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Domain-Dependent National Pride and Support for the Radical Right: Pride in the Nation's History

Marcel Lubbers,¹ and Anouk Smeekes²

Populist radical right-wing's rhetoric often includes a reference to the nation's past when everything was supposed to be better. This runs from considered heroic times of the country in terms of war victory and economic grandeur to an idealized past which fits the ideology of nativism, meaning that a homogeneous society is preferred over a multicultural one. In this contribution, we study to what extent voters for the radical right indeed differ from voters of other party families in their pride in the nation's history. We compare this to other forms of domain-dependent national pride. Earlier studies suggested that not only nostalgia differentiates the radical right electorate from others, but that other positive attitudes in relation to the nation may do so as well. Making use of the International Social Survey Program data on national identity, we study domain-dependent national pride across European nations to answer whether it is pride in the nation's history that characterizes radical right voters when accounting for other dimensions of national attitudes.

KEYWORDS: Europe; idealized past; national attitudes; national pride; nativism vs. multiculturalism; right-wing rhetoric.

INTRODUCTION

The European Parliament has witnessed a steady increase in the representation of the radical right party family. Although the party family regrouped over and over again, the parties that have been considered to belong to the radical right party family have increased their seats. In 2021, most of them are included in the political party group called “Identity and democracy” (e.g., *Rassemblement National*, *Vlaams Belang*, *Partij voor de Vrijheid*, *Danske Folkeparti*, *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, *Lega*). Others are member of the group of “European conservatives and reformists” (e.g., *Sverigedemokraterna*, *VOX*, *Fratelli d'Italia*). Where the parties affiliated to the former are all considered to belong to the radical right party family as a result of their nativist ideology, this is not the case for the latter group, where some of the parties are mostly conservative and not so much nativist (such as the Dutch SGP). Political parties with a nativist ideology focus on a fundamental nationalist agenda (Eger and Valdez 2015) with an exclusionary ideology of elements that threaten the nation (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007). Most often the central foci in the parties' programs are the perceived threats to the nation stemming from immigration and further

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European integration. Their nationalist agenda is mainly directed toward establishing an ethnically homogeneous nation. Ethnic nationalism is therefore considered a core element in the ideology of the radical right (Aslanidis 2018; Bar-On 2018; Bonikowski 2017; Rydgren 2007). However, radical right parties also appeal to the pride dimension of nationalism (Eger and Valdez 2015).

This appeal to pride often is connected to their rhetoric of national nostalgia (Bar-On 2018; Betz 1994; Steenvoorden and Hartevelde 2018). Radical right parties often express pride for the (constructed) glory-days of the nation and hereby evoke a longing for the good-old days of the country. In their exclusionary national nostalgic discourse, the national past is mainly portrayed as glorious because it was ethnically and culturally homogeneous and therefore more simple, safe, and secure (Bar-On 2018; Smeekes 2019). This glorious past is subsequently put in stark contrast with present times, in which increasing levels of immigration and ethno-cultural diversity are portrayed as undermining the nation. As such, radical right parties use national nostalgia to increase the persuasiveness of their nativist ideology. Research has theorized and evidenced that national nostalgia makes a relevant contribution in explaining the radical right vote (Smeekes et al. 2021) and that pride in the nation's history is expressed within the radical right's electorate (Lubbers 2019). However, radical right voters' pride is not necessarily confined to the nation's history and may also be experienced in relation to other domains, such as economic grandeur, political influence in the world, or sports successes. The main aim of this contribution is to investigate whether radical right voters have pride in the history of the nation in particular or whether they stand out in pride in other domains of the nation as well, as compared to people not voting or voting for other party families. In addition, we investigate whether pride in the history of the nation stands out among radical right voters when accounting for other dimensions of nationalism that are found to affect radical right-wing voting (Lubbers and Coenders 2017), in particular ethnic nationalism.

Moreover, we aim to get an understanding to what extent pride in different aspects of the nation goes along with (current) pride in being a country's national and whether this differs between radical right-wing voters and voters for other parties. Smith and Kim (2006) evidenced that a sum-scale of domain-specific national pride is positively associated with general national pride, but did not establish to what extent pride in separate domains are more or less strongly associated with general national pride. Our approach forms a starting point for understanding whether pride in the nation's history makes people proud to be a country's national today, or whether there are more temporary aspects of pride in the nation (i.e., other domains of national pride) that feed current pride in being a country's national. We test our predictions with ISSP data across 12 European countries.

THEORY

Radical right parties are defined by their nativist ideology (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007), the combination of keeping the nation state native and a reduction of threats to the homogeneity of the nation state. Radical right parties mostly use the label "nationalism" to define themselves and literature agrees that ethnic nationalism

is the core ideology on which the radical right bases its xenophobia (Rydgren 2007). It stresses the relevance of the ethnically pure nation and focuses on the threats that are perceived to harm the position of this ethnically homogeneous community (Bar-On 2018). However, it is that exclusive dimension that may come with ethnic nationalism, the xenophobia, that is most pertinent for the characterization of the radical right's electorate. Research evidenced that voters for the radical right stand out in negative attitudes on immigration but also regarding European integration (Ivars-Flaten 2008; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Rydgren 2007).

