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Fučík, Petr

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## Research note: The educational gradient of divorce in the Czech Republic during the late post-socialist transition

Petr Fučík<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Masaryk University

Address correspondence to: Petr Fučík, Masaryk University, Department of Sociology, Joštova 218/10, 602 00 Brno (Czech Republic). Email: fucik@fss.muni.cz

### Abstract

**Objective:** This study aims to describe the educational gradient and the role of educational homogamy in divorce risk in the Czech Republic.

**Background:** The Czech Republic underwent a social transformation in the 1990s, which resulted in a significant change in many demographic trends. In contrast, the divorce trend seems to have been less affected. My aim is to describe the evolution of the patterns of the educational gradient of divorce during the late phase of the post-communist transformation.

**Method:** Register data on marriages contracted in 1995, 2000, and 2005 were supplemented with divorce register records up to 2020. Besides the duration of the marriage, the data contains information on the education, age, and marital status of both partners at the time of marriage. The Kaplan-Meier curves and the Cox regression are used for the analysis.

**Results:** The risk of divorce is substantially higher for the less educated, and this holds across all three marriage cohorts observed here. Homogamous marriages are not the most stable ones. From an individual's perspective, marriage with a more educated partner shows the highest stability.

**Conclusion:** This analysis confirmed the stability of the negative educational gradient of marriages contracted during the late phase of the post-communist transition period in the Czech Republic. It refutes the notion that the higher relative education of the woman or man in the couple destabilises partnerships.

**Key words:** divorce risk, education, the educational gradient of divorce, post-communist countries



## 1. Introduction

The stratified risk of divorce represents one of the links between the quality of family life and social status. In general, the educational gradient of divorce is an essential aspect of the theoretical connection between divorce and modernisation and between family life and social inequality (Goode, 1970, 1993). Modernization theory assumes that in traditional contexts, where divorce is less common and more stigmatised, more educated individuals (the higher social classes) face fewer barriers to divorce and are also able to bear its higher social and economic costs. As divorce becomes more prevalent and less stigmatised, the educational gradient disappears or reverses, and higher divorce rates are come to be associated with lower social status (Goode, 1993). This dynamic has been empirically confirmed by several studies around the world (Bernardi & Martinez-Pastor, 2011; Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Hoem, 1997; Chen, 2012; Cheng, 2016; Maslauskaitė et al., 2015; Park & Raymo, 2013; Puur et al., 2016; Raymo et al., 2013), and it can be considered a general pattern of development for partnership instability during the processes of modernisation and de-traditionalisation. The negative educational gradient in divorce shows how diverse the consequences of education can be in modern societies, highlighting the crucial importance of education for predicting unequal chances in various spheres of life and reflecting its changing role in the context of educational expansion.

The negative education gradient in divorce has typically been explained as due to the higher levels of partner satisfaction (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Kreager et al., 2013; McLanahan & Jacobsen, 2015), but Boertien and Härkönen (2018) have shown that more educated women face higher barriers to divorce (which is surprising given the conventional wisdom about their higher chances and greater attractiveness for repartnering).

Although the educational gradient of divorce in European countries has been the subject of a number of studies, including a meta-analysis (Matysiak et al., 2014), CEE countries are often not represented in surveys on this subject. The Czech Republic was included in van Damme's (van Damme, 2020) international comparative analysis, which was based on partnership breakdowns between the two waves of the GGS and dealt with women's education only. However, the study offers results from which it is possible to assume that divorce has a negative educational gradient in Czech society.

The aim of my study is to deepen our understanding of the impact of education and educational heterogamy on the risk of marital instability in the Czech Republic during the late post-communist transition in the decades after 1989. I believe that it is important to observe not only the influence of educational attainment itself but also the combination of the partners' education since educational assortative mating is an important part of the marriage market, a theoretical prerequisite for the stability of partnerships, and a reflection of the evolution of gender roles and the changing educational structure of women and men (Katrňák & Manea, 2020).

