinforced.

Despite facing repeated entry restrictions, Indian immigrants never gave up and persistently resisted, harbouring a strong ambition to pursue economic advantages in North America. Moreover, they recognised various means available to gain entry into North America, including changing entry points or travel routes, as well as appealing to legal processes – an option rendered feasible due to the lack of explicit mention within the legal texts of Canada and the US of Indian nationals as being subject to immigration restrictions. Furthermore, the implementation of laws and policies ultimately varied across different immigration checkpoints, leading Indian migrants to seek out sites with higher chances of admission.

Nonetheless, whenever Indian migrants discovered new approaches to circumvent entry limitations, restrictive measures were further tightened, compelling Indians to once again explore alternative strategies. During this cycle of restriction and resistance, the pursuit of strategies to enter North America resulted in the strengthening of interregional connectivity among Indians residing in Manila and North America. At the same time, their frustrations intensified as they repeatedly confronted obstacles. These frustrations reached a peak when the attempted landing of the steamship *Komagata Maru*, the culmination of the Indians' struggle against restrictions on entry to North America, was thwarted.

While protests against the exclusion of Chinese immigrants from the United States led to the 1905 boycott of US products throughout China (Yoshizawa 2003: 54–86, Kido 2012: 243–247), protests against the exclusion of Indian immigrants from the US led to the anti-British Ghadar Movement rather than to direct antipathy towards the US. Protesting against the British in the face of discrimination by US authorities occurred not only because the leaders of the Ghadar movement fuelled anti-British sentiment. It also stemmed from the fact that Indian resistance to exclusion from the US mainland was part of a broader series of resistance movements among Indians across Canada, the US mainland and the Philippines, all grappling with exclusion from the Pacific coast of North America. In the course of these resistance movements, Indian immigrants strengthened their interregional connectivity. Furthermore, Indian immigrants repeatedly asked the British authorities for assistance in dealing with the problems they faced, but became increasingly frustrated at the lack of support they received. The experiences of Indian immigrants' resistance movements and their enhanced interregional connectivity played a crucial role in the development of the anti-British Ghadar movement, which spanned across regions.

Indians who travelled between Canada, the US mainland and Manila continued to exchange knowledge concerning optimal migration destinations, secure routes and effective methods to achieve entry, persistently exploring strategies to overcome the challenges they faced. The situation in Manila revealed the fact that the political leader G. D. Kumar, arriving from North America, did not simply bestow knowledge upon Indian immigrants in Manila; instead, the knowledge and experience of the immigrants seamlessly integrated with those of their leader. The complexity of the knowledge and experience of Indian immigrants in each region was also an important factor in shaping the Komagata Maru incident and the anti-British Ghadar movement.

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