The extent to which radical right voters are also characterized by their (ethnic) nationalist attitudes is less well evidenced. Not only did research pay less attention to it (possibly because of a lack of relevant nationalist attitude measures in survey data or because of a publication bias), the studies that did include various dimensions of nationalist attitudes showed that the effects were mixed and markedly smaller than anti-immigrant attitudes (Billiet and De Witte 1995; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Smeekes et al. 2021). Others suggest that anti-immigrant attitudes are affected by (ethnic) nationalist attitudes and thus mediate direct effects of the dimensions of nationalism on voting for the radical right, making the role of national attitudes invisible in studies where exclusionist attitudes or threat perceptions are included simultaneously (Lubbers and Coenders 2017).

Perhaps the issue at stake is that nationalism forms a “multidimensional spectrum” (Davidov 2009; Eger and Hjerm 2021; Hjerm and Schnabel 2010), or covers “a wide range of attitudes that constitute respondents' national schemata” (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). In studies on nationalism, there is a large body of research that focuses on the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012), which respectively define the nation in terms of political institutions and principles vs. common origin and descent. Based on the notion that “ethnic nationalism is the master concept of the radical right” (Bar-On 2018:20), an ethnic nationalist conception of nationhood should then be decisive in voting for the radical right. Indeed, research shows that stronger endorsement of ethnic nationhood is related to more support for the radical right (Smeekes et al. 2021).

However, civic and ethnic nationalism do not contain an affective dimension, which is also argued to be a distinct and an important element of attitudes about the nation. Scholars have proposed that national attitudes can be divided into one neutral and two positive affective dimensions: national identification, national pride (or patriotism), and national hubris (or chauvinism; sometimes this dimension is simply labeled “nationalism”) (Coenders et al., 2004; Davidov 2009; Eger and Hjerm 2021; Hjerm and Schnabel 2010). National identification is a neutral attitude that relates to the feeling of attachment and closeness to the nation, regardless of whether this nation is considered to be ethnic or civic in nature. National pride (often referred to as patriotism) is a positive attitude that indicates one's positive attachment and pride in one's country, regardless of whether this country is considered ethnic or civic. National hubris (often referred to as chauvinism) is a positive attitude about the nation that goes beyond love of the country and indicates a feeling of national superiority and dominance, regardless of whether this nation is considered ethnic or civic in character.

Some theorize about the hierarchy of these dimensions, with national identification being a condition for pride, and pride for chauvinism (Dekker et al. 2003; Smith and Kim 2006), where others emphasize the independence of the three dimensions (Eger and Hjerm 2021). Moreover, these three dimensions can be considered to reflect different forms of national identity, while ethnic and civic nationhood are widely understood as indicating the content of national identity (Miller and Ali 2014; Pehrson et al. 2009; Pehrson and Green 2010). Although these forms and contents are sometimes correlated with another, they are generally considered separate dimensions of national identity (Miller and Ali 2014). Scholars have proposed that national pride is relevant for understanding radical right support, but theorizing and empirical research on distinct dimensions of national pride in relation to radical right support is limited. Research proposing that more pride in the nation affects radical right voting has led to mixed expectations and findings (Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Meuleman and Lubbers 2013). Patriotism and pride both refer to a positive, affective relation to the current state of the country (Smith and Kim 2006; Solt 2011). Sometimes, it is suggested that patriotism and pride are so widespread that this cannot discriminate between voters: it is high within each electorate (Lubbers and Coenders 2017). Others come with a more theoretically motivated reason why patriotism or national pride turns out to be a weak predictor of radical right voting: radical right parties make an appeal to a *specific form* of national pride that focuses on the past instead of the present. That is, most radical right parties claim that the country needs to restore a previous version of itself, in which people can have pride again (Bar-On 2018; Betz 1994). The radical right often formulates explicitly in their programs that people cannot have pride in how the nation is today, spoil it as it is suggested to be by the elite and non-native others. Therefore, according to the radical right, what should be tackled are the threats to the nation that have disrupted its glorious past and changed the nation into a present state that is described as deplorable. This would make that pride in the current version of the nation less likely a predictor of radical right support. For this reason, propositions on the construct of “national nostalgia” to understand radical right voting have been developed further (Betz 1994; Smeekes et al. 2021).

National Nostalgia and the Radical Right

“We are destined for great things. We are still the people of Piet Heyn and Michiel de Ruyter. [...] We used to be proud of the Netherlands; of our power, of our freedom, of our flag, of our own gilder. Of everything that we have reached ourselves. Friends, I have good news: that time will return. We will make sure of that.”