After 1989, the entire region of Central Eastern Europe underwent a major political, economic, and social transformation, which was then soon after also reflected in demographic indicators. Post-communist countries underwent some of the changes that in the West are associated with the second demographic transition, but did so within the short timeframe of one or two decades (Sobotka, 2008). For example, in the Czech Republic, during the 1990s, the total fertility rate dropped from 1.8 to 1.12. The mean age of first birth increased from 22.5 to 25 years, and the mean age at marriage rose from 21.4 to 26.5 for women and from 24.0 to 28.9 for men (CZSO, 2023). The proportion of out-of-wedlock births and the incidence of cohabitation also increased substantially. In contrast, trends in divorce have a very different time horizon. The total divorce rate in the Czech Republic has been rising almost linearly since the middle of the 20th century, with no significant change in this trend in the period since the Velvet Revolution in 1989.

Härkönen Billingsley and Hornung (2020) point out that although post-communist countries have followed comparable geopolitical trajectories, trends in divorce rates are highly individual and depend on the history and cultural differences of each society. Although in some post-communist countries we find significant fluctuations in the stability of partnerships during the (post)transition period, the Czech Republic is not one of them.

I am interested in the connection between the post-communist transition process and the determinants and stratification of divorce. Using education as an indicator of social status, I aim to show whether the post-1989 social transformation has changed the patterns of divorce stratification. As I suggested above, the stratification of divorce risk is a key link between social development and the internal logic of intimate relationships. It shows whether and how inequalities spill over from the public sphere and the labour market into family life. Did this link between the public sphere and family life change in any way in the Czech

Republic between 1995 and 2005? That decade, which was full of transformational changes, was when education began to play a different symbolic and structural role in society and was when socio-economic differences began to widen. It was also the beginning of educational expansion and the transformation of the gender education gap. In a broader sense, then, my question is: whether and how the role of education in the intimate sphere changed in the light of its significant transformation in the public sphere.

## 2. Data, Methods, Questions

This analysis is performed on a unique dataset obtained by merging anonymised individual records of marriages and divorces from the vital statistics database of the Czech Statistical Office. All first marriages (at least for one of the spouses) contracted during the years 1995, 2000, and 2005 on the territory of the Czech Republic were selected, and the divorce record for the particular marriage (if present in the database up to 2020) was attached. In this way it is possible to observe the marital histories of three marital cohorts for a period ranging from fifteen to twenty-five years.

Using descriptive statistics and event history analysis, I attempt to answer the following four research questions: 1) How does the educational level of men and women influence the duration of the marriage and the probability of divorce? 2) What are the effects of educational homogamy and heterogamy on the risk of divorce? 3) Does the pattern of the educational gradient of divorce remain the same when we control for age at marriage? 4) What is the difference in the educational gradients of divorce between the three marital cohorts? Is there any temporal trend in the explored patterns?

Given the descriptive nature of the analysis, I do not formulate hypotheses, but it is clear that the main relationship under investigation is the association between divorce risk and education. Because the data do not come from a sample but from vital statistics, I do not use inferential statistics tools anywhere.

## 3. Basic data description

In total, the database contains records of 136,596 marriages, of which 48,759 (35.7%) had broken up by 2020 (See Table 1). Because of the different lengths of the observation period for each cohort (censoring from the right), the proportion of divorcees is found to be highest for marriages contracted in 1995. In this cohort, which is observed for a quarter of a century, 41% of marriages ended in divorce. (The total divorce rate estimated for this cohort by the Czech Statistical Office in 1995 was 38%.) In the younger cohorts from 2000 and 2005, the proportion is 36% and 30%, respectively. To ensure a meaningful comparison of the proportion of marriages ending in divorce across the cohorts, I use an interval of 15 years (derived from the longest measurable period in the last marriage cohort). Although we know from the data on the 1995 and 2000 marriage cohorts that a significant number of divorces occurred later, I decided to observe a comparable period. Using this restriction, we see an almost identical share of divorced marriages within the cohorts; this suggests that the divorce risk, in general, did not change significantly over this decade.