(Geert Wilders 2012)

Scholars have proposed that nostalgia for the national past forms an important part of radical right parties' discourses employed to increase support for their exclusionary standpoints (Betz and Johnson 2004; Smeekes et al. 2021; Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018). Although radical right parties are not the only parties that use nostalgia in their discourses, they heavily rely on nostalgia as a strategy to increase their appeal among voters. Research on speeches by populist radical right party leaders

in Western Europe indicates that they typically evoke nostalgia for the national past by portraying national history as marked by glory and pride, which stands in stark contrast with the national present as marked by decline and looming danger (Mols and Jetten 2014). This is illustrated by the quote above from Geert Wilders from a speech in 2012, in which he highlights how the downfall of present Dutch society (as a result of the political elite that supports European integration and immigration) forms a break with the glorious days of the nation's past when people were still proud of their national identity. Moreover, by suggesting that the PVV will make sure that these glorious days of the country will return, this quote exemplifies the reactionary nature of the radical right—the desire to restore an idealized version of the national past. As such, radical right parties employ a restorative nostalgic discourse, which consists of the recurring notion that the best times of the country were in the past and that we can make the country glorious again by restoring this past.

This nostalgic portrayal of “the good old days” of the country is what Taggart (2004) calls the “heartland”—a conception of an ideal world that is constructed, respectively, from the past. This heartland is romanticized and does not necessarily refer to how the past was. Moreover, since the (albeit imagined) glorious days of the heartland have already been lived, returning is portrayed as feasible. For contemporary radical right parties in Western Europe, the heartland consists of a national community that is culturally and ethnically homogeneous. It is based on a mythical and idealized version of the national past as safe, communal, and secure because it was “just us” (Duyvendak 2011). This radical right heartland hence excludes groups that were not part of this idealized past, such as immigrants and ethnic minorities. In this way, the nostalgic portrayal of the heartland serves to increase the persuasiveness of their nativist ideology and its related exclusionary populism. The reason is that it divides society into “us” (the virtuous people with a native ethnic background) who are part of this glorious past and “them” (newcomers/immigrants) who came later and are responsible for losing this cherished past. As such, radical right parties strategically use nostalgic narratives to essentialize group boundaries and to argue for re-asserting native identities and symbols and combatting non-native elements to restore the glorious homogeneous ethno-cultural community that people were once proud of. This can also be applied to the rhetoric of some of the radical right parties to an imagined homogeneous nation that is more modern than countries immigrants arrive from (Brubaker 2017). Empirical research has shown that native Dutch people who are nostalgic for their country of the past are more likely to support radical right parties and their nativist standpoints (Smeekes et al. 2021). Since the radical right's national nostalgic discourse heavily relies on a portrayal of national history as one of glory and pride, it is likely that this dimension of pride stands out among radical right voters. We therefore expect that:

Hypothesis 1: The more pride one has in the history of the nation, the more likely one is to vote for the radical right.

Intimately linked to radical right's nostalgia for the national past is its pessimism about the national present and future. Interestingly, this contrasts the rheto-

ric of classic fascist parties that originated in modernist and futurist ideological movements (Bowler 1991; Griffin 2000). For present-day radical right parties, in contrast to the uncontaminated glorious national past, the present is portrayed as one of decline and the future as one marked by loss of national identity (Mols and Jetten 2014). Research indicates that, compared to other parties, radical right voters are most concerned that society is in decline (i.e., societal pessimism) (Steenvoorden and Hartevelde 2018). Together, national nostalgia and societal pessimism form a powerful discourse that radical right parties use to highlight the imminent threats to the continuity of the nation and its lost identity. It makes clear that the past is no longer connected to the present, and hence that there is a risk that people will lose valued elements of their national identity. Radical right party leaders propose that they are the only party that is prepared to fight all the elements that undermine the continuity of national identity and can hereby restore the glorious nation of the past that people can be proud of. Given that radical right parties contrast the glorious past with a deplorable present, we could expect that, present-day national pride is less widespread among radical right voters than among voters of other parties and that if there is remaining present-day pride to be a country's national that this is related first and foremost to pride in the nation's history.

Hypothesis 2: Pride in the nation's history is more strongly positively associated with present-day pride to be a country's national among radical right-wing voters than among voters for other parties.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

We make use of the National Identity module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP Research Group 2015) from 2013 (the most recent wave that this module was included). We selected European countries in which at least 40 radical right voters were included, which reduced our study to the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

Voting Behavior: In the ISSP dataset, a party family voting behavior variable is pre-constructed. However, we altered some coding, to meet the international radical right literature. This implies that the (only) following parties are considered as radical right: Belgium's *Flemish interest*, the *Danish People's Party*, Finland's *True Finns*, French *National Front*, Germany's *Nationaldemocratic Party* and *Alternatives for Germany*, the *Hungarian Movement for a better Hungary*, the *Dutch Party for Freedom*, Norwegian's *Progress Party*, *Slovakian National Party*, *Swedish Democrats*, the Swiss' *Swiss People's Party*, and Turkey's *National Movement Party*. We distinguish this radical right party family voters from voters for the preconstructed categories "far left," "social-democrats," "liberals," "right-wing conservatives," and people who did not vote. The small category of people voting blank or invalid were

left from the analyses, as are respondents who did not provide an answer to the question.

Pride in Domains: Respondents were asked how proud they are of the country in each of the following domains: democracy, political influence in the world, economic achievements, social security, scientific achievements, sports, arts, the army, history, and fair treatment. For each of these domains, respondents were asked to indicate whether they are “not proud at all,” “not very proud,” “somewhat proud,” or “very proud.” Instead of taking the different domains of pride as a sum scale (Solt 2011), we included all the different proud questions in the analyses.

Nationalist Attitudes: We assessed participant’s *pride in the nation’s present* using the question asking how proud people are to be a country’s national. This question uses the same answer categories as the pride in domains questions, extended with the option “I am not a country’s national” (3.9%), who were set as missing. *Ethnic nationalism* is measured by a single item, asking how important national ancestry is for being a true national. The four answer categories (very important, fairly important, not very important, and not important at all) are recoded such that a high score refers to strong ethnic nationalism. *Chauvinism* is measured with a single item as well: “Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries,” on a five-point scale running from disagree strongly to agree strongly.

Immigrant Threat: Immigrant threat is a scaled by the means out of five items that tap the extent to which immigrants are perceived a threat to the economy, culture, and crime in the country (on a five-point scale running from disagree strongly to agree strongly). The scale’s reliability is 0.81.

Control Variables: As for the control variables, we include gender (comparing men to the reference category of women), age and level of education. Education is measured by highest completed level of education. The ISSP dataset contains a cross-national educational classification measure for international comparison. This measure of education runs from 0 “no formal education” to 6 “upper-level tertiary (master or doctor).” The share without formal education is low and merged with the category 1 “primary school.”

ANALYSES

We performed multinomial logistic regression analyses in which we control for variance between countries in the popularity of the radical right-wing parties, by including the country dummies. Since we do not test for higher-level, macro-level effects, we did not apply a multi-level model. We tested the likelihood to vote for one of the other parties versus the radical right. First, we modeled the extent to which the domain-specific forms of pride affect voting behavior, controlled for gender, age and level of education. Second, we included other dimensions of nationalism: national pride, ethnic nationalism, and chauvinism. And third, we tested whether the effects remain (or are mediated, as can be expected from certain theoretical perspectives)




Fig. 1. Domain-specific strong pride by voting for party family (% very proud).
 Source: ISSP.

once immigrant threat is included in the model. Then we study the extent to which pride in the history is associated to national pride today, differently among radical right voters as compared to voters for other parties. In the Appendix A, we present the first model for each of the countries separately, comparing a vote for the radical right versus all other voters, to find variance in the role that pride in the nation plays in different contexts.

Figure 1 provides the descriptive evidence that a strong sense of pride in the history of the nation is most widespread among voters for radical right-wing parties. On average, 41% of the radical right voters shows strong pride in the history of the nation. There is no other group of voters that expresses this much pride in a domain. Radical right voters also are most proud of sports (33%) and the army (25%). The voters for these parties are relatively proud of the nation's scientific and technological innovations as well (32%), but this is slightly higher among voters for right-wing conservative parties (34%). As compared to voters for other party families and non-voters, voters for radical right parties, together with non-voters, are least often very proud of the social security (23%) and score just as low as radical left-wing voters and non-voters in pride in their country's democracy (15%).

Table 1 shows that also when controlled for education, gender, and age, pride in the history of the nation is the main discriminator between not voting, voting for a party family other than the radical right and radical right-wing voting. We find that more pride in the nation's history decreases the likelihood not to vote and decreases the likelihood to vote for the radical left, the center left, the center right and the conservative right in favor of a vote for the radical right. We can thus support our first hypothesis that pride in the history of the nation relates to a higher likelihood to vote for the radical right. There are however two other domains of pride that have consistent effects comparing the radical right to each and every other option: pride in democracy and pride in the country's political influence in the world. These two

Table I. Domain-Specific Pride Effects on Non-Voting and Voting for Party Families Versus Voting for the Radical Right

	Not voting		Far left (communist etc.)		Left. center left		Center. liberal		Right. conservative	
	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE
Versus the radical right										
Proud of										
Democracy	0.11	0.08	0.32	0.10	0.41	0.07	0.33	0.08	0.38	0.07
Political influence	0.27	0.08	0.22	0.10	0.33	0.07	0.42	0.08	0.35	0.07
Economic achievem.	-0.06	0.08	-0.16	0.10	-0.20	0.07	-0.10	0.08	0.04	0.07
Social security	0.16	0.07	0.23	0.09	0.26	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.12	0.06
Scientific achievem.	-0.30	0.08	-0.20	0.10	-0.27	0.07	-0.16	0.08	-0.12	0.07
Sports	-0.27	0.07	-0.39	0.09	-0.19	0.07	-0.13	0.08	-0.15	0.06
Arts	0.19	0.08	0.55	0.09	0.36	0.07	0.15	0.08	0.11	0.07
Army	-0.16	0.06	-0.71	0.08	-0.27	0.06	-0.12	0.07	-0.09	0.06
History	-0.28	0.07	-0.46	0.08	-0.41	0.06	-0.34	0.07	-0.19	0.06
Fair treatment	0.12	0.06	-0.07	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.07	0.18	0.06
Education	-0.02	0.04	0.18	0.04	0.23	0.03	0.39	0.04	0.24	0.03
Gender	-0.42	0.10	-0.72	0.12	-0.63	0.09	-0.61	0.10	-0.57	0.09
Age	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00

Note: Parameters in bold: $p < .05$.