*Table 1: Basic description of the dependent variable*

Marriage cohort:	1995		2000		2005		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Number of marriages	46 430	100.0%	46 660	100.0%	43 506	100.0%	136 596	100.0%
Marriages ending in divorce within 15 years	13 951	30.0%	14 047	30.1%	12 818	29.5%	40 816	29.8%
Marriages ending in divorce up to 2020	18 998	40.9%	16 943	36.3%	12 818	29.5%	48 759	35.7%
Marriages still intact in 2020	27 432	59.1%	29 717	63.7%	30 688	70.5%	87 837	64.3%

*Source: Czech Statistical Office: marriage and divorce database 1995-2020, custom data, own calculations*

To add context for data interpretation, the basic descriptives of the explanatory and control variables are computed in Table 2. People entering marriage for the first time chose, in most cases, an unmarried partner. Other marital statuses occur in about a tenth of cases.

The educational distribution varies between cohorts, with higher educational categories growing over time. Between 1995 and 2005, the proportion of university educated among men entering marriage nearly doubled, and the increase was even higher for women. This trend is offset by a significant drop in the proportion of vocationally trained people. These figures reflect the beginning of the educational expansion that full unfolded in the first decade of the 21st century. Additionally, the context of increasing selection into marriage must be taken into account. Declining marriage rates and higher rates of cohabitation are especially observed among people in lower educational categories, fewer numbers of whom then marry (Kalmijn, 2013).

Concerning the timing of marriage, the Czech Republic began in the 1990s to gradually move away from the early-marriage model common during the communist era towards marriage at a later age. Marriages in the younger cohorts are, on average, contracted at a higher age. The age shift in marriage captured in our data corresponds to the main period of demographic change in the timing of family transitions in the Czech Republic (the trend in the timing of first birth is similar). These basic trends in nuptiality reflect the more general large-scale demographic change that occurred during the transition period.

If we compare the same time span (15 years) for the three marriage cohorts observed here, we find that there has been a slight increase in the divorce risk in all educational categories. The proportion of marriages that broke up increased by seven percentage points among people with basic education and by four percentage points among people with university education, while the smallest change was among people with secondary education, where the difference is less than two percentage points. The slight increase in the risk of divorce is more noticeable when we sort by female education. Noticeably, the total proportion of divorces within 15 years of marriage has not changed (cf. Table 1), as the trend of increasing risk in the different educational categories is masked by the increasing proportions of the lower risk categories (university educated).

Table 2: Basic description of the independent variables

		1995		2000		2005		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Marital status of man at marriage	single	41 507	89.4%	41 360	88.6%	38 347	88.1%	121 214	88.7%
	divorced	4 792	10.3%	5 161	11.1%	5 057	11.6%	15 010	11.0%
	widowed	131	0.3%	139	0.3%	102	0.2%	372	0.3%
Marital status of woman at marriage	single	41 679	89.8%	41 528	89.0%	38 605	88.7%	121 812	89.2%
	divorced	4 582	9.9%	4 954	10.6%	4 723	10.9%	14 259	10.4%
	widowed	169	0.4%	178	0.4%	178	0.4%	525	0.4%
Educational attainment of man at marriage	elementary	4 485	9.7%	3 447	7.4%	2 450	5.6%	10 382	7.6%
	vocational	22 880	49.3%	20 826	44.6%	15 709	36.1%	59 415	43.5%
	high school	14 063	30.3%	15 911	34.1%	17 085	39.3%	47 059	34.5%
	university	5 002	10.8%	6 476	13.9%	8 262	19.0%	19 740	14.5%
Educational attainment of woman at marriage	elementary	5 746	12.4%	4 251	9.1%	3 127	7.2%	13 124	9.6%
	vocational	18 312	39.4%	14 879	31.9%	10 659	24.5%	43 850	32.1%
	high school	18 836	40.6%	22 214	47.6%	21 594	49.6%	62 644	45.9%
	university	3 536	7.6%	5 316	11.4%	8 126	18.7%	16 978	12.4%
Age at marriage (mean)	men		25.50		27.60		29.90		27.60
	women		22.80		24.90		27.10		24.90
Total		46 430	100.0%	46 660	100.0%	43 506	100.0%	136 596	100.0%