Source: ISSP 2013 (ISSP Research Group 2015).

forms of pride do however consistently lower the likelihood to vote for the radical right. Other forms of pride do not reach significance in each of the contrasts but do reveal the relevance of pride when contrasting specific parts of the electorates. Pride in technological and scientific achievements, the army and sports successes also increase the likelihood to vote for the radical right in most of the contrasts that are studied. Pride in a country's arts and literature and social security system, on the other hand, decreases the likelihood to vote for the radical right (mainly as in contrast to a vote for left-wing parties).

In Table II, we include other dimensions of nationalism that are deemed important to voting radical right: national pride, ethnic nationalism, and chauvinism. Next to the pride in the distinguished domains, ethnic nationalism has a strong effect as expected: stronger endorsement of ethnic nationalism (i.e., agreement that ancestry is important for being a true national) is related to a higher likelihood to vote for the radical right as it decreases the likelihood to choose the alternative voting outcomes. Chauvinism reaches significance only where the center parties are compared to the radical right, which indicates that voters who are more chauvinist are more likely to vote for the radical right than for center, liberals. National pride decreases not voting and voting for the radical left as compared to voting for the radical right, but has a small effect on the other contrasts, which indicates that it does not distinguish the electorates of the center left, center right and conservative right from the radical right. In this model (where we control for other dimensions of national attitudes), the effect of pride in different domains is less marked. In particular, the effects of pride in history and sports have are now less substantial and remained significant for a few contrasts only. Pride in history still decreases voting for the left/center left and

Table II. Domain-Specific Pride Effects and Other Dimensions of Nationalism on Non-Voting and Voting for Party Families Versus Voting for the Radical Right

	Not voting			Far left (communist etc.)			Left, center left			Center, liberal			Right, conservative		
	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE	
Versus the radical right															
Proud of															
Democracy	0.08	0.08	0.35	0.10	0.36	0.07	0.31	0.08	0.38	0.07	0.38	0.07	0.38	0.07	0.07
Political influence	0.27	0.08	0.24	0.11	0.33	0.07	0.43	0.08	0.34	0.07	0.34	0.07	0.34	0.07	0.07
Economic achievements	-0.02	0.08	-0.09	0.11	-0.14	0.07	-0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06
Social security	0.17	0.07	0.20	0.10	0.24	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.06
Scientific and tech. Achievem.	-0.30	0.08	-0.20	0.11	-0.24	0.07	-0.14	0.09	-0.11	0.07	-0.11	0.07	-0.11	0.07	0.07
Sports successes	-0.13	0.08	-0.15	0.10	-0.09	0.07	-0.04	0.08	-0.08	0.08	-0.08	0.08	-0.08	0.07	0.07
Arts and literature	0.14	0.08	0.47	0.10	0.31	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
The army	-0.07	0.07	0.59	0.09	0.20	0.06	-0.05	0.07	-0.03	0.07	-0.03	0.07	-0.03	0.06	0.06
History	-0.09	0.08	-0.16	0.09	-0.25	0.07	-0.21	0.08	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	0.07	0.07
Fair treatment	0.12	0.07	-0.04	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.15	0.07	0.19	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.06
National pride	-0.39	0.08	-0.63	0.10	-0.11	0.08	-0.15	0.09	-0.17	0.07	-0.17	0.07	-0.17	0.07	0.07
Ethnic nationalism	-0.36	0.06	-0.78	0.07	-0.61	0.05	-0.46	0.06	-0.35	0.05	-0.35	0.05	-0.35	0.05	0.05
Chauvinism	-0.03	0.05	-0.05	0.07	-0.16	0.05	-0.13	0.05	-0.07	0.05	-0.07	0.05	-0.07	0.05	0.05
Education	-0.05	0.04	0.11	0.05	0.17	0.03	0.34	0.04	0.21	0.03	0.21	0.03	0.21	0.03	0.03
Gender (Men)	-0.47	0.10	-0.83	0.13	-0.67	0.09	-0.64	0.10	-0.61	0.09	-0.61	0.09	-0.61	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00

Note: Parameters in bold: $p < .05$.
 Source: ISSP 2013 (ISSP Research Group 2015).

center/liberal parties as compared to voting for the radical right when controlled for other dimensions of nationalism. Hypothesis 1 thus partly holds as well when is accounted for ethnic nationalism, general national pride, and chauvinism.

In the final model, we also include the xenophobic part of the nativist ideology, the perceived threat from immigrants (See Table III). We find that its effect is larger than that of nationalist attitudes. We find that the effects of pride in the history and sports have almost all turned insignificant. What remains as effect from the domain-specific pride effects is that pride in the country's political influence in the world increases the likelihood of almost all outcomes as compared to a vote for the radical right. Pride in technological and scientific achievements still decreases most of the other outcomes in favor of a vote for the radical right. So next to the strong effects of perceived ethnic threat and ethnic nationalism, pride in the scientific and technological achievements still increases the likelihood to vote radical right, whereas pride in the international political influence of the country still decreases the likelihood to vote for the radical right.

The patterns we found are also replicated in the contrast between the Turkish (radical right) MHP and (Erdogan's) AKP. For the contrast between the Hungarian (radical right) Jobbik and (Orban's) Fidesz, we do not find support that pride or other dimensions of nationalism (or ethnic threat) discriminate between the electorates (and neither between the radical right and the other Hungarian party voters) (Appendix B III).

A second hypothesis that we formulated is that, among radical right-wing voters, pride in the nation's history is associated stronger with pride in being a country's national at present than among voters for other parties. Table IV shows that among all groups of voters, more pride in economic achievements, sports successes, the army, and history is associated with more pride in being a country's national. In line with our hypothesis, this positive association between pride in the nation's history and pride in being a national is stronger among radical right voters than among other voters. In addition, we find that the association between pride in the nation's economic achievements and pride in being a national is stronger among radical right voters than among other voters.

There are other domains of pride that are related to pride in being a country's national among voters other than for the radical right, but these associations are not significantly different among radical right voters and at the same time do not reach significance when tested among radical right voters.

Up till now, we analyzed all countries together, but Fig. 2 shows that there is variance between European countries on what the population is proud of. Levels of pride on many domains are higher in Turkey than in other countries, in particular pride in the country's history, army, and political influence. In Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland however, the population is prouder of democracy than the population of Turkey is. It is the Swiss population that is the proudest of their democracy. They also have the most pride in the country's scientific and technological achievements. The Norwegians are most often very proud of the country's economic achievements and social security system. The Hungarians express the most pride in the country's sports successes and the country's arts and literature.

Table III. Domain-Specific Pride Effects and Other Dimensions of Nationalism and Perceived Immigrant Threat on Non-Voting and Voting for Party Families Versus Voting for the Radical Right

	Not voting		Far left (communist etc.)		Left, center left		Center, liberal		Right, conservative	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Versus the radical right										
Proud of										
Democracy	0.02	0.08	0.21	0.10	0.24	0.07	0.20	0.08	0.31	0.07
Political influence	0.24	0.08	0.18	0.11	0.29	0.07	0.38	0.09	0.32	0.07
Economic achievements	-0.05	0.08	-0.15	0.11	-0.18	0.07	-0.11	0.08	0.05	0.07
Social security	0.16	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.19	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.06
Scientific and tech achievements	-0.30	0.08	-0.21	0.11	-0.25	0.08	-0.14	0.09	-0.12	0.07
Sports successes	-0.13	0.08	-0.10	0.10	-0.06	0.07	-0.02	0.08	-0.07	0.07
Arts and literature	0.10	0.08	0.37	0.10	0.24	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.04	0.07
The army	-0.07	0.07	-0.57	0.09	-0.19	0.06	-0.03	0.07	-0.03	0.06
History	-0.02	0.08	-0.04	0.09	-0.14	0.07	-0.12	0.08	0.00	0.07
Fair treatment	0.06	0.07	-0.12	0.09	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.06
National pride	-0.40	0.08	-0.63	0.11	-0.12	0.08	-0.16	0.09	-0.18	0.07
Ethnic nationalism	-0.19	0.06	-0.44	0.08	-0.32	0.05	-0.20	0.06	-0.18	0.05
Chauvinism	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.07	-0.07	0.05	-0.04	0.06	-0.02	0.05
Immigrant threat	-0.61	0.07	-1.23	0.09	-1.11	0.07	-0.98	0.08	-0.64	0.06
Education	-0.09	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.03	0.29	0.04	0.18	0.03
Gender (Men)	-0.43	0.10	-0.74	0.13	-0.61	0.09	-0.59	0.11	-0.56	0.09
Age	-0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00

Note: Parameters in bold: $p < .05$.
 Source: ISSP 2013 (ISSP Research Group 2015).

Table IV. Associations Between Domain-Specific Pride and Proud of Being a Country’s National, Among Voters for the Radical Right and Voters with Other Outcomes

	Among voters for the radical right	Among voters for other parties and non-voters
Proud of		
Democracy	0.06	0.09***
Political influence	0.06	0.06***
Economic achievements	0.11**	0.04***
Social security	-0.00	0.01
Scientific and tech achievements	-0.02	0.01
Sports successes	0.12**	0.18***
Arts and literature	-0.02	-0.04***
The army	0.08*	0.10***
History	0.25***	0.16***
Fair treatment	0.00	0.06***
Education	-0.02	-0.02***
Gender (Men)	-0.00	-0.05**
Age	0.00	0.00***

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; parameters in bold denote a significant difference in the size of the effects: $p < .05$ (based on models including an interaction between pride and party preference). Controlled for country dummies.

Source: ISSP 2013 (ISSP Research Group 2015).