Source: Czech Statistical Office: marriage and divorce database 1995-2020, custom data, own calculations

#### 4. Results

If we simply compare the proportions of divorced marriages by the educational level of the bride or groom at the time of marriage, we see substantial differences that are systematic and very similar across cohorts. The proportion of divorcees is significantly lower in the more educated categories than the less educated ones. For the 1995 marriage cohort, in a period of twenty-five years, the percentual difference is 24% of divorced in the category of university-educated people compared to 52% of divorced among people with basic education.

The differences are negligible when we base this analysis on the bride and when we use the groom, which means that there are no substantial differences in how education affects the divorce risk in men or women.

A detailed overview of the progression of the risk of divorce over time for each marriage cohort by education at the time of marriage is shown in the following Kaplan-Meier estimator chart (see Figure 1). Because the curves computed using male and female education are indistinguishably close, I present only the graph based on female education. It shows that the divorce risk is considerably stratified at every point in time, with the largest differences found between primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education. Within secondary education, there is a noticeable similarity between people with lower secondary (i.e. vocational) education and people with upper secondary education, but even here upper secondary education slightly reduces the risk of divorce. All these patterns remain constant when we compare the course of the first fifteen years for all three marriage cohorts. This is further evidence that the educational gradient of divorce in Czech society remained stable during the post-communist transformation period.

A Cox model with the duration of the marriage in months until the divorce as the dependent variable was used for the regression analysis. I estimated two versions of the model with different specifications for the variables measuring the educational level of the married couple. The first version of the model is computed with male and female education as separate variables, and the second version works with a variable that captures all 16 education combinations. Thus, the first model estimates the effect of individual education, while the second focuses on the effect of educational homogamy/heterogamy in the couple. Both variants of the model are estimated separately on data for individual marriage cohorts (1995, 2000, 2005).


Marital status and age are used as the control variables. Although the relationship between education and these control variables is complex, and it can also be argued that age at marriage and previous marital status are influenced by education, I consider it important to offer results that include controls for these variables. A comparison of the two model variants offers a wider range of possibilities for interpreting the effects of education, age, and marital status. For this reason both sets of models are estimated once without and once with the control variables.

*Table 3: Odds ratios of the Cox regression model for the duration of marriage with individual education as a predictor variable*

Explanatory variable:		model A: education only			model B: control variables		
		1995 Exp(B)	2000 Exp(B)	2005 Exp(B)	1995 Exp(B)	2000 Exp(B)	2005 Exp(B)
Educational attainment of man at marriage	elementary	1.688	1.707	1.701	1.490	1.566	1.598
	vocational	1.508	1.560	1.475	1.259	1.379	1.354
	high school	1.467	1.397	1.406	1.266	1.268	1.304
	university				1	1	1
	elementary	1.903	1.855	2.143	1.495	1.589	1.861
Educational attainment of woman at marriage	vocational	1.621	1.520	1.592	1.255	1.298	1.418
	high school	1.392	1.356	1.330	1.132	1.185	1.205
	university				1	1	1
	single				0.649	0.681	0.839
Marital status of man at marriage	divorced				1.119	1.098	1.320
	widowed				1	1	1
	single				1.112	0.884	0.581
Marital status of woman at marriage	divorced				1.932	1.591	1.065
	widowed				1	1	1
Age at marriage	man				0.965	0.976	0.979
	woman				0.959	0.955	0.949

*Source: Czech Statistical Office: marriage and divorce database 1995-2020, custom data, own calculations*

Figure 1: Survival curves according to the educational level at the time of marriage for the three marriage cohorts