Fig. 2. Domain-specific strong pride by selection of countries (% very proud) among voters and non-voters.

Source: ISSP.

The effects of pride in different domains on voting for the radical right have also been tested per country (Appendix C). We find that there is quite some between-country variance in what kind of pride affects the vote for the radical right versus all other outcomes. Pride in the national history has a significant effect on radical right voting in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey and has a marginally significant effect in Sweden ($p < 0.10$). The results show that most pride domains that significantly relate to radical right voting in more than one country follow the same direction in the other countries, indicating some consistency in the pattern of results.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

This study aimed to provide insight in which dimensions of nationalism affect the voting for the radical right, and in particular which domain-specific pride is related to radical right-wing voting. Moreover, it evidenced which dimensions of national pride are related to being proud to be a country's national at present and the extent to which this differed between radical right voters and voters for other parties.

Pride in the nation's history as part of a national nostalgic discourse sets the radical right electorate apart from voters of other party families as well as from non-voters. Pride in the history of the nation not only increases the vote for the radical right, but it is also associated with being proud to be a country's national, and more so among voters of radical right parties than among the voters of other parties. These findings are in line with recent work pointing at the relevance of national nostalgia as a new master frame of radical right parties that attracts voters (Betz 1994; Smeekes et al. 2021). In response to voters' growing societal pessimism about the present state of the country (Steenvoorden and Hartevelde 2018), radical right parties strategically portray the national past as one of grandeur and pride and claim that they are the only party who can restore these glorious days of the nation (Mols and Jetten 2014).

There are however other domains of pride that are related to radical right voting in particular. First, pride in the country's scientific and technological achievements is related to radical right-wing voting, also when controlling for other national attitudes and perceptions of immigrant threat, whereas pride in the country's political influence in the world decreases the vote for the radical right. These are two pride dimensions that have hardly been theorized in the radical right's literature. The former form of domain-specific pride may refer to pride in what the country invented and produced and might instill pride in a generalized country's population ingenuity and development. However, in radical right rhetoric, such achievements are often portrayed as part of the countries glorious past and not of the present. For example, in his speech announcing his candidacy for the French presidential elections, Eric Zemmour talks about how France was once a brilliant country of (among others) arts and sciences (such as the invention of the Concorde, the cinema and cars) and argues that these cherished elements of the country's past are disappearing in the present (Zemmour 2021). Pride in the country's political influence in the world being

negatively related to the likelihood to vote for the radical right may indicate an underlying rejection of engaging in international affairs and signify an attitude of national as opposed to international orientation. Second, pride in economic and technological achievements is associated with pride in being a country's national in particular among radical right-wing voters. Although this association is controlled for pride in a country's history, radical right voters feel proud to be a country's national at present when they also perceive pride in the economic grandeur of the nation.

We see it as a limitation that we could not disentangle present-day pride to be a country's national from present-day pride in the nation. Research indicates that current societal pessimism makes radical right-wing voters prone to the rhetoric of national nostalgia (Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018). We found evidence that pride in the nation's history is positively related to pride in being a country's national, but we think that further research is needed to see how people relate to the country today. One option would be to include measurements of general pessimism, but more relevant would be to investigate how national nostalgia relates to pride (or patriotism) of the country today. A hypothesis that is proposed in earlier research is that because of the current discontent (or pessimism), pride in the country today lowers the vote for the radical right and as such it is pride in the history that increases the vote for the radical right (Meuleman and Lubbers 2013). Some evidence for this may be found here in the lack of an effect of chauvinism in our models. It would be relevant to test to what extent pride in the country at present and the measure we could include in this study, pride to be a country's national at present, have different effects in voting for the radical right. Moreover, we found that pride in the history of a country is associated positively with pride to be a country's national, but it would be interesting to test whether such a positive association also holds for pride in the history of a country and pride in the country today, among radical right voters.

Another issue that needs to be developed is the theorizing on why different domains of pride have different effects across countries (Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville 2021). Although there are patterns that seem more general, for none of the pride dimensions we found an effect that was present in each of the countries. This is likely also related to the relatively small number of radical right voters in some countries in our study, but there are many country-specific interpretations on why certain domains of pride will instill more pride in the nation and is made part of the nationalist ideology of a country, which need further theorization.

A final limitation of this study is the attitudinal dispositions we lack to better understand the role of some of the pride dimensions. Pride in democracy decreases radical right voting, whereas pride in the army increases radical right voting. We lacked however attitudes on political dissatisfaction and authoritarianism that specifically may explain the role of these forms of pride. Theorizing on why pride in international political influence of the country and pride in the country's arts and literature (beyond level of education) lower the voting for radical right-wing needs further attention as well.

We evidence that pride in the history of the nation is the most relevant domain of pride to understand the voting for the radical right. Its effect is however overshadowed by ethnic nationalism and perceptions of immigrant threat (Rooduijn et al.

2017). The linkages between nostalgia as a master frame of the radical right (Smeeke et al. 2021), ethnic nationalism as the master concept of the radical right (Bar-On 2018) or ethnic exclusionism as the main driving part of nativism (Rydgren 2007) need further development. It makes clear, however, that the historical interpretation of a country and its population is crucial to understand the position of the radical right. It also makes clear that debates about a country's history and acknowledgement of black pages in a country's history will affect national pride among voters for the radical right in particular.

APPENDIX A. DISTRIBUTION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR WITHIN SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Not voting (%)	Far left (communist etc.) (%)	Left, center left (%)	Center, liberal (%)	Right, conservative (%)	Radical right (%)	Radical right party
Belgium	4.8	0	36.5	24.6	30.7	3.4	<i>Flemish interest</i>
Denmark	4.6	16.6	23.4	10.1	37.0	8.3	<i>Danish People's Party</i>
Finland	20.2	0	24.8	22.4	21.6	11.0	<i>True Finns</i>
France	8.4	9.5	32.8	7.0	31.4	10.9	<i>National Front</i>
Germany	20.0	9.0	33.1	4.0	29.2	4.6	<i>National democratic Party and Alternatives for Germany</i>
Hungary	29.0	0	17.9	1.5	46.2	5.4	<i>Movement for a better Hungary</i>
Netherlands	6.3	12.8	19.9	25.7	29.1	6.2	<i>Party for Freedom</i>
Norway	9.5	0.8	34.6	15.5	27.3	12.4	<i>Progress Party</i>
Slovakia	30.8	1.5	33.7	14.7	15.3	4.2	<i>Slovakian National Party</i>
Sweden	7.3	4.8	39.0	15.5	29.3	4.0	<i>Swedish Democrats</i>
Switzerland	38.3	0.4	20.1	4.2	20.9	16.1	<i>Swiss People's Party</i>
Turkey	13.1	4.8	17.8	0.2	54.1	10.0	<i>National Movement Party</i>

APPENDIX B. DOMAIN-SPECIFIC PRIDE EFFECTS AND OTHER DIMENSIONS OF NATIONALISM AND PERCEIVED IMMIGRANT THREAT ON VOTING FIDESZ VERSUS JOBBIK IN HUNGARY AND AKP VERSUS MHP IN TURKEY

	Hungary Fidesz (1) versus Jobbik (0)	TR AKP (1) versus MHP (0)
Proud of		
Democracy	-0.09	0.18
Political influence	0.40	0.31
Economic achievements	0.44	0.46*
Social security	0.39	0.23
Scientific and tech achievements	-0.40	-0.21

APPENDIX B (Continued)

	Hungary Fidesz (1) versus Jobbik (0)	TR AKP (1) versus MHP (0)
Sports	-0.23	-0.03
Arts	-0.22	0.16
Army	0.50*	-0.15
History	0.09	-0.45*
Fair treatment	-0.11	0.12
Proud to be a national	-0.40	-0.59*
Ethnic nationalism	-0.22	-0.34*
Chauvinism	-0.08	0.14
Immigrant threat	-0.11	0.01
Education	0.23	-0.22*
Gender	-0.75	-0.61*
Age	0.03*	0.01

* $p < .05$.

Source: ISSP 2013 (ISSP Research Group 2015).

APPENDIX C. LIKELIHOOD TO VOTE FOR THE RADICAL RIGHT VERSUS ANOTHER VOTING OUTCOME (CONTROLLED FOR LEVEL OF EDUCATION, GENDER, AND AGE)

	BE	DK	FI	FR	DE	HU	NL	NO	SK	SE	CH	TR
Democracy	-0.90	-0.24	-0.29	-0.29	-0.62	-0.03	-0.37	-0.42	-0.50	-1.09	-0.11	-0.13
Political influence	0.21	-0.57	-0.58	0.02	-0.40	-0.46	-0.60	-0.78	0.21	-0.23	-0.38	-0.14
Economic achievements	0.20	0.33	-0.14	-0.16	0.09	-0.22	-0.09	0.36	0.23	0.18	0.61	-0.33
Social security	-0.15	-0.29	0.29	-0.23	-0.19	-0.09	-0.15	-0.45	0.02	0.25	-0.37	-0.04
Scientific and tech achievements	0.20	0.32	0.27	0.26	0.68	0.31	0.27	0.25	-0.20	0.78	-0.42	0.09
Sports	-0.30	0.03	0.36	0.06	0.06	0.20	0.90	0.23	0.12	0.48	0.28	-0.03
Arts	0.18	-0.02	-0.16	-0.30	0.11	0.16	-0.71	-0.11	-0.02	-0.77	-0.55	-0.05
Army	0.01	0.45	0.14	0.25	-0.08	-0.53	0.19	0.24	-0.02	-0.63	0.45	0.34
History	-0.20	0.20	-0.18	0.28	0.47	-0.10	0.64	0.39	-0.11	0.46	0.51	0.36
Fair treatment	-0.74	-0.06	-0.09	-0.27	0.14	0.30	-0.53	-0.11	0.53	-0.74	0.10	-0.05

Note: Parameters in bold: $p < .05$.

Source: ISSP 2013 (ISSP Research Group 2015).

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