Source: Czech Statistical Office: marriage and divorce database 1995-2020, custom data, own calculations

Table 4: Odds ratios of the Cox regression model for the duration of marriage with the educational composition of marriage as a predictor variable

		model A: homogamy only			model B: control variables		
		1995	2000	2005	1995	2000	2005
Explanatory variable:		Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
	<b>EL-EL</b>	<b>2.645</b>	<b>2.533</b>	<b>2.987</b>	<b>1.977</b>	<b>2.090</b>	<b>2.546</b>
	EL-VOC	3.291	3.540	3.221	2.258	2.710	2.685
	EL-HS	2.678	3.113	3.005	1.946	2.470	2.419
	EL-UNI	2.009	2.531	1.124	2.356	2.660	1.140
	VOC-EL	3.086	3.450	3.320	2.088	2.640	2.685
	<b>VOC-VOC</b>	<b>2.309</b>	<b>2.339</b>	<b>2.231</b>	<b>1.577</b>	<b>1.817</b>	<b>1.874</b>
	VOC-HS	1.990	2.147	1.911	1.419	1.690	1.605
	VOC-UNI	1.361	1.725	1.391	1.257	1.603	1.313
	<b>HS-EL</b>	<b>2.982</b>	<b>3.266</b>	<b>3.694</b>	<b>2.056</b>	<b>2.494</b>	<b>2.828</b>
	HS-VOC	2.215	2.169	2.184	1.556	1.717	1.808
	<b>HS-HS</b>	<b>1.973</b>	<b>1.903</b>	<b>1.787</b>	<b>1.456</b>	<b>1.548</b>	<b>1.538</b>
	HS-UNI	1.336	1.374	1.328	1.257	1.287	1.274
	UNI-EL	2.879	3.042	2.416	2.602	2.581	2.272
	UNI-VOC	1.652	1.661	1.407	1.375	1.475	1.281
	UNI-HS	1.258	1.351	1.247	1.101	1.227	1.167
	<b>UNI-UNI (ref.)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
	single				0.642	0.685	0.846
Marital status of man at marriage	divorced				1.094	1.091	1.317
	widowed(ref.)				1	1	1
	single				1.114	0.904	0.581
Marital status of woman at marriage	divorced				1.915	1.601	1.054
	widowed(ref)				1	1	1
Age at marriage	age of groom				0.966	0.976	0.979
	age of bride				0.959	0.956	0.950

Source: Czech Statistical Office: marriage and divorce database 1995-2020, custom data, own calculations

Although the data include marriages that were the first for at least one of the spouses, partners who had already been married could have various different statuses (divorced, widowed, etc.). Remarriage is less stable

and repartnering can be educationally structured (Kreidl & Hubatková, 2017), so it is advisable to check the marital status of both partners separately. Age at entry into marriage plays a significant role in modifying the risk of divorce (Booth & Edwards, 1985; Davis & Greenstein, 2004). At the same time, lower educational categories may in fact also imply a lower marriage age, and these effects should be separated. Therefore, I use age at marriage as a control variable.

The results of the Cox regression model using only the individual educational levels (Model A) clearly show an almost linear relationship between educational level and the risk of divorce (see Table 3). The odds ratios show that men with lower secondary and upper secondary education face an approximately 40% to 50% higher risk of divorce than university graduates, and the risk is 70% higher among men with basic education. We see similar figures for women. For both sexes, the results differ very little across the three marriage cohorts (the odds ratios are shown in separate column for each marriage cohort). When the control variables are included (Model B), the effect of education weakens slightly but remains very strong, with the same pattern of differences observed between educational categories (as those in Model A).

From the second set of model specifications, in which both partners' educational levels are combined, it is evident that educational heterogamy plays a significant role, but not in the sense of heterogamous divorces in general being at a higher risk of divorce (see Table 4). The difference between marrying a partner who is more educated or less educated is very substantial. Anyone who marries a more educated partner faces a lower risk of divorce than in a homogamous marriage. The only exception is women and men with basic education, whose divorce rates are even slightly higher or similar if they marry a more educated partner. For all other categories, it can be said that educationally homogamous marriages are not the most stable. Therefore, rather than the positive effect of similarity, we might look for an explanation in the cumulative advantages associated with education, and where the sum of advantages is higher, we find a lower risk of divorce.

## 5. Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, I focused on the trends in the educational gradient of divorce for three cohorts entering marriage in the Czech Republic during the long period of transition from state socialism after 1989. The answers to the four research questions are as follows: 1) Higher education in the Czech Republic leads to a significantly lower risk of divorce, and this fact does not differ by the gender of the spouse. 2) Educational heterogamy does not generally increase the risk of divorce. From an individual perspective, marriage to a more educated partner reduces the risk of divorce and vice versa. 3) Lower age at marriage increases the risk of divorce, but educational differences persist when age is controlled for. 4) All of these patterns are stable across the three marriage cohorts studied (1995, 2000, and 2005).

Taken together, these results imply that the negative educational gradient of divorce in the Czech Republic persisted unchanged during the transition period. On this basis, it can be concluded that substantial changes in the timing of marriage and other demographic trends are not accompanied by or linked to a change in divorce trends, nor by a change in the stratification of its causes. Thus, it can be assumed that partnership instability and divorce decisions shaped a different dimension of demographic behaviour, which stems from different causes and is thus not directly linked to social development during the post-communist transformation.

A limitation of this paper is the fact that detailed longitudinal data on the educational gradient of divorce rates before the Velvet Revolution in 1989 are not available, so we only talk about the trend captured by comparing three post-revolutionary cohorts. As Härkönen Billingsley and Hornung (Härkönen et al., 2020) have shown, the transitional change in divorce trends across the post-communist region cannot be understood by approaching these countries as a homogeneous cultural cluster. The Czech Republic was not included in their analysis, but we can state that it would rank rather among the countries that did not experience major fluctuations in divorce trends. We can moreover specifically add that this holds even when we take into account such a crucial factor as the education of partners, which reflects and impacts many other aspects of stratification, labour market position, and life chances. I am certainly not saying that factors relating to the economic situation in a country or a person's position in the labour market have no effect on partnership (in)stability; on the contrary, differences in the risk of instability due to these factors are in strong evidence. However, the patterns of these differences have not changed during the period under review. One explanation may be the relatively less turbulent economic development (In comparison with the other



transforming countries), which means that the long-term (and more or less universally modernising and post-modern) cultural trends associated with individualisation, changing gender roles, and the deinstitutionalisation of marriage are reflected in trends of partnership instability rather than in short-term socio-economic disturbances. The positive effect of marrying a more educated partner also remains stable across cohorts. This finding is specifically relevant to the discussion of the impact of increasing female dominance in education and the consequences of gender role changes on divorce rates. Here, it is clearly evident that the preponderance of educational capital on the part of women (as well as men) reduces rather than increases the risk of marriage instability. The finding here that homogamous partnerships are not the most stable ones is inconsistent with the hypothesized stabilising function of (educational) partner homogamy and the results of some studies (Jalovaara, 2003; Kaplan & Herbst, 2015) but is consistent with the results of other studies (Boertien & Härkönen, 2018; Theunis et al., 2018). This contradiction is thus a promising subject for further exploration, as not only does it promise to dispel the public-discourse myth about the risk of educationally unequal marriages, it points to a new explanation that works with the importance of the sum of two partners' educational capital or the stabilising effect of the more educated partner's education. Explanations that operate with educational homogamy as a stabilising element and link the higher instability of heterogamous marriages also to the existence of a gender-traditionalist normative demand for a capital surplus on the male side need to be corrected to reflect the reversal of the gender education gap. This may be the way to go. Since the number of highly educated women is increasing faster than men, and since my analysis shows that the effect of heterogamy is symmetric and does not differ substantially by gender, I conclude that, at least for the Czech Republic, the appropriate explanation will lie in a function of the cumulation of educational capital and the spillover of associated cultural capital within the partnership. Another mechanism may have to do with labour market position and the fact that if at least one of the partners can benefit from employment positions that are opened up by higher education, this benefits the family budget and offers wider possibilities for reconciling family and paid work.

It should be added that a retrospective longitudinal approach that uses high-quality data to track completed divorces helps to correct and flesh out interpretations based on total divorce rates, which are often presented in the media without reference to the fact that they are hypothetical measures premised on the assumed persistence of behaviour patterns from previous generations to future ones.

The fact that the marriages of less educated people face a higher risk of partnership instability fits into the mosaic of other findings that point to strong educational differentiation in family behaviour. Knowledge of the negative educational gradient of divorce is essential for examining many aspects of divorce: the economic consequences of divorce are amplified by low status, the chances of shared parenting after divorce are lower for the less educated. (McLanahan, 2004) This necessitates the use of an intersectional approach to understand partnership instability, as cumulative disadvantages lead to diverse consequences. Children of lower-educated parents consequently have a higher risk of parental separation but also a lower chance of being cared for by both parents after the partnership breaks up.

These forms of transmission of inequality from the public to the private sphere deserve particular attention, as they carry with them the potential to impact intergenerational reproduction. Thus, in addition to the mechanisms of educational reproduction itself, there is an increased risk of socialisation in family forms, which lead to the cumulation of disadvantage.

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## **Data availability statement**

This study used anonymised database of marriage and divorce records, which was obtained from the Czech Statistical Office on condition of confidentiality. The same data structure can be requested at: [https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/information\\_services\\_at\\_headquarters\\_of\\_the\\_czso](https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/information_services_at_headquarters_of_the_czso)

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# Information in German

## Deutscher Titel

Der Bildungsgradient von Scheidung in der Tschechischen Republik während des späten post-sozialistischen Wandels

## Zusammenfassung

**Fragestellung:** Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, den Bildungsgradienten und die Rolle der Bildungshomogamie in Scheidungen in der Tschechischen Republik zu beschreiben.

**Hintergrund:** Die Tschechische Republik durchlief einen sozialen Wandel in den 1990ern, was eine signifikante Änderung in vielen demographischen Trends zur Folge hatte. Im Gegensatz dazu scheinen die Scheidungstrends weniger beeinflusst zu sein. Mein Ziel ist es, die Entwicklungen in den Mustern des Bildungsgradienten von Scheidungen während der späten Phase des post-kommunistischen Wandels zu beschreiben.

**Methode:** Registerdaten über Eheschließungen in den Jahren 1995, 2000, und 2005 wurden mit Scheidungsregisterdaten bis einschließlich 2020 ergänzt. Die Daten enthalten Informationen zur Dauer der Ehe, Bildung, Alter und Familienstatus beider Partner zum Zeitpunkt der Ehe. Die Kaplan-Meier-Kurve und die Cox-Regression wurden für die Analyse genutzt.

**Ergebnisse:** Das Risiko einer Scheidung ist erheblich höher für weniger gebildete Menschen und das zeigt sich in allen drei Ehekohorten. Homogame Ehen sind nicht die stabilsten. Aus der Perspektive eines Individuums, sind die Ehen mit einem höher gebildeteren Partner am stabilsten.

**Schlussfolgerung:** Diese Analyse bestätigte die Stabilität der negativen Bildungsgradienten von Ehen, die geschlossen wurden, während der späten Phase des post-kommunistischen Wandels in der Tschechischen Republik. Dies entkräftet die Ansicht, dass die höhere relative Bildung von der Frau oder des Mannes in der Beziehung, die Partnerschaft destabilisiert.

**Schlagwörter:** Scheidungsrisiko, Bildung, Bildungsgradient von Scheidungen, post-kommunistische Länder

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Petr Fučík: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5763-8748>